In an article published in the Journal of Political Philosophy, Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule argue that the government and its allies ought to activelyundermine groups that espouse conspiracy theories deemed “demonstrably false.” They propose infiltrating such groups in order to “cure” conspiracy theorists by treating their “crippled epistemology” with “cognitive diversity.” They base their proposal on an analysis of the “causes” of such conspiracy theories, which emphasizes informational and reputational cascades. Some may regard their proposal as outrageous and anti-democratic. (...) I agree. However, in this article I merely argue that their argument is flawed in at least the following ways: their account of the popularity of conspiracy theories is implausible, and their proposal relies on misleading “stylized facts,” including a caricature of those who doubt official narratives and a deceptive depiction of the relevant history. (shrink)

Economists use the term ‘stylized fact’ in many contexts, though the meaning of this phrase and the motivation for using such a concept is unclear. In this paper, we provide a philosophical analysis of stylized facts, which aims to be methodologically interesting and useful. While our framework applies to all principled uses of stylized facts, we illustrate its core features by applying it to Nicholas Kaldor's initial and exemplary use of stylized facts in (...) growth economics. (shrink)

Though the concept of ‘stylized fact’ plays an important role in the economic literature, there is little analysis of the definition and evaluative use of the term. A permissive account of stylized facts is developed which focuses on their mediating role between models and empirical evidence. The mediation relationship restricts stylized facts by requiring concrete empirical targets. On the other hand, there is much legitimate diversity within the permissive account; key dimensions of diversity are argued (...) to be the part of the model targeted (explanans vs. explanandum) and degree of partiality of correspondence. The use of stylized fact in model evaluation points to the downside of stylization: decreased ability to support strong claims about particular targets. In the final analysis, the role of stylized facts in model-based explanation depends on the view taken of the relative importance of generality and empirical adequacy. (shrink)

This paper addresses how communication processes among investors affect stock prices formation, especially emerging predictability of stock prices, in financial markets. An agent based model, called the word of mouth model, is introduced for analyzing the problem. This model provides a simple, but sufficiently versatile, description of informational diffusion process and is successful in making lucidly explanation for the predictability of small sized stocks, which is a stylized fact in financial markets but difficult to resolve by traditional models. Our (...) model also provides a rigorous examination of the under reaction hypothesis to informational shocks. (shrink)

Recently, we proposed an agent-based model called the word of mouth model to analyze the influence of an information transmission process to price formation in financial markets. Especially, the short-term predictability of asset return was focused on and an explanation in the view of information transmission was provided to the question why the predictability was much clearly observed in the small-sized stocks. This paper, to extend the previous study, demonstrates that the word of mouth model also has a consistency with (...) other important financial stylized facts. This strengthens the possibility that the information transmission among investors plays a crucial role in price formation. Concretely, this paper addresses two famous statistical features of returns; the leptokurtic distribution of return and the autocorrelation of return volatility. The reasons why these statistical facts receive especial attentions of researchers among financial stylized facts are their statistical robustness and practical importance, such as the applications to the derivative pricing problems. (shrink)

The paper presents stylized facts about the two hundred years of Brazilian economic history according to classical liberals, nationalists, and Marxists. For this, some classic authors of each theoretical orientation are chosen according to the influence of their interpretations. While classical liberals praise economic dependence and criticize the political struggle to overcome the colonial and neo-colonial heritage, nationalists and Marxists, in different ways, criticize dependence and propose to overcome it politically. Marxists have never been in power in Brazil, (...) but a pendulum between liberals and nationalists is clear. The relevance of the proposed classification is illustrated by recalling that, today, Brazil is governed by a leader in the Latin American authoritarian neoliberalism tradition inaugurated by Augusto Pinochet in 1973. However, shortly after commemorating 200 years of political independence on September 07th, 2022, the presidential elections in October 2022 may set a new swing in the pendulum toward a nationalist vision of the Brazilian past and future. (shrink)

Human behavior regarding medicine seems strange; assumptions and models that seem workable in other areas seem less so in medicine. Perhaps we need to rethink the basics. Toward this end, I have collected many puzzling stylized facts about behavior regarding medicine, and have sought a small number of simple assumptions which might together account for as many puzzles as possible.

In this chapter, one considers finance at its very foundations, namely, at the place where assumptions are being made about the ways to measure the two key ingredients of finance: risk and return. It is well known that returns for a large class of assets display a number of stylized facts that cannot be squared with the traditional views of 1960s financial economics (normality and continuity assumptions, i.e. Brownian representation of market dynamics). Despite the empirical counterevidence, normality and (...) continuity assumptions were part and parcel of financial theory and practice, embedded in all financial practices and beliefs. Our aim is to build on this puzzle for extracting some clues revealing the use of one research strategy in academic community, model tinkering defined as a particular research habit. We choose to focus on one specific moment of the scientific controversies in academic finance: the ‘leptokurtic crisis’ opened by Mandelbrot in 1962. The profoundness of the crisis came from the angle of the Mandelbrot’s attack: not only he emphasized an empirical inadequacy of the Brownian representation, but also he argued for an inadequate grounding of this representation. We give some insights in this crisis and display the model tinkering strategies of the financial academic community in the 1970s and the 1980s. (shrink)

Written by four recognized experts with senior experience in research and government, this text is the first comprehensive survival kit for students and practitioners of economic policy. It is set to become an indispensable resource for everyone involved or interested in modern economic policy. Academic scholars willing to engage in policy discussions and students at graduate or advanced undergraduate levels will find it an essential bridge to the policy world. What makes the book unique is that it combines like no (...) other, facts-based analysis, state-of-the art theories and models, and insights from first-hand policy experience at national and international levels. The book has grown out of ten years of experience teaching economic policy at the graduate level. It provides an intellectually coherent framework to understand the potentialities and limits of economic policy. It addresses positive dimensions, normative dimensions and political-economy constraints. It fills an important gap by reconciling in each major policy area stylized facts of recent economic history, key questions faced by contemporary policymakers, and essential lessons from theory which are captured and explained in a clear, concise, and self-contained way. All major areas of domestic and international policymaking are covered: fiscal policy, monetary policy, international finance and exchange-rate policy, tax policy, and long-term growth policies. The book concludes with a special chapter on the lessons of the financial crisis. The authors are intellectually non-partisan and they draw examples from various countries and experiences; from emerging markets to developing economies, shedding light when necessary on local specificities such as European Union rules and instruments. Economic Policy: Theory and Practice is the essential guide to economic policy in the new post-crisis context. (shrink)

This article focuses on the significance of low pay, investigating: who is low paid and why, and who is low paying and why? This elaborates on two important aspects: the determinants of being paid a wage towards the bottom of the earnings distribution, and the individual chances of remaining in the lower part, moving into or out of it, and up or down the distribution. Section 2 discusses the economic analysis of low pay. Section 3 presents definitions, measurement, and data (...) issues. In Section 4, some stylized facts on low pay are presented and the main results from the empirical literature are critically reviewed. Section 5 contains a discussion of policy issues and suggestions for future research. (shrink)

This article provides a method for estimating the bounds of transaction costs in horizontal mergers. Consider, for example, a completed monopoly merger in linear Cournot oligopolies with 10 symmetric firms. The method shows that its transaction costs are at most 25% (78%) of total premerger profits if there is zero (100%) excess capacity. Such estimations can be extended in a straightforward manner to other mergers and other oligopoly models. The estimation is based both on the profitability precondition, and on the (...) non-empty core precondition, which postulates that the split of a merger’s profits be in its core. The article shows that the core in linear Cournot oligopolies has a non-empty interior, and indicates that the non-empty core precondition also sheds new lights on understanding important issues such as the stylized fact that mergers are likely to occur in markets plagued by excess capacities; why profitable mergers might not be formed; and why completed mergers might break up in the future. (shrink)

Any experimental field consists of preparing special conditions for examining interesting objects for research. So naturally, the particular ways in which scientists prepare their objects determine the kind and the content of knowledge produced. This book provides a framework for the analysis of experimental practices - the Social Epistemology of Experiment - that incorporates both the ‘material’ and the ‘social’ dimensions of knowledge production. The Social Epistemology of Experiment is applied to experimental economics and in so doing, it introduces the (...) epistemic role of the participation of human subjects in experiments and the causal efficacy of institutions in constraining and enabling human behaviour. It also develops the role of the social and socially established practices in overcoming the methodological difficulties associated with experimenting with humans subjects in the social sciences as well as the effect of scientists’ interventions in the laboratory worlds. This book provides an historical and contextualized account of the emergence of experimental economics, the methodological discussions that have informed and constituted it, its main research programmes, and stylized facts. The analysis of its three main research programmes – market experiments, game theory experiments and individual decision-making experiments – shows how economics experiments are particularly tailored to produce knowledge about market institutions and individual behaviour in contexts where there might be conflicts of individual and social goals, and also about the processes of individual decision-making. (shrink)

In this chapter we consider economic systems, and in particular financial systems, from the perspective of the physics of complex systems (i.e. statistical physics, the theory of critical phenomena, and their cognates). This field of research is known as econophysics—alternative names are ‘financial physics’ and ‘statistical phynance.’ This title was coined in 1995 by Eugene Stanley, and since then its researchers have attempted to forge it as an independent and important field, one that stands in opposition to standard (‘Neo-Classical’) economic (...) theory. Econophysicists argue that the empirical data is best explained in terms flowing out of statistical physics, according to which the (stylized) facts of economics are best understood as emergent properties of a complex system. However, some economists argue that the methods used by econophysics are not sufficient to prove the existence of underlying complexity in economic systems. The complexity claim can nonetheless be defended as a good example of an inference to the best explanation rather than a definitive deduction. (shrink)

Introduction: Wellbeing policy analysis is often criticized for requiring a cardinal interpretation of measurement scales, such as ranking happiness on an integer scale from 0-10. The commonly-used scales also implicitly constrain the human capacity for experience, typically that our most intense experiences can only be at most ten times more intense than our mildest experiences. This paper presents the alternative “heavy-tailed valence” (HTV) hypothesis: the notion that the accessible human capacity for emotional experiences of pleasure and pain spans a minimum (...) of two orders of magnitude. Methods: We specify five testable predictions of the HTV hypothesis. A pilot survey of adults aged 21-64 (n = 97) then tested two predictions, asking respondents to comment on the most painful and most pleasurable experiences they can recall, alongside the second most painful and pleasurable experiences. Results: The results find tentative support for the hypothesis. For instance, over half of respondents said their most intense experiences were at least twice as intense as the second most intense, implying a wide capacity overall. Simulations further demonstrate that survey responses are more consistent with underlying heavy-tailed distributions of experience than a “constrained valence” psychology. Discussion: A synthesis of these results with prior findings suggests a “kinked” scale, such that a wide range of felt experience is compressed in reports at the high end of intensity scales, even if reports at lower intensities behave more cardinally. We present a discussion of three stylized facts that support HTV and six against, lessons for a future survey, practical guidelines for existing analyses, and implications for current policy. We argue for a dramatic increase in societal ambition. Even in high average income countries, the HTV hypothesis suggests we remain far further below our wellbeing potential than a surface reading of the data might suggest. (shrink)

Productive exchange between disciplines faces a paradox. Modern fields of enquiry are large, differentiated, and always growing. This means their boundaries are extensive, and there are many areas of potential contact between them. We are spoiled for shared topics and overlapping questions. Yet differentiation also entails a high degree of specialization at any particular point, and so traffic across disciplinary borders is less common than it ought to be. The trouble with interdisciplinary work is that you need disciplines in order (...) to do it, and a discipline is a kind of exclusive conversation. Over time, participants come to share reference points and assumptions. The conversation gets more involved. Instead of looking outside, disciplines will reproduce for themselves (in miniature and unsatisfactorily) tools and concepts that are better developed in cognate fields. Economists produce a working psychology, sociologists make a sketch of historical development, political philosophers know some stylized facts about social institutions. This process is guaranteed to produce straw men and errors of fact, but it is also inevitable because the ability to assume away some topics as settled or irrelevant is a precondition for any successful discipline. (shrink)

Long-range correlation, a property of time series exhibiting long-term memory, is mainly studied in the statistical physics domain and has been reported to exist in natural language. Using a state-of-the-art method for such analysis, long-range correlation is first shown to occur in long CHILDES data sets. To understand why, Bayesian generative models of language, originally proposed in the cognitive scientific domain, are investigated. Among representative models, the Simon model was found to exhibit surprisingly good long-range correlation, but {\em not} the (...) Pitman-Yor model. Since the Simon model is known not to correctly reflect the vocabulary growth of natural language, a simple new model is devised as a conjunct of the Simon and Pitman-Yor models, such that long-range correlation holds with a correct vocabulary growth rate. The investigation overall suggests that uniform sampling is one cause of long-range correlation and could thus have a relation with actual linguistic processes. (shrink)

According to Ernst Gombrich, cartoons provide us the chance to “study the use of symbols in a circumscribed context [and] find out what role the image may play in the household of our mind” (Gombrich 1973, 190). This paper looks at some underexplored implications and outcomes of Ernst Gombrich’s conceptual schemata when such a schemata is applied to cartoons. While we might easily avoid defamatory reference when picking out a subject in writing or speech, cartoon depictions, especially those unaccompanied by (...) speech bubbles or captions, often rely on a visual symbolism typified by the warping of some features the removal of others, and the manifestation of some visual trope or other, more easily lend themselves to defamatory reference. While harms to the referent are many in cases of defamatory cartoons, this paper focuses on the harms to the viewers of such cartoons by the depicter’s message and mode of representation, unique to the cartoon form. I will focus on the harms of misinformation of the viewer by the visual schemata (Gombrich 1960) present in certain cartoons, and the way this misinformative visual schemata (Ibid) may also restrict the possibility of conceptual revisions in its viewership. Harms of this kind come out uniquely in cartoons via norms of cartooning (as a particularly stylized and symbolic mode of visual representation) and the norms of interaction employed in the act of viewing a cartoon. As we’ll see in our case study of the infamous Jyllands Posten cartoons of Muhammad the Prophet, even in cases where a cartoon representation bears no visual similarity to its referent, viewers can easily and reliably pick out the referent by calling to mind, in our focal case, the defamatory stereotypes, stock figures and icons inextricably linked with the referent. I argue that the damage to viewers of these sorts of depictions lies not in the fact that the viewer manages to pick out the intended referent of the depiction but what tools they use to pick out the referent and how such tools of reference (mis)inform their understanding of the referent they’ve picked out. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 64.4 (2003) 619-637 [Access article in PDF] Overcoming Gnosticism:Hans Jonas, Hans Blumenberg, and the Legitimacy of the Natural World Benjamin Lazier University of Chicago In 1984, about a decade before his own murder, the Romanian scholar of religion Ioan Culianu complained of a more widespread, if decidedly less grisly form of assault. 1 The gnostics, he declared in a moment of high jocularity, (...) had "taken hold of the whole world, and we were not aware of it. It is a mixed feeling of anxiety and admiration, since I cannot refrain myself from thinking that these alien body-snatchers have done a remarkable job indeed." 2Though offered in jest, Culianu's designation "alien body-snatchers" quite accurately sums up what has remained since 1934 the leading view of gnosticism as a delimited, identifiable phenomenon. In that year appeared the first monumental volume of Gnosis und spätantiker Geist (Gnosis and the Spirit of Late Antiquity) composed by the young Jewish philosopher Hans Jonas as a dissertation under Martin Heidegger and the theologian Rudolf Bultmann. Over the next sixty years Jonas returned again and again to the movement as he defined it. Above all, gnosticism had as its guiding principle the notion of das Fremde. The term includes in its linguistic domain not only "the alien," by which it is most usually translated, but its cognates as well: the strange, the foreign, the other, the unknown, the uncanny, and the like. This sense of alienation is wildly overdetermined in gnostic theology: man is alienated from himself, from a fully transcendent God, and most powerfully from the material, [End Page 619] sensuous universe in which he lives, created as it was by an evil, malicious demiurge. Such anti-cosmism could license both ascetic retreat from the world as well as an antinomian descent into the worldly abyss, with the intent to defeat it from within. The locution "body-snatcher" now acquires relevance, for gnostic theology made impossible any positive appraisal of the physical body, or of the physical world at all for that matter. As the political philosopher Leo Strauss put it in a letter to Jonas, gnosticism may well have been the most radical rebellion in Western history against the Greek notion of physis.In stylized terms Jonas's philosophical career represents what I would like to call gnosticism's "third overcoming." Such terms signal an allegiance to the work of the German philosopher Hans Blumenberg. But they signal a departure as well. In Legitimität der Neuzeit (Legitimacy of the Modern Age, 1966), Blumenberg undertook what must count among the most ambitious revisions of Western intellectual history ever ventured. Against a rash of attacks on the modern age as an ill-concealed, secularized derivative of an earlier Christian era, he stepped up in its defense. He linked the emergence of the modern age—defined preeminently by man's need for self-assertion, to act in the world—to a "second overcoming" of gnosticism at the end of the Middle Ages. The gnostic spirit he found revived by the nominalism and theological voluntarism of late-medieval scholastic theology, a loose confluence of thought centripetally bound by the black hole of the deus absconditus or hidden god. Whereas gnosticism's first overcoming was Augustine's work and but a partial success, its second, and for Blumenberg "final" overcoming was the work of an ethos of human self-assertion best instantiated by the scientific program of Francis Bacon.To argue for its third overcoming in the late 1920s and '30s is therefore to take leave of Blumenberg's account, if also to extend it. The condition for the possibility of this argument, of course, is that gnosticism had in fact returned. Gnosticism, or at the very least a host of phenomena going by the name and generally understood as such, did indeed return, and with a vengeance—on the occult scene, in philosophy, in theology of all persuasions, even in natural-scientific discourse. This period also witnessed the return of the... (shrink)

John Ford’s The Broken Heart has been interpreted as a play in which “mannered artifice” is able to impose beauty onto the chaos and misery of human affairs.1 For Sharon Hamilton, each character in the play “makes his blighted life more bearable by envisioning it as a work of art”: the “spiritual starvation” of the characters is consequently set against the fact that they are “beautifully stylized.”2 Apollo, god of beautiful form and appearance, and the patron of the Sparta (...) in which the play is set, is thus seen to triumph over the tragedies it charts, offering a means of redemption.3 In this essay, I argue, instead, that the play depicts beauty as a metaphysical ideal, identical with truth and... (shrink)

Much of Ludwik Fleck’s work on the social constitution of knowledge, scientific facts, and objects of inquiry is informed by a specific use of transcendental arguments. This paper analyzes the ways in which Fleck looks for “conditions of possibilities” for the stylization and circulation of cognition. Following a brief discussion of his political agenda regarding science’s “cultural mission,” the paper offers a reconstruction of Fleck’s implicit concept of the transcendental. It is argued that Fleck addresses scientific truth as an (...) ongoing revealing and concealing of possibilities for doing research. By implication, the truth about a scientific fact is at once situated in scientific practices and transcended by a horizon of possibilities. The transcendental takes shape in Fleck’s social epistemology as a result of the reflection upon knowledge production’s “situated transcendence.”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Style: A Queer Cosmology by S. Taylor BlackJoe Edward HatfieldStyle: A Queer Cosmology. By Taylor Black. New York: New York University Press, 2023. 304 pp. Hardcover $99.00, paper $35.00. ISBN- 10: 147982500X.Style is a perennial concern within rhetorical studies. As one of Aristotle's five canons, style has inspired a great deal of rhetorical theory over the past two millennia and counting. Hence, it would be reasonable to presume (...) that there is not much, if anything, else original to contribute to the well-trodden domain of the stylistic. However, Taylor Black's Style: A Queer Cosmology challenges this assumption by offering a fresh take on its titular concept. The book's grounding in the interdisciplinary field of American Studies allows its author to speak to multiple audiences at once, including those invested in queer theory, race and ethnicity, popular culture, new materialism, and literary criticism. To this inventory, I would add anyone interested in the art of rhetoric, particularly those committed to incorporating new, diverse perspectives into the field's existing analytical tool chest. Tonally whimsical but nonetheless boldly argued, Style dramatically reframes a timeworn concept in the rhetorical lexicon that many of us have likely—and mistakenly—come to take for granted.Readers of this journal will be immediately seduced by Black's provocative rethinking of style as elemental. Here, the term "elemental" directs attention toward style as "the rudimentary source of difference that distinguishes one thing from another, something perhaps, more closely aligned with myth than fact: an immaterial force or energy, perhaps supernatural in essence, that imbues everything under the sun" (5). As Black infers throughout the book's introduction, style is the expression of difference available to all human and nonhuman beings. More than aesthetic ornamentation, or the mere ability to make oneself appear outwardly beautiful, style is a mysterious yet universal condition of possibility underlying the cultivation [End Page 226] of a personality. Style names the intertwined processes of self-fashioning and self-discovery that produce individuation as its outcome. And though everyone "has" a style, Black asserts, "not everyone is a stylist" (15). Black posits the figure of the stylist to denote a minoritarian subject who transmutes the experience of oppression into a purposeful performance of self. Upon realizing their exclusion from a majoritarian social order organized by deeply embedded attachments to a hierarchy of difference that discriminates on bases of race, gender, sexuality, class, and other intersecting codes of identification, stylists turn their failure to conform into an opportunity for opening possibilities for alternative futures.In other words, from the limitations that accompany experiences of structural oppression, style authorizes potential. Referencing Zora Neale Hurston's 1928 essay "How It Feels to Be Colored Me," Black suggests stylists tend to dwell in cosmology, a form of storytelling or narrative fabulation about the universe's origins and one's place in its ongoing unfolding. "Stylists," Black poetically avers, are "naturally drawn to understanding the universe better by virtue of developing a more and more acute consciousness of who and what they are and how they came to be" (20). Black highlights style's fundamental elementality as emerging from cosmic renderings of marginalized experience and the pursuit of a future otherwise. To further illustrate this elemental notion of the stylistic, Black assembles an eclectic corpus of texts by those he calls "subterranean American stylists" (5), namely Quentin Crisp, Bob Dylan, Toni Morrison, Flannery O'Connor, and Edgar Allan Poe, among others, whose lives and work he examines over seven chapters divided into three main parts. Each chapter supplies unique insights on the elementals of style, as well as its subject matter, thus allowing Black to support the thesis constructed in the introduction without ever seeming overly redundant.The first part of Style, "The Mystery of Personality: Queerness as Style," consists of a preface and two chapters oriented around the specific ways stylizations of queer selfhood may function as a survival strategy and, relatedly, a means for exploring elemental mysteries of personality and being. In the initial chapter, Black analyzes texts authored by openly gay memoirist and cultural commentor Quentin Crisp, who became famous for his humorous and often brash... (shrink)

Let me begin with a stylized contrast between two ways of thinking about morality. On the one hand, morality can be understood as the dictate of, or uncovered by, impartial reason. That which is (truly) moral must be capable of being verified by everyone’s reasoning from a suitably impartial perspective. If we are to respect the free and equal nature of each person, each must (in some sense) rationally validate the requirements of morality. If we take this view, the (...) genuine requirements of morality are a matter of rational reflection and self-imposed law. For Kant it seemed to be a matter of reflection by a rational individual, testing the impartiality of his maxims. For Rousseau, who was an important influence on Kant, under the proper conditions collective deliberation could yield impartial rules of justice that are willed by all. From another point of view moralities are social facts with histories. The heroes of this tradition are Hume, Ferguson and, perhaps surprisingly given his “deductive” method, Hobbes. The moral codes — or if “code” implies too much systematization, moral “practices” — we have ended up with are, to some extent, a matter of chance. This is by no means to say that morality is entirely arbitrary, but it does contain a significant arbitrary element. The morality we have ended up with is path-dependent: only because our moral codes have started somewhere, and have changed in response to unanticipated events, can we explain why we ended up where we have, and different societies end up in different places. The proponents of each view typically seek to discredit the other. Those who conceive of morality as the demand of impartial reason often insist the evolutionists confuse “positive morality” (the moral code that people actually follow) with justified (or true) morality, which is revealed by impartial reason. The positive morality that has evolved is simply what people think is morality, not what really is morality.. (shrink)

Abstract. Since Darwin, scholars have contemplated what our growing understanding of natural selection, combined with the fact that great suffering occurs, allows us to infer about the possibility that a benevolent God created the universe. Building on this long line of thought, I develop a model that illustrates how undesirable characteristics of the world (stylized “evils”) can influence long-run outcomes. More specifically, the model considers an evolutionary process in which each generation faces a risk from a “natural evil” (e.g., (...) predation, disease, or a natural disaster) subsequent to a basic resource allocation game. This allows both resource allocation and the natural evil to influence the number of surviving offspring. As the model shows, when the risk from the natural evil can be mitigated through the benevolent behavior of neighbors, the population may have increasing benevolence as a result of (1) greater risk from the natural evil and (2) a greater degree to which selfish individuals transfer resources to themselves in the resource allocation game. The main implication is that a world with evolutionary processes (in contrast to a world of static design) can allow two factors that have traditionally been considered “evils”—namely, the indiscriminate cruelty of the natural world and the capacity for humans to harm each other—to promote desirable long-run outcomes. (shrink)

Harry Frankfurt’s twenty-two page long essay “On Bullshit” was published in 1986 in an academic journal and appeared as a stand-alone book in 2005. The small book was successful and has sparked many discussions by both academics and public intellectuals. In this article I want to examine if, in the realm of art, kitsch overlaps with bullshit as a sort of “aesthetic bullshit” or if there are differences between bullshit as a predominantly ethical phenomenon and kitsch, which works much more (...) with categories such as pleasure and indulgence. Given bullshit’s intrinsic link with techniques such as embellishment and the willful stylization of facts, as well as its ambition to create an autonomous reality, bullshit seems.. (shrink)

If we attempt to unify the theoretical efforts that appreciate a specific social activity in play, we can sketch the perspective of an entire anthropology of play into cohesive parts deriving from the knowledge of collective experience. This preoccupation is, in fact, two-fold. On the one hand is the comprehensive description of the relationship between life styles and their stylizations in everyday practices and customs as well as in cultural works, and on the other are social sensitivities and representations that (...) are relatively shared by individuals grouped in human communities. This very general framework encourages situating the presence of play as one of the concrete manifestations of an emotional core, converting primitively negative impulses into attractive forces which, because of this, becomes the seat of all human interaction and agitation, the energetic heart of social power. (shrink)

A scholarly and imaginative contribution to ethics and aesthetics. The author sees in certain types of abstract art an affectation of austerity which he interprets as compensation in the aesthetic realm for moral lassitude, and a symptom of the decadence which characterizes our age. Decadence is natural and inevitable; in fact, everything is decadence, but in some ages, notably ours, decadence becomes monstrous. The author distinguishes two types of austerity: the limited and rational, and the infinite. Rational austerity is the (...) austerity of the scientist, who denies himself everything but abstract relationships. Through this austerity, the aesthetic and moral realms are joined, in a Platonic fashion; but when this sort of austerity is applied to ethics, it results in a stylized and unproductive ethics. It is necessary to turn to infinite austerity, in which it is seen that the moral "cure" is itself a further "malady," but a malady which is a continuous cure. Even infinite austerity, however, is not enough; in the end, "C'est l'amour qui importe, non l'austérité."--D. S. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:GenetGerald PrinceGenet, by Edmund White (with a chronology by Albert Dichy); xliii & 820 pp. London: Picador, 1994, $29.95 paper.Abandoned to a foundling home in 1910 at the age of seven months, he started to steal before puberty, spent over two years as a teenager in the penal colony of Mettray, signed up with the French army for several tours of duty, and deserted. He traveled through Europe (...) and was arrested in Albania, Yugoslavia, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland. He was also repeatedly arrested and sent to jail in France—for embezzlement, for petty theft, for vagrancy—and his record of convictions made him liable for a life sentence until he was pardoned by the President of the Republic. He looked like a dandified tramp or a retired boxer. He frequented thugs and artists or philosophers, criminals and police chiefs, prostitutes as well as cabinet ministers. A book lover, he owned no books. A homosexual, he was rarely attracted to other homosexuals. A great champion of singularity, he came to feel that all human beings were equally valuable. Though he showed himself capable of impassioned friendship, he extolled and often practiced betrayal. He once boasted of being “strong from never having passed through a woman except at the moment of [his] birth” (p. 594). Yet he was a feminist. For a long time he could barely compose a standard letter in French but, when he died from throat cancer in 1985, he had written several masterpieces. He was Jean Genet.If, in his monumental Saint Genet, Sartre pays more attention to the configuration of the writer’s life than to the moments making up that life, Edmund White, in his admirable biography, patiently aligns the moments and waits for patterns to emerge. Genet is, first of all, a meticulous chronicle and can be savored for the details it provides about the protagonist’s daily life or its context, from gay bars in Pigalle to the 1968 Democratic convention in Chicago which Genet covered for Esquire. We learn many things. For example, that the FBI spelled his name as “John Genet” and Sartre’s as “Jean Paul Sat”; or that Leonard Nimoy (Mr. Spock) started his career by playing in movie versions of two Genet plays: The Balcony and Deathwatch.Through the accumulation of facts and anecdotes, great themes—homosexuality, death, abjection, gesture, power—slowly crystallize and White writes splendid pages on the quality of Genet’s texts (beyond their shock value: Genet said that “poetry is the art of using shit and making you eat it”). Written from 1942 to 1947, his five novels (Our Lady of the Flowers, The Miracle of the Rose, Funeral Rites, A Thief’s Journal, Querelle) treat homosexuality with unsurpassed candor, glorify evil, transvalue all values, and blend sociology and myth, slang and highly formal language, in a sumptuously lyrical prose. With The Balcony, The Blacks, and The Screens—composed between 1955 and 1957—Genet invents a stylized and ritualistic theater to explore the dynamics of power. Finally, in the striking mixture of memoir, pamphlet, and epic called The Prisoner of Love [End Page 146] (1985) Genet exalts two disinherited groups—the Black Panthers, the Palestinians—and suggests that love is the site where uniqueness and universality merge.More generally, certain constants in Genet’s life become evident: the loyalty to the abandoned child he was and the hatred for the bourgeois society that dispossessed him; the need to reject before being rejected; the fascination with power and the affirmation of otherness; the ability to mythify himself as an angel of rebellion. Genet was a sociopath of genius.Above all, by its scrupulous scholarship, its successful determination to remain impartial, and its capacity for authoritative prosaism, White’s biography encourages readers to take a (new) look at Genet’s flamboyantly unorthodox writing. It is a remarkable achievement.Gerald PrinceUniversity of PennsylvaniaCopyright © 1995 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

Mainstream news broadcasting pursues an authentication project, to bolster its claims to serious, weighty and factual news reporting. News review contributes to this project when it seeks to humanize front-stage news personnel. It moves away from the traditional, institutionalized concern with `authenticity-from-above' and works to generate `authenticity-from-below'. As an extreme instance of resistance to the `from-above' formulation, this article considers data from a televised UK weekday morning show, The Big Breakfast, and specifically its `review of the papers' slot. The show's (...) orientation is iconoclastic, from the establishment perspective on news, partly by its high degree of reflexivity about the television medium. Its main presenter, Johnny Vaughan, extrapolates from newsprint sources well beyond the conventional bounds of the review genre. He delivers a thoroughly performed, burlesque response to more and less trivial aspects of the day's print news. His stylized vocal and visual representations of figures in the news achieve a populist moral consensus, as a key process in constructing a `from-below' authenticity. Even in this thoroughly tabloidized and comic performance, the show retains a clear critical dimension, strikingly at odds with authorized modes of news and news review. (shrink)

The chapter explores the perceptual and epistemic structures of boomerang perception, as developed by María Lugones, by focusing on contemporary lived experiences of Latinas of commercialization and homogenization. Boomerang perception is the mechanism through which people of color are constructed through a white imaginary lens and denied subjectivity. The internalization of boomerang perception subsequently yields horizontal hostilities whereby people of color construct each other through white eyes and engender a fake/real dichotomy that polices the boundaries of communities. The commercialization of (...) Latina identity in the 21st century serves as one example that draws out the ways in which boomerang perception is internalized and plays on the production of the real/fake dichotomy. Drawing on Gloria Anzaldúa’s notion of conocimiento, the chapter subsequently considers the possibilities of resistance through the development of style politics that can transform embodied ways of knowing. In this capacity, the chapter takes up the project of chonga stylized politics as exemplifying practices of conocimiento. (shrink)

Este artigo tematiza o desamparo vivenciado pela consciência ante a ausência de bases sólidas para seus anseios de felicidade e para suas representações simbólicas. Com esse propósito, toma como objeto de reflexão um dos ensaios filosóficos de Albert Camus, O mito de Sísifo, equacionando a possibilidade de uma ética que estilize a vida, sem que se minimize a dolorosa precariedade da existência humana. Posteriormente, em diálogo com alguns textos de M. Foucault, a reflexão procura estabelecer os vínculos possíveis entre a (...) ética camusiana e a ética como uma estética da existência, tal como pensada entre os gregos antigos. This article discusses the helplessness experienced by the consciousness vis-à-vis the absence of solid bases for its longings for happiness and for its symbolic representations. For this purpose, the object of reflection of the article is one of Albert Camus' philosophical essays, The Myth of Sisyphus, and we inquire into the possibility of an ethics that stylizes life without minimizing the painful precariousness of human existence. Making reference to certain texts by Foucault, we attempt to establish possible connections between Camus' ethics and an ethics of the aesthetics of existence as found in the thinkers of ancient Greece. (shrink)

This paper explores Merleau-Ponty’s mature philosophy of painting as it emerges out of his essay, “Eye and Mind.” It does so by briefly outlining the ontology implicit in this discussion of the phenomenology of painting, an ontology that finds a more explicit expression in a consideration of other works by Merleau-Ponty, namely, The Visible and the Invisible and Phenomenology of Perception. This is an ontology of style, perspective, becoming. Having briefly sketched this image of the world, the paper moves to (...) a study of the phenomenological significance of Picasso’s famous Dora Maar au Chat. This is the primary aim of this paper: the staging of an encounter between Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenologist, and Pablo Picasso, the painter. We will find in this encounter the claim that it is by means of the painter’s style that he brings his world to life. In seeing the painting, we see along with it: we see the painter’s own way of seeing the world. In seeing the painting we are literally seeing seeing. But we do so by means of our own stylized perspectives, for vision, in Merleau-Ponty’s eyes, is itself already stylized. This is a pan-stylicism: an endless interplay of stylistic becomings the locus of which is the painting itself. As the emblem of this interplay, the painting is capable of disrupting profane vision, of awakening vision to the bottomless plenitude of being, and transforming it thereby. (shrink)

In Between Facts and Norms, Jürgen Habermas works out the legal and political implications of his Theory of Communicative Action (1981), bringing to fruition the project announced with his publication of The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere in 1962. This new work is a major contribution to recent debates on the rule of law and the possibilities of democracy in postindustrial societies, but it is much more. The introduction by William Rehg succinctly captures the special nature of the (...) work, noting that it offers a sweeping, sociologically informed conceptualization of law and basic rights, a normative account of the rule of law and the constitutional state, an attempt to bridge normative and empirical approaches to democracy, and an account of the social context required for democracy. Finally, the work frames and caps these arguments with a bold proposal for a new paradigm of law that goes beyond the dichotomies that have afflicted modern political theory from its inception and that still underlie current controversies between so-called liberals and civic republicans. The book includes a postscript written in 1994, which restates the argument in light of its initial reception, and two appendixes, which cover key developments that preceded the book. Habermas himself was actively involved in the translation, adapting the text as necessary to make it more accessible to English-speaking readers. (shrink)

Some modern philosophers have retrieved the old idea that the identification of facts and events is dependent on language. For instance, Davidson holds that ...

In an article published in this journal in 1996, I surveyed number stylization in monetary amounts recorded in Roman-era literature up to the Severan period. I argued that certain leading digits such as 1, 3 and 4 were heavily over-represented in the evidence. For the limited samples I used at the time these findings are not in need of revision. However, as I show here, a more inclusive approach to the material produces a substantially different picture. The most significant shortcoming (...) of my study was my failure to take account of the probable distribution of leading digits in a random sample, which may serve as a benchmark for assessing the nature and extent of number preference. While I noted that lower leading digits were inherently more likely to occur than higher ones, I schematically related observed frequencies to an even distribution of leading digits. This benchmarking strategy is invalidated by a widely observed phenomenon known as Benford's Law, according to which leading digits frequently conform to a predictable pattern that greatly favours lower over higher numbers. This is true in particular if observations are spread across several orders of magnitude. Ancient monetary valuations satisfy this condition since recorded amounts range from single digits to hundreds of millions. Yet, to the best of my knowledge, Benford's Law has never been applied to the study of these data. (shrink)

The essay addresses the debates about the ontology of norms considering the case of accounting for customary norms. It undertakes and defends a stance in favor of a semantic ontology by developing a framework for the explanation of norms as abstract objects and their linking with social facts to be identified in categories like “customary”, “enacted”, “legal”, “grammatical”, and so on. Furthermore, the work addresses the rival conceptions (pragmatic and eclectic) by showing the specific impossibility that these face for (...) giving a satisfactory account on customary norms. The inquiry concludes by exploring some possible insights from the philosophy of mind to explain the conceptual nature of norms as mental representations. (shrink)

An argument that the major metaphysical theories of facts give us no good reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world. -/- In this book Arianna Betti argues that we have no good reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world, at least as they are described by the two major metaphysical theories of facts. She claims that neither of these theories is tenable—neither the theory according to which facts are special (...) structured building blocks of reality nor the theory according to which facts are whatever is named by certain expressions of the form “the fact that such and such.” There is reality, and there are entities in reality that we are able to name, but, Betti contends, among these entities there are no facts. -/- Drawing on metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and linguistics, Betti examines the main arguments in favor of and against facts of the two major sorts, which she distinguishes as compositional and propositional, giving special attention to methodological presuppositions. She criticizes compositional facts (facts as special structured building blocks of reality) and the central argument for them, Armstrong's truthmaker argument. She then criticizes propositional facts (facts as whatever is named in “the fact that” statements) and what she calls the argument from nominal reference, which draws on Quine's criterion of ontological commitment. Betti argues that metaphysicians should stop worrying about facts, and philosophers in general should stop arguing for or against entities on the basis of how we use language. (shrink)

Should our factual understanding of the world influence our normative theorising about it? G.A. Cohen has argued that our ultimate normative principles should not be constrained by facts. Many others have defended or are committed to various versions or subsets of that claim. In this paper I dispute those positions by arguing that, in order to resist the conclusion that ultimate normative principles rest on facts about possibility or conceivability, one has to embrace an unsatisfactory account of how (...) principles generate normative political judgments. So political theorists have to choose between principles ostensibly unbiased by our current understanding of human motivation and political reality, or principles capable of reliably generating political judgments. I conclude with wider methodological observations in defence of the latter option, and so of a return to political philosophy’s traditional blend of normative and descriptive elements. (shrink)

With the Descriptive Constraint discussed in Ch. 9 at hand, Ch. 11 examines diverse theories of facts with a view to establishing how viable they are, and then turns to claims about the semantics of causal statements that have been used to motivate ontologies of facts and events. Neale makes the point that there is considerable confusion in the literature on the matter of whether causal statements are extensional, but shows that once the clarifications effected in earlier chapters (...) are brought to bear, almost all of the confusion can be eradicated and decisive results obtained. There are still some extensional causal statements, and these can be delimited on the basis of their superficial grammatical forms, but there are other causal statements for which it is, as far as Neale can ascertain, still an open question whether extensional or non‐extensional treatments are to be preferred, much turning on the position taken on the overall shape of a semantic theory. If non‐extensional treatments prove appealing, the resulting theories will have to satisfy the strictures imposed by the Descriptive Constraint. The six sections of the chapter are: Identity Connectives; Fact Identity; Events; Events and Causes; Facts and Causes; and Fact Identity Again. (shrink)

In *Austerlitz* by W.G. Sebald, we go through a detailed report of Austerlitz of Austerlitz's life as delivered by him to a narrator about whom we know very little. The story dwells on a wealth of events and situations that Austerlitz experienced at the time as strange or episodic. There is however a constant impulse that, in hindsight, Austerlitz regards as unifying all those events and situations. I will approach the story in *Austerlitz* as the recounting of the process by (...) which Austerlitz becomes aware of the direction of this impulse and engages in a quest for truth the details of which will reveal (and determine) the ethical nature of the impulse that unifies his life. More specifically, I will account for Austerlitz's constant impulse in terms of the inescapability of a certain dynamics of projection that connects a particular situation to which his life is anchored to a more universal concern. (shrink)

Cílem mého článku je podat kritiku fact-checkingu a navrhnout úpravy metodiky vedoucí ke zvýšení jeho epistemické relevance. Nejprve představím současný model fact-checkingu jako odvětví aplikované epistemologie, jeho metodiku a cíle. Dále vymezím a zhodnotím epistemické charakteristiky procesu fact-checkingu modelovaného coby typ přesvědčovacího dialogu. Jakou měrou by měl institucionalizovaný fact-checking ovlivňovat důvěru veřejnosti v hodnocená tvrzení? Jaké jsou epistemologické charakteristiky hodnotících kritérií fact checkingu? Kdy jsou fact-checkingová kritéria objektivní?

The terms theory, fact, and hypothesis are sometimes treated as though they had clear meanings and clear relations with one another, but their histories and uses are more complex and diverse than might be expected. The usual sense of these words places them in a relationship of increasing uncertainty. A fact is usually thought of as a described state of affairs in which the descriptions are true or highly supported. A highly corroborated or supported hypothesis is also a fact; a (...) less well corroborated one is still a hypothesis. A hypothesis which is not supported by or corroborated by other evidence would not be a fact, but could become a fact if it came to be corroborated to a high degree of certainty by other evidence. Similarly, a theory, which is a logically connected set of hypotheses, could come to be a fact if the hypotheses in the theory were to be highly corroborated by the evidence. (shrink)

This is a brief exploration of the notion of an objective fact. The form of objectivity at issue is distinct from epistemic objectivity or objectivity about truth. It is an ontological form of objectivity. Objective facts may obtain whether or not we know, believe or are aware of them. They depend upon objects, for example, on the properties that objects have or the relationships into which objects enter. Setting scepticism to one side, there is a perfectly mundane sense in (...) which we may come to have knowledge or fail to have knowledge of such facts. We must perceive objective facts from a perspective, but this does not enter into the facts. Nor does the fact that we must describe facts using language mean that facts are language-dependent. (shrink)