Open peer commentary on the target article “Arguments Opposing the Radicalism of Radical Constructivism” by Gernot Saalmann. First paragraph: My remarks are basedon the view that mind-and-world structures of subject-inclusive experience are created by individual and collective subjects, and are not derived from pre-existing subject-exclusive structures structuring; see my papers in CF and the Karl Jaspers Forum). I will comment on two points.

The rise of modernity in the 19th century can, among other things, be vividly illustrated by the phenomenal advance of medical profession and, in particular, surgery as its most radical form. In the 20th century, the doctor has already been steadily associated with the phenomenon of power. Medical experiments on human subjects are generally recognized as one of the most extreme manifestations of this discursive nexus. Despite considerable amount of historical research, predominantly dealing with the experiences of Nazi medicine and (...) its patients in concentration camps and some other disciplinary institutions, as well as somewhat gloomy attraction providing for unabated fascination on the part of trivial literature, such experiments have not yet become an established literary topos. The elusive nature of this phenomenon which belongs to the kern of post-war anxiety, but is rarely addressed to, allows me to attest to the fact that human experiments, especially those conducted in Nazi concentration camps, have become a cultural «exclusion zone». Nonetheless, there is a whole range of texts in which attempts has been made to overcome the cultural taboo and to give voice to the victims of human vivisection. Two of them – Friedrich Dürrenmatt’s Suspicion and Marcel Beyers The Flying Foxes – are analyzed in this paper against the backdrop of the so called «intellectual witness» – a concept proposed by Geoffrey Hartman and meaning a distanced witnessing, mostly on behalf of younger generations or, as in case with Dürrenmatt, of those who stayed aside of the World War II. In both novels, the narrative structures of intellectual witnessing serve to surmount the metaphorizing tendency which turns the reality of human experiments into tropes corroborating the author’s idea or concept. Combining documentary elements with the elements of trivial fiction, Dürrenmatt and Beyer make significant strides in deconstructing the naïve «over-identifying» with the victims, as well as their overt fictionalization. As a result, they manage to open the possibility of witness beyond the perspective of eyewitnesses, and at the same time subjugate this rearticulation of the past to the demands of the present situation that facilitates it. This perilous duality reveals the ethical double bind which seems to be inherent to the most reactualizations of utterly traumatic historical experiences, such as human experimentation, transformed into «exclusion zones» and then voiced through intellectual witness and other forms of «secondary witness». In order to become an object of witnessing, those traumatic experiences must correspond to the anxieties of the present originating from them. While triggering the reactualization process, such anxieties, however, also subject the experience of concrete victims to the desiderata of a traumatized «(intellectual) witness» and, in such a way, misuse the tragedy as a means of the witness’s coming to terms with his or her own trauma. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Misquotations from RealityAnn Lauterbach (bio)In the girdle of Aphrodite, in the crown, in the body of Helen and her phantom, beauty is superimposed over necessity, cloaking it in deceit. The necessary has a certain splendor, and behind any splendor one senses a metallic coldness, as though of a weapon poised to strike. The real split in Greek consciousness, like all other irreversible steps it took, comes when Plato for (...) the first time affirms, ‘How very different is the nature of the necessary from the nature of the good.’ And he means an immense, an unbridgeable distance—the same distance that made atheists of ‘those who study astronomy and other sciences of the necessary, when they see that what is, is so out of necessity and not out of any plan conceived by some will to accomplish the good.’ The Beautiful, in this scenario, must either be quickly reabsorbed into the Good—as its agent, instrument, and pedagogue—or left up in the air, like a malignant spell (goeteuma) bewitching the mind only to subject it even more helplessly to the fiat of necessity.—Roberto Calasso, The Marriage of Cadmus and Harmonyl. The Stranger’s HandOnce at the circus, when I was young we were strolling around in a throng of clowns and cotton candy, bright sun, I looked up to find that the hand I was holding was that of a stranger.Just before dawn, ejected from sleep, I am unraveled into another condition.The place between these two conditions is complex and difficult, a peculiar suspension between two exclusive frames for which there is no dialogue box. The familiar crosses into the unfamiliar and back again.What separates works of art from the fallible empirical world is not their higher degree of perfection but their ability to actualize themselves in a brilliant and expressive appearance just like fireworks. 1Fireworks! Temporality construed as ephemeral vision.And so: In every work of art something appears that does not exist. 2And so: The question of the truth of art comes into view when a non-existent is seen to rise as if it were real. In terms of its form, art promises what is not real. Objectively, it raises the claim, however obliquely this may come out, that just because something appears, it [End Page 143] must be possible to imbue it with being. The unquenchable longing excited by the beautiful is the longing for the fulfillment of a promise. 3The promise of meaning.One of my students writes, “We deem beautiful that which offers meaning to our meaningless lives.”I failed to draw a map and you followed it perfectly because the word for ‘cannot’ inscribes itself here to define an atmosphere of absolute trust which both fastens and unfastens us. 4Day unblooms into insatiable prerogatives vetoedsustained in their august sudden ramifications as if saying soEvery frame is danger and security. Poems that interest me are poems that show me how to proceed, not where to go or what to look at. They assuage the panic of the Stranger’s Hand by awakening curiosity rather than fear. The poem attests to the mobility of the frame, not to the totality of the picture.Thus the grip of realism has found a picture chosen to cover the space occupied by another picture establishing a flexibility so we are not immobile like a car that spends its night outside a window, but mobile like a spirit. 5* * * but we were not, we are not shadows; as we walk, heel and sole leave our sandal-prints in the sand, though the wounded heel treads lightly and more lightly follow, the purple sandals. 6 [End Page 144]2. The Real ThingA poet too has constantly to ask himself: “but is what I am writing really true?”—and this does not necessarily mean: “Is this how it happens in reality?” 7I do not remember when or why I became interested in looking at the ways in which notions of the truth and notions of the real had become blurred. Perhaps in the slogans of advertising. Perhaps it was the political discourse around the Vietnam... (shrink)

BACKGROUND: Delusions in schizophrenia are commonly approached as empirical false beliefs about everyday reality. Phenomenological accounts, by contrast, have suggested that delusions are more adequately understood as pertaining to a different kind of reality experience. How this alteration of reality experience should be characterised, which dimensions of experiential life are involved, and whether delusional reality might differ from standard reality in various ways is unclear and little is known about how patients with delusions value and (...) relate to these experiential alterations. This study aimed to investigate the nature of delusional reality experience, and its subjective apprehension, in individuals with lived experience of delusions and a schizophrenia-spectrum diagnosis. METHODS: In this qualitative phenomenological study, we recruited individuals with lived experience of delusions and a schizophrenia-spectrum diagnosis from two psychiatric-hospital services in Belgium using homogenous sampling. Criteria for participation were having undergone at least one psychotic episode with occurring delusional symptoms, present at least 1 year before participation, on the basis of clinical notes assessed by the attending psychiatrist; a schizophrenia-spectrum diagnosis, ascertained through clinical interview by the attending psychiatrist upon admission; being aged between 18 years and 65 years; and having the capacity to give informed consent. Exclusion criteria included worries concerning capacity to consent and risk of distress caused by participation. We did phenomenologically driven semi-structured interviews with the participants to explore the nature of delusional reality experience and their subjective valuation of these experiences. We used interpretative phenomenological analysis, a qualitative method tailored to the in-depth exploration of participants’ first-person perspective, to analyse their accounts. FINDINGS: Between March 2, 2020, and Sept 30, 2020, 18 adults participated in the interview study. The findings suggest that delusions are often embedded in wide-ranging alterations of basic reality experience, involving quasi-ineffable atmospheric and ontological qualities that undermine participants’ sense of the world as unambiguously real, fully present, and shared with others. We also found that delusional reality experience can differ from standard reality in various ways, across multiple dimensions, and that participants are often implicitly or explicitly aware of the distinction between delusional and standard reality. Delusional experience can have an enduring value and meaning that is not fully captured by a strictly medical perspective. INTERPRETATION: Increased awareness and recognition of the distinctive nature of delusional reality experience, in both clinical and research settings, can improve diagnostic accuracy, explanatory models, and therapeutic support for individuals with delusions whose lived realities are not always evident from an everyday perspective. FUNDING: FWO Flanders. TRANSLATION: For the Dutch translation of the abstract see Supplementary Materials section. (shrink)

The central thesis of the philosophy of Advaita Vedānta is the doctrine of the identity of brahman and ātman. Brahman is essentially sat, being as such in the sense of the dimension of existence in which all worldly goings-on take place. The ātman is conceived as the “seer,” i.e., as the pure subject qua the to-whom of any experiential givenness; and this subject, in turn, is understood not as some entity that performs the seeing but as nothing but (...) the very seeing itself, i.e., as consciousness in the sense of the abiding presence-realm in which permanently changing experiential contents come to givenness. The Advaitic thesis is that this presence-realm—the seeing that takes place “in us”—is ultimately nothing other than the universal being-dimension—brahman—itself, modified by the mental contents of an innerworldly individual. This paper attempts to vindicate this doctrine by a series of reflections on the nature of the I and of reality as such. It argues that Advaita Vedānta can be viewed as a version of cosmopsychism in its idealist version which does not view consciousness as one of the features of the cosmos as a whole, but as its exclusive intrinsic nature, i.e., as the very essence of being as such. (shrink)

Dharmakīrti’s apoha theory of concept formation aims to provide an account of intersubjectivity without relying on the existence of real universals. He uses the pan-Yogācāra theory of karmic imprints to claim that sentient beings form concepts by treating unique particulars as if a certain subset of them had the same effects. Since this judgment of sameness depends on an individual's habits, desires, and sensory capacities, and these in turn depend on the karmic imprints developed over countless lifetimes and continuously reshaped (...) by ongoing actions, the extent to which individuals experience themselves as acting within a shared world depends on these imprints. However, a number of critics—traditional and contemporary—have expressed compelling doubts about whether or not apoha can be successful given Dharmakīrti's ontology which, in addition to denying universals, eventually denies the reality of even the most basic structure of conventional experience: subject/object duality. In line with the tradition he inherits, Dharmakīrti considers even the mere division of a moment of awareness into defined structures of subject and object to be a distortion shaped by beginningless karmic imprints. While this initial moment of awareness is nonconceptual, the experience of a certain world is always already shaped by the previous actions of sentient beings trapped within the web of saṃsāra, in a process driven by ignorance. Dharmakīrti’s reliance on karmic imprints on two distinct levels—one within the conventional world, and one which constitutes the conventional world—may thereby provide a compelling account of intersubjectivity without relying on universals. (shrink)

Argues that social science has not achieved the pre-eminence of physical science because it lacks a theory of social dynamics. To overcome this problem and prepare for a future of interacting agents, a theory is sketched of the social statics and dynamics in interaction contexts. The boundary limits of cognitive science are established and a theory that maps between objective and subjective reality is provided. By determining the relationships between perceived and actual situations and behaviors, interaction context theory has (...) the potential to advance our knowledge of human behavior. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Leslie Armour argues for the rules of a dialectical logic which can account for the metaphysical problems of stability and change. He proposes a specific/general exclusion reference, a variation of the polar opposites contrast, which will make possible a rigorous development of the core structural concepts necessary for systematic explanation. His initial move is significantly different from Hegel’s being-nothing-becoming triad. The opposite of "pure being," Armour contends, is "pure disjunction." "Being" unifies, "disjunction" makes distinctions possible. Seven more categories are developed, (...) each at lower levels of abstraction, to introduce actual specificity and change. Armour’s main contention is that Hegel erred in introducing concrete "becoming" at a high level of logical abstraction. The ordering of his concepts is straightforward. "Pure being" contrasted with "pure disjunction" necessitates "determinate being." "Systematic unity" unifies the opposing elements in and. "Pure process" establishes the possibility of ongoing experience. Particularity is accounted for by the concepts of "determinate process" instantiated in the contrast of "ideal" and "objective universality" realized in the "dialectical individual." The final concept maintains the tension between structure and actualization without resulting in mere vacillation. This is done by arguing that self-identity is not a matter of bodily and dispositional consistency, but, rather, the pursuit of reasonableness. Armour contends that we identify people by the coherence of their actions which is understood in the context of an overall structure, such as the one he proposes. Some will be bothered by Armour’s admission that the development of the concepts of specificity cannot exemplify the necessity of the more general initial dialectical concepts. Others will be attracted to the degree of freedom for the subject in his concept of individuality which is supported by a clear systematic account.—P. G. W. S. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to present an overview of emergent examples of macroscopic quantum phenomena. While quantum theory asserts that such quantum behaviors as superposition, entanglement, and coherence are possible for all objects, assumptions that quantum processes operate exclusively within the quantum realm have contributed to on-going bias toward presumed primacy of classical physics in the macroscopic realm. Non-trivial quantum macroscopic effects are now recognized in the fields of biology, quantum physics, quantum computing, quantum astronomy, and neuroscience, with (...) implications for medicine, psychology and sociology. Robust examples of macroscopic quantum coherence and entanglement contain unmistakable biological advantages, such as are observed in the green sulphur bacteria photosynthesis transfer mechanism, and in the navigational system of the European Robin. Macroscopic quantum processes in the form of an olfactory electron tunneling mechanism best account for the otherwise inexplicable difference observed in the odor of identically-shaped molecules. Evidence of reverse-direction causality is apparent in experiments with large numbers of photons and human subjects. Entanglement, retrocausality, and superposition of states are suggested as causal factors to account for increases in efficacy of the placebo effect. Alternate histories of "flashbulb memories" and embodied cognition are considered as possible examples of superposition of states in a holographic multiverse in which the many worlds of the multiverse and the many worlds of quantum mechanics might just be one and the same thing. Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;}. (shrink)

The essay aims to offer some thoughts about the configuration of the subject as a category of analysis for the understanding of citizenship. For this purpose, two key dimensions are outlined: ideal and empirical. The arguments presented allow an understanding of citizenship as a symbolic construct fraught with tension, beyond the legal and administrative dimension; for example, through its links with migration, racism and identity. Finally, it presents what we have called the ideal-empirical subject, as a construct that (...) contributes to the understanding of social reality from the perspective of the subject as irreducible singularity. The central thesis of this essay is that citizenship, as a construct supported in the inclusion exclusion dichotomy, operates as a shaping element of the ideal-empirical subject in modern societies, and more specifically in globalized post-industrial societies. El ensayo tiene por objetivo exponer algunas reflexiones relativas a la configuración del sujeto como categoría de análisis para la comprensión de la ciudadanía. Para estos efectos se plantean dos dimensiones claves, la ideal y la empírica. Los argumentos que se presentan permiten captar la ciudadanía como un constructo simbólico cargado de tensiones, más allá de la dimensión jurídica y administrativa; por ejemplo, por medio de su articulación con las migraciones, el racismo y la identidad. Finalmente se expone lo que hemos denominado el sujeto ideal-empírico, como constructo que contribuye a la comprensión de la realidad social desde la perspectiva del sujeto, en tanto singularidad irreductible. La tesis central de este ensayo es que la ciudadanía en tanto constructo sustentado en la dicotomía inclusión exclusión opera como elemento modelador del sujeto ideal-empírico en el escenario de las sociedades modernas y más específicamente en las sociedades postindustriales globalizadas. (shrink)

So obviously and blatantly real is the world around us—our own bodies and all things within reach of our senses—that from time immemorable man has tended to give it exclusive status—to feel that things in and related by space are the only realities. Such a belief is adequate for all practical affairs, but philosophers have always recognized that something is lacking in it. The very statement of the existence and reality of the external world brings in a second (...) element: the mind that recognizes and admits it; the agent that by its own consciousness establishes the contrast of internal and external. This mind—the group of all our interrelated mental faculties, conceptions, and perceptions, and our consciousness of them—is definitely not something external, not something in space that can be handled physically, and studied in its mechanical and geometrical relationships. It is completely invisible, intangible, and inaudible, and obviously we neither taste nor smell it. It forms no part of the external world, and yet the very fact that we are conscious of the world is a tacit recognition of the mind that perceives it. An inevitable dualism seems to result between the internal mind and the external world it perceives, between the subjective and the objective. (shrink)

The relationship between 'subjective' and 'objective' features of social reality (and between 'subjectivist' and 'objectivist' sociological approaches) remains problematic within social thought. Phenomenology is often taken as a paradigmatic example of subjectivist sociology, since it supposedly places exclusive emphasis on actors' 'subjective' interpretations, thereby neglecting 'objective' social structures. In this article, we question whether phenomenology is usefully understood as falling on either side of the standard divides, arguing that phenomenology's conception of 'subjective' experience of social reality includes (...) many features taken to be 'objective' elements of it. We illustrate our argument by a critical examination of Jean Lave's attempt to differentiate social practice theory from phenomenology. We show that many theoretical positions that want to overcome the subjective—objective dualism retain an objectivist conception of the 'subjective' features of social reality. (shrink)

Underlying theories of rape in legal philosophy are assumptions about the relationships between rights and property, self and others, mind and body, public and private domains, subject and object. Philosophers who study sexual assault by focusing almost exclusively on the law of rape often fail to interrogate their implicit ways of conceptualizing subjects and the harm done to them. In particular, these analyses often overlook the impact of rape on the development of personal identity and understanding of self. This (...) project provides an analysis of the wrongness of rape that considers rape not as a moment of nonconsent, but as a stage in an experiential process that includes, but is not limited to, the violation of rights. By integrating the philosophical methods of phenomenology and critical theory with current writings on the philosophy of rape law, rape trauma, and critical race theory, this study develops a descriptively full theory of rape that takes the experience of the survivor as the point of departure. A philosophically rich understanding of the harm of rape emerges when approaching the issue through the lived realities of women who have been subjected to sexual violence along with a critical social theory of how the social, historical, and material conditions inform that experience. (shrink)

The phenomenal properties of conscious mental states happen to be exclusively accessible from the first-person perspective. Consequently, some philosophers consider their existence to be incompatible with materialist metaphysics. In this paper I criticise one particular argument that is based on the idea that for something to be real it must (at least in principle) be accessible from an intersubjective perspective. I argue that the exclusively subjective access to phenomenal contents can be explained by the very particular nature of the epistemological (...) relation holding between a subject and his own mental states. Accordingly, this subjectivity does not compel us to deny the possibility that phenomenal contents are ontologically objective properties. First, I present the general form of the argument that I will discuss. Second, I show that this argument makes use of a criterion of reality that is not applicable to the case of subjective experience. Third, I discuss a plausible objection and give an argument for rejecting observation models of self-knowledge of phenomenal contents. These models fall prey to the homunculus illusion. (shrink)

The life of the brain is believed to be a major factor determining the existence of subjective reality during clinical death. The duration of the existence in question cannot be measured in the units of astronomical time for two reasons. Firstly, it is impossible to determine once and for all how long the brain survives after cardiac arrest and termination of breathing. Secondly, the duration of subjective time during near death experience (NDE) differs from that typical of daily regular (...) experience. Immobilization, loss of the sensation of one’s body, state of affect and severe sensory deprivation ensure that consciousness is focused and fixated in and onto itself exclusively which, in its turn, diminish and slacken the course of time so that it expands to eternity and subjective reality goes beyond the usual limits of the temporal “past-present-future” paradigm. (shrink)

In recent years some archaeological commentators have suggested moving away from an exclusively anthropocentric view of social reality. These ideas endorse elevating objects to the same ontological level as humans – thus creating a symmetrical view of reality. However, this symmetry threatens to force us to abandon the human subject and theories of meaning. This article defends a different idea. It is argued here that an archaeology of the social, based on human intentionality, is possible, while maintaining (...) an ontology that does not involve dualistic conceptions of reality. Building upon the philosophical work of Vincent Descombes, it is contended that humans are intentional actors and society is predicated on triadic relations that involve humans, objects and meanings. These relations can only be understood holistically, given that these relations are merely parts of a meta-narrative. These meta-narratives contain specific historical and social settings, and it is only within these settings that social relations are intelligible. (shrink)

This article is an attempt to rethink the interconnectedness between discourse and subjective agency and to highlight methodological approaches to studies of gendering processes as a central part of it. The notions of desire, subjectification and biography are understood as mediated by narratives and metaphors, as a movement between the individual and her contexts. The transformative methodological project suggests conceptual retoolings as new analytic approaches to empirical analysis of the kind that aims to provide complex understanding of subjectification processes in (...) lived life. The empirical field brought into the article as a means of explication deals with university cultures, and more specifically with a case of an assistant professor caught in conflicts between official academic discourses and more subtle political and gendered discourses. The author takes the concepts of desire trajectories, discursive authority, multifaceted discursive realities and past experiences into an analysis of the enacting forces involved in the processes of exclusion that finally ejects the protagonist in the empirical case from the university field. (shrink)

In its traditional form epistemology has always rested on the exclusive reality of the subject-object relationship. If one asks how the subject knows the object, one has in brief form the essence of theory of knowledge from Plato to Bergson; the differences between the many schools of philosophy can all be understood as variations on this theme. There are, first of all, differences in emphasis as to whether the subject or the object is the more (...) real--as in rationalism and empiricism, idealism and materialism, personalism and logical positivism. There are differences, secondly, as to the nature of the subject, which is variously regarded as pure consciousness, will to life, will to power, the scientific observer, or the intuitive knower. There are differences, thirdly, as to the nature of the object--whether it is material reality, thought in the mind of God or man, pantheistic spiritual substance, absolute and eternal mystical Being, or simply something which we cannot know in itself but upon which we project our ordered thought-categories of space, time, and causation. There are differences, finally, as to the relation between subject and object: whether the object is known through dialectical or analytical reasoning, scientific method, phenomenological insight into essence, or some form of direct intuition. (shrink)

The phenomenal properties of conscious mental states happen to be exclusively accessible from the first-person perspective. Consequently, some philosophers consider their existence to be incompatible with materialist metaphysics. In this paper I criticise one particular argument that is based on the idea that for something to be real it must (at least in principle) be accessible from an intersubjective perspective. I argue that the exclusively subjective access to phenomenal contents can be explained by the very particular nature of the epistemological (...) relation holding between a subject and his own mental states. Accordingly, this subjectivity does not compel us to deny the possibility that phenomenal contents are ontologically objective properties. First, I present the general form of the argument that I will discuss. Second, I show that this argument makes use of a criterion of reality that is not applicable to the case of subjective experience. Third, I discuss a plausible objection and give an argument for rejecting observation models of self-knowledge of phenomenal contents. These models fall prey to the homunculus illusion. (shrink)

Amid the wide variety of interpretations of quantum mechanics, the notion of a fully coherent ontological interpretation has seen a promising evolution over the last few decades. Despite this progress, however, the old dualistic categorical constraints of subjectivity and objectivity, correlate with the metrically restricted definition of local and global, have remained largely in place – a reflection of the broader, persistent inheritance of these comfortable strictures throughout the evolution of modern science. If one traces this inheritance back to its (...) ancient roots in Plato and Aristotle, it is clear that the coherence, scientific utility, and historical durability of the various natural philosophies that followed have been directly proportional to their commitment, tacit or explicit, to object-oriented realism. As Simondon might put it, it is a commitment to the primacy of individuated substance over the process of individuation. For Whitehead, it is the misplaced assimilation of becoming to being, of potentiality to actuality. Quantum mechanics has challenged this commitment with a combined breadth and depth of force that far exceeds any other theory in the history of science. The theory’s objectively demonstrable empirical application is manifest only by way of a fundamentally subjective, context-dependent mechanism of measurement. More compelling still, actual system states are always actualizations of locally contextualized yet globally conditioned potential system states, such that “globally objective” reality is no longer merely the object of local measurement, but also its product. Thus, any coherent, ontological interpretation of quantum theory must include a conceptual framework by which objectivity and subjectivity, actuality and potentiality, global and local, being and becoming, individuated fact and process of individuation, are no longer understood as merely epistemic, mutually exclusive category pairs descriptive of an already extant, closed reality – but rather as mutually implicative ontological categories explicative of an ontogenetic, open reality-in-process. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics & the Environment 7.1 (2002) 24-38 [Access article in PDF] Arne Naess, Val Plumwood, and Deep Ecological SubjectivityA Contribution to the "Deep Ecology-ecofeminism Debate" Christian Diehm Karen Warren's recent essay, "Ecofeminist Philosophy and Deep Ecology," begins by noting that the philosophical positions found under the heading "deep ecology" are anything but monolithic. This point, which has been overlooked by deep ecologists as often as by others, is crucial (...) for those who are interested in the "deep ecology-ecofeminism debate," for just as one must specify which of the ecofeminisms are in question, so too one must be clear about which of the deep ecologies is being debated, if one is to make one's way through the complex relationships between them. In the course of her article, Warren recounts with approval Val Plumwood's "Nature, Self and Gender: Feminism, Environmental Philosophy, and the Critique of Rationalism," an essay which locates, discusses, and critiques three versions of the "self" that various deep ecologists offer. In light of Plumwood's comments, Warren argues that the work of Arne Naess differs significantly from other deep ecologists such that "Naess' deep ecology position is or could be compatible with ecofeminism" (Warren 1999, 255). [End Page 24]In this essay, I propose to continue the analysis offered by Warren by examining how Naess might respond individually to the objections Plumwood voices. This will be done by looking closely at Naess's articulation of what he refers to as the "ultimate premises" of his view, premises that are not necessarily aspects of deep ecology per se, but of his own ecophilosophy, "Ecosophy 'T'." 1 I will argue that even though Naess may not be subject to Plumwood's most immediate criticisms, her work exposes the problematic tendency of his philosophy of identification to stress sameness in relations with others. I will conclude by suggesting a critical revision of the notion of identification that would allow one to retain key features of Naess's view—most notably his gestaltist understanding of the "self" or "subject" and his emphasis on "Self-realization" as an ultimate norm—while responding to the problems that Plumwood's work exposes. The Self as Transpersonal One of the three senses of self specified by Plumwood is the "transpersonal" self. Her discussion of the transpersonal self focuses on the work of Warwick Fox who, in his Toward a Transpersonal Ecology, describes three "varieties of identification": personal, ontological, and cosmological. 2 Fox favors the latter two because they are less local than personal identification, and this is due to the fact that they are not rooted in the immediate reality in which one moves, but rather within broader, more encompassing views, and thus are said to be "impartial" (Fox 1995, 256). As such, it is claimed that these trans-personal forms of identification escape the problem that accompanies personal identification, which is that, qua personal, it is necessarily biased in favor of those with whom one has personal contact, and thus seems to "have far more to do with the cause of possessiveness, greed, exploitation, war, and ecological destruction than with the solution to these seemingly intractable problems" (262). But this is not meant to imply an outright rejection of personal identification, and Fox cites as proof of this Naess's approval of the "felt nearness" of others as a principle for resolving conflicts. Fox's point is to show that trans-personal identification "proceeds from a sense of the cosmos... and works inward to each particular individual's sense of commonality with other entities" (258), but that within this framework personal identification remains important as "an inescapable aspect of living and... plays a fundamental role in human development" (266-7).Plumwood's critique of this view is that the privileging of the transpersonal [End Page 25] over the personal repeats a patriarchal gesture of the exclusion of a "corrupting and self-interested" particularity in favor of an impersonal and abstract universality (Plumwood 1991, 15). And, ultimately, such a position "cannot allow for the deep and highly... (shrink)

In my dissertation, I develop the idea that Nietzsche's perspectivism constitutes a thesis on subjectivity, i.e., a thesis that asserts the indeterminate nature of both reality and the issue of human significance. Simply put, I contend that Nietzsche's perspectivism connotes a broad ranging anti-foundationalism that denies not only the reality of a fixed world of being, but also the idea that human significance is objectively defined in terms of a universal human ideal. ;In addition, I also argue that (...) although Nietzsche heralds the idea of subjectivity, in so far as he develops his perspectivism, he is himself unable to come to terms with it. More precisely, I contend that rather than overcoming a psychological need for objectivity, Nietzsche satiates this need by developing a naturalized account of existence, one that he ultimately appeals to as a means of justifying his own peculiar conception of human significance. ;Structurally, the insights of this project emerge as a consequence of three different discussions. The first is a preliminary discussion that sets the stage for an historical treatment of Nietzsche's perspectivism. Highlighting the fact that much of the contemporary focus on Nietzsche's perspectivism is motivated by a desire to establish the overall consistency of his thought, this first discussion explores the character and shortcomings of the conservative attempt to interpret Nietzsche's philosophy as wholly committed to truth and the radical attempt to interpret it as a complete abandonment of truth. ;Concentrating exclusively on the historical development of Nietzsche's perspectivism, the second discussion focuses on the shift from what first emerges as a very conservative thesis concerning the structure of cognition and the possibility of knowledge to what later emerges as a very radical and broad ranging anti-foundationalism. Highlighting the tension between the pluralistic implications of this perspectivism and the dogmatic nature of many other aspects of Nietzsche's thought, the third discussion explores the psychological underpinnings of Nietzsche's philosophical inconsistency. (shrink)

The subject of this study is materialism, understood in the broadest sense of this concept: both as a philosophical doctrine and as a way of life corresponding to a certain worldview position. The aim is to clarify the objective role of this worldview position in various fields of human activity. At the center of the research is the question of the essence of materialistic ideas about the world hiding behind the sensually given reality to man. The study consists (...) of two parts, published in separate articles. The first part is devoted to the origins of the materialistic worldview and the main question of philosophy, and in this, its second part, the question of the philosophical problems of non-classical physics is considered, the root of these problems is revealed, a comparative worldview analysis of the basic concepts of classical and non-classical physics is carried out and the overall result of the research is summarized. The methodology of this research is the principle of materialistic monism, according to which absolutely all phenomena of the human-cognizable world can be based only on something material, "influencing". The general conclusions of this study are as follows: the roots of the materialistic worldview go back to the origins of life, to such a condition of successful vital activity of living beings, which is inherently ideological; this condition, called by the author the Main Question of Life, is the historical forerunner of the Main Question of Philosophy; the worldview position, equivalent to the materialistic solution of the OVF, is inherent in the vital activity of absolutely all living beings; all people in their daily and practical activities are born materialists. In addition, this study clarifies the idea of the essence of materialistic teaching; shows the exclusivity of the materialistic worldview as the only true worldview; provides a refined definition of the concept of matter; proves the need to shift the "center of gravity" of modern materialistic teaching from dialectics to the principle of materialistic monism; formulates the missing requirement for scientific theories to ensure their ideological viability; shows the ideological inconsistency the main ideas of the new, non-classical physics. (shrink)

The subject matter of this work covers the issues or problems listed below: * The problem of the ontological status of language signs and a more general philosophical problem connected with it: * What is language as a system of signs, which – on the one hand – serves to: 1) represent our knowledge about the reality which is being recognized, and, on the other one to: 2) a. explore and better cognize or discover it, b. describe it (...) in an adequate manner, and c. enable users to make interpersonal communication? All the pragmatic functions of language require carrying out its logical-philosophical analysis, and this means both regarding its syntax and semantics. Such an analysis is not possible without determining the following: How are signs perceived and what is their ontological nature in the so-called functional approach towards logical semiotics of natural language, founded on two ways of their usage: either as signs which we use in concrete situational or situational-language contexts or as isolated signs detached from such contexts? In the first case, they are language tokens (concretes), existing material objects perceived through the senses, with a fixed temporal-spatial location, in the other one – they are non-concretes and as such (as the majority of researchers in the field of philosophy and linguistics accept) – abstract objects, language types. The type-token distinction (differentiation between abstract and concrete) has already acquired a certain status in contemporary philosophy and is of considerable importance to metaphysics and epistemology in particular. Indeed, it is most often illustrated with reference to language signs (words, expressions) as the distinction type/token of a sign, introduced into semiotics by Ch. S. Peirce. In the semiotic analysis, and also in the linguistic one, there are used both types and tokens of signs, however, often without paying due attention to when it is said about types and when about tokens. This is related to the problems which are still considered by the philosophy of language: What is the type? What is the token (specimen)? What are the mutual relations between the type and the token? Disputes concerning providing answers to these questions are related to existential issues dealing with the ontological status of these language signs and two currents within the ontology of language, remaining under the influence of two fundamental concepts formed in the debate: nominalism and realism. The author presents in brief different stances on the above-mentioned issues or problems, as well as argues that from the logical point of view: 1) working out any theoretical conception of language must take into account its bi-aspectual characteristics: as a language of expression-tokens and as a language of expression-types; 2) advocating either of the standpoints: (a) types exist independent of their tokens, or (b) it is not so, can be omitted in syntactic considerations on language; 3) mutual relations between sign-tokens differ from the mutual relations between sign-types, yet; 4) determination of the mutual relation between sign-types and sign-tokens depends on accepting either of the standpoints: (a) or (b); 5) semantic or semantic-pragmatic concepts of language, such as meaning, denotation, interpretation should be defined exclusively for types of tokens, but their definitions require certain reference to the functions which sign-tokens perform in the language (words, expressions), or to relations between them; 6) The concept of an act of language communication differs from general language communication: the first one is defined by means of sign-tokens, whereas the other one – with the use of sign-types. (shrink)

This article discusses the reality of the existence of the Self as a self-sufficient phenomenon by tracing the relationship between the concepts of subject and the Self with consideration of postmodernist and socioconstructionist critiques. The author identifies the main approaches in the history of philosophy, arguing for the disappearance of the individual subject and propose counterarguments against those positions. Critically assessing the postmodern idea of the “death of the subject,” notions of the Self as a social (...) and linguistic construction, as well as a narrative, the author demonstrates the inconsistency of a position that views the Self exclusively as a product of the European cultural tradition. It is shown that the concept of the Self presents the real phenomena of consciousness and self-awareness, and the use of this concept is necessary for the realization of any of the subject’s actions, both cognitive and social. At the same time, it is necessary to reconsider the concept of the Self from... (shrink)

This paper presents a unified theory of reality, which integrates two interdependent frameworks: Cellular Primary Consciousness Theory (CPCT) and Open and Closed Systems Theory (OCST). Although CPCT and OCST can each stand as individual theories, they are, in this work, combined to form a cohesive explanation of both the mechanics and purpose of the universe. CPCT posits that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of all life, extending to even the simplest cells, rather than being an emergent property exclusive (...) to complex neural systems. Drawing upon evidence from quantum mechanics, cell biology, and systems theory, CPCT challenges traditional views on the origins of consciousness by suggesting that awareness is a universal property present from the cellular level. OCST, which forms the second component of this unified theory, examines the nature of the universe as a closed system subject to the laws of entropy. This theory explores how the universe is moving toward maximum entropy, where meaning and contrasts dissolve. However, beyond this closed system lies the realm of an open system—a domain of infinite potential that transcends the dualities and limitations of the physical universe. This open system offers a philosophical explanation for existence and the possibility of eternal meaning. Together, these two theories provide a novel and cohesive framework that addresses both the mechanics of consciousness and the ultimate purpose of the universe. The integration of CPCT and OCST bridges scientific evidence from quantum biology and systems theory with philosophical explorations of existence, presenting a comprehensive vision of reality as both a closed physical system and an open metaphysical one. This unified theory encourages a reexamination of our place in the cosmos, suggesting that beyond the observable universe lies an infinite realm of potential where consciousness and meaning endure. (shrink)

La estética fenomenológica debería ser capaz de revelar cómo la estructura de cualquier objeto estético dado está conectada con la experiencia de ese objeto, así como demostrar las condiciones necesarias para la propia experiencia estética. Para hacerlo, hay que argumentar en contra de los supuestos unilaterales, como por ejemplo la suposición del objetivismo estético que postula la belleza como rasgo exclusivo de la realidad independiente del sujeto; o la creencia opuesta, que la belleza es esencial y únicamente la proyección del (...) gusto subjetivo sobre las cosas en el mundo. Sesemann analiza el objeto estético y el acto estético, enfatizando su conexión. Esta conexión se refiere a lo que se describe en la fenomenología de Husserl como la correlación entre el objeto intencional y el acto intencional. Esta conexión puede ser descubierta sólo mediante el método fenomenológico: realizando la reducción fenomenológica. En este documento se explicará en primer lugar la percepción estética en la estética de Sesemann. Más adelante, se examina la concepción de la estructura del objeto estético en el contexto de la estética de Sesemann: la composición de los elementos, las sensaciones en relación con el significado, etc. Por último, el artículo sugiere que la estética de Sesemann se basa fundamentalmente en el método de la reducción fenomenológica.Phenomenological aesthetics should also be able to show how the structure of any given aesthetic object is connected with the experience of that object, as well as to demonstrate the necessary conditions for the aesthetic experience itself. In order to do so, one must argue against one-sided assumptions, such as the aesthetic objectivism’s supposition that beauty is exclusively the trait of reality not at all dependent on the subject’s experience of it; or its opposite belief that beauty is essentially and solely the projection of the subjective taste onto the things in the world. Sesemann analizes the aesthetic object and aesthetic act by emphasizing their connection. This connection relates to what is described in Husserls phenomenology as the correlation between the intentional object and the intentional act. This connection can be discovered only by using the phenomenological method: by doing phenomenological reduction. This paper will first explain the aesthetic perception in Sesemann‘s aesthetics. Later, it examine the conception of the aesthetic object‘s structure in Sesemann‘s aesthetic: composition of elements, sensations in connection with meaning; etc. Finally, the paper will argue that Sesemann‘s aesthetics is essentially based on the method of phenomenological reduction. (shrink)

Human beings make themselves with language in history. Language defines human beings making them subjects of their being and mode of being. In this sense language is essential and exclusive of humans. The problem with language consists in explaining the reality of language, something internal to speakers but manifesting itself as external to them.

The essay is designed to investigate the foundations of the conjunction of modern/postmodern premises that the world is a construct of discourses and their power. Such premises require the exclusion of the world of perception, including the lived world, and the appearance of the modern subject and its specific interpretation of reality. The question is as follows: how must the modern subject access such reality when it is assumed that such reality is not accessible to (...) direct, perceptual intuition? Here we encounter the way how the subject must construct methodological and theoretical discourses which do not represent, but ‘make’ modern reality. (shrink)

We previously showed that the illusory sense of ownership and agency over a moving body in immersive virtual reality can trigger subjective and physiological reactions on the real subject’s body and, therefore, an acute improvement of cognitive functions after a single session of high-intensity intermittent exercise performed exclusively by one’s own virtual body, similar to what happens when we actually do physical activity. As well as confirming previous results, here, we aimed at finding in the elderly an increased (...) improvement after a longer virtual training with similar characteristics. Forty-two healthy older subjects completed a parallel-group randomized controlled trial including an adapted version of the virtual training previously used: while sitting, participants observed the virtual body in a first-person perspective or a third-person perspective performing 20 min of virtual high-intensity intermittent exercise. This was repeated twice a week for 6 weeks. During the vHIE, we measured the heart rate and administered questionnaires to evaluate illusory body ownership and agency. Before the beginning of the intervention, immediately after the first session of vHIE, and at the end of the entire intervention, we evaluated the cognitive performance at the Stroop task with online recording of the hemodynamic activity over the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. While we confirm previous results regarding the virtual illusion and its physiological effects, we did not find significant cognitive or neural improvement immediately after the first vHIE session. As a novelty, in the 1PP group only, we detected a significant decrease in the response time of the Stroop task in the post-intervention assessment compared to its baseline; coherently, we found an increased activation on left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex after the entire intervention. While the current results strengthen the impact of the virtual full-body illusion and its physiological consequences on the elderly as well, they might have stronger and more established body representations. Perhaps, a longer and increased exposure to those illusions is necessary to initiate the cascade of events that culminates to an improved cognitive performance. (shrink)

Materialism has been the subject of extensive and rich controversies since Robert Boyle introduced the term for the first time in the 17th century. But what is materialism and what can it offer today? The term is usually defined as the worldview according to which everything real is material. Nevertheless, there is no philosophical consensus about whether the meaning of matter can be enlarged beyond the physical. As a consequence, materialism is often defined in stark exclusive and reductionist (...) terms: whatever exists is either physical or ontologically reducible to it. This conception, if consistent, mutilates reality, excluding the ontological significance of political, economic, sociocultural, anthropological and psychological realities. Starting from a new history of materialism, the present book focuses on the central ontological and epistemological debates aroused by today’s leading materialist approaches, including some little known to an anglophone readership. The key concepts of matter, system, emergence, space and time, life, mind, and software are checked over and updated. Controversial issues such as the nature of mathematics and the place of reductionism are also discussed from different materialist approaches. As a result, materialism emerges as a powerful, indispensable scientifically-supported worldview with a surprising wealth of nuances and possibilities. (shrink)

The apologetic method of the Nyāya is inductive. The subject is distilled from the scripture and the Nyāya investigates it through logical argument. Through this procedure of partial verification, the reliability of the composer is established, and consequently the authority of the entire scripture is justified. The domains of thescripture and rational investigation overlap in significant issues such as the reality of the Self, and therefore, they can cooperate to establish the common truth. In Mīmāṃsā apologetics, the domain (...) of the scripture and that of rational argument are mutually exclusive. Their apologetic program is basically accomplished as a process of purely rational investigation without referring to the content of the scripture. But at the same time, the authority of the Veda is regarded as innate and has no external basis. Working autonomously, the rational investigation imposes its own limitation from within and thereby secures the scriptural domain that is free from the intervention of any other kind of knowledge. The overlap between the domains of the scripture and the ordinary experience including rational investigation constitutes a necessary condition for the Nyāya apologetics, whereas in Mīmāṃsā apologetics, it is the absence of the overlapping domain that assures the unique authority of the Veda. This difference is supposed to be rooted in their disagreement on whether a man is able, or qualified, to examine the content of the scripture or not. (shrink)

In the modern world of total technologization, scientific knowledge devoid of worldview correction (humanitarian expertise) carries a threatening tendency of self-denial: without a constant, philosophically correct transformation of objective knowledge about certain fragments (branches) of the surrounding reality into human knowledge (questions) about itself, the practical effectiveness of such knowledge inevitably accumulates in itself the threat of practical helplessness. Aim and the tasks of the research. Based on an in-depth analysis of the category of existence, as well as on (...) modern philosophical reflections on the methodological and cognitive insolvency of the idea of the world, to find out the real meaning of those changes that this idea meaningfully undergoes in the conditions of the modern total technologization of human life. The research methodology. From a methodological point of view, the author prefers a dialectical approach, considering the analyzed phenomena, regardless of the mode of their reality, in their development and internally contradictory essence. H. Plesner’s theory of eccentric positionality serves as a certain base point for the analysis of human nature and, accordingly, the world of human existence. Research results: The problematic existence of the world and the epistemological «failure» of the corresponding category, declared in some modern philosophical reflections, are connected exclusively with its anthropological and worldview function, which is based on the fundamental uncertainty of a man’s place in the world. The «worthlessness» («futility») of worldview thematization is derived from the allencompassing inability of the human figure in the world, from that «emptiness» and «invisibility» (specific own transparency) of the spiritual dimension of human existence, on which, however, this existence is based. Discussion. The human «option» of fulfilling the unity of living being can be characterized as extremely intense. In this variant, the phylogenetic line of development turns into an ontogenetic point of worldliness devoid of predetermined content, a fundamentally new type of integration. The horizons of such integration far exceed primarily because of its understanding. And the subject of such a meaningful life is forced to integrate everything that happens to him every time into a certain system (synthesis) of the world. That subjectivity the world has distinguishes the subject from the thing. Subjectivity and the world mutually belong to each other - they are correlative. A thing exists because it is what it is. The subject (and with it his world) does not exist like that. A subject is how and to what it relates. But the relation «how» and «to what» is not carried out completely anew and isolated every time, but exists in its multiplicity in a certain relationship. Each individual case, each individual action (method of action) acquires its meaning from a wider, structured context – in whole or in part. This context is the «world», the «life world» of the real subject, or the «world» as an anthropological idea. Conclusions. The task of modern humanitarianism is not only to find opportunities for rational use of the fact of the fundamental openness of the human being, but also to cultivate the ability to reconcile a man with himself, to accept himself. This gives us certain reasons to hope for the enduring significance of worldview thematization. Criticism regarding the seemingly paradoxical conclusion that to become a man, one must already be one, could be considered fair, but only if one does not take into account the principled nature of such an aphoristic position, because this is exactly how the human world exists - as the art of tolerance uncertainty. (shrink)

The article analyzes four areas of social life - the so-called "information power", public morality, public information and mass-media information. It's argued that they have become closely related in the information-dependent society. Understanding of their cross correlations and mutual determinations, as well as interconnections of those categories, is an important matter on the way of Intellectual Property philosophic research, believing the IP is one of the fundamental social institutions of our time. Regarding the abovementioned, the purpose of this research paper (...) is to synthesize a socio-philosophical vision of nowadays mutual determination and correlation of "information power", public morality, public information and mass-media information aspects of social reality. Then we obtain an opportunity to make appropriate extrapolation of these links and interdependencies into a social institution of Intellectual Property. At first glance, the relationship amidst mentioned four categories together is not quite obvious, as well as their relation to the Intellectual Property institution. But it becomes clearer when we define each of those aspects. The phenomenon of "information power" is functionally associated with the Intellectual Property institution: countries-innovators maximize their organizing and technological efforts to maintain a monopoly for intellectual property protected products as long as possible. In particular that applies to the objects protected by industrial property laws, and the objects of copyright. On effective protection of this monopoly it may depend the whole prospects of domination of some countries in the post-industrial world. Sometimes the use of "information power" ignores the principles of public morality, leaving the ideas of humanism, equality, freedom of information exchange, free access to knowledge and technologies, and some other noble postulates declared by the governments of leading countries regularly. In its turn Public Morality institution is essential to the substantiation of intellectual property, to the legitimization of this kind of "monopoly for knowledge" in information-dependent society. The state of public morality makes an influence upon the ideology formation inside different societies, including mental manifestations of their attitude towards the property itself, and intellectual property in particular. The Public Information is rather capacious notion. In the context of intellectual property it is most applicable to cases where the validity of intellectual-legal monopoly expires, and the product of creative or intellectual activity goes into the category of "the public domain". If we would restrict ourselves by terminology of Ukrainian legislation about information, then we could conclude that "public information" is almost incompatible with any monopoly on information. Therefore the right to distribute the information subjected as "a matter of public interest" sometimes comes into logical conflict with intellectual property rights. And further everything will already depend on a philosophical interpretation, as any intellectual product has its value for society's growth potential, so any object of intellectual property may be considered a priori as one that is "a subject of public interest" accordingly. But here we should recall the constitutional principles of the private property inviolability, and respect to the author's exclusive rights to own, to use and to dispose with the results of his own intellectual or creative work. After all, any work must be fairly rewarded, and the intellectual work especially. The term "mass-media information" is not the same as "public information". The mass-media info is not so much related to the content, as to the audience towards it meant to be distributed, and depends on the means and methods of broadcasting. The social significance of the mass-media information also varies. The Intellectual Property institution "meets" the mass-media institution in communicative space. The media are able to promote intellectual property commercialization very effectively. It's obvious that the media often do a popularizing effect, a distribution function for the newly created intellectual property objects. At the same time creative & intellectual products affect directly to the media ranking, filling their pages and diversifying their broadcasting by interesting creative production, that surely finds its audience. The reflection of referred issues is performed within the Doctor habil. Dissertation for philosophic research named "Intellectual Property Institution at the age of Information and Postmodernity: social-philosophic view". Methodological grounds of the research are based on general scientific methods and ad hoc approaches. Selected problematic's relevance is determined by the increasing weight and significance of intellectual property at the Information age. The Intellectual Property institution has become an inalienable sociocultural attribute of post-industrial society. Thus, the comprehension of informational and ethical nature of Intellectual Property enables to create a more objective view of the transformation's character for this specific kind of property at current sociocultural realities. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.2 (2002) 187-188 [Access article in PDF] Listening to Foucault Patrick J. Bracken ERICA LILLELEHT'S INTERESTING PAPER combines philosophy, history, service analysis, and social commentary. The philosophical themes are below the surface, implicit rather than explicit. As such the paper echoes the work of Foucault himself. The subjects of his books and other writings ranged from histories of madness and psychiatry, hospitals and medicine, prisons (...) and punishment, to sexuality and ethics. But these were clearly more than histories. In doing what he initially called archaeology and later genealogy, Foucault was writing about different dimensions of how the Western world has come to understand what it is to be human. In Foucault's hands history becomes philosophy. The essence of his work is an invitation to question the project of Enlightenment. However, his interrogation of the legacy of Enlightenment is far from a rejection of reason as has sometimes been claimed. Rather it represents a realization that there are different forms of reason, none of which can claim a place of privilege over others. Foucault challenged the idea that we have to choose to be for or against Enlightenment (Foucault, 1984).Of central concern for him is the idea that knowledge and power imply each other and cannot be separated. This, of course, is anathema to both Marxist and liberal analysts who hold out the idea that truth and ideology are mutually exclusive. The assumption is that if we get the starting point of our analysis right, the truth ("pure and simple") will emerge. For Foucault there are "regimes of truth," discourses through which certain things can be said and statements can be judged as true or false. Such regimes are social products, bound up with the economic, cultural, and political realities of their times. This is not some sort of mindless relativism nor a nihilistic advocacy that, when it comes to knowledge claims, "anything goes." As human beings in an imperfect world we have to struggle continuously toward a better understanding of ourselves and the make-up of this world. As individuals, we have to continue to debate and argue about ideas, facts, and the nature of knowledge. We have to present evidence, argue our case, and prepare to be contradicted as well as supported. This is not in question. Instead, what is involved here is recognition that there is no neutral asocial, acultural, or apolitical vantage point from we can judge the validity of one position over another. Foucault's work nurtures a healthy skepticism of those who claim to have found such a vantage point.Importantly, he rejected the idea that power is always repressive in its nature: working to silence, obscure, and suppress. Particularly in the modern era power is more characteristically productive. Its operations are bound up with the ever-multiplying discourses we produce about ourselves. While increasing scientific knowledge about the human condition appears to represent progress, listening to Foucault means coming to appreciate that things are a great deal more complex. The title of Lilleleht's paper reflects this. At [End Page 187] a time when there is a great deal of talk about "progress" in the area of mental health, her analysis is opportune. Unless we pay attention to the micropolitics of clinical encounters we are at some risk of simply endorsing new forms of professional power. In one light, the psychiatric rehabilitation approach of William Anthony and colleagues appears obviously progressive. It does not depend on the "medical model" and the use of medication and seems genuinely committed to the idea of empowerment. However, with the sort of sensibility engendered through an encounter with Foucault, other issues come into view. Beneath its focus on skills and training we see a very clear normative framework centered on the idea that the person with psychiatric problems should be guided and trained toward fitting in with "his or her particular environment." At stake here is the assumption that the deficit is in the patient. It is he or she who needs to change. Herein lies the issue of power: who is in control of the way in which... (shrink)

This guide accompanies the following article(s): ‘Full Disclosure of the “Raw Data” of Research on Humans: Citizens’ Rights, Product Manufacturer’s Obligations and the Quality of the Scientific Database.’Philosophy Compass 6/2 (2011): 90–99. doi: 10.1111/j.1747‐9991.2010.00376.x Author’s Introduction Securing consent (and informed consent) from patients and research study participants is a key concern in patient care and research on humans. Yet, the legal doctrines of consent and informed consent differ in their applications. In patient care, the judicial doctrines of consent and informed (...) consent are disclosure doctrines based on the obligation of physicians to inform their patients of the following types of information: the nature of the procedure the physician is recommending in the patent’s care (P), the alternatives to the physician‐recommendation (A), and the risks of procedure and its alternatives (R). In addition, the physician must provide truthful answers to the patient’s questions (Q) to the best of the physician’s abilities. In research on humans, the onus of disclosure by study sponsors and principal investigators is much greater than in patient care precisely because the purpose of research is not patient care. The purpose of research is the identification and development of new generalizable knowledge. Thus, participation in a research study or trial may not benefit the study volunteer at all. In addition, the participant may carry a heavy risk burden in relationship to any testing of a newly designed drug or device as part of their experiences in the research study. Presently, despite the risks borne by the research study participant, the raw data collected from volunteers in research trials are treated by courts as if they were the private property of the study sponsor rather than generally owed to the public as would be expected by an effort like research participation aimed at contributing to the development of generalizable knowledge. This paper reviews the obligations that study sponsors owe to their study participants based on the very definition of research as a systematic activity whose purpose is to develop generalizable knowledge to help all humans. Author Recommends Court cases Canterbury v. Spence, United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit 464 F.2d 772 (1972). (Federal appellate decision heard in the District of Columbia, USA) Reibl v. Hughes, 2 S.C.R. 880 (1980). (Supreme Court of Canada) Rogers v. Whitaker, 175 C.L. R. 479 (1992). (High Court of Australia) Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital and Others. 1 A.C. 871 (1985) (House of Lords) Canterbury v. Spence is the landmark Federal informed consent case in the United States heard in the District of Columbia. In this case, Judge Spottswood Robinson articulated the reasonable person standard of informed consent. This standard was subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada (Reibl v. Hughes, 2 S.C.R. 880 (1980)) and the High Court of Australia (Rogers v. Whitaker, 175 C.L. R. 479 (1992)). The House of Lords rejected the reasonable person standard in England in Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital and Others. 1 A.C. 871 (1985). Book Mazur, Dennis J. The Science and Ethics of Research on Humans. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007. This book is a detailed guide for the review of scientific and ethical aspects of research on humans contained in the research study protocols and research informed consent forms which need to be submitted by study sponsors and principal investigators to institutional review boards (IRBs) for IRB review before a research study can receive approval to be conducted within a human study population in those institutions over which the IRB has authority. It also presents basic definitions in the area of research on humans and basic approaches to help conduct a deep review of the underlying scientific and ethical issues that are present within a research study protocol and its accompanying research informed consent form. Report National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The Belmont Report: Ethical Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research. Washington, DC: DHEW Publications, 1978 (78‐0012). This U.S. National Commission in the Belmont Report argued for the necessity of a reasonable volunteer standard in research on humans in the United States. Arguing that the professional standard and the reasonable person standard of consent and informed consent were insufficient to base a disclosure standard in research on humans, this National Commission developed the reasonable volunteer standard where a study participant is to be approached in research informed consent with that information that a reasonable volunteer would want to know. Online Materials Belmont Report: Syllabus Topics for Lecture and Discussion Week I: Introduction and Overview Readings: Rogers v. Whitaker, 175 C.L.R. 479 (1992). (High Court of Australia) Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital and Others. 1 A.C. 871 (1985) (House of Lords) Week II: The Different Standards of Consent and Informed Consent Readings: Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (1972). (Federal appellate opinion heard in the District of Columbia) Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital and Others. 1 A.C. 871 (1985) (House of Lords) Week III: Definition of Research Reading: Mazur, Dennis J. The Science and Ethics of Research on Humans. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007. (Especially Chapters 2 and 3) Week IV: How to Review a Research Study Protocol and Research Informed Consent Form Reading: Mazur, Dennis J. The Science and Ethics of Research on Humans. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007. (Especially Chapters 4–6, 10, and 12–14) Week V: Obligations in Research of Humans Versus Patient Care Reading: National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The Belmont Report: Ethical Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research. Washington, DC: DHEW Publications, 1978 (78‐0012). Focus Questions • How do the judicial doctrines of consent in England and Australia compare to the judicial doctrines of informed consent in the United States and Canada? • How does a professional standard of disclosure differ from a reasonable person standard of disclosure? • What is the definition of research? • How is a research study (study proposal and research informed consent form) reviewed from scientific and ethical bases for considerations of approval by an IRB? • How do the obligations of a study sponsor, a principal investigator, and a research team conducting a research trial on human study participants differ from the obligations of a physician caring for a patient? • Should all raw data of research derived from humans be made available to the public for use in developing generalizable knowledge to help others, or should raw data be considered the private property of the study sponsors (for example, prescription drug manufacturers), who fund the research trials? Seminar/project Idea Draw a timeline of the development of the basic concepts of consent and informed consent in patient care and in patient research. On this timeline, first place the dates of the key court cases in England, the United States, Canada, and Australia on consent and informed consent. Then place the date of the development of the Belmont Report. Why do differences exist between these four countries in terms of the legal requirements of informedness of a patient (in medical care) and a study participant (in medical research)? What roles if any do the concepts of self‐determination and self‐decision have in consent and informed consent in patient care and in informed consent in research on humans among the four countries of interest? What are the realities of research on human participants that require a new standard of informed consent, the reasonable volunteer standard, to be developed beyond the two standards in patient care, the professional standard, and the reasonable person standard? Counterpoint Arguments The following are counterpoint arguments that need to be appreciated to more fully understand the concepts that impact the thesis that ‘raw data’ should be open to the public to allow the opportunity of checking of the results of its associated scientific paper and for further analysis. De‐Identified (Anonymized) Raw Data A current approach to identifying (anonymizinig) raw data is based on the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 (P.L.104‐191). HIPAA was enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1996 to keep a person’s medical information private. In a research study, a person’s private medical information can become research data. HIPAA’s Privacy Rule allows a covered entity to de‐identify data by removing all 18 elements that could be used to identify the individual or the individual’s relatives, employers, or household members; these elements are enumerated in the Privacy Rule. The covered entity must also have no actual knowledge that the remaining information could be used alone or in combination with other information to identify the individual who is the subject of the information. Under this method, the identifiers that must be removed are the following: 1 Names. 2 All geographic subdivisions smaller than a state, including street address, city, county, precinct, ZIP Code, and their equivalent geographical codes, except for the initial three digits of a ZIP Code if, according to the current publicly available data from the Bureau of the Census: 2a. The geographic unit formed by combining all ZIP Codes with the same three initial digits contains more than 20,000 people. 2b. The initial three digits of a ZIP Code for all such geographic units containing 20,000 or fewer people are changed to 000. 3 All elements of dates (except year) for dates directly related to an individual, including birth date, admission date, discharge date, and date of death, and all ages over 89 and all elements of dates (including year) indicative of such age, except that such ages and elements may be aggregated into a single category of age 90 or older. 4 Telephone numbers. 5 Facsimile numbers. 6 Electronic mail addresses. 7 Social security numbers. 8 Medical record numbers. 9 Health plan beneficiary numbers. 10 Account numbers. 11 Certificate/license numbers. 12 Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plate numbers. 13 Device identifiers and serial numbers. 14 Web universal resource locators (URLs). 15 Internet protocol (IP) address numbers. 16 Biometric identifiers, including fingerprints and voiceprints. 17 Full‐face photographic images and any comparable images. 18 Any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code, unless otherwise permitted by the Privacy Rule for re‐identification. Even though ‘raw data’ can be de‐identified (anonymized) so that there is no way to trace back the data to the study participant from which it was drawn, there are still questions whether the ‘de‐identified raw data’ can be given to other researchers or made public without the original study participant’s approval. It may be the case that this approval could be done at the start of any research study where the individual considering study participation would be counseled on what the process of de‐identification consists of and would be asked whether the participant would allow use of the data by other researchers or made available to the public in a de‐identified state. However, there may be questions of the study participants as to whether the data are truly de‐identified and untraceable back to the study participant since the participant would not be able to see the process actually being carried out in detail in all relevant circumstances. Using Raw Data in Context Simply being in possession of raw data is never enough to build on that data from a research perspective. Researchers need to understand the context of the scientific research study in which the data were collected. This research context includes (but is not limited to): (i) the scientific hypothesis of the research study, (ii) the inclusion and exclusion criteria selected by the research designers of the study to determine which study participants were included and which were excluded from the study, (iii) the methods used to collect the data and possibilities of errors in the data collection processes, and (iv) answers to questions regarding whether any data were excluded from the study data and why these data were excluded. Ownership Rights Over Data There are ownership rights over data. Ownership rights include court decision making related to the question which parties are to be considered as the owners of the data. Possible owners here include (but are not limited to) (i) the study sponsor whose only role was to fund that study, (ii) the principal investigator(s) who developed the scientific hypothesis, and (iii) individual study participants through special contracts made by individual participants who negotiate such contracts with study sponsors and principal investigators to share in the ownership of data. Examples of such data are participant sources of unique gene lines or unique cell lines to be used in future research. Objections to Data Sharing Finally, individual researchers may simply object to sharing data. A researcher’s arguments here may be simply stating that he or she has a right to fully analyze the data since the collection of the data was the researchers’ idea in the first place. These researchers may argue that they have the right to mine the data as fully as they can before deciding to make the data open to the public for others to analyze. Works Cited 1 Kaiser, J. ‘Making Clinical Data Widely Available.’Science 322.5899 (10 Oct. 2008): 217–8. 2 de Lusignan, S., J.F. Metsemakers, P. Houwink, V. Gunnarsdottir, and J. van der Lei. ‘Routinely Collected General Practice Data: Goldmines for Research? A Report of the European Federation for Medical Informatics Primary Care Informatics Working Group (EFMI PCIWG) from MIE2006, Maastricht, The Netherlands.’Informatics in Primary Care 14.3 (2006): 203–9. 3 Sim, I. ‘Human Studies Database Project’, CTSA Data Repositories Symposium (17 Oct. 2008). 23 Nov. 2010. 4 Sim, I., C.G. Chute, H. Lehmann, R. Nagarajan, M. Nahm, and R.H. Scheuermann. ‘Keeping Raw Data in Context.’Science 323.5915 (6 Feb. 2009): 713. 5 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, HIPAA Privacy Rule, Information for Researchers. 13 Nov. 2010. 6 Wilczynski, N.L., R.B. Haynes, and Hedges Team. ‘EMBASE Search Strategies for Identifying Methodologically Sound Diagnostic Studies for Use by Clinicians and Researchers.’BMC Medicine 29.3 (March 2005): 7. (shrink)

Knowing the occasions related to the revelation of the Qur'ānic verses is one of the factors contributing to its correct understanding. Since the examples named as "Umar's Muwāfaqāt" (corcurrences of Umar’s perception with certain divine revelatio) is related to the occasion of Qur'ān's revelation, they also contribute to the understanding of the related verses. ‘Umar's Muwāfaqāt instances refers here to the subject mentioned after his expression of "I agreed with my Lord in three things." His agreement with His Lord (...) is that he delivered an anticipating opinion, appropriate to God’s provision. This is considered to be of the great virtues of ‘Umar and of the most important sections of his life. Some narrated reports of ‘Umar's Muwāfaqāt shows that there were many occasions of agreement. Of these instances, the verses that come upon his request that Abraham’s Maqām is taken as a place of prayer and the Prophet’s wives to veil as well as his statement to the Prophet’s wives that God will grant him better wives than them if they give trouble to the Prophet. There have been conducted a number of studies on the subject of ‘Umar's Muwāfaqāt. However, these studies are generally framed by Sunnī sources. This study focuses on the way in which the instances of “‘Umar's Muwāfaqāt" included in the Sunni sources are discussed in the sources of Shi’a tafsir. Therefore, the study is the critique of the way that ‘Umar's Muwāfaqāt is handled in Shia tafsir sources.Summary: Muslim scholars particularly Qur’ānic exegetists, have conducted important works in numerous areas that have would have any relations to the Qur'an in order that it is understood correctly. No doubt that one of these areas deals with issues related to the reasons of revelation of Qur'anic verses. The examples named as "Muwāfaqāt ‘Umar" are related to the reasons of the revelation and contribute to the understanding of the Qur’ānic verses.Muwāfaqāt ‘Umar literally means “the agreements of ʿUmar” (i.e. with God). It is taken from his expression, "I agreed with my Lord in three things." His agreement with His Lord is that he delivered an anticipating opinion, appropriate to God’s provision. This is considered to be of the great virtues of ‘Umar and is regarded as one of the most important sections of his life.The numerous narrations on Muwāfaqāt ‘Umar show that there were many occasions of such agreement. Actually, some scholars raised the number of muwāfaqāt to twenty. This study does not deal with all instances of Muwāfaqāt ‘Umar, as such an undertaking would require more extensive research to cover the topic in-depth. Hence, only five instances of the muwāfaqāt are discussed:The verse revealed after his request that the Maqām of Abraham is taken as a place of prayer (Q 2:125).The verse revealed after requesting that the Prophet orders his wives to veil (Q 33:53).The verse revealed after his statement to the Prophet’s wives that God will grant him better wives if they continue to bother the Prophet (Q 66:5).The verses revealed in agreement with his view on the judgment upon the captives of the Battle of Badir (Q 8:67-69).The verse revealed in agreement with his demand that the Prophet should not perform the funeral prayer on Abdullah b. Ubayy when the Prophet had willed to do so (Q 9:84). A number of studies have been conducted on the subject of Muwāfaqāt ‘Umar. However, these studies are generally within the framework of Sunni sources. This study, on the other hand, discusses how the above cited five instances of “Muwāfaqāt ‘Umar" are mentioned or ignored in the most prominent Shi’î tafsir sources. Therefore, the study is the critique of the way that Muwāfaqāt ‘Umar is handled in the most prominent Shi’i exegesis.Following a survey of existing research, no previous study of this topic was found. Thus, this study is expected to make a new contribution to the field. In this study, the following process was generally followed: Initially, ‘Umar’s Muwāfaqāt with His Lord was defined, followed by providing brief information of the instances of these muwāfaqāt incorporated within the Sunni sources. Then, of those accepted "muwāfaqāt" within Sunni sources, only five instances were selected, as cited above. This was followed by the "case of these examples in the primary exegesis of the Shia", which constitutes the main theme of this study. The designated case was then analysed and evaluated in order to reach a conclusion on the topic at hand.As a result of this research, the following conclusions were reached:It is seen that some instances of Muwāfaqāt ‘Umar cited in the Sunni sources have not been mentioned at all in the Shi’i Tafsir sources; such as the examples of the verse revealed after ‘Umar’s request that the station or maqām of Abraham is taken as a place of prayer. Also, the same was observed for the verse revealed after his demand that the Prophet should not perform the funeral prayer on Abdullah b. Ubayy when the Prophet willed to do so. It was found that the reason for these exclusions may be the fact that the narrations do not comply with the hadith criteria of Shi’a.In the cases where there are two narratives which the former clearly show that the occasion is from the Muwāfaqāt 'Umar and the latter that it is revealed for another case and they have both the same soundness and narrators, it is seen that the narrations non-related to 'Umar is cited and the narration related to ‘Umar is either not mentioned at all or pointed out that it is weak. An example of this is the Hijab verse, revealed after ‘Umar’s request that the Prophet’s wives wear the veil. It may be understood that the position that the Shi’i interpreters exhibit about such examples is based entirely on sectarian fanaticism and they ignore the narrations that can be interpreted as 'Umar's virtue.It is one of the remarkable points that while the Shi’i exegetists do not mention the narrations related to Muwāfaqāt Umar cited and considered as his virtue in Sunni sources, they on the other hand, cite within the same sources some narrations which condemn Ḥafṣah and ‘Ā’ishah. These exegetists follow this perspective in the interpretation of the verse revealed after ‘Umar’s statement to the Prophet’s wives that God will grant to him wives better than them if they continue bothering the Prophet. It can be commented that this approach of the Shi’i exegetists in their Tafsirs towards ‘Umar is also another manifestation of their negative attitude towards him.The Shi’i exegetists argue that the bulk of muwāfaqāt narrations cited in the Sunni sources of tafsir are unsound and fabricated as Shi’i exegetists are deluded that such narrations lay blame on the Prophet. In this context, with regards to the verse on the captives of the Battle of Badr revealed in agreement with ‘Umar’s view, all these narrations are deemed unsound and fabricated. It may be concluded these narrations, in reality, do not put the Prophet at fault and therefore their deductions of such interpretations stem from their misinterpretations of the related narrations. (shrink)

The recently celebrated division into ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ problems of consciousness is unfortunate and misleading. Built on functionalist grounds, it carves up the subject matter by declaring that the most elusive parts need a fundamentally and intrinsically different solution. What we have, rather, are ‘difficult’ problems of conscious experience, but problems that are not difficult per se. Their difficulty is relative, among other things, to the kind of solution one is looking for and the tools used to accomplish the (...) task. I argue that the study of conscious experience in our scientific and philosophical tradition is a very difficult problem because it has been addressed with inappropriate tools: with harmful long-lasting and inadequate dogmas that have dogged science for centuries. I describe five of these dogmas, which are: the existence of an objective reality independent of human understanding; the subordination of epistemology to ontology; the restricted view of the objectivist-subjectivist dichotomy; the exclusion of the body from the study of the mind; and the idea of explaining the mind in terms of the neurophysiological processes of individual brains. I claim that conscious experience is not a transcendental, paranatural, mystic or magic phenomenon. It is tractable and approachable with scientific methods. However, one must look not only for non-reductionist views to approach it, but also for views that avoid the dogmas here described. Conscious experience is a living phenomenon and it has to be understood as such. Accordingly, our understanding of it has to make sense at several levels, from evolution to morphophysiology, from neuroanatomy to language. I put forward an approach to conscious experience which is free of the dogmas that make the study of conscious experience so difficult. This view, called ecological naturalism, is a non-functionalist and non-reductive view that provides an naturalistic account of the mind. It also puts special emphasis on irreducible supra-individual biological processes that are essential in the realization of mental phenomena and therefore conscious experience. (shrink)

The response aims at detecting additional angles in Benhabib's problematic and adding some variables to its potential resolution. I examine two such variables. One concerns the rights-bearing subject. Benhabib addresses the tension between individual universal rights and sovereign self-determination by positing a modified Kantian `cosmopolitan federalism'. While I can support this thesis, I see a whole other reality in the making that offers additional kinds of resolutions as well as a repositioning of cosmopolitan federalism in a different field (...) of forces. Critical here is the incipient denationalizing of citizenship which is taking place inside the nation state, and hence is not predicated on post-national and transnational conditions for citizenship. Such resolutions are precluded in Benhabib's text because of the closure she projects onto the nation state. The second variable I discuss addresses precisely this question of the state today — that is to say, in a context of the ascendance of an international human rights regime and of globalization. Benhabib sees the national and the global as mutually exclusive. In my own research I see a process whereby global logics get partly constituted inside the nation state and the state apparatus itself, producing, again, an incipient denationalizing of what historically was constructed as national. This opens up possibilities for cosmopolitan federalism that Benhabib overlooks given her national—global binary. (shrink)

How do we assign values to virtual items, which include virtual objects, properties, events, subjects, worlds, environments, and experiences? In this article, I offer a framework for answering this question. After considering different value theses in the literature, I argue that whether we think these theses mutually exclusive or not turns on our view about the number of value-salient kinds virtual items belong to. Virtual monism is the view that virtual Xs belong to only one value-salient kind in relation (...) to X. Virtual pluralism is the view that they belong to more than one value-salient kind. I argue for two claims. First, virtual monism is mistaken. Minimally some virtual Xs are Xs, while others are not. Second, dualistic virtual pluralism is also mistaken because it is too coarse grained. Instead, I argue for fourfold pluralism: virtual items either represent an original's properties or reproduce essential properties and do so to lesser or greater extents. This gives us four value-salient kinds of virtual X: virtual reproductions, simulations, representations, and simulacra of X. I apply this view to various debates in the literature and conclude with a discussion of less basic hybrid kinds. (shrink)

Jean Baudrillard is one of the outstanding representatives both of French poststructuralism and postmodernism. Because of radical criticism it was not possible for him to establish a logically coherent theoretical system; the philosophical aspects of his work are specifically merged, therefore, into a critical asystematic fragmentarism, which is the subject of this work. From the critique of the political economy of the sign, through critiques of rationalism, reality, progress, truth, history to the theory of simulation, Baudrillard's specific para-concepts (...) (fatal strategy, symbolic exchange, seduction, hyperreality, pataphysics, etc.) are constantly fragmentarily present in the development of his thought. These concepts are Baudrillard's attempt at disengagement from modern philosophy and his new, unsystematic postmodern view of reality in general. In the analysis of binary metaphysical oppositions (reality-simulation, subject-object, knowledge-seduction, history-end, radical-irradical nihilism, metaphysics (God)-pataphysics), Baudrillard is radically exclusive through the arbitrary preference of one over the other concept. his ideas, it is possible to conclude that these dualistic antagonisms are also paradoxically compatible in his system, this compatibility is very close to the irrational mysticism of this thinker. This book is a clear and lucid presentation of this unique brand of postmodernism to English speaking scholarship. (shrink)

"This work attempts to establish a philosophy of art that is both intellectual and objective. At first sight it may appear that these goals are at variance with contemporary ideas. On closer examination, however, the reader will see that the tendency is in the opposite direction, a closer approach to present-day thought rather than a departure from it. To admit that there exists a world other than that of our subjective states is to subscribe to an interpretation more in keeping (...) with the real, and thus also with artistic reality. The intellectual and objective philosophy to which this book appeals in order to interpret the beauty of art will not be an intrusion, if it guards against all exclusiveness and does not itself compromise that which gives it its value."--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Ethnography as Christian Theology and Ethics ed. by Christian Scharen and Anna Marie VigenJohn KiessEthnography as Christian Theology and Ethics Edited by Christian Scharen and Anna Marie Vigen New York: Continuum, 2011. 304 pp. $29.95Over the past decade, an increasing number of Christian theologians and ethicists have turned to ethnographic methodologies in order to attend more closely to the complexities of lived faith and the bodily character of (...) theological knowledge. For those wishing to get a glimpse of what this looks like in practice, what its implications might be for theology and ethics, and how one might set off and do it oneself, this book is an excellent introduction.Editors Christian Scharen and Aana Marie Vigen organize the book into three parts. The first part orients readers to the use of ethnography in cultural anthropology and reviews the recent “ethnographic turn” in Christian theology and ethics. This is followed by a brief survey of theological critiques of social science and a defense of ethnography against these critiques. Scharen and Vigen argue that the use of ethnography, far from compromising the integrity of theology, has the potential to renew and enrich the discipline through the incorporation of long-overlooked forms of local wisdom. As a method attuned to practical, often noncognitive forms of knowledge, ethnography can help scholars move away from an exclusive focus on texts to a deeper consideration of the theological and ethical claims “embedded and embodied” in the lives and practices of everyday communities (xxii). [End Page 190]Naturally, the best argument for such an approach is exemplification. The second part of the book presents an impressive collection of ethnographic work from contexts as diverse as Chicago, Atlanta, Oregon, Chiapas, Nairobi, and Gulu. Contributors employ ethnography to compare pastoral leadership in two African American churches, track grassroots dissent on the issue of contraception among women living with HIV/AIDS, and reimagine the debate on physician-assisted suicide from the perspective of the poor and disabled. Particularly effective are Vicini’s exploration of the liturgical response of local churches to the legacy of violence in Chiapas and Whitmore’s critical examination of his own place as a white researcher in Northern Uganda, which makes hauntingly transparent the ethical complexities of the research process itself.The final part of the book offers a more practical how-to guide for those looking to do ethnography, covering such issues as institutional review board approval, interview methodology, and accountability to research subjects. This part, like the rest of the book, will be a gift for graduate students facing down a dissertation proposal or scholars contemplating the use of ethnography in their work. Admirably reflexive, vigilantly attentive to issues of power and privilege, and articulate about the ways that research can be a form of discipleship, one can only hope this book will succeed in its aim of encouraging other scholars to “go and do likewise.”Those who have already incorporated ethnographic techniques in their scholarship or who are looking for a fuller articulation of the relation between ethnography, ethics, and theology may find themselves less satisfied with the book. Its treatment of existing options (virtue ethics, Catholic social ethics) and thinkers (David Ford, Stanley Hauerwas, and John Milbank) is thin, and a number of key figures in the broader story of the ethnographic turn in theology (Karl Barth, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and Hans Frei) are conspicuously missing. Their absence is felt particularly strongly in the unanswered questions the volume provokes, including how to account for God’s difference when appeals to experience become primary (Barth), and how to avoid positivism when appeals to the “reality” of the church become the point of departure for ecclesiology (Bonhoeffer).Such provocations, however, are reminders that we are still at the very early stages of the ethnographic turn in Christian theology and ethics. If this volume is any indication, the future of this exciting intersection of thought and practice looks very promising indeed. [End Page 191]John KiessLoyola University MarylandCopyright © 2013 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

The remarkable growth in the application of information and communications technologies indicates a great shift toward a globally integrated society. The urban metropolises are turning into intersections of transit and migration of goods, capital, services, cultures, knowledge and especially people. Moreover the flow of bodies, information and money is changing the rules of what defines national territory, space and identity. Social realities with specific qualities are appearing, implying a new spatial correlation between the local and the global. International airports and (...) within emerging extraterritorial zones have become an important threshold controlling the flow of people in a free market economy. The airport border mutates into an abstract space permeating the physical territory of the airport and beyond. This abstract border space, within which mobile bodies operate, is created by a bureaucratic system of inclusion and exclusion particular to transition states. Transit zones at airports emerge because of a complex set of factors: border crossing as well as increasingly stringent security and safety regulations. The innumerable thresholds within these transit zones are points of congestion governed and increasingly supported by technological systems of identification. Within the transnation state, the movement of bodies is the constant subject of streaming and proceduralization. Increasingly, the conventional system of control based on face-to-face interaction between the controlling and the controlled is being replaced by the algorithmic precision of database logic. The paradigm of pattern matching ensures precise verification of the uniqueness of the body, in turn offering new potentials for permeability and flux. These different orders of legal and economic categorization create manifold sub-territories accessible to select groups of travellers. Nowadays, the airport is a transnation state spatialized through a new order of architecture, a manifestation of technology of abstract procedures of transition, inclusion and exclusion, adopting emergent patterns of socio-spatial mobility in a globalized network. (shrink)

Although intersectionality has been widely disseminated across the disciplines as a tool to center women of color's developed perspectives on social reality, it has been notably absent in the scholarship of feminist philosophy and philosophy of race. I first examine the causes and processes of the exclusions of women of color feminist thought more generally, and of intersectionality in particular. Then, focusing attention on Black feminisms, I read Sandra Jackson-Opoku's 1997 novel, The River Where Blood Is Born, with and (...) against Paget Henry's Africana ethnophilosophy. I model an interdisciplinary, intersectional approach to Henry's ethnophilosophy, broadening its philosophical scope by historicizing the liminality that characterizes the realities of many diasporic Black women. I also develop an interpretation of the female protagonists to suggest how many Black women within different historical contexts develop practices to recover African symbolic and discursive registers as a means to claim their subjectivities. Additionally, I challenge Henry's teleological explanation for an increasingly secular Africana philosophical identity. (shrink)

This volume brings together philosophers and physicists to explore the parallels between Quantum Bayesianism, or QBism, and the phenomenological tradition. It is the first book exclusively devoted to phenomenology and quantum mechanics. By emphasizing the role of the subject's experiences and expectations, and by explicitly rejecting the idea that the notion of physical reality could ever be reduced to a purely third-personal perspective, QBism exhibits several interesting parallels with phenomenology. The central message of QBism is that quantum probabilities (...) must be interpreted as the experiencing agent's personal Bayesian degrees of belief--degrees of belief for the consequences of their actions on a quantum system. The chapters in this volume elaborate whether and specify how phenomenology could serve as the philosophical foundation of QBism. This objective is pursued from the perspective of QBists engaging with phenomenology as well as the perspective of phenomenologists engaging with QBism. These approaches enable us to realize a better understanding of quantum mechanics and the world we live in, achieve a better understanding of QBsim, and introduce the phenomenological foundations of quantum mechanics. Phenomenology and QBism is an essential resource for researchers and graduate students working in philosophy of physics, philosophy of science, quantum mechanics, and phenomenology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On the Way to Ethical CultureThe Meaning of Art as Oscillating between the Other, Il y a, and the ThirdRossitsa Varadinova Borkowski (bio)Who can suppose that a poet capable of effectively introducing into his scenes rhetoricians, generals and various other characters, each displaying some peculiar excellence, was nothing more than a droll or juggler, capable only of cheating or flattering his hearer, and not of instructing him?Are we all (...) agreed that the chief merit of a poet consists in his accurate representation of the affairs of life? Can this be done by a mere driveller, unacquainted with the world?The excellence of a poet is not to be measured by the same standard as that of a mechanic or a blacksmith, where honor and virtue have nothing to do with our estimate. But the poet and the individual are connected, and he only can become a good poet who is in the first instance a worthy man.— Strabo, The Geography of StraboAfter Emmanuel Levinas showed the need for radically positing the Ethical as the original structure of human inwardness and as art is a fundamental aspect of being human, a reexamination of the meaning of the Artistic and its relation with the Ethical is necessary.1 Throughout [End Page 195] the history of Western thought and culture, the meaning of art has been regarded either as imitation of the world and nature (Plato and Aristotle), objective self-expression of the Absolute Spirit (Hegel) or Being (Heidegger), a subjective “free play of imagination” and judgment (Kant and the Romanticists), or as inevitable engagement with social issues and political position (the Marxists and Sartre). In spite of the variety of theories and views about the essence and value of art, it is unquestionable that the Artistic has transformational power over humans, which points to art’s connection with ethics. Therefore, following Levinas, instead of asking the general ontological questions about the gist of art “What is art?” or “Why is there art instead of something else?” we should seek an answer to the ethical question about the meaning of art: “How can the existence of art be justified?”The answers could be sought in two directions. The first already quite well beaten path explores Levinas’s own vision on art, which most critics find hesitant or even ambiguous.2 The impression of this hesitation is significant on the background of Levinas’s rigorous clarity about the Ethical. Overlooking this impression would lead to conclusions that would deviate our attention from the main question about how the existence of art can be justified. A possible explanation would be that Levinas’s seemingly fragmentary thoughts about art are woven into the fabric of his ultimate meta-ethical project — that is, his approach to art is instrumental, subjected to the Ethical. For example, commentators agree that Levinas’s early article “Reality and Its Shadow” (1948) is the only one exclusively focused on art and use it as a starting point to assemble the fragments of his aesthetic views into an aesthetic theory. Although this move might be justified methodologically, Levinas is clear that the discussion of art in this article is subordinated to the more general (and more serious) question about the nontruth of being (LR 132). Positing art as mythological and mystical, thus incapable of transmitting a meaningful message if separated from philosophical criticism (142), Levinas puts “in brackets” the discussion about the artistic and focuses on the reason qua knowledge (philosophy) and its relation with the Other. The impression of his hesitation about art’s [End Page 196] independent capability to dephase the instant, to breach the ontological gravity, and to expose the human spirit to the Ethical comes from those texts where Levinas applies his own vision about the integrative role of philosophical criticism — i.e., texts that work as philosophical criticism of art: “Transcendence through poetry — is this serious?”3 (PN 175n12), “if poetry can contain teachings” (165; emphasis added). Therefore, on one hand, Levinas exhaustively scrutinizes all possibilities of ethics of philosophy and comes to the clear position that in order for reason to function humanly it should be dethroned by the Other. He is... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Writing and Authority in Early ChinaLothar von FalkenhausenWriting and Authority in Early China. By Mark Edward Lewis. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999. Pp. vii + 544. Hardcover $92.50. Paper $31.95.Writing and Authority in Early China is a forceful and sparklingly original work in which Mark Edward Lewis explores the role of writing and texts in the transformation of political authority during the Warring States, Qin, (...) and Western Han periods. Following in the footsteps of the author's well-received first book1 and his magisterial contribution to the Cambridge History of Ancient China,2Writing and Authority establishes Lewis as the premier Western historian of the crucial centuries surrounding the unification of China under a centrally administered empire in 221 B.C. The book's complex, comprehensive, and coherent argument is informed by a variety of Western theoretical approaches, but it principally emanates from a close reading of the full record of transmitted texts and recently excavated manuscripts on [End Page 127] bamboo or wooden slips. The inclusion of the latter class of sources, beset with treacherous problems of decipherment, is still unusual in mainstream sinological scholarship and indicates the author's supreme confidence in his philological skills. With a firm hand, undaunted by the multifarious nature of his materials, Lewis guides the reader to some fundamental themes in recent sinology, opening manifold novel perspectives along the way. Even when dealing with well-known texts, he often proposes striking reinterpretations.In his Introduction, Lewis enumerates six main functions of writing in ancient China: enforcing state authority; creating text-based communities and "public spheres"; transcending the confines of space, time, and human mortality; fashioning figures of authority in the past; standardizing specialized technical terminology; and encrypting secret meanings. In Lewis' own words, "the culminating role of writing in the period, and the key to its importance in imperial China, was the creation of parallel realities within texts that claimed to depict the entire world" (p. 4). This ultimately led to the formation of the Confucian canon as a "textual double of the polity" that could survive cataclysmic changes of regimes.In chapter 1, "Writing the State," Lewis points out that before the Warring States period Chinese writing occurred exclusively in religious contexts. After circa 500 B.C., written documents gradually came to be used in the administration of government and trade. Both in their details of formulation and in the implication that anything committed to writing was thereby supernaturally validated, these new types of documents exhibit pervasive continuity with the earlier kinds of texts used in ritual communication with the ancestral spirits. Such continuity is also reflected in the rise of religious beliefs in a netherworld governed by a bureaucratic hierarchy and administrative processes parallel to those of the world of the living. According to Lewis, "the most important modification in the shift to an administrative polity [in the Warring States] was the extension of writing to new elements of the population. The attributes of the Zhou nobility... were transferred to the common people in the administrative documents of the new state. This widening range of inscription into the state order altered the social meaning of being recorded from a sign of power to one of subjection" (p. 13).Warring States rulers were cast in the role not of the authors of texts but of the authority behind them. Administrative and legal texts were concerned, ultimately, with the proper naming of phenomena, a process that had to adapt itself continually to the changes of the times. The authority of rulers came to encompass both human society and the natural world. "Whereas local and central administration were largely created through reworking and rewriting the ritual bases of the old Zhou order by means of a rationalizing cosmology, the re-invention of rulership drew on the contemporary religious realm and what is sometimes described as shamanism to provide images of cosmic power" (p. 42). Lewis illustrates the mechanics for applying these universal principles of rulership by a comprehensive analysis of the Zhou li (or Zhou guan), emphasizing the cosmological arrangement of the ideal government described therein and the dual administrative and religious dimensions of... (shrink)

In what follows I will provide an explication of what the principle of philosophical sufficiency (PPS) refers to as conceptualized by François Laruelle, whereas, at the moment, suffice it to say that it is comparable to Marx’s extolling of the principle of praxis over that of philosophy as a critique of the philosophical “self-mirroring,” a thesis that pervades Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy in General (Marx, Manuscripts), German Ideology (1968), Theses on Feuerbach (1969). The self-mirroring thought (philosophy is) subsumes the Real (...) itself reducing it to a postulate, to its transcendental aspect exclusively rather than reversing the hierarchy whereby thought submits to the Real albeit radically foreclosed for philosophy’s totalizing ambition. Instead of revisiting the dialectics between thought and the real, or reviving a Kantian dilemma, in his critique of Feuerbach’s materialism and the critique of Hegel’s philosophy under the aforementioned several titles, in particular in “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy in General,” Marx proposes that a shift toward “objectivism” would proffer a proper foundation for a truly scientific discussion of human reality. It is probably an undisputable fact that subjectivity-centered thinking and anthropocentric ontology, epistemology, and morality have determined the civilizational legacy of modernity: it begins with Kant’s practical philosophy and metaphysics of morals, if we must choose a single philosophical threshold in the Western history of ideas. Certainly, it coincides with the birth of republicanism as the model state promulgated by the French and the American Revolution and the completion of the enlightenment project. In Karl Marx’s politico-philosophical project, subjectivity, political state, and secularism are not what a modern society should consist in but quite the opposite their transcendence by way of sublation when confronted with a materialist, objective science of the species-being of humanity. Secularism is, argues Marx in The Jewish Question, a name for a “political” state that has alienated itself from the society precisely by way of relegating everything pertaining to the individual to the so-called “civil society.”. (shrink)

Photographic discourse between doxa and paradoxe appearing in 1839 as a technical process of representation of the image, in the amateur and enlightenment middle, Photography will produce a popular speech that will be exclusive for almost three decades: the photographic image is beautiful more perfect it is as an imitation of the reality. Clear and with formal information about time and space. This popular speech includes a short historical information about some authors of technical inventions that improved fixation (...) and circulation image. In the last quarter of that century, as a sensibleness against Industrial making, amateur photographs define an artistic and creative sight supported with a photographic theory, the Pictorialism, that overvalues the creative subject coinciding with new forms of Thought and Art. When Pictorialism is exhausted after the 1st G. War, a new sight which includes the ability of the new camera to mimic cinema effects, the subjective sight will no longer abandon the photographic practice while the photographic literature multiplies itself with the interest of philosophers, thinkers, film makers, psychologists and psychiatrists since the developing of the mass society. In the last quarter of the XX century, with post-modern inspiration, it appears as an international pattern a new History of Photography treated as History of Art, with styles and authors, that still remains. The objective of this work is to distinguish popular and scholarly photographic reading from its origins to the technological revolution that provokes a real crisis through the analysis of its greatest analysts. Taking into consideration our time, a period of numeric change, facing the new computational technology, that work with algoritms, image reading must change, but photographs and analysts repeat analog concept and strategies. (shrink)