Hamkins’ multiverse view is a prominent position on the nature of set theory. It is posited against the universe view and proposed as a philosophical theory explaining current set-theoretic practice. This paper confronts the multiverse view with the results of an interview study investigating current set-theoretic practice. The study reveals a heterogeneity of set-theoretic research practices. The multiverse view is found to align well with pluralist research practices but not with absolutist practices. The generalisation claim (...) of the multiverse view fails because of this heterogeneity; only a reduced interpretation of the multiverse view might hold generally. Furthermore, Hamkins’ prediction that the community as a whole will not adopt axioms deciding the continuum hypothesis is found probably true, but for different reasons: although part of the community has already accepted axioms beyond ZFC, another part of the community will withdraw from doing so. In conclusion, I argue that Hamkins’ multiverse view is best interpreted as a valuable perspective on pluralist set-theoretic practices. (shrink)

Many believe mathematical truth is indisputable. However, the set-theoretic independence phenomenon challenges this idea. Certain statements about infinite sets, like the continuum hypothesis, are neither true nor false according to the standard axioms. While philosophers have offered various diagnoses of this problem, this book posits that the set-theoretic community is key to solving the issue, proposing a pragmatic approach. It presents the first extensive empirical study, featuring interviews with 28 set theorists from varied backgrounds. It explores the spectrum (...) of disagreement and agreement among practitioners, predicting whether the community will adopt new axioms. Overall, this book demonstrates the potential of empirical research for philosophical purposes, also contributing to debates in social epistemology. It addresses a complex problem, applies a novel sociological method, and reveals much about the inner workings of a scientific community in the foundations of mathematics. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to propose what seems to me a distinctive approach to set theoretic methodology. By ‘methodology’ I mean the study of the actual methods used by practitioners, the study of how these methods might be justified or reformed or extended. So, for example, when the intuitionist's philosophical analysis recommends a wholesale revision of the methods of proof used in classical mathematics, this is a piece of reformist methodology. In contrast with the intuitionist, I will (...) focus more narrowly on the methods of contemporary set theory, and, more importantly, I will certainly recommend no sweeping reforms. Rather, I begin from the assumption that the methodologist's job is to account for set theory as it is practiced, not as some philosophy would have it be. This credo lies at the very heart of the so-called ‘naturalism’ to be described here.A philosopher looking at set theoretic practice from the outside, so to speak, might notice any number of interesting methodological questions, beginning with the intuitionist's ‘why use classical logic?’, but this sort of question is not a live issue for most practicing set theorists. One central question on which the philosopher's and the practitioner's interests converge is this: what is the status of independent statements like the continuum hypothesis (CH)? A number of large questions arise in its wake: what criteria should guide the search for new axioms? For that matter, what reasons support our adoption of the old axioms? (shrink)

It is a common view among philosophers of science that theoretical virtues (also known as epistemic or cognitive values), such as simplicity and consistency, play an important role in scientific practice. In this article, I set out to study the role that theoretical virtues play in scientific practice empirically. I apply the methods of data science, such as text mining and corpus analysis, to study large corpora of scientific texts in order to uncover patterns of usage. These patterns (...) of usage, in turn, might shed some light on the role that theoretical virtues play in scientific practice. Overall, the results of this empirical study suggest that scientists invoke theoretical virtues explicitly, albeit rather infrequently, when they talk about models (less than 30%), theories (less than 20%), and hypotheses (less than 15%) in their published works. To the extent that they are mentioned in scientific publications, the results of this study suggest that accuracy, consistency, and simplicity are the theoretical virtues that scientists invoke more frequently than the other theoretical virtues tested in this study. Interestingly, however, depending on whether they talk about hypotheses, theories, or models, scientists may invoke one of those theoretical virtues more than the others. (shrink)

My ultimate goal in this paper is to illuminate, from a naturalistic point of view, the significance of the application of mathematics in the natural sciences for the practice of contemporary set theory.

Emmanuel Levinas sets up alterity as a fundamental ontological category, irreducible to being and nothingess. There are two difficulties in understanding this ontological alterity. On the one hand, Levinas formulates it with negative terms - infinition, abstraction, ab-solutenes, trace of a past that has never been present. On the other hand, Levinas invokes the notions of the superlative, the Good, and God. These notions are very difficult to separate from the notion of a redoubling of the positivity by which the (...) things of the world are posited in their own subsistent being. The quasi-concepts with which Levinas has thematized the alterity of the others who face us in an ontological sphere of infinition, absoluteness, and abstractness have determined negatively what he envisions as beyond negativity and positivity. They reduce the determinateness of the wants and needs of another, and reduce the otherness of one other from other others. In addition, the positivism with which Levinas eliminates the imperatives with which the elements summon us and the material imperatives with which the things put demands on us effaces the phenomenality of the other whose want and needs are inscribed on the susceptibility and vulnerability of his surfaces of skin. (shrink)

The status of independent statements is the main problem in the philosophy of set theory. We address this problem by presenting the perspective of a practising set theorist. We thus give an authentic insight in the current state of thinking in set-theoretic practice, which is to a large extent determined by independence results. During several meetings, the second author asked the first author about the development of forcing, the use of new axioms and set-theoretic intuition on independence. (...) Parts of these conversations are directly presented in this article. They are supplemented by important mathematical results as well as discussion sections. Finally, we present three hypotheses about set-theoretic practice: First, that most set theorists were surprised by the introduction of the forcing method. Second, that most set theorists think that forcing is a natural part of contemporary set theory. Third, that most set theorists prefer an answer to a problem with the help of a new axiom of lowest possible consistency strength, and that for most set theorists, a difference in consistency strength weighs much more than the difference between Forcing Axiom and Large Cardinal Axiom. (shrink)

This article discusses two coextensive concepts of logical consequence that are implicit in the two fundamental logical practices of establishing validity and invalidity for premise-conclusion arguments. The premises and conclusion of an argument have information content (they ?say? something), and they have subject matter (they are ?about? something). The asymmetry between establishing validity and establishing invalidity has long been noted: validity is established through an information-processing procedure exhibiting a step-by-step deduction of the conclusion from the premise-set. Invalidity is established by (...) exhibiting a countermodel satisfying the premises but not the conclusion. The process of establishing validity focuses on information content; the process of establishing invalidity focuses on subject matter. Corcoran's information-theoretic concept of logical consequence corresponds to the former. Tarski's model-theoretic concept of logical consequence formulated in his famous 1936 no-countermodels definition corresponds to the latter. Both are found to be indispensable for understanding the rationale of the deductive method and each complements the other. This study discusses the ontic question of the nature of logical consequence and the epistemic question of the human capabilities presupposed by practical applications of these two concepts as they make validity and invalidity accessible to human knowledge. (shrink)

Protecting consumers' rights set higher standards on the rights of security compared with other participants of civil turnover, so the concept of consumer acquires not only theoretical but also practical significance. Definition of consumer must be sufficiently clear and precise as the proper subject of classification depends on what rules will apply to legal relationships arising. To this purpose, the concept of consumer is formulated as the concept of both the European Union and national legislation. Both presented the concept of (...) consumer that is defined in accordance with the formal characteristics and prejudices that individuals are the weaker party without the actual value of that person experiences and knowledge and so on. (shrink)

Leading philosophical accounts presume that Thomas H. Morgan’s transmission theory can be understood independently of experimental practices. Experimentation is taken to be relevant to confirming, rather than interpreting, the transmission theory. But the construction of Morgan’s theory went hand in hand with the reconstruction of the chief experimental object, the model organism Drosophila melanogaster . This raises an important question: when a theory is constructed to account for phenomena in carefully controlled laboratory settings, what knowledge, if any, indicates the theory’s (...) relevance to phenomena outside highly controlled settings? The answer, I argue, is found within the procedural knowledge embedded within laboratory practice. †To contact the author, please write to: Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Minnesota, Department of Philosophy, 831 Heller Hall, 271 19th Ave., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455‐0310; e‐mail: ckwaters@umn.edu. (shrink)

Stanovich & West continue a history of norm-setting that began with deference to reasonable people's opinions, followed by adherence to probability theorems. They return to deference to reasonable people, with aptitude test performance substituting for reasonableness. This allows them to select independently among competing theories, but defines reasoning circularly in terms of aptitude, while aptitude is measured using reasoning.

This paper analyses the hidden use of new axioms in set-theoretic practice with a focus on large cardinal axioms and presents a general overview of set-theoretic practices using large cardinal axioms. The hidden use of a new axiom provides extrinsic reasons in support of this axiom via the idea of verifiable consequences, which is especially relevant for set-theoretic practitioners with an absolutist view. Besides that, the hidden use has pragmatic significance for further important sub-groups of the (...) set-theoretic community---set-theoretic practitioners with a pluralist view and set-theoretic practitioners who aim for ZFC-proofs. By describing this, the paper gives a more complete picture of new axioms in set-theoretic practice. These observations, for instance, show that set-theoretic practitioners interested in ZFC-proofs use tools that go beyond ZFC. The analysis is based on empirical data that was collected in an extensive interview study with set-theoretic practitioners. (shrink)

This article addresses the question of fundamental entities in set theory. It takes up J. Hamkins’ claim that models of set theory are such fundamental entities and investigates it using the methodology of P. Maddy’s naturalism, Second Philosophy. In accordance with this methodology, I investigate the historical case study of the use of models in the introduction of forcing, compare this case to contemporary practice and give a systematic account of how set-theoretic practice can be said to (...) introduce models as new entities. In conclusion, I argue for a view that takes both sets and models to be fundamental entities in set theory. (shrink)

In the educational sphere, the concept of democracy is used in many and varied ways, though the hegemonic school culture often starts from a concept of democracy that is taken for granted, and it is understood that the entire educational community shares a similar concept. As a result of the research project “Democracy, participation and inclusive education in schools” we realized that the above-mentioned concept is used without being accurately defined in the school setting. This observation is what has prompted (...) us to write this article, basically structured in two parts. In the first part, based on the theoretical debate occurring in the field of social sciences, we delimit the concept of democracy and structure it in four basic dimensions: governance, inhabitance, otherness and ethos. In the second part, we specify and examine in depth these four dimensions in the school setting in order to construct a broad and transversal, yet specific, definition, with which to be able to develop ambitious democratic projects and, in turn, contribute to scientific debate. (shrink)

This book presents a history of the correspondence principle from a new perspective. The author provides a unique exploration of the relation between the practice of theory and conceptual development in physics. In the process, he argues for a new understanding of the history of the old quantum theory and the emergence of quantum mechanics. The analysis looks at how the correspondence principle was disseminated and how the principle was applied as a research tool during the 1920s. It provides (...) new insights into the interaction between theoretical tools and scientific problems and shows that the use of this theoretical tool changed the tool itself in a process of transformation through implementation. This process, the author claims, was responsible for the conceptual development of the correspondence principle. This monograph connects to the vast literature in the history of science, which analyzed theoretical practices as based on tacit knowledge, skills, and calculation techniques. It contributes to the historical understanding of quantum physics and the emergence of quantum mechanics. Studying how physicists used a set of tools to solve problems, the author spells out the ‟skillful guessing” that went into the making of quantum theoretical arguments and argues that the integration and implementation of technical resources was a central driving force for the conceptual and theoretical transformation in the old quantum theory. (shrink)

This paper explores the idea that deep disagreements essentially involve disputes about what counts as good reasoning, whether it is theoretical or practical reasoning. My central claim is that deep disagreements involve radically different paradigms of some principle or notion that is constitutively basic to reasoning—I refer to these as “basic concepts”. To defend this claim, I show how we can understand deep disagreements by accepting the indeterminacy of concept-formation: concepts are not set in stone but are responsive to human (...) needs, and differences in individuating and ordering concepts lead to clashes in paradigms of reasoning. These clashes can be difficult to resolve because linguistic concepts, especially basic concepts, impose a normative structure onto thought to make reasoning possible at all. This, I also argue, is an authentically Wittgensteinian account of the nature of reasoning. While deep disagreements involving theoretical and practical reasoning both stem from the same root problem of clashing paradigms of basic concepts, I will also draw attention to the particularly radical indeterminacy of moral concept-formation, which makes moral deep disagreements more difficult to resolve. Over the course of the paper, I will discuss two examples of deep disagreements to illustrate and defend my central claim: deep disagreements over vaccines and the concept of “evidence” (theoretical reasoning) and deep disagreements over affirmative action and the concept of “fairness” (practical reasoning). I conclude by suggesting how my account of reasoning does not lead to moral relativism. (shrink)

In this chapter I explore the reciprocal relationship between the metaphysical views mathematicians hold and their mathematical activity. I focus on the set-theoretic pluralism debate, in which set theorists disagree about the implications of their formal mathematical work. As a first case study, I discuss how Woodin’s monist argument for an Ultimate-L feeds on and is fed by mathematical results and metaphysical beliefs. In a second case study, I present Hamkins’ pluralist proposal and the mathematical research projects it endows (...) with relevance. These case studies support three claims: (1) the metaphysical views of mathematicians can shape what counts as relevant research; (2) mathematical results can shape the metaphysical beliefs of mathematicians; (3) metaphysical thought and mathematical activity develop in tandem in mathematical practices. This makes metaphysical thought an integral part of mathematical practices. (shrink)

Frank E. Zachos offers a comprehensive review of one of today's most important and contentious issues in biology: the species problem. After setting the stage with key background information on the topic, the book provides a brief history of species concepts from antiquity to the Modern Synthesis, followed by a discussion of the ontological status of species with a focus on the individuality thesis and potential means of reconciling it with other philosophical approaches. More than 30 different species concepts found (...) in the literature are presented in an annotated list, and the most important ones, including the Biological, Genetic, Evolutionary and different versions of the Phylogenetic Species Concept, are discussed in more detail. Specific questions addressed include the problem of asexual and prokaryotic species, intraspecific categories like subspecies and Evolutionarily Significant Units, and a potential solution to the species problem based on a hierarchical approach that distinguishes between ontological and operational species concepts. A full chapter is dedicated to the challenge of delimiting species by means of a discrete taxonomy in a continuous world of inherently fuzzy boundaries. Further, the book outlines the practical ramifications for ecology and evolutionary biology of how we define the species category, highlighting the danger of an apples and oranges problem if what we subsume under the same name ("species") is in actuality a variety of different entities. A succinct summary chapter, glossary and annotated list of references round out the coverage, making the book essential reading for all biologists looking for an accessible introduction to the historical, philosophical and practical dimensions of the species problem. (shrink)

BackgroundMoral Case Deliberation is a specific form of bioethics education fostering professionals’ moral competence in order to deal with their moral questions. So far, few studies focus in detail on Moral Case Deliberation methodologies and their didactic principles. The dilemma method is a structured and frequently used method in Moral Case Deliberation that stimulates methodological reflection and reasoning through a systematic dialogue on an ethical issue experienced in practice.MethodsIn this paper we present a case-study of a Moral Case Deliberation (...) with the dilemma method in a health care institution for people with an intellectual disability, describing the theoretical background and the practical application of the dilemma method. The dilemma method focuses on moral experiences of participants concerning a concrete dilemma in practice. By an in-depth description of each of the steps of the deliberation process, we elucidate the educational value and didactics of this specific method.ResultsThe didactics and methodical steps of the dilemma method both supported and structured the dialogical reflection process of the participants. The process shows that the participants learned to recognize the moral dimension of the issue at stake and were able to distinguish various perspectives and reasons in a systematic manner. The facilitator played an important role in the learning process of the participants, by assisting them in focusing on and exploring moral aspects of the case.DiscussionThe reflection and learning process, experienced by the participants, shows competency-based characteristics. The role of the facilitator is that of a Socratic teacher with specific knowledge and skills, fostering reflection, inquiry and dialogue.ConclusionThe specific didactics of the dilemma method is well suited for teaching bioethics in clinical settings. The dilemma method follows an inductive learning approach through a dialogical moral inquiry in which participants develop not only knowledge but also skills, attitude and character. The role of a trained facilitator and a specific view on teaching and practicing ethics are essential when using the dilemma method in teaching health care professionals how to reflect on their own moral issues in practice. (shrink)

This edited collection bridges the foundations and practice of constructive mathematics and focuses on the contrast between the theoretical developments, which have been most useful for computer science (ie: constructive set and type theories), and more specific efforts on constructive analysis, algebra and topology. Aimed at academic logician, mathematicians, philosophers and computer scientists with contributions from leading researchers, it is up to date, highly topical and broad in scope.

Explores the difficult problems that arise from efforts to understand the characteristic norms of practical rationality involved in planning agency. It is noted that "cognitivists" tend to view these rationality norms as norms of theoretical rationality while others see the notion that these rationality norms have a distinctive normative force as a "myth." The focus is on finding a middle path that emphasizes links between practical reason, planning structures, & the metaphysics of self-governance. The reason planning agents conform to norms (...) of practical rationality is based at least in part on their desire to govern their own lives. The norms of rationality examined are "wide-scope norms on sets of attitudes," described as norms that reject or proscribe combinations of attitudes. The relation between reasons & rationality is addressed, along with the normative significance of intention coherence & consistency; & problems that arise during attempts to account for the "distinctive normative force of Means-End Coherence in a way that is in the spirit of Reason for Means-End Coherence.". Adapted from the source document. (shrink)

This paper describes a novel diagramming technique that we have found useful for highlighting differences in the work values of countries located within a single cultural region, followed by a brief demonstration of its application to countries in two regions (Latin America and the Mediterranean) with regard to managing corruption. We also indicate a few of the various ways that this technique can be used, such as to identify similarities between countries that are not in the same cultural region, yet (...) have one or more important cultural characteristics in common which set them apart from others in their respective regions.The paper directs attention to the practical and theoretical significance of intra-regional cultural differences that may be taken for granted by insiders to the region, while being overlooked by others. We hope that the introduction of this diagramming technique will stimulate further conceptual and empirical exploration of the potential significance of intra-regional cultural differences for international business ethics, as a preliminary step towards development and delivery of organizational interventions to manage the ethical frictions generated by critical differences in beliefs, attitudes, norms and values internationally. (shrink)

A wide variety of theoretical tasks is inescapably part of psychological research, practice, and public policy initiatives. A classification and illustrated summary of these theoretical tasks is provided, an important purpose of which is to remind providers and users of psychological research and interventions of important theoretical dimensions of these activities. A larger purpose, however, is the promotion of theoretical psychology as an orientation toward, and a set of understandings and tools with which psychologists might approach, an appropriately contextualized (...) self-understanding of their practices as researchers and practitioners. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Memoires by eminently creative people often describe architectural spaces and qualities they believe instrumental for their creativity. However, places designed to encourage creativity have had mixed results, with some found to decrease creative productivity for users. This may be due, in part, to lack of suitable empirical theory or model to guide design strategies. Relationships between creative cognition and features of the physical environment remain largely uninvestigated in the scientific literature, despite general agreement among researchers that human cognition is physically (...) and socially situated. This paper investigates what role architectural settings may play in creative processes by examining documented first person and biographical accounts of creativity with respect to three central theories of situated cognition. First, the embodied thesis argues that cognition encompasses both the mind and the body. Second, the embedded thesis maintains that people exploit features of the physical and social environment to increase their cognitive capabilities. Third, the enaction thesis describes cognition as dependent upon a person’s interactions with the world. Common themes inform three propositions, illustrated in a new theoretical framework describing relationships between people and their architectural settings with respect to different cognitive processes of creativity. The framework is intended as a starting point toward an ecological model of creativity, which may be used to guide future creative process research and architectural design strategies to support user creative productivity. (shrink)

Quillen [17] introduced model categories as an abstract framework for homotopy theory which would apply to a wide range of mathematical settings. By all accounts this program has been a success and—as, e.g., the work of Voevodsky on the homotopy theory of schemes [15] or the work of Joyal [11, 12] and Lurie [13] on quasicategories seem to indicate—it will likely continue to facilitate mathematical advances. In this paper we present a novel connection between model categories and mathematical logic, inspired (...) by the groupoid model of (intensional) Martin–Löf type theory [14] due to Hofmann and Streicher [9]. In particular, we show that a form of Martin–Löf type theory can be soundly modelled in any model category. This result indicates moreover that any model category has an associated “internal language” which is itself a form of Martin-Löf type theory. This suggests applications both to type theory and to homotopy theory. Because Martin–Löf type theory is, in one form or another, the theoretical basis for many of the computer proof assistants currently in use, such as Coq and Agda (cf. [3] and [5]), this promise of applications is of a practical, as well as theoretical, nature. This paper provides a precise indication of this connection between homotopy theory and logic; a more detailed discussion of these and further results will be given in [20]. (shrink)

This work analyses the speech-act of arguing as proposed by Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation (LNMA) with the help of diagrams, examples and basic formalization techniques. The focus is set on one of the most novel issues of LNMA, modal qualification, and the distinction between epistemic and ontological modals. The first conclusion is that employing LNMA in order to analyse and evaluate actual argumentation as it is proposed is too complex to be applied as is. The second conclusion, at a (...) theoretical level, is that the distinction between ontological and epistemic modals is highly problematic in LNMA. (shrink)

In this paper we describe an approach to practical reasoning, reasoning about what it is best for a particular agent to do in a given situation, based on presumptive justifications of action through the instantiation of an argument scheme, which is then subject to examination through a series of critical questions. We identify three particular aspects of practical reasoning which distinguish it from theoretical reasoning. We next provide an argument scheme and an associated set of critical questions which is able (...) to capture these features. In order that both the argument scheme and the critical questions can be given precise interpretations we use the semantic structure of an Action-Based Alternating Transition System as the basis for their definition. We then work through a detailed example to show how this approach to practical reasoning can be applied to a problem solving situation, and briefly describe some other previous applications of the general approach. In a second example we relate our account to the social laws paradigm for co-ordinating multi-agent systems. The contribution of the paper is to provide firm foundations for an approach to practical reasoning based on presumptive argument in terms of a well-known model for representing the effects of actions of a group of agents. (shrink)

Lieve Van Hoof's welcome addition to the study of Plutarch's moral works focuses on a group of writings that discuss practical issues, ranging from coping with exile and curbing one's curiosity to proper nutrition and table manners. Van Hoof collectively refers to these treatises as "Plutarch's practical ethics," setting them apart from Plutarch's theoretical works, which discuss key philosophical concepts.Van Hoof begins by noting with regret the scholarly neglect of Plutarch's practical ethics. Historians of philosophy, who usually read Plutarch's moral (...) works as sourcebooks on academic philosophical theories, are frustrated when confronted with Plutarch's practical treatises, where references to academic .. (shrink)

The growing literature on corporate responsibility (CR) has drawn attention to how different CR practices complement each other and interact in the form of configurations. This study investigated CR patterns associated with high financial performance for 466 firms in Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. We applied a set-theoretic approach using qualitative comparative analysis to identify similarities and differences across these three societies in configurations of CR practices relating to customer, employee, investor, community, and environmental stakeholder groups. The extent (...) to which the financial benefits of various configurations of CR practices are attributable to institutional factors is examined. (shrink)

The essay by Potter and El-Mallakh proposes "on the ground" consultations in psychiatric ethics as a novel style of bioethics deliberation. The continual dialogue between a moral philosopher and clinician creates the opportunity for informal real-time ethical thinking as cases unfold, instead of formal ethics committee reviews and instead of the artificially simple scenarios found in much bioethics literature. The essay has important practical implications for ethics pedagogy during psychiatric training and in mental health settings more generally. It also has (...) important theoretical implications for the cross-talk between... (shrink)

This book examines the philosophical and theoretical foundations of early years practice, and supports practitioners as they reflect on the collective and personal rationales which motivate and inform their work with young children. Theoretical underpinnings are explored from a variety of perspectives, and are translated into effective strategies for application in a range of early years settings. Featuring contributions from leading early years professionals, The Philosophy and Practice of Outstanding Early Years Provision draws on sound expertise to deepen (...) the reader's understanding of the concepts and ideas behind everyday practice. The book is divided into four easily navigated sections which explore key issues including the creation of enabling environments, leadership in the early years, the opportunities and challenges presented by diversity, and the value of creative approaches. Recommended strategies are discussed in relation to emerging global pressures and the needs of the contemporary child, inviting practitioners to modify and enhance future behaviour and practice. This will be essential reading for students and practitioners who wish to improve current and future practice by gaining insight into the philosophical foundations which underpin outstanding provision. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical LifeLiz DisleyRobert B. Pippin. Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Pp. xi + 308. Paper, $29.99In this work, Pippin offers an interpretation of freedom, rationality, and agency in Hegel’s work and adds substantive content to the key concept of recognition. In doing so, he offers not only a compelling elucidation of a particularly (...) opaque part of Hegel’s analysis of human action and interaction, but also demonstrates the relevance of his practical philosophy to contemporary discussions about free will, intersubjectivity, autonomy, recognition, and liberalism. Pippin provides a substantial defense of Hegel’s position in the context of contemporary political philosophy, arguing against a commonly-held view that Hegelian political philosophy must be much closer to modern communitarian theories than those of classical or modern liberalism. Pippin’s work is central to the recent resurgence of interest in Hegel’s theoretical philosophy by analytical philosophers such as Robert Brandom and John McDowell, as well as the renewed study of recognition in a practical context.Controversially, Pippin claims that Hegel has only one theory of intersubjectivity and recognition from the time of the Jena writings to the Philosophy of Right. The theory develops from an initial stage, where “the desideratum of mutual recognition is posed and explored,” to a realization that ethical life as described in the Philosophy of Right provides the necessary conditions for rational, mutual recognition (184n4). Thus, he rejects the common view in recent Continental Hegel scholarship, asserted by critics including Jürgen Habermas, Michael Theunissen, and Axel Honneth, that Hegel fails to develop adequately the theory of intersubjectivity initially present in his earlier writings and subsumes intersubjectivity into a “grand metaphysical process” of the Absolute Subject’s self-manifestation (184).Pippin defends Hegel from this common charge on the basis of his “very unusual” concept of freedom (185). The key claim here is that Hegel does not set recognition or indeed other-relation as a precondition for any kind of self-relation, but rather, “A true individual [End Page 112] is a free subject and recognition relations function in a complex way as conditions for that possibility” (186). This seems like a promising method of demonstrating that Hegel’s intersubjectivity does not, after all, dissolve in the face of a monological divine conception of reality. The difficulty with the approach, as Pippin concedes, is that it involves making a series of radical, strange, and controversial claims. These claims, in general, focus on the temporal priority of freedom, recognition, and rationality: deeds can count as “mine” in Pippin’s special sense only if they are undertaken rationally, but this state of rationality depends on being in a social state of recognizing and being recognized (190). However, it is neither radical nor strange to make a clear distinction between human interdependence in terms of our particular social psychology and in terms of “an ideal of normative mutuality inherent in any attempt to act” (211).Pippin appreciates that defenders of Hegel’s concept of recognition do not want to say that I cannot be a free subject by myself, but at the same time want to leave the door open for there to be some kind of possibility of ascertaining moral harm in cases of failure to recognize. For Pippin, free actions, and actions committed out of free will, are those committed by agents in a particular social context, namely being situated within norm-governed relations of reciprocal recognition to others. Such an approach fulfills neither of these criteria, since it means I cannot be free by myself but also that, in the case of my being placed in a situation where I am not within these relations of reciprocal recognition to others, there is no obvious originator of moral harm caused by this recognition (218). Pippin accepts that there is no clear answer to this difficulty, but his account of the genesis of norms and social rationality does save Hegel’s account from the objection by Theunissen, Habermas, Honneth et al. mentioned above. Like Rolf-Peter Horstmann, Pippin sees the answer to charges of introducing a... (shrink)

This article is about a virtue ethical approach to the professional ethics of teaching, centred around the ideal of _phronesis_ (practical wisdom) in an Aristotelian sense. It is grounded empirically in extensive research conducted at the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues into teachers and other UK professionals, and it is grounded theoretically in recent efforts to revive an Aristotelian concept of _phronesis_ as excellence in ethical decision-making. The article argues for the need for a virtue-based approach to professional (...) class='Hi'>practice, based on time-honoured Aristotelian assumptions and culminating in a conceptually viable construct of _phronesis_ as a psycho-moral integrator and adjudicator. After setting some of the historical background in Sect. 1, Sect. 2 charts the most relevant empirical findings. Section 3 introduces a call for _phronesis_ as a guide to virtue-based professional ethics: its role, nature, and methods of instruction. Section 4 adds some caveats and concerns about if and how _phronesis_ can be cultivated as part of teacher training. Finally, Sect. 5 offers some concluding remarks about the novelty and radicality of the approach on offer in this article. (shrink)

Scientific pluralism has become a household position within the philosophy of science literature. There are numerous accounts of plurality within various research fields. Most scientific pluralists, however, focus on the plurality of theories, explanations, or mechanisms, while other potential targets of plurality that the philosophy of scientific practice has particularly emphasized have so far not received extensive treatment. How should we approach such practice-based candidates of plurality? And what are potential pluralist positions concerning the objects of scientific (...) class='Hi'>practice? In this article, I set out to answer these questions. I combine approaching a widely influential topic within the philosophy of science, scientific pluralism, with social science methodology. Using interview data combined with sociological analysis, I provide a nuanced picture of the dynamics of one particular research field that displays plurality. Focusing on how sociological configurations resonate with intellectual commitments within a research field, I disentangle practice-based from theoretical plurality. I consider how these empirical results should feedback on the scientific pluralism literature. (shrink)

This paper studies Paul Cohen’s philosophy of mathematics and mathematical practice as expressed in his writing on set-theoretic consistency proofs using his method of forcing. Since Cohen did not consider himself a philosopher and was somewhat reluctant about philosophy, the analysis uses semiotic and literary textual methodologies rather than mainstream philosophical ones. Specifically, I follow some ideas of Lévi-Strauss’s structural semiotics and some literary narratological methodologies. I show how Cohen’s reflections and rhetoric attempt to bridge what he experiences (...) as an uncomfortable tension between reality and the formal by means of his notion of intuition. (shrink)

Karl Marx argued that the preferable starting point for influencing social practices is to understand their workings—not to simply moralize social systems through idealization. This thread in Marx informs contemporary critical social theories such as feminism and critical race theory. Such work attempts to diagnose and analyze internal contradictions, limitations, and dysfunctions in social structures as they actually are in order to connect them to normative dissatisfactions in lived experience. This critical theoretical methodology thus embodies what Charles Mills calls for (...) in nonideal explanatory models that abstract without idealizing. In this chapter I argue that Marx’s theory of society, which informs his critique of political economy in Capital, offers bioethics a nonideal framework through which to analyze normative dissatisfactions in health care practice. What may appear to be moral problems or dilemmas in health care can be the result of, or significantly influenced by, structural patterns in health care’s material production—not its abstract moral content. Therefore, understanding health care structurally, as a set of productive practices within a larger systematic whole of capitalist production, can help diagnose systemic dysfunctions in health care’s material production that produce or make worse normative dissatisfactions of concern for bioethics. I call such morally significant structural dysfunctions social pathologies of health care, and contend that a Marx-informed bioethics can descriptively theorize structural bases of moral discontent and conflict in health care, and therein inform its social and political transformation for the better. (shrink)

Is knowledge-how, or “practical” knowledge, a species of knowledge-that, or “theoretical” knowledge? There is no comfortable position to take in the debate around this question. On the one hand, there are counterexamples against the anti-intellectualist thesis that practical knowledge is best analysed as an ability. They show that having an ability to ϕ is not necessary for knowing how to ϕ. On the other hand, the intellectualist analysis of practical knowledge as a subspecies of theoretical knowledge is threatened by its (...) own set of counterexamples, which convincingly establish that practical knowledge lacks many of the typical characteristics of theoretical knowledge. Most strikingly it does not even appear to require a belief. In this paper, I develop an account of practical knowledge that avoids these counterexamples. It also manages to preserve both the status of such knowledge as a cognitive achievement and its apparently close conceptual relation to abilities. I start with the counterexamples against the necessity of abilities for practical knowledge and show that they fail because they underestimate the cognitive demands of attempts. I then make use of the logic of dispositions to bridge the gap that counterexamples against the necessity of abilities for practical knowledge open. It is argued that, instead of the ability to ϕ, it is a specific disposition to have the ability to ϕ that constitutes practical knowledge about ϕ. The resulting theory is an anti-intellectualist position that preserves essential intellectualist motivations and thus should be satisfactory for proponents of both views. (shrink)

The goal of this chapter is to catalogue ways in which practical argumentation —argumentation aimed at deciding on a course of action—is produced discursively in deliberative discussions. This is a topic largely neglected in the literature on PA focused primarily on the abstract features of practical inference. I connect to this literature by arguing that the complex scheme of PA inferentially hinges on three different principles for rationally selecting means to achieve the desired goal: the means have to be either (...) the best, satisfactory or necessary in order to ground the practical inference and thus be adopted. Based on these theoretically-derived distinctions, I scrutinise the linguistic indicators of the three types of means-goal inferences of PA. As a corpus, I use a set of official European Union policy documents called Transforming Europe’s energy system released in Brussels in July 2015. (shrink)

Most previous research on human cognition has focused on problem-solving, and has confined its investigations to the laboratory. As a result, it has been difficult to account for complex mental processes and their place in culture and history. In this startling - indeed, disco in forting - study, Jean Lave moves the analysis of one particular form of cognitive activity, - arithmetic problem-solving - out of the laboratory into the domain of everyday life. In so doing, she shows how mathematics (...) in the 'real world', like all thinking, is shaped by the dynamic encounter between the culturally endowed mind and its total context, a subtle interaction that shapes 1) Both tile human subject and the world within which it acts. The study is focused on mundane daily, activities, such as grocery shopping for 'best buys' in the supermarket, dieting, and so on. Innovative in its method, fascinating in its findings, the research is above all significant in its theoretical contributions. Have offers a cogent critique of conventional cognitive theory, turning for an alternative to recent social theory, and weaving a compelling synthesis from elements of culture theory, theories of practice, and Marxist discourse. The result is a new way of understanding human thought processes, a vision of cognition as the dialectic between persons-acting, and the settings in which their activity is constituted. The book will appeal to anthropologists, for its novel theory of the relation of cognition to culture and context; to cognitive scientists and educational theorists; and to the 'plain folks' who form its subject, and who will recognize themselves in it, a rare accomplishment in the modern social sciences. (shrink)

Autonomous vehicle moral dilemmas matter less for the particular outcomes of potential accidents than for their role in defining the values of the society we wish to live in. Different approaches have been suggested to determine the ethical settings that autonomous vehicles should be implemented in and identify the legitimate agents for making such decisions. Most of these, however, fail on theoretical grounds, facing severe issues related to moral justifications and compliance to the law, or on practical grounds, being insufficiently (...) universal, action-guiding, or technically viable to be implemented. The analogy with the “trolley problem” has been extensively discussed. However, researchers have rarely tried to adapt this framework to autonomous vehicle cases or investigate how it could be used to address these issues. In doing so, this paper aims to answer the two key problems of autonomous vehicle dilemmas. With regards to the decision-maker, it rejects autonomous vehicle users’ choice-based models, showing the absurdity of both switch of control and adaptative preferences and arguing for common legislator-determined ethical settings. With regards to the decisions themselves, it criticizes both utilitarian views and those based on individuals’ criteria to suggest a deontologist rights-based approach. This allows for the defence of a morally coherent, regulatory compliant, explainable, and easily implementable framework capable of addressing all autonomous vehicle moral dilemma scenarios present in the literature. (shrink)

In the tradition stemming from Aristotle through Aquinas, rational decision making is seen as a complex structure of distinct phases in which reasoning and will are interconnected. Intention, deliberation, and decision are regarded as the fundamental steps of the decision-making process, in which an end is chosen, the means are specified, and a decision to act is made. Based on this Aristotelian theoretical background, we show how the decision-making process can be modeled as a net of several patterns of reasoning, (...) involving the classification of an action or state of affairs, its evaluation, the deliberation about the means to carry it out, and the decision. It is shown how argumentation theory can contribute to our understanding of the mechanisms involved by formalizing the steps of reasoning using argumentation schemes, and setting out the value-based criteria underlying the evaluation of an action. Representing each phase of the decision-making process as a separate scheme allows one to identify implicit premises and bring the roots of ethical dilemma to light along with the means to resolve them. In particular, we will show the role of framing and classification in triggering value-based reasoning, and how argumentation theory can be used to represent and uproot the grounds of possible manipulations. (shrink)

Nurses practicing in forensic mental health hospital settings work with patients involved in the criminal justice system who are also diagnosed with psychiatric illnesses. Nurses work towards collaborative and therapeutic relationships with patients with an eventual goal of recovery and successful discharge to the community. Though the majority of patients in these settings in Canada are diagnosed with psychotic disorders, a smaller proportion may be diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), a patient population often described as ‘difficult’ or even ‘untreatable’ (...) by nurses. In this paper, we offer a critical examination of forensic mental health nursing practice with this patient population, based upon a qualitative study, using discourse analysis methodology of nursing practices in a Canadian high security forensic hospital setting. Nurse participants described those challenges faced and strategies employed when working with patients diagnosed with ASPD, and who had been found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD). Michel Foucault's poststructuralist concept of disciplinary power provides the theoretical lens in which both patient behaviours deemed ‘difficult’ and nursing practices are interrogated. Our findings indicate that the secure forensic mental health hospital environment represents a highly disciplinary space, wherein constant observation of patients occurs, and attempts are made to ‘normalize’ behaviours deemed abnormal. Patients diagnosed with ASPD regularly violate hospital rules and behavioural expectations, leading to frustration amongst nursing staff. Tensions existed in proposed strategies for working with these patients between strict adherence to unit rules and the disciplinary order, and a willingness to loosen these rules in attempts to improve nurse–patient relationships. The nursing implications of these opposing strategies are critically examined, with proposals for practices that exist both within and outside the disciplinary order are offered. (shrink)

The aim of psychology is to understand the human mind and behavior. In contemporary psychology, the method of choice to accomplish this incredibly complex endeavor is the experiment. This dominance has shaped the whole discipline from the self-concept as an empirical science and its very epistemological and theoretical foundations, via research practice and the scientific discourse to teaching. Experimental psychology is grounded in the scientific method and positivism, and these principles, which are characteristic for modern thinking, are still upheld. (...) Despite this apparently stalwart adherence to modern principles, experimental psychology exhibits a number of aspects which can best be described as facets of postmodern thinking although they are hardly acknowledged as such. Many psychologists take pride in being “real natural scientists” because they conduct experiments, but it is particularly difficult for psychologists to evade certain elements of postmodern thinking in view of the specific nature of their subject matter. Postmodernism as a philosophy emerged in the 20th century as a response to the perceived inadequacy of the modern approach and as a means to understand the complexities, ambiguities, and contradictions of the times. Therefore, postmodernism offers both valuable insights into the very nature of experimental psychology and fruitful ideas on improving experimental practice to better reflect the complexities and ambiguities of human mind and behavior. Analyzing experimental psychology along postmodern lines begins by discussing the implications of transferring the scientific method from fields with rather narrowly defined phenomena—the natural sciences—to a much broader and more heterogeneous class of complex phenomena, namely the human mind and behavior. This ostensibly modern experimental approach is, however, per se riddled with postmodern elements: creating phenomena in an experimental setting, including the hermeneutic processes of generating hypotheses and interpreting results, is no carbon copy of “reality” but rather an active construction which reflects irrevocably the pre-existing ideas of the investigator. These aspects, analyzed by using postmodern concepts like hyperreality and simulacra, did not seep in gradually but have been present since the very inception of experimental psychology, and they are necessarily inherent in its philosophy of science. We illustrate this theoretical analysis with the help of two examples, namely experiments on free will and visual working memory. The postmodern perspective reveals some pitfalls in the practice of experimental psychology. Furthermore, we suggest that accepting the inherently fuzzy nature of theoretical constructs in psychology and thinking more along postmodern lines would actually clarify many theoretical problems in experimental psychology. (shrink)

This chapter explores the theoretical and practical aspects of Chinese Mahayana Buddhism’s ethics of generosity from a philosophical point of view. Buddhism is a religion par excellence of strangification and generosity. After an introduction, I discuss some essential sources both from Indian and Chinese Buddhism. Then I develop the idea of strangification and ethic of generosity in Chinese Mahayana Buddhism, before I arrive at some words of conclusion.On the theoretical side, I explore the ontological foundation of the ethics of generosity (...) in The Awakening of Faith. This is one of the founding texts in the history of Chinese Mahayana Buddhism that offers an ontological foundation to Buddhist generosity. It does this by the affirmation of One Mind or the Mind of All Sentient Beings as the Ultimate Reality. However, it also sets certain limits to generosity by denying difference/otherness, and sees difference/otherness as merely a delusion. On the practical side, I discuss three types of gift, namely the gift of material goods, the gift of no fear and the gift of teaching Dharma, and more interestingly, the practice of huixiang 迴向 as discussed by Huiyuan in the entry “huixiang” of his Dasheng Yizhang.Some conclusive reflections are done to consider the Chinese Buddhist ethics of generosity in relation to the post-modern ethics of generosity to many others. (shrink)

Scientific specialties are the key unit of analysis in Kuhn’s theory of scientific change. Kuhn believed that scientific specialties, in their normal phases, are characterized by theoretical monism. This is what makes scientists so efficient in realizing their epistemic goals. Recent work in the philosophy of scientific practice raises questions about the extent to which there is or needs to be consensus in science, thus challenging a key dimension of Kuhn’s view. Hasok Chang has been a leader in this (...) project, focusing attention on the benefits of pluralism. I argue that Chang and other pluralists are overcorrecting. I argue that a variety of types of pluralism can be reconciled with theoretical monism, and that theoretical monism serves significant functions, aiding scientists in the effective pursuit of their epistemic goals. Thus, I aim to set limits to pluralism. I argue that Kuhn’s theoretical monism not only has room for the sort of pluralism that Chang and others aims to defend, I also show that it presupposes such forms of pluralism. (shrink)

This paper describes how an innocent venture outside the confines of academia to update my nursing skills completely changed the focus of my research. I was deeply involved in the theoretical development of my thesis, which I thought was a feminist exploration of the meaning of health for mid‐life women. I was immersed in feminist theory and was exploring the work of the French Feminists. I had written comprehensive draft chapters about nursing, women's bodies and science. While I was absorbed (...) in my theoretical exploration I decided to venture back into practice to improve my nursing skills. I am still unsure why I chose to do this; however, in hindsight, my theoretical exploration was inexorably pushing me in that direction. While my conscious thinking was focused on my stated topic, my subconscious (my intuition) turned me towards another. Being confronted with the reality of nursing practice through working with staff nurses in a gynaecological ward caused a major disjunction in every aspect of my research: the topic, my methodology and the setting, and the experience challenged my feelings about nurses and nursing. This inevitably led to a dramatic and fundamental change in my research. (shrink)

In this article, we present a dialogical approach to empirical ethics, based upon hermeneutic ethics and responsive evaluation. Hermeneutic ethics regards experience as the concrete source of moral wisdom. In order to gain a good understanding of moral issues, concrete detailed experiences and perspectives need to be exchanged. Within hermeneutic ethics dialogue is seen as a vehicle for moral learning and developing normative conclusions. Dialogue stands for a specific view on moral epistemology and methodological criteria for moral inquiry. Responsive evaluation (...) involves a structured way of setting up dialogical learning processes, by eliciting stories of participants, exchanging experiences in (homogeneous and heterogeneous) groups and drawing normative conclusions for practice. By combining these traditions we develop both a theoretical and a practical approach to empirical ethics, in which ethical issues are addressed and shaped together with stakeholders in practice. Stakeholders' experiences are not only used as a source for reflection by the ethicist; stakeholders are involved in the process of reflection and analysis, which takes place in a dialogue between participants in practice, facilitated by the ethicist. This dialogical approach to empirical ethics may give rise to questions such as: What contribution does the ethicist make? What role does ethical theory play? What is the relationship between empirical research and ethical theory in the dialogical process? In this article, these questions will be addressed by reflecting upon a project in empirical ethics that was set up in a dialogical way. The aim of this project was to develop and implement normative guidelines with and within practice, in order to improve the practice concerning coercion and compulsion in psychiatry. (shrink)

The philosophy of mind encompasses a familiar set of topics: consciousness, intentionality, mental causation, emotion, whatever topics in psychology happen to capture our interest (concepts, mindreading . . .), and so on. There is a topic deserving of addition to this list, a topic that should be receiving regular attention from philosophers of mind but is not: practical rationality. The philosophy of mind bears directly upon what can be called the ‘meta-theory’ of practical rationality, and meta-theories of rationality likewise impose (...) constraints on the philosophy of mind. Philosophers of mind who do not engage with work on practical rationality risk developing theories that are blind to important theoretical demands. They also risk allowing ethicists—who have been at work on the meta-theory of practical rationality—to unilaterally set their theoretical agendas. It is therefore time to get to work. (shrink)

The term “emotional practices” is gaining currency in the historical study of emotions. This essay discusses the theoretical and methodological implications of this concept. A definition of emotion informed by practice theory promises to bridge persistent dichotomies with which historians of emotion grapple, such as body and mind, structure and agency, as well as expression and experience. Practice theory emphasizes the importance of habituation and social context and is thus consistent with, and could enrich, psychological models of situated, (...) distributed, and embodied cognition and their approaches to the study of emotion.It is suggested here that practices not only generate emotions, but that emotions themselves can be viewed as a practical engagement with the world. Conceiving of emotions as practices means understanding them as emerging from bodily dispositions conditioned by a social context, which always has cultural and historical specificity. Emotion-as-practice is bound up with and dependent on “emotional practices,” defined here as practices involving the self , language, material artifacts, the environment, and other people. Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu's concept of habitus, the essay emphasizes that the body is not a static, timeless, universal foundation that produces ahistorical emotional arousal, but is itself socially situated, adaptive, trained, plastic, and thus historical. Four kinds of emotional practices that make use of the capacities of a body trained by specific social settings and power relations are sketched out—mobilizing, naming, communicating, and regulating emotion—as are consequences for method in historical research. (shrink)

Froom and Froom all attention to referral bias as a frequent cause for misinterpreting the medical literature. This is particularly a source of false certainty, and therefore false science, in U.S. practice, where referral centers are often seen as the only legitimate source of medical knowledge and where primary care is discounted as a source of scientific observations. Appreciation of the primary care setting is therefore a critical element in theoretical understanding of medical epistemology.