I discuss the application, to the case of sortal concepts, of Kit Fine’s conception of the species of necessary truth that he characterizes as ‘transcendental truth’. I argue for scepticism about Fine’s thesis that substance sortals are associated with transcendental truths about contingently existing individuals. My discussion has implications for the interpretation of the type of necessity that is involved in the attribution of essential properties to contingent existents. In addition, it has implications for the question whether there (...) are sortal predicates that are ‘timeless’ in their application to contingently existing individuals. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that the criteria of identity over time for ordinary objects entail that such objects are permanent members of certain sortal kinds. The sortal kinds in question have come to be known as substance sortal kinds. But in this article, I defend a criterion of identity that is suited to phasalism, the view that alleged substance sortals are in fact phase sortals. The criterion I defend is a sortal‐weighted version of a change‐minimizing (...) criterion first discussed by Eli Hirsch. I present this criterion and then argue that it withstands attempts to show that it is inferior to non‐phasalist rivals. (shrink)

The question whether two things can be in the same place at the same time is an ambiguous one. At least three distinct questions could be meant: Can two things simpliciter be in the same place at the same time? Can two things of the same kind be in the same place at the same time? Can two substances of the same kind be in the same place at the same time? The answers to these questions vary. In what follows, (...) all three will be discussed in the light both of recent and of classic earlier examinations of the matter. The following theses will be defended. (shrink)

Sameness and Substance Renewed (hereafter, 2001) is, in effect, a second edition of Wiggins’s 1980 book Sameness and Substance (hereafter, 1980), which in turn expanded and corrected some ideas in his 1967 Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity (hereafter, 1967). All three books have similar aims. The first is to argue, primarily against Geach, that identity is absolute not relative. The second is to argue that, despite this, whenever an identity claim a = b is true, there is a (...) class='Hi'>sortal f such that a is the same f as b. The biggest difference between 1967 and the two later books is that the later books contain much more detail on what a sortal must be if this claim, called D, is to be both correct and philosophically interesting. The third aim is to apply the first two conclusions to the topic of personal identity. (shrink)

This volume gathers twelve essays by David Wiggins in an area where his work has been particularly influential. Among the subjects treated are: persistence of a substance through change, the notion of a continuant, the logic of identity, the co-occupation of space by a continuant and its matter, the relation of person to human organism, the metaphysical idea of a person, the status of artefacts, the relation of the three-dimensional and four-dimensional conceptions of reality, and the nomological underpinning of (...) sortal classification. From a much larger body of work the author has selected, edited or annotated, and variously shortened or extended eleven pieces. He has added an Introduction and one completely new essay, on the philosophy of biology and the role there of the idea of process. (shrink)

The term 'essentialism' in its popular usage is usually qualified in some way, as in 'biological essentialism', 'gender essentialism' and 'social essentialism'. The essentialist theses were defended on the grounds that denying them leads, under plausible assumptions, to pairs of worlds containing objects which are intrinsic and spatio‐temporal duplicates and yet which are numerically distinct. This chapter outlines some technical difficulties in getting the definitions of 'essential property' and 'individual essence' exactly right. It explains the idea of a metaphysically essential (...) property in terms of Aristotle's 'essential/accidental' contrast. A popular idea is to invoke the notion, which has its roots in Aristotle's theory of essence and accident, of a substance sortal. A different way of developing a sortal‐based account of essential kinds is suggested by David Wiggins, who argues that it is only ultimate sortals that represent essential properties, where an ultimate sortal is the most general sortal corresponding to a given principle of individuation. (shrink)

This is the most recent edition of Sameness and Substance, a version of which actually appeared even earlier as Identity and Spacio-Temporal Continuity of 1967. The main thesis of the work is that identity—along with the correlative concepts of substance and being the same particular, or more generally of being the same a as b—depends on the specification of the sort of thing instantiated by a and b. Wiggins calls this the “sortal dependency” thesis: in the case (...) of an identity of a and b, it is only correct to say a is the same f as b, where f is a certain predicate applicable to both a and b. Wiggins develops, in other words, Wittgenstein’s suggestion in the Tractatus—the identity symbolized in an equals sign, such as a = b, is meaningless unless it means simply f & f. An addition to this developing work of special note is the new chapter on personal identity. (shrink)

‘Second substances’ are Aristotle’s species and genera that reveal the general nature of a thing. Sortals correspond to the most specific, least abstract of these, normally thought of as ‘the’ kind to which a thing belongs. I argue against a common view that artifact terms such as ‘clock’ or ‘pen’ are suitable as sortals and for their being regarded as more like genera. If we can individuate clocks and pens as we do trees and rocks, by a combination of (...) class='Hi'>sortal plus ostension, then we must use more specific sortals which indicate the structures by virtue of which the objects perform the functions of clocks or pens. Functions by themselves do not supply the identity conditions of sortals. Similar reasoning supports Wiggins’ view that ‘the kind’ to which we belong is our biological species, not the purely functional kind of being a person. (shrink)

The paper defends a combination of perdurantism with mereological universalism by developing semantics of temporary predications of the sort ’some P is/was/will be (a) Q’. We argue that, in addition to the usual application of causal and other restrictions on sortals, the grammatical form of such statements allows for rather different regimentations along three separate dimensions, according to: (a) whether ‘P’ and ‘Q’ are being used as phase or substance sortal terms, (b) whether ‘is’, ‘was’, and ‘will be’ (...) are the ‘is’, ‘was’, ‘will be’ of identity or of constitution, and (c) whether ‘Q’ is being used as a subject or predicate term. We conclude that this latitude is beneficial, as it conforms with linguistic reality (i.e., the multiple uses actually in place) and also enables one to turn what is ordinarily perceived as a problem for universalist perdurantism viz., a commitment to all sorts of weird and gerrymandered temporally extended entities, into an advantage, for the richness in questions allows us to make sense of. (shrink)

One aim of this dissertation is to remove ambiguities that have impeded a clear discussion and adequate evaluation of animalism. To that end I develop a taxonomy of different varieties of animalism and argue that there are substantive differences between them. In earlier debates about animalism, the previously elided distinctions that my taxonomy makes clear create unnecessary confusion and disagreement. My taxonomy resolves some of that confusion and provides the parties to the debate with a conceptual framework for importantly distinct (...) accounts of personal identity. I also evaluate animalist arguments in light of the distinctions my taxonomy tracks. Specifically I identify which arguments support which varieties of animalism. The most popular varieties, I argue, are critically under-supported. All rely on a tacit presupposition that ‘animal’ is a natural kind term or a substance sortal, a supposition that animalists are under some pressure to reject. Thus, my evaluation prompts a refocusing of the standard defenses of animalism to prioritize defending the tacit presupposition. Finally, I defend a hylomorphic variety of animalism from two objections: first, from the objection that if animalism is true, then human persons cannot survive death, or at least they cannot exist in an intermediate, disembodied state between their deaths and resurrections. I do this by arguing that given hylomorphism, animals can become immaterial, and that this is less an affront to intuition and mereology than it might seem. Second, I defend a hylomorphic variety of animalism from the objection that if it is true, we are not the primary thinkers of our thoughts. The criticism is that if hylomorphism can solve certain puzzles, the resolving of which is one of the main points in hylomorphism’s favor, the view implies that our contingent mental properties primarily characterize something other than us. I argue that this criticism turns on a misunderstanding of how the hylomorphism at stake solves the relevant puzzles and that it can do so without major modification. (shrink)

I argue that a form of animalism that does not include the belief that ‘human animal’ is a substance-sortal has a dialectical advantage over other versions of animalism. The main reason for this advantage is that Phase Animalism, the version of animalism described here, has the theoretical resources to provide convincing descriptions of the outcomes of scenarios problematic for other forms of animalism. Although Phase Animalism rejects the claim that ‘human animal’ is a substance-sortal, it is (...) still appealing to those who believe that our nature is continuous or of a similar kind to that of other physical entities. (shrink)

Many philosophers today accept the broadly Aristotelian view that one can explain de re necessary properties by invoking essence. These ‘Neo-Aristotelian essentialists’ hold that a property F is an essential property of x iff specifying F gives a correct answer to the Aristotelian ‘what is x?’ question. We are sceptical. According to neo-Aristotelian essentialists, essential properties are not themselves de re modal properties, but they are supposed to explain why things have their de re modal properties. Neo-Aristotelian essentialists accept the (...) following principle (ENL): If x is essentially F, then x is necessarily F. We ask: Why? We first clarify the neo-Aristotelian notion of essence via the Aristotelian “what is x?” question. So far as we can see, the only way to do this is by appeal to the notion of a substance sortal. We then consider the notion of a substance sortal itself, and argue that there is nothing in that notion that even so much as suggests that ENL is true. (shrink)

This paper follows Part I of our essay on case-intensional first-order logic (CIFOL; Belnap and Müller (2013)). We introduce a framework of branching histories to take account of indeterminism. Our system BH-CIFOL adds structure to the cases, which in Part I formed just a set: a case in BH-CIFOL is a moment/history pair, specifying both an element of a partial ordering of moments and one of the total courses of events (extending all the way into the future) that that moment (...) is part of. This framework allows us to define the familiar Ockhamist temporal/modal connectives, most notably for past, future, and settledness. The novelty of our framework becomes visible in our discussion of substances in branching histories, i.e., in its first-order part. That discussion shows how the basic idea of tracing an individual thing from case to case via an absolute property is applicable in a branching histories framework. We stress the importance of keeping apart extensionality and moment-definiteness, and give a formal account of how the specification of natural sortals and natural qualities turns out to be a coordination task in BH-CIFOL. We also provide a detailed answer to Lewis’s well-known argument against branching histories, exposing the fallacy in that argument. (shrink)

In this paper Animalism is analysed. It will be argued that Animalism is correct in claiming (i) that being of a certain sort of animal S is a fundamental individuative substance sortal concept (animal of the species Homo Sapiens), (ii) that this implies that Animalism is correct in claiming that persons such as us are, by necessity, human beings, (iii) that remaining the same animal is a necessary condition for our identity over time. Contrary to Animalism it will (...) be argued that this does not imply that person should be understood as a phased sortal concept. It will be argued that Animalism rests upon a prior conception of person, and that this implies that person must be understood as a basic substance sortal concept through which we have to individuate ourselves and others. It is further argued that this, together with the insights of Animalism, implies that persons, by necessity, are beings of a biological nature. (shrink)

This paper is a critique of David Wiggins's treatment of essentialism in his book Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity (Blackwell 1967). I argue in detail that he has not provided an adequate account either of the concept of a sortal term or of the concept of a substance-concept, even though both concepts play important roles in his case for essentialism. I also discuss Wiggins's views on how substance-concepts are related to judgments of identity through time.

Reference to persons with personal pronouns raises the issue of the primary referent and its nature. “I” does not refer to a property or cluster of properties. This contrasts with our identifying grasp of persons. A person is a radical singularity and thus stands in contrast to a kind or sortal term. The individuation of persons is not adequately grasped by “definite descriptions” or “eidetic singularities.” In spite of the seeming possibility of persons being wholly identical in terms of (...) properties, in other words, “doubles,” the core referent of reference to persons is not to what is individuated merely by mere numerical differences or spatial-temporal, and essential-eidetic determinations. Rather we have to do with a “non-sortal unique essence.” What “I” refers to is a self-individuating substance. This raises questions for the proper referent of “love.” What is it that love intends or loves if persons are basically radical singularities. What does one love and why does one love if whom one loves is most essentially non-sortal? The question of the ontological status of persons requires integrating the status of being transcendental I’s, and thus being non-temporal, non-spatial, non-sortal, simple substances and thus not homogenous with the experienced world. (shrink)

Resumo Recentemente o Hilemorfismo – a visão tradicional, segundo a qual, as substâncias são constituídas pela combinação de forma e matéria – tem sido alvo de renovado interesse. Este artigo centra-se na substância material e sugere que, neste caso, a constituição hilemórfica exige uma noção de forma que deve ser alargada ao conceito de energia, ou ao exercício de uma força. Neste artigo também se defende o gradualismo substancial: se a forma for assim entendida, a substancialidade possui graus, ou seja, (...) as coisas podem ser substâncias em maior ou menor grau. O gradualismo substancial pode iluminar os actuais debates relativos à identificação das partes das substâncias e à compatibilidade entre o hilemorfismo e o categorialismo. Palavras-chave : forma, gradualismo substancial, hilemorfismo, matéria, substânciaHylomorphism, the old traditional view according to which substances are constituted by the combination of form and matter, has recently undergone a renaissance. This essay focuses on material substance, and suggests that in this case the hylomorphic constitution calls for a notion of form which should be understood also as energy, or the exercise of a force. It further argues for substantial gradualism: when form is thus understood, substantiality comes in degrees, i.e. things can be substances to a greater or lesser degree. Substantial gradualism sheds new light on current discussions concerning the identification of the parts of substances and the compatibility between hylomorphism and sortalism. Keywords : form, hylomorphism, matter, substance, substantial gradualism. (shrink)

For this volume David Wiggins has selected and revised eleven of his essays in an area of metaphysics where his work has been particularly influential, and he has added a substantial introduction and one new unpublished essay. Among the subjects treated are substance, identity, persistence, persons, sortals, and artefacts.

Over his philosophical career, David Wiggins has produced a body of work that, though varied and wide-ranging, stands as a coherent and carefully integrated whole. In this book Ferner examines Wiggins’ conceptualist-realism, his sortal theory ‘D’ and his human being theory in order to assess how far these elements of his systematic metaphysics connect. In addition to rectifying misinterpretations and analysing the relations between Wiggins’ works, Ferner reveals the importance of the philosophy of biology to Wiggins’ approach. This book (...) elucidates the biological anti-reductionism present in Wiggins’ work and highlights how this stance stands as a productive alternative to emergentism. With an analysis of Wiggins’ construal of substances, specifically organisms, the book goes on to discuss how Wiggins brings together the concept of a person with the concept of a natural substance, or human being. An extensive introduction to the work of David Wiggins, as well as a contribution to the dialogue between personal identity theorists and philosophers of biology, this book will appeal to students and scholars working in the areas of philosophy, biology and the history of Anglophone metaphysics. (shrink)

This paper follows Part I of our essay on case-intensional first-order logic ). We introduce a framework of branching histories to take account of indeterminism. Our system BH-CIFOL adds structure to the cases, which in Part I formed just a set: a case in BH-CIFOL is a moment/history pair, specifying both an element of a partial ordering of moments and one of the total courses of events that that moment is part of. This framework allows us to define the familiar (...) Ockhamist temporal/modal connectives, most notably for past, future, and settledness. The novelty of our framework becomes visible in our discussion of substances in branching histories, i.e., in its first-order part. That discussion shows how the basic idea of tracing an individual thing from case to case via an absolute property is applicable in a branching histories framework. We stress the importance of keeping apart extensionality and moment-definiteness, and give a formal account of how the specification of natural sortals and natural qualities turns out to be a coordination task in BH-CIFOL. We also provide a detailed answer to Lewis’s well-known argument against branching histories, exposing the fallacy in that argument. (shrink)

Anil Gupta's slightly revised 1977 Pittsburgh doctoral dissertation is not a linguistic investigation of common nouns. There is no thorough attempt to organize and explain data about common nouns in natural languages. Gupta's goal is to develop and to defend formal modal languages and logics useful for the representation and defense of metaphysical theses on topics such as the structure of individuals, sorts or kinds, substances, and essences. He does, however, develop the special features of his formal syntax and semantics (...) on the basis of two theses about common nouns in our natural languages. Geach's work suggests the first thesis that properly expressed identity statements are of the form: b is the same K as c, where K is a common noun. Because the individual variables bound by quantifiers must be capable of being terms of an identity relation, this first thesis leads Gupta to require quantifiers to link individual variables with common noun expressions. Thus in his formal languages we can only express: "every K is _____" or "some K is _____" where K is syntactically part of the quantifier. We can call this "sortal quantification." Hence, "Every K is P" and "Some K is P" are not even expressible as "If anything is K then it is P" or "Something is K and P," let alone equivalent to such ill-formed expressions in his languages. Gupta's book is a useful introduction to the syntax and semantics for languages with this non-standard sortal quantification for those already familiar with the syntax and formal semantics of first order extensional and modal languages with standard quantifiers. Those unfamiliar with standard formal languages and model structure semantics will find Gupta's provocative metaphysical theories and conjectures inaccessible. (shrink)

How is it possible that a thing singled out not exist? How is it possible that two things singled out be numerically identical? How is one to understand the relationship between, say, a quality of a thing and what this quality is? And how is one to understand the relation between this quality and the thing which happens to be thus qualified? Trying to answer these four questions involves investigation of the four senses of the verb "to be," or of (...) the concepts of existence, identity, essential and accidental predication. Butchvarov’s thesis is that these four questions admit of a common answer, that the cornerstone of this comprehensive theory is an answer to the second question, and that this crucial answer depends on making some such distinction as his between "objects" and "entities." The bare bones of his argument are these: We commonly make statements of the form "a is b" where "a" and "b" are used referringly. A "material identity" statement of this form may be true. If true, it is about one thing; yet what it is about appears to be distinct things. This distinctness is not a real distinction among existents, nor does it arise solely or primarily from features of language. Butchvarov’s account is based on a distinction "of reason" between objects and entities. An entity is an existent, a constituent of the world. An object is whatever can be singled out once, and only once, in perception or imagination or in "thought". Entities as such cannot be singled out, yet they may be recognized through applications of a conceptual apparatus to objects. A material identity statement, then, states that two objects are one entity. If true, it is both about two distinct objects and about the one entity which each is. When two objects are judged to be one entity, then indiscernibility is enforced. Seeming counterexamples to the indiscernibility of identicals are explained in terms of the distinction between objects and entities. Though some applications of the concept of identity are relative to sortal characteristics, others are not. The latter are prior to the former. These primary judgments constitute the backbone of "thought" and discourse. They are governed by impersonal, nonhuman "paradigms." There are entities, of course; and there are objects, though as objects none exists. Some objects are entities, some are not. The notion of existence, like the notion of identity in its material role, is then a principle of classification, a concept. Butchvarov examines nine objections to this claim, and elaborates his distinction between objects and entities. He concludes that identifiability, hence indefinite reidentifiability, is the logically sufficient condition of applicability of the concept of existence. A statement such as "Socrates is white" is a disguised conjunction, viz., "Socrates has this color, and this color is white." The second conjunct is an "essential" statement; it says of an object singled out that it is a certain entity; or, to allow for essences of nonexistent objects, it states what entity the object would be were it an entity. An essential statement is not a material identity statement, for only one of its terms is used referringly. The essence of an object is not a property of it, for it is what the object is or would be. Whereas logically prior consciousness of objects is intentional and non-conceptual, consciousness of entities is conceptual and nonintentional; it consists in recognizing that a thing can be identified by oneself or by others. What is accidentally white, say, cannot be a material substance or bare particular; therefore it is a "cluster" of qualities. The Resemblance Theory, according to which qualities are particulars, is not a coherent alternative to the Identity Theory; therefore the qualities an individual happens to have are themselves universals. The Bradleyan critique of ontological atomism is cogent; therefore an individual is a cluster of qualities each of which depends for its "formal identity" on its being together with the rest. An individual’s having qualities is then to be understood in terms of the necessary togetherness of the qualities constitutive of it. Since in addition each of these qualities is essentially a universal, and specific universals are contingently coinstantiated, the predication in question is properly regarded as accidental. The problem of identifying quality-clusters through space and time is discussed. (shrink)

I can be aware of myself and refer to myself without it being necessary to think of any third-personal characteristics; indeed one may be aware of oneself without having to be aware of anything except oneself. This consideration raises issues in phenomenological ontology of identity, individuation, and substance.

Background: Previous research has identified a link between the loss of a significant person, grief complications, and substance abuse. People with substance use disorder (SUD) are more vulnerable to complicated grieving symptoms following loss. From sociocognitive theories, the model of coping with stress assumes that substance use is one of the responses used to cope with traumatic life events. The main objective of this study is to identify the coping strategies of people with SUD and to analyze (...) their relationship to complicated grief (CG).Methods: A sample of 196 bereaved drug-dependent patients was assessed, after providing written consent, in sociodemographic variables, drug and bereavement related characteristics, CG symptomatology (Inventory of Complicated Grief) and coping strategies (Coping Strategies Inventory).Results: There are differences in relation to the coping strategies used among patients with CG, using more those focused on emotional expression, social withdrawal, wishful thinking, and self-criticism.Conclusion: We can conclude that, in general, CG in patients with SUD is more associated with the use of less adaptive coping strategies. This data can contribute to a better understanding of the different variables involved in the grieving process among people with SUD. It is important to point out the clinical implications of addressing what the coping strategies associated with improved grief outcomes among people with addiction problems are. (shrink)

This paper starts from the debate between proponents of a neo-Lockean psychological continuity view of personal identity, and defenders of the idea that we are simple mental substances. Each party has valid criticisms of the other; the impasse in the debate is traced to the Lockean assumption that substance is only externally related to its attributes. This suggests the possibility that we could develop a better account of mental substance if we thought of it as having an internal (...) relation to its states. I suggest that we may be able to do this by relying on the notion of expression. In developing this idea I draw heavily on aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophical psychology, while also developing and criticizing Strawson's account of persons and recent work by Lynne Baker. I conclude by arguing that mental substance, understood in this way, can only be grasped in narrative terms; substantialist and narrative accounts of personal identity, far from being opposed, are mutually supporting and require one another to be coherent. (shrink)

Sortal predicates have been associated with a counting process, which acts as a criterion of identity for the individuals they correctly apply to. We discuss in what sense certain types of predicates suggested by quantum physics deserve the title of ‘sortal’ as well, although they do not characterize either a process of counting or a criterion of identity for the entities that fall under them. We call such predicates ‘quantum-sortal predicates’ and, instead of a process of counting, (...) to them is associated a ‘criterion of cardinality’. After their general characterization, it is discussed how these predicates can be formally described. (shrink)

The concept of enhypostaton was introduced into theological discourse during the sixth-century Christological debates, and aimed to elucidate the orthodox doctrine of the unity of two natures in the singular hypostasis of Christ. In spite of the fact that the conceptual content of the term is recognized by contemporary scholarship as pertaining to the core of Christology, the notion of enhypostaton is often described as obscure and not clearly defined. The coining of the term is often ascribed to Leontius of (...) Byzantium, whereas in fact he only followed and developed solutions already introduced into Christological discourse by John the Grammarian. The article aims to clarify the notion by offering a philosophical account of the meaning and theoretical origins of “enhypostaton,” as introduced by John the Grammarian in the context of his discussion of substance as en-hypostatical being. Enhypostaton emerges as the proper way of describing the ontological complements of a particular entity. This seems to be a significant development in the philosophical explanation of substance. (shrink)

This book presents a strong case for substance dualism and offers a comprehensive defense of the knowledge argument, showing that materialism cannot accommodate or explain the 'hard problem' of consciousness. Bringing together the discussion of reductionism and semantic vagueness in an original and illuminating way, Howard Robinson argues that non-fundamental levels of ontology are best treated by a conceptualist account, rather than a realist one. In addition to discussing the standard versions of physicalism, he examines physicalist theories such as (...) those of McDowell and Price, and accounts of neutral monism and panpsychism from Strawson, McGinn and Stoljar. He also explores previously unnoticed historical parallels between Frege and Aristotle, and between Hume and Plotinus. His book will be a valuable resource for scholars and advanced students of philosophy of mind, in particular those looking at consciousness, dualism, and the mind-body problem. (shrink)

In the Essay, Locke refers to the ordinary-sized natural things as ‘particular sorts of Substances’ (2.23), whereas the ‘three sorts of Substances’ (2.27) are more metaphysically laden sorts: God, finite spirits, and fundamental material particles. He posits the much-contested ‘substratum’ in each particular sort of substance but not any of the three sorts. It should also be noted that his list of the particular sorts includes ‘men’. In regard to this nobler sort, he refers to a further classification – (...) viz., ‘the Substance of spirit’ and ‘the Substance of the body’ – only in terms of their nominal essence. A naturalistic, nominalist approach is deeply entrenched in his account of the human-related sorts as well. In this chapter, I shall explore how Locke develops a theory of substance in the Essay that is less metaphysical, more naturalistic, and epistemically humbler than those of his rationalist contemporaries. (shrink)

This book offers an original new account of one of Aristotle's central doctrines. Freudenthal He recreates from Aristotle's writings a more complete theory of material substance which is able to explain the problematical areas of the way matter organizes itself and the persistence of matter, to show that the hitherto ignored concept of vital heat is as central in explaining material substance as soul or form.

In the Corpus Aristotelicum there are two different theories of substance which apply to the sublunary world. The first theory is found in the Categories and selects the individual concrete as a primary substance. The second is found in the Metaphysics and selects the Form and the Essence as a primary substance. Most of the interpretations of modern Aristotelian scholarship claim an inconsistency. They suggest that if at all Aristotle has a theory of substance, then it (...) is either the substance theory of the Categories or the one of the Metaphysics but not both of them. The supposition of all these interpretations is that Aristotle’s theory of substance is unambiguous and that there can be only a single primary substance. These interpretations suppose that the theory of substance is applicable only to a single domain, namely to ontology.In my paper I argue that this supposition is false. I suggest that Aristotle’s theory of substance is applicable not only to ontology but also to the domain of determinology whose meaning is explained in the paper. The theory of substance of the Categories applies to ontology whereas the one of the Metaphysics applies to determinology. The two theories are consistent with each other in a way that there are two commensurate sorts of primary substance: the individual concrete as the ontological primary substance of the Categories and the Form‑Essence as the determinative primary substance of the Metaphysics.Furthermore, I claim that Aristotle’s concept of substance is manifold and flexible. The concept evolves and is expanded in the Metaphysics. It is manifold because his theory of substance has a certain structure which includes the following three criteria for selecting a primary substance: subjecthood viz. being a subject, independence and determined individuality. Aristotle’s concept of substance is flexible because these criteria do not have an absolute signification per se but are general and relative. They get a final signification when they are applied either to the ontology in the Categories or to the determinology in the Metaphysics. Their application to a certain domain establishes a theory of substance according to the domain in question and selects a primary substance according to the same domain. Aristotle’s concept of substance is flexible also because in the Metaphysics he enlarges his first concept of substance expressed by the three criteria by adding a new sort of substancehood expressed by the idion criterion. (shrink)

Many contemporary philosophers of mind disagree with substance dualism, saying that despite the failure of physical theories of mind, substance dualism cannot be advocated, because it faces more serious problems than physical theories, lacking compatibility with philosophical arguments and scientific evidence. Regardless of the validity of the arguments in support of substance dualism, it is demonstrated in this article that this theory is coherent, with no philosophical or scientific problems. The main arguments of opponents of substance (...) dualism are explained and criticized in this respect. Based on this, it becomes clear that the interaction of soul and body has a reasonable philosophical explanation, the problem of the pairing of soul and body, although it may not have a scientific explanation, it has a philosophical and theological solution, the principle of the physical causal closure lacks conclusive reasons and cannot reject the existence of the soul, the existence of the soul does not contradict the theory of evolution, the dependence of the soul on the brain is compatible with its independence, and finally, the principle of simplicity does not make any problem for accepting the substance dualism. (shrink)

This book introduces student to the three major figures of modern philosophy known as the rationalists. It is not for complete beginners, but it is an accessible account of their thought. By concerning itself with metaphysics, and in particular substance, the book relates an important historical debate largely neglected by the contemporary debates in the once again popular area of traditional metaphysics. in philosophy. (Do Not USE).

In her recent paper, “A Defense of Substance Causation,” Ann Whittle makes a case for substance causation. In this paper, assuming that causation is a generative or productive relation, I argue that Whittle’s argument is not successful. While substances are causally relevant in causal processes owing to outcomes being counterfactually dependent upon their role in such occurrences, the real productive work in causal processes is accomplished by the causal powers of substances.

Fortunately, there is heat; and Freudenthal is keen to promote it as an overlooked central factor in Aristotle’s theory of material substance. He begins in agreement with the many scholars who argue that Aristotle’s theory of the four elements underdetermines the plain fact that there are organic substances which exhibit both synchronic and diachronic unity. He goes further than most, however, by arguing that left unaugmented Aristotle’s account of the four basic elements would positively preclude the existence of these (...) forms of unity. For Aristotle embraces the Presocratic picture of the four elements as engaged in “endemic strife”, so constituted that their natural propensities lead them to separate and dissolve rather than to unite and synthesize. Thus, for example, each of the four elements has a natural direction, which ought to result in fire and air ever moving upward and away from earth and water, which will move downward if unimpeded. Hence, as Aristotle himself recognizes, some agent force is required to hold the four elements together when they are mixed. (shrink)

This paper examines the debate about the referential meaning of Kant’s concept of substance. In the Critique of Pure Reason and other works such as the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, the category or concept of substance appears quite uncontroversially to have both a logical meaning (by which it means roughly ‘a thing that is the ultimate subject of predication’) and an objective meaning (by which it means roughly ‘a thing that is permanent’, or, equivalently, ‘a thing existing (...) at all times’). However, it is highly contested what kind of object, or objects, are supposed to meet, in experience, the criteria imposed by the conjunction of these two distinct meanings. I discuss two examples of the main interpretations to be found in the literature: Peter Strawson (2000), who contends that the reference of substance is only matter, and Claudia Jáuregui (2021), who also includes ordinary particular objects as substances. I scrutinize their fit with some of the textual evidence, primarily from the First Analogy of Experience, and finally reject Jáuregui’s interpretation as implying a kind of mereological essentialism about particular objects. Keywords: substance, meaning, matter, ordinary objects, First Analogy of Experience. (shrink)