In their self-understanding, expert committees solely draw on scientific knowledge to provide policy advice. However, we try to show, first, on the basis of material related to the German Radiation Protection Commission that much of their work consists in active model building. Second, expert advice is judged by criteria that diverge from standards used for judging epistemic research. In particular, the commitment to generality or universality is replaced by the criterion of specificity, and the value of precision gives way (...) to epistemic robustness. Third, non-epistemic considerations are included in the reasoning—albeit hesitantly. Manageability and social robustness, understood as compatibility with widespread value attitudes in society, affect the content of the recommendations. (shrink)

A common objection to a pragmatist perspective on scientific expertise is that, while there is a well-known pragmatist theory of inquiry, which was formulated first by Peirce, then refined by Dewey and others, this theory cannot provide a clear-cut account of scientific expertise. In this paper, after addressing this objection in the second section, I claim that, on the contrary, pragmatism offers robust tools to think scientific expertise. In Sections 3 to 7, I present (...) five important insights that one can derive from a pragmatist epistemology when responding to contemporary problems posed by expertise: about science and scientific expertise in a legal context (sections 3 and 4), about collective expertise (sections 5 and 6), and even about expertise on ignorance (section 7). (shrink)

In 1902, the Calabrian brigand Giuseppe Musolino was tried on several counts of murder and many crimes of lesser magnitude. While the tale of the brigand’s 1898 false conviction, imprisonment, escape and then revenge sparked a national debate about the political and cultural meaning of brigandage, the trial came to focus on Musolino’s emotional state at the time of his crimes. Was he a cold-blooded and calculating killer who manipulated southerners into believing he was a folk hero? Or was he (...) an angry, passionate and insane murderer victimized by his own feelings? Both jurists and scientists weighed in to determine his culpability. By turning a political question of banditry or brigandage into a psychological question of morbid or criminal emotions, the trial politicized the criminal character. This article examines the perspectives on emotions that shaped Musolino’s trial, and how psychiatric knowledge came to challenge legal notions of insanity and culpability. It argues that the determination of emotions as motives served to de-legitimize the rationale and political motives of the defendant, in turn politicizing his emotions and character. At the same time, the cause of Musolino’s crime and his culpability represented the failures of national unification and the ongoing tensions between the North and South of Italy. The introduction of psychiatric expertise into the criminal court pushed judgement and punishment to examine increasingly who a person was as opposed to what that person had done. The court’s definition of who a person ‘was’, was a matter of how that person felt. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Scientific Expertise, Service Users and Democratising Psychiatric ResearchThe author reports no conflict of interests.Friesen outlines six different reasons for democratizing scientific research. Three of them are epistemic and three are ethical. In this commentary I consider how service users might relate to values if significant levels of scientific knowledge are required to understand those values. I specifically consider the traditional theoretical virtues discussed by philosophers (...) of science (Psillos, 1999; Solomon, 2001) whereby we might judge scientific concepts based upon their simplicity, consistency or coverage. This raises questions of how democratic approaches should function when expertise is important.There is a general problem of how democratic institutes should function when members lack understanding. For example, most voters in current European democracies have limited understanding of economics. They may understand some broad principles but would not understand how to actually manage an economy on a daily basis. A simple solution to this is that political parties outline a broad framework and then are given consent to run the economy once elected. Our elected representatives or members of an unelected bureaucracy actually then make the "on the ground" decisions about how to run the economy given the broad framework which the political party was voted in on. This hopefully then means that, with varying degrees of success, people who have some understanding of economies are playing a key role. We can certainly ask important questions about this system, such as what level of economic understanding do citizens have and what level they need, who should constitute the unelected bureaucracy and whether the bureaucracy could actually be elected. My simple point is that this is one approach to limiting the decision-making of people who may lack economic expertise. In relation to democratizing psychiatric research, I consider whether Friesen's approach might mean service users require a level of expertise that they typically lack.Friesen outlines how there is a very high level of value decision involved in psychiatry given the gap between data and theories. Friesen thinks service users should be included in decisions over what values to use. I now provide an example of where making good value decisions might require [End Page 135] significant levels of scientific knowledge. I consider a specific type of value applied to a specific area. There has been recent discussion of service users being involved in decision-making over modifying psychiatric diagnoses, whereby they might play a role in deciding what psychiatric diagnoses there are and what their diagnostic criteria should be (Bueter, 2019; Fellowes, 2023; Tekin, 2022). I consider how we can assess psychiatric diagnoses using theoretical virtues. It should be emphasized that this problem may or may not have applicability to other areas of service user involvement, that theoretical virtues are not the only values which are important for assessing psychiatric diagnoses and that scientists might themselves make bad decisions in relation to theoretical virtues. I now outline five theoretical virtues.First, simplicity. There are lots of different ways to understand simplicity but here I consider how simple a system of psychiatric diagnoses (i.e., the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders [DSM]) is. We can ask if the system of psychiatric diagnoses is too simple because it contains too few diagnoses or too complicated because it contains too many diagnoses. Simplicity and complexity might also depend on the degree different diagnoses have overlapping symptoms. We can judge a particular psychiatric diagnosis on the degree it adds to simplicity or complexity. Establishing the strength of this theoretical virtue requires knowledge of many different psychiatric diagnoses.Second, coverage. This relates to the degree that all the phenomena that we desire covered are being covered. We can ask whether a system of psychiatric diagnoses is or is not covering all the symptoms that we think need covering by psychiatry. We can judge particular diagnoses on how they contribute to coverage. Assessing this requires knowledge of a vast range of symptoms.Third, embedded within a theoretical network. Scientific concepts can be connected to other scientific concepts. A diagnosis can be judged on the degree it connects to other well-established areas of science, whereby the diagnosis might have been formulated based upon being... (shrink)

Modern societies depend on a growing production of scientific knowledge, which is based on the functional differentiation of science into still more specialised scientific disciplines and subdisciplines. This is the basis for the paradox of scientific expertise: The growth of science leads to a fragmentation of scientific expertise. To resolve this paradox, the present paper investigates three hypotheses: 1) All scientific knowledge is perspectival. 2) The perspectival structure of science leads to specific forms (...) of knowledge asymmetries. 3) Such perspectival knowledge asymmetries must be handled through second order perspectives. We substantiate these hypotheses on the basis of a perspectivist philosophy of science grounded in Peircean semiotics and autopoietic systems theory. Perspectival knowledge asymmetries are an unavoidable and necessary part of the growth of scientific knowledge, and more awareness of this fact can help avoid blind and futile struggles between scientific perspectives, and direct efforts toward more appropriate ways of handling these fundamental knowledge asymmetries. Concretely, we show how different kinds of scientific knowledge, expertise, disagreement and learning can be correlated to the perspectival structure of science, and propose how polyocular communication based on observations of the observations made by specialised perspectives can be used to handle such perspectival knowledge asymmetries. This can help overcome the observed problems in carrying out cross-disciplinary research and in the collective use of different kinds of scientific expertise, and thereby make society better able to solve complex, real-world problems. (shrink)

Etymologically, pseudoscience means false science. The term is often explained as referring to claims or teachings that are presented as scientific but are in fact not scientific. Any understanding of the notion of pseudoscience must therefore build on both an understanding of what science is and a clarification of what forms of errors or misrepresentations make a statement pseudoscientific instead of scientific.

The article explores epistemic and social conditions of the trustworthiness of scientific expertise. I claim that there are three kinds of conditions for the trustworthiness of scientific expertise. The first condition is epistemic and means that scientific knowledge enjoys high credibility. The second condition concerns the significance of scientific knowledge. It means that scientific generalizations are relevant for elucidating the particular cases that constitute the challenges for expert judgment. The third condition concerns the (...) social processes involved in producing science-based recommendations. In this context trust is created by social robustness, expert legitimacy, and social participation. (shrink)

When scientists are asked to give expert advice on risk-related questions, such as the authorization of medical drugs, deliberation often does not eliminate all disagreements. I propose to model these remaining discrepancies as differences in risk assessments and/or in risk acceptability thresholds. The normative question I consider, then, is how the individual expert views should best be aggregated. I discuss what “best” could mean, with an eye to some robustness considerations. I argue that the majority rule, which is currently often (...) used in expert panels, has significant drawbacks. (shrink)

Scientists are often asked to advise political institutions on pressing risk-related questions, like climate change or the authorization of medical drugs. Given that deliberation will often not eliminate all disagreements between scientists, how should their risk assessments be aggregated? I argue that this problem is distinct from two familiar and well-studied problems in the literature: judgment aggregation and probability aggregation. I introduce a novel decision-theoretic model where risk assessments are compared with acceptability thresholds. Majority voting is then defended by means (...) of robustness considerations. (shrink)

The “expertise defense” is the claim that philosophers have special expertise that allows them to resist the biases suggested by the findings of experimental philosophers. Typically, this defense is backed up by an analogy with expertise in science or other academic fields. Recently, however, studies have begun to suggest that philosophers' intuitions may be just as subject to inappropriate variation as those of the folk. Should we conclude that the expertise defense has been debunked? I'll argue (...) that the analogy with science still motivates a default assumption of philosophical expertise; however, the expertise so motivated is not expertise in intuition, and its existence would not suffice to answer the experimentalist challenge. I'll also suggest that there are deep parallels between the current methodological crisis in philosophy and the decline of introspection-based methods in psychology in the early twentieth century. The comparison can give us insight into the possible future evolution of philosoph.. (shrink)

This essay compares two philosophical proposals concerning the relation between values and science, both of which reject the value-free ideal but nevertheless place restrictions on how values and science should interact. The first of these proposals relies on a distinction between the direct and indirect roles of values, while the second emphasizes instead a distinction between epistemic and nonepistemic values. We consider these two proposals in connection with a case study of disputed research on the topic of environmental justice and (...) argue that the second proposal has several advantages over the first. (shrink)

In the United States, lay-adults with a range of educational backgrounds often conceptualize species change within a non-Darwinian adaptationist framework, or reject such ideas altogether, opting instead for creationist accounts in which species are viewed as immutable. In this study, such findings were investigated further by examining the relationship between religious belief, scientific expertise, and ecological reasoning in 132 college-educated adults from 6 religious backgrounds in a Midwestern city. Fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist religious beliefs were differentially related to concepts (...) of evolution, adaptation, and extinction. Biological expertise and creationism were significantly and differentially related to the endorsement of the Darwinian concept of common descent. Yet, creationists were more likely to reject macroevolutionary than microevolutionary concepts. Overall, the greater the taxonomic distance between species, the less likely were participants to agree that species-pairs had common ancestors. It is argued that lay adults from contemporary industrialized societies adopt a view of evolution in which species adapt to novel environments, but remain the same "kind" despite changes. Therefore, extinction is considered unlikely and the relations between micro- and macroevolution misconstrued. Lay-adults' species concepts appear to be an amalgam of a common-sense understanding of species and of evolutionary ideas, modified but not transformed by religious and scientific beliefs. Finally, it is argued that the development of scientific expertise does not involve the radical transformation of ingrained worldviews. Rather, scientists select specializations that are compatible with their existing philosophies, then consciously apply the constructs of their disciplines in order to transcend their common-sense folk beliefs. (shrink)

This paper investigates the value of trust and the proper attitude lay people ought to have towards scientific experts. Trust in expertise is usually considered to be valuable, while distrust is often analyzed in cases where it is harmful. I will draw on accounts from political philosophy and argue that it is not only public trust that is valuable when it comes to scientific expertise – but also public vigilance. Expertise may be distorted in different (...) ways, which cannot be remedied by internal control mechanisms alone. This reveals the importance of some forms of democratic oversight. The proper attitude is vigilant trust in expertise. However, vigilant trust seems to be a contradictory notion: How can one be trusting and watchful at the same time? I will show that it is not, and that trust and vigilance can be compatible to a certain extent. I will do so by distinguishing between different levels of both trust and vigilance. Interestingly, this argument requires acknowledging the value of some forms of distrust in scientific expertise, even if that distrust targets trustworthy experts. (shrink)

An expert is commonly considered to be somebody who possesses the right kind of knowledge and skills to find out true answers for questions in a domain. However, this common conception that focuses only on an individual’s knowledge and skills is not very useful to understand the epistemically interdependent nature of contemporary scientific expertise, which becomes increasingly more relevant due to the rise of large interdisciplinary research collaborations. The typical scientific expert today relies substantially on complex (...) class='Hi'>scientific instruments and numerous other experts in forming expert judgment. Moreover, we have research collaborations where multiple scientists interact in a way that gives rise to distributed cognitive systems, which can act as a single informant. Accordingly, our concept of scientific expertise should not consist only in individual knowledge and skills, but also accommodate epistemic dependence and collective knowledge production. To this aim, this paper proposes a reconstruction of the concept of scientific expertise as informant reliability by building on the virtue-epistemological account of epistemic competences and theories of extended and distributed cognition. Considered in reference to the social epistemic function of expertise, a scientific expert should be conceived as a reliable informant in a scientific domain, which implies that when consulted on matters in that domain they assert competently, honestly, and completely. Competent expert assertion involves the epistemic responsibility to draw on nothing but the highest degree of epistemic competence relevant to the given context. Thus, being a reliable informant may require one to draw on an extended epistemic competence that goes beyond one’s individual competence, or to form supra-individual or group-informants that manifest collectively the kind of complex epistemic competence required for the investigation of certain research questions. (shrink)

In this article we develop a pragmatist-inspired notion of intelligence that should lead to a better understanding of the notion of scientific expertise. The notion of intelligence is drawn from Dewey and is therefore used here in its technical sense. Our thesis is that scientific knowledge is a necessary but not sufficient condition for scientific expertise; intelligence should also be added. Conceived of as the capacity to apply general knowledge to particulars, we reach the conclusion (...) that intelligence is a necessary requirement for scientific experts in the wake of Dewey’s logic of inquiry. In particular, we argue that an all-important task that scientific experts are asked to accomplish, and which puts their expertise to the test, is to transform indeterminate situations into problematic situations, and that such a goal can only be achieved if scientific experts succeed in paying attention to all the contingent and precarious aspects that make the situation they face unique. (shrink)

Realizing the ideal of democracy requires political inclusion for citizens. A legitimate democracy must give citizens the opportunity to express their attitudes about the relative attractions of different policies, and access to political mechanisms through which they can be counted and heard. Actual governance often aims not at accurate belief, but at nonepistemic factors like achieving and maintaining institutional stability, creating the feeling of government legitimacy among citizens, or managing access to influence on policy decision-making. I examine the traditional relationship (...) between inclusiveness and accuracy, and illustrate this connection by discussing empirical work on how group decision-making can improve accuracy. I also advance a Generic Epistemic Principle that any evidence-based decision-making procedures must embrace. Focusing on policy-making, I then measure the distance between these standards and the ones actually implemented in U.S. political settings. Psychological research on individual and group decision-making is a source of normative assessment for existing policy judgment, but it neither rationalizes nor legitimates the actual and typical processes used in U.S. institutions of political decision making. To establish this point, I focus on one characteristic government institution—the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science, Space, and Technology—that displays deliberative processes at odds with the sciences they advocate, and with the Generic Epistemic Principle. I explain this discouraging condition in terms of several inveterate factors in U.S. politics: a limitlessly money-driven and endless campaigning process that effectively forces elected representatives to align themselves with money and vote strategically, the use of procedural arrangements known to make people feel politically included when they are not, and the unresponsiveness of a majoritarian (vs. consensus) democracy. (shrink)

Motivated by the work of Hardwig (1985, 1991) on epistemic dependence and trust in expertise, we enquire into the nature and extent of the critical assessment that non-scientists can make—and that they should be taught to make—with regard to science. Our thesis is that critical assessment of science is possible for non-experts because at the basis of science is a set of norms, beliefs and values that are contestable by non-scientists. These norms, beliefs and values are of critical importance (...) to science education and valuable to explore from a pedagogical perspective. (shrink)

Resumen: Este artículo busca observar las diferencias entre el modelo sistémico funcional y el modelo pragmático-formal en su comprensión de la experticia científica y su rol en las sociedades modernas. Se elaborará un breve diagnóstico acerca de la importancia de la confianza en experticia científica en la sociedad contemporánea y cómo este proceso ha sido analizado. Luego, se analizará la descripción del conocimiento científico en la sociedad contemporánea desde el modelo sistémico funcional. Utilizando los conceptos de diferenciación funcional y acoplamiento (...) estructural, se sugerirá que, desde este modelo, el conocimiento científico es una forma de comunicación especializada propia de un sistema funcional de la sociedad. A continuación, se describirá la aproximación del modelo pragmático formal. Especial importancia tienen aquí las ideas de mundo de la vida y esfera pública. Sobre la base de estas caracterizaciones, se comparan las visiones de estos autores y se analizan las diferencias en su conceptualización de la experticia. Se argumenta que las diferencias de estos dos modelos en relación con el estatus ontológico del mundo de la vida marcan sus visiones de la experticia y los debates actuales acerca de sus posibilidades de convertibilidad en la literatura especializada. El artículo finaliza con un resumen y posibles líneas futuras de investigación.: This article seeks to observe the differences between the functional-systemic model and the pragmatic-formal model in their understanding of scientific expertise and its role in modern societies. First, a brief diagnosis about the importance of trust in scientific expertise in contemporary society and how this process has been analyzed in the specialized literature will be made. Then, the description of scientific knowledge will be analyzed from the point of view of the functional systemic model. Using the concepts of functional differentiation and structural coupling, it will be argued that scientific knowledge is here considered a specialized form of communication characteristic of a functional system. Next, the approximation of the formal-pragmatic model is described. Of special importance here are the ideas of lifeworld and public sphere. On the basis of these characterizations, the visions of these authors are compared and the differences are analyzed in relation to their conceptualization of expertise. It is then suggested that the differences between these two models in relation to the ontological status of the lifeworld shape their views of scientific expertise as well as current debates on this topic. The article ends with a summary and possible future line of research. (shrink)

Given the complexity of most phenomena, we have to delegate much epistemic work to other knowers and we must find reasons for relying on these specific knowers and not others. In our societies, these other knowers are often called experts and we rely on their epistemic authority more and more. For many complex phenomena such as climate change, genetically modified crops, and immunization, the experts that are called upon are scientific experts. For that reason, finding good reasons and justification (...) for deferring to their knowledge is of paramount societal importance. As we shall see, many have analyzed this epistemic dependence on scientific experts and have tried to show in what contexts are there good... (shrink)

This article examines a frequent assumption of sociological accounts of knowledge: the idea that knowledge acts. The performativity of knowledge claims is here analysed through the prism of ‘sociological excuses’: the idea that sociological explanations can act as ‘excuses’ for otherwise unacceptable behaviour. The article builds on Austin’s distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary effects to discuss the relationship between sociological explanation, sociological justification and sociological critique. It argues that understanding how (and if) sociological explanations can act requires paying attention to (...) social and political conditions of performativity and their transformation in late liberalism. (shrink)

In this paper I criticize the current standards for the acceptability of expert testimony in current US legislation. The standards have been the subject of much academic literature after the Frye and Daubert cases. I expose what I call the Paradox of Proof, and argue that the historical and current standards have sidestepped the problem of determining who is an expert and who is not in a court of law. I then investigate the problem of recognizing expertise from the (...) layperson’s standpoint, and suggest what courses of action the future research ought to take on the problem of identifying expertise. (shrink)

‘Scientific advice to politics’, the ‘nature of expertise’, and the ‘relation between experts, policy makers, and the public’ are variations of a topic that currently attracts the attention of social scientists, philosophers of science as well as practitioners in the public sphere and the media. This renewed interest in a persistent theme is initiated by the call for a democratization of expertise that has become the order of the day in the legitimation of research funding. The new (...) significance of ‘participation’ and ‘accountability’ has motivated scholars to take a new look at the science – politics interface and to probe questions such as "What is new in the arrangement of scientific expertise and political decision-making?", "How can reliable knowledge be made useful for politics and society at large, and how can epistemically and ethically sound decisions be achieved without losing democratic legitimacy?", "How can the objective of democratization of expertise be achieved without compromising the quality and reliability of knowledge?" Scientific knowledge and the ‘experts’ that represent it no longer command the unquestioned authority and public trust that was once bestowed upon them, and yet, policy makers are more dependent on them than ever before. This collection of essays explores the relations between science and politics with the instruments of the social studies of science, thereby providing new insights into their re-alignment under a new régime of governance. (shrink)

ABSTRACTTaking some controversial claims philosopher Jason Brennan makes in his book Against Democracy as a starting point, this paper argues in favour of two theses: There is No Such Thing as Superior Political Judgement; There Is No Such Thing as Uncontroversial Social Scientific Knowledge. I conclude that social science experts need to be kept in check, not given more power.

The problem of the role of experts in society may seem to be a topic marginal to the main concerns of sociology, but it is in fact deeply rooted in the sociological project itself. Sociologists and social thinkers have long been concerned with the problem of the role of knowledge in society. Certain Enlightenment thinkers, notably Turgot and Condorcet, believed that social progress depended on the advance of knowledge and the wider dispersion of knowledge in society. But Condorcet especially recognized (...) that this idea had complex political implications. On the one hand, it required science, which for him included social science, to be supported by the state, yet retain independence or self‐governance in order to advance without political interference. On the other hand, he recognized that social advance required that the most enlightened be the rulers, and that this conflicted with the ideas of democracy and equality. (shrink)

This paper takes an embodied and extended cognition perspective to ER integration – a cognitive process through which a learner integrates external representations (ERs) in a domain, with her internal (mental) model, as she interacts with, uses, understands and transforms between those ERs. In the paper, I argue for a theoretical as well as empirical shift in future investigations of ER integration, by proposing a model of cognitive mechanisms underlying the process, based on recent advances in extended and embodied cognition. (...) I present this new model in contrast to the still dominant classical cognitivist (information processing) approaches to ER integration, and the educational technology intervention designs such approaches inspire. I then exemplify this distinction between the information processing model and the new model through a case of arithmetic problem solving. Corroborative neuroscience evidence presented in relation to this case provides empirical support for the new model by showing how bodily actions (sensorimotor mechanisms) are critical to ER integration and learning. Finally, as educational implications of the new model, I demonstrate the need for: (i) re-viewing the development of ER integration and expertise as fine-tuning of the learner's action or sensorimotor system, and (ii) a shift of focus in new-media intervention design principles based on this newer understanding of ER integration in science, technology, engineering and mathematics. (shrink)

The policy decision to recommend the vaccination of children against COVID was a controversial one - a controversy that Guibilini and colleagues characterize as stemming from expert disagreement. I argue that scientific dissent was not the primary issue here - rather, this is a problem of a persistent ambiguity concerning what standard needs to be met for the vaccination of children to be justified - which potential benefits should we take into account, and for whom? I trace the decision-making (...) process in both the UK and the US to draw this out, and then consider some of the key ethical questions we need to consider when adopting a standard of justification. (shrink)

When the utility of masks or vaccinations became politicized during the COVID-19 pandemic and lost its mooring in scientific evidence, an already-developing crisis of expertise was exacerbated. Those who believe in consensus science wondered: “How can ‘those people’ not see the truth?” With a foreword by Harry Collins, this book shows that the crisis is not a scientific controversy, but an ideological dispute with believers on both sides. If the advocates for consensus science acknowledge the uncertainties involved, (...) rather than insisting on cold, hard facts, it is possible to open a pathway towards interaction and communication, even persuasion, between world views. As the crisis of expertise continues to be a global issue, this will be an invaluable resource for readers concerned about polarized societies and the distrust of consensus science. (shrink)

Modern dialogue of society and science proceeds in the conditions of social media distribution and the convergence of scientific knowledge. This processes change system of mass information and communication channels between scientific actors, leaders of public opinion and organizers of public initiatives. The conflict between an elite normativity of a scientific discourse and an egalitarian normativity of a public discourse takes the new forms. Authors show how in large quantities extending practice of civil expertise, based on (...) civil journalism (a blogosphere and social networks), interrupt into procedures of scientific examination. Active inclusion of civil experts became an attribute of transdisciplinary science. The main feature of this type of science is operational decision making in the conditions of uncertainty. However transition of transdisciplinary science to a phase of the technoscience defines convergence borders of the formal and informal knowledge. Technoscience takes root into the vital world as a magic “black box” for the inhabitant. Authors believe that the transdialogue formed by transdisciplinary scientific experts and deprofessionalized leaders of civil journalism is complicated by deficiency of epistemological competence of civil experts. One of the problem is inclusion the electronic media practices in production and the social circulation of scientific knowledge. Using rather known, but not yet entered in the field of philosophical scientific research examples of direct influence of civil experts on processes which in a former communication order were intra scientific, authors realised a research of the new aspects of modern science expanding a traditional subject of philosophy of science and technology. (shrink)

Previous research on scientific reasoning has shown that it involves a diverse set of skills. Yet, little is known about generality or domain specificity of those skills, an important issue in theories of expertise and in attempts to automate scientific reasoning skills. We present a study designed to test what kinds of skills psychologists actually use in designing and interpreting experiments and contrast expertise within a particular research area with general expertise at designing and interpreting (...) experiments. The results suggest that psychologists use many domain‐general skills in their experimentation and that bright and motivated Carnegie Mellon undergraduates are missing many of these skills. We believe that these results have important implications for psychological and artificial intelligence models of expertise, as well as educational implications in the domain of science instruction. (shrink)

The weaponizing of scientific expertise to oppose regulation has been extensively studied. However, the relevant studies, belonging to the emerging discipline of agnotology, remain focused on the analysis of empirical corruption: of misinformation, doubt mongering, and other practices that cynically deploy expertise to render audiences ignorant of empirical facts. This paper explores the wrongful deployment of expertise beyond empirical corruption. To do so, I develop a broader framework of morally subversive expertise, building on recent work (...) in political philosophy (Howard, 2016). Expertise is subversive if it sets up its audience to fail morally, either intentionally or negligently. I distinguish three modes of subversive expertise: empirical subversion (the focus of agnotology), normative subversion and motivational subversion. Drawing on these distinctions, I offer a revisionary account of the Trump Administration’s regulatory science as a case study. I show that the Trump Administration’s use of expertise to dismantle climate regulation, contra the standard charge, cannot be explained using the resources of agnotology alone: the Administration produced highly reliable climate assessments, detailing the risks of climate change, candidly admitting the harms of its proposed policies, and still successfully deployed these findings to justify massive climate deregulation. The lesson of the analysis is that dismissing the expertise that underpins climate deregulation as empirically corrupt ‘anti-science’ both obscures its actual role in the politics of climate change and understates its wrongfulness: it misses the breadth of the assault on moral agency that sustains climate injustice. (shrink)

Whilst the notion of bioethical expertise might raise a host of questions concerning moral authority it is nevertheless the case that bioethicists continue to advance well thought out, detailed and comprehensive arguments concerning the ethical implications of the biosciences and healthcare. Not to make use of such work or those who produce it when it comes to the work of government and the development of policies would seem misguided at best. Thus, in the light of existing analysis of (...) class='Hi'>scientific expertise and its proper contribution to democratic political processes, this essay explores the role expert bioethicists might legitimately play in the production of policy and broader public moral debates. However, given that ethics can shade into politics and, furthermore, does so in a way that is not the case for science and politics, the ethico-political limitations that constrains and constructs the exercise of bioethical expertise is examined. Particular attention is paid to the implications of this view when it comes to bioethical research predicated on religious perspectives in the context of public reason, the validity of which has recently been called into question. We conclude with the suggestion that, if they are to act as experts in political contexts, bioethicists cannot simply make expert contributions to policymaking processes, they should also acknowledge they are responsible for shaping the broader public moral discourses about science and medicine. (shrink)

Civil activism in the field of science is one of the most crucial issues and the key factor of autonomy of science. Herewith, the position of universities and other scientific institutions is vulnerable and hinges upon state and private financing. Science finds itself between two unattractive and doubtful prospects of developing in either bureaucratic or corporate (in the business sense) way, which leads to the abridgement of basic academic freedoms. Setting the problem of professional expertise and mediation is (...) highly important for the definition of borders and consolidation of the position of science. (shrink)

In this paper I will introduce a practical explication for the notion of expertise. At first, I motivate this attempt by taking a look on recent debates which display great disagreement about whether and how to define expertise in the first place. After that I will introduce the methodology of practical explications in the spirit of Edward Craig’s Knowledge and the state of nature along with some conditions of adequacy taken from ordinary and scientific language. This eventually (...) culminates in the respective explication of expertise according to which this term essentially refers to a certain kind of service-relation. This is why expertise should be considered as a predominantly social kind. This article will end up with a discussion of advantages and prima facie plausible objections against my account of expertise. (shrink)

Philosophers of science are increasingly arguing for and addressing the need to do work that is socially and scientifically engaged. However, we currently lack well-developed frameworks for thinking about how we should engage other expert communities and what the epistemic benefits are of doing so. In this paper, I draw on Collins and Evans' concept of ‘interactional expertise’ – the ability to speak the language of a discipline in the absence of an ability to practice – to consider the (...) epistemic benefits that can arise when philosophers engage scientific communities. As Collins and Evans argue, becoming an interactional expert requires that one ‘hang out’ with members of the relevant expert community in order to learn crucial tacit knowledge needed to speak the language. Building on this work, I argue that acquiring interactional expertise not only leads to linguistic fluency, but it also confers several ‘socio-epistemic’ benefits such as the opportunity to cultivate trust with scientific communities. These benefits can improve philosophical work and facilitate the broader uptake of philosophers' ideas, enabling philosophers to meet a variety of epistemic goals. As a result, having at least some philosophers of science acquire interactional expertise via engagement will likely enhance the diversity of epistemic capacities for philosophy of science as a whole. For some philosophers of science, moreover, the socio-epistemic benefits identified here may be more important than the ability to speak the language of a discipline, suggesting the need for a broader analysis of interactional expertise, which this paper also advances. (shrink)

La question des relations entre expertise scientifique, société et politique est fondamentalement communicationnelle. Souvent présenté comme univoque et incontestable, l’avis des experts ne fait pas taire les controverses. Il est élaboré dans le cadre de relations toujours incertaines, mobilisant les multiples parties prenantes de l’objet de l’expertise dans une situation sociale. Les connaissances qui en résultent constituent, quelque part, des récits qui relèvent de multiples interprétations et recadrages traduisant des logiques d’action hétérogènes, des intérêts économiques et politiques contradictoires, (...) des tensions et des conflits. Ce mouvement s’opère en lien étroit avec les médias et réseaux, au travers desquels les résultats de l’expertise sont diffusés, et de plus en plus souvent discutés.The question of relationships between scientific expertise, society and politics fundamentally revolves around communication. Though often presented as unequivocal and indisputable, expert scientific opinions do not put an end to controversy. They are developed in the context of relationships that are always uncertain, involve many different stakeholders with an interest in the object of the controversy and exist in a social situation. The resulting knowledge shapes narratives that can be interpreted and framed in many different ways, each reflecting different reasons for action, conflicting economic and political interests, tensions or disputes. This process takes place in close conjunction with the activities of the media and networks, through which expert conclusions are broadcast and increasingly debated. (shrink)

A 2 × 2 experiment was conducted to compare the effectiveness of using diagrams to writing summaries for students given biological information to learn and who possessed different levels of expertise in that topic area. A main effect of learning strategy used on number of idea units encoded was found: drawing diagrams was superior to writing summaries. However, no interaction effect between learning strategies and expertise was found. An examination of students’ subjective ratings of cognitive load revealed that (...) those with low expertise reported higher levels of cognitive load when constructing diagrams. These findings suggest that using diagrams is effective for identifying and encoding important information when learning, but that it would be helpful to provide guidance about diagram use particularly to students who are novices in the topic area to reduce cognitive load. (shrink)

The combination of government’s significant involvement in science, science’s significant effects on the public, and public ignorance raise important challenges for reconciling scientific expertise with democratic governance. Nevertheless, there have recently been a variety of encouraging efforts to make scientific activity more responsive to social values and to develop citizens’ capacity to engage in more effective democratic governance of science. This essay introduces a special issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal on “Science, Expertise, and (...) Democracy,” consisting of five papers that developed from the inaugural Three Rivers Philosophy conference held at the University of South Carolina in April 2011. The pieces range from a general analysis of the in-principle compatibility of scientific expertise and democracy to much more concrete studies of the intersection between scientific practices and democratic values in areas such as weight-of-evidence analysis, climate science, and studies of locally undesirable land uses. (shrink)

Between formal propositional knowledge and embodied skill lies ‘interactional expertise’—the ability to converse expertly about a practical skill or expertise, but without being able to practice it, learned through linguistic socialisation among the practitioners. Interactional expertise is exhibited by sociologists of scientific knowledge, by scientists themselves and by a large range of other actors. Attention is drawn to the distinction between the social and the individual embodiment theses: a language does depend on the form of the (...) bodies of its members but an individual within that community can learn the language without the body. The idea has significance for our understanding of colour-blindness, deafness and other abilities and disabilities. They say that love's a word. (shrink)

Contrary to widespread assumptions, post-truth politicians formally adopt a rhetoric of ‘truth’ but turn it against established experts. To explain one central factor behind this destructive strategy and its success with voters, I consider Walter Lippmann and Friedrich Hayek, who from 1922 onwards helped develop and popularize a political rhetoric of ‘truth’ in terms of scientific expertise. In Hayek’s influential version, market economics became the crucial expert field. Consequently, the 2008 financial crisis impacted attitudes towards experts more generally. (...) But even sweeping rejection of experts continues to use the rhetoric, by now dominant, of expert truth. Paradoxically, this bipartisan language fuels division as opponents accuse each other of disregarding ‘truth itself’. Against the underlying metaphysics of context-free ‘facts’, John Dewey and Alfred Schutz recommend understanding truth as ‘presumptive’ knowledge produced within human practices, which can be robust but requires a readiness to engage in pluralistic and open-ended processes of (re-)contextualization. (shrink)