Powers

Some time ago, Joel Katzav and Brian Ellis debated the compatibility of dispositional essentialism with the principle of least action. Surprisingly, very little has been said on the matter since, even by the most naturalistically inclined metaphysicians. Here, we revisit the Katzav–Ellis arguments of 2004–05. We outline the two problems for the dispositionalist identified Katzav in his 2004 , and claim they are not as problematic for the dispositional essentialist at it first seems – but not for the reasons espoused (...) by Ellis. (shrink)

I argue that a powers-based metaphysics radically reconfigures the existing free will problematic. This is different from claiming that such an approach solves the ill-conceived problems that emerge from Humean-Kantian default commitments.

The phenomenal powers view claims that phenomenal properties metaphysically necessitate their effects in virtue of how they feel, and thereby constitute non-Humean causal powers. For example, pain necessitates that subjects who experience it try to avoid it in virtue of feeling bad. I argue for this view based on the inconceivability of certain phenomenal properties necessitating different effects than their actual ones, their ability to predict their effects without induction, and their ability to explain their effects without appeal to laws (...) or regularities. I also offer a harmony argument according to which the view offers the best explanation for otherwise seemingly fortunate psychophysical regularities. I then outline the view’s main implications for the metaphysics of causation and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

An account of what sort of causal integration is necessary for an agent to exercise agency is offered in support of a soft-line response to Derk Pereboom’s four-case argument against source-compatibilism. I argue that, in cases of manipulation, the manipulative activity affects the identity of the causal process of which it is a part. Specifically, I argue that causal processes involving direct manipulation fail to count as exercises of intentional agency because they involve heteromesial causal deviance. In contrast, standard deterministic (...) causal processes do not involve heteromesial causal deviance and are agency-preserving. The upshot is that there is a relevant difference between a causal process involving direct manipulation by another agent and a deterministic causal process that involves no such intervention. If this is right, then Pereboom’s four-case argument does not pose a threat to source-compatibilist theories of free will and moral responsibility. (shrink)

The idea that causation involves the production of changes due to the exertion of influence of something on something else—the core idea of causal realism—used to be the default view. Today this idea is at the heart of (i) transmission/causal process accounts, (ii) mechanistic accounts, and (iii) powers-based accounts. However, as I have previously argued (Ingthorsson 2021) the above-mentioned approaches are based—to varying degree—on the very problematic assumption that causal influence is essentially unidirectional; that it passes from whatever is the (...) cause to the effect. As first pointed out be Mario Bunge (1959), the idea that causal influence is unidirectional is incompatible with what is today considered a scientific fact, notably that all interactions are perfectly reciprocal; whenever any object exerts an influence on any other object, the latter simultaneously exerts the same kind of influence, of the same magnitude, on the former. Drawing on Bunge’s result, I have developed a fourth approach to efficient causation that accepts the reciprocity of interactions (Ingthorsson 2002 & 2021). According to this view a cause is not the action of something on something else that receives the influence, but the reciprocal action between powerful particulars which results in a modification of both sides, producing a new state of affairs. In this paper, I present the core ideas of the four different approaches to causal efficacy, what I think is problematic with the first three and finally attempt to compare how well the four approaches fare in explaining two often discussed types of causal interactions: (i) collisions between billiard balls, and (ii) how water dissolves salt. I argue that only reciprocal actions between powerful particulars can plausibly claim to fully account for these phenomena, in a manner compatible with the theories and findings of the natural sciences. (shrink)

This book advocates dispositional essentialism, the view that natural properties have dispositional essences.1 So, for example, the essence of the property of being negatively charged is to be disposed to attract positively charged objects. From this fact it follows that it is a law that all negatively charged objects will attract positively 10 charged objects; and indeed that this law is metaphysically necessary. Since the identity of the property of being negatively charged is determined by its being related in a (...) certain way to the property of being positively charged, in any world in which these properties exist they must be related so that all negatively charged objects attract positively charged objects. 15 Bird opposes his dispositional essentialism to the view that properties are categorical in nature, with their identities grounded in quiddities that are not exhausted by their relations to other properties. The main exponents of this view are D.M. Armstrong and David Lewis. They take the laws of nature to be contingent though they entertain very different views about their nature: Armstrong is a necessitarian 20 about laws, taking them to be relations of nomic necessitation between universals, while Lewis is a Humean about laws who takes them to be a special kind of regularity. The book is a sustained defence of the dispositional essentialist conception of properties and laws against the competing conceptions espoused by Armstrong and Lewis. One rough way to characterize the difference between these conceptions is to say that 25 the categoricalist sees properties as passive and inert with the laws of nature being fixed independently of the nature of properties whereas, in contrast, the dispositional essentialist sees properties as active potencies from which the laws of nature automatically spring. A slightly more tendentious way to express the difference is to say, as Bird does, that the categoricalist views embrace the Humean doctrine that there are no 30 necessary connexions in nature, while the dispositional essentialist view, on the other hand, repudiates this doctrine.. (shrink)

I wish to prove in this article that Thomas Aquinas was a metaontological pluralist, i.e., that he held that there are many, non-equivalent and irreducible dependence relations in the universe. In this respect, I shall focus on Aquinas' doctrine of the four causes and on the dependence relationships between matter and form in material substances. Subsequently, I shall also reconstruct Aquinas' doctrines by explicitly appealing to metaontological pluralism. I shall explore two routes towards Aquinas' metaontological pluralism: one based on cases (...) of apparent mutual dependence and the other based on the asymmetry of natural priority. Finally, I shall provide two original interpretations of the doctrine of the four causes and of the dependence relationships between matter and form. Such interpretations will be based on the metaphysics of powers. In Section 1 I shall introduce metaontological pluralism and the two routes. In Section 2 I shall examine Aquinas' doctrine of the four causes. In Section 3 I shall provide an interpretation of that doctrine based on powers. In Section 4 I shall consider the dependence relationships between matter and form in material substances. In Section 5 I shall provide an interpretation of such relationships based on powers. (shrink)

Power metaphysicians are concerned with, well, powers. Theists claim interest in the most powerful entity there is, God. As such, recent work on the ontology of powers may well have much to offer theists when thinking about God’s power. In this paper I start to provide a metaphysics of God’s ‘power’, something many definitions of omnipotence make reference to. In particular I will be interested in explicating how a power ontology can account for the strength and range of God’s power, (...) as well as showing how this account of divine power can fit with a timeless conception of God. (shrink)

This book provides an exhaustive overview of the ontology of relations. Moreover, it offers a detailed defense of the existence of irreducible relations in the universe and shows that entities such as powers should be better thought of as relations. At first, the author discusses many classical arguments for and against the existence of relations and draws preliminary distinctions between internal and external relations and symmetrical and non-symmetrical relations. He defends the existence of irreducible relations against several objections, most notably (...) three Bradleyan regresses. In response to these objections, the author argues that both internal and external relations should be thought of as relational modes and that intentional, temporal and spatial relations are external. He also presents several problems that are typically taken to affect non-symmetrical relations and introduces one new version of a theory to deal with them-the O-role theory. Finally, the author explores essential dependence relations and causal dependence relations and defends the view that power are relational modes. The Ontology of Relations will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in metaphysics, philosophy of science, and history of philosophy. (shrink)

This paper explores the distinction between active and passive powers. Interest in the distinction has recently been revived in some quarters of the philosophy of action as some have sought to elucidate the distinction between action and passion (the changes that happen to a substance) in terms of the former (Hyman, 2015; Mayr, 2011; Lowe 2013). If there is a distinction between active and passive powers, parallel to the distinction between action and passion, what is it? In this paper, I (...) distinguish two ways of drawing it. According to the first one, active and passive powers are distinguished by the ways in which their manifestations come about. According to the second, they are distinguished by their directedness, i.e. what they are powers to do. Both accounts are examined and the latter is defended against the former. I argue that active powers are powers to alter, modify, corrupt or change something. (shrink)

The view that to act is to cause change and that to be an agent is to be the causer of an action’s result has gained traction in the past twenty years or so. This view seems to have two significant corollaries. First, there is no distinction between doing an action and causing its result. Second, any two actions that have the same result will turn out to be identical. Ruben (2018) has recently used the first corollary to challenge the (...) view, and the second corollary raises further problems for the view. This article aims to refine this view and defend it against the challenges that arise out of its two corollaries. It is argued that being the cause of an action’s result is not the same as being its causer and that doing an action is not just causing its result but causing it in a specific way. (shrink)

Taking steps from Wilson’s distinction between strong and weak emergence, in this paper I cast doubts on the prospect of weak emergence. After discussing the relationship between properties set at different levels and supporting different counterfactuals and laws, I discuss one crucial condition for a property to be weakly emergent, one that is usually taken as the primary motivation for emergence, that of being “realization indifferent”. I set an argument aimed at showing that this realization indifference does not accord with (...) systematic relations holding between properties set at the mental level vis-a-vis their realizers. Since it is not possible to have mental properties which are not systematic, mental properties cannot be weakly emergent properties. (shrink)

In this paper, we consider recent attempts to metaphysically explain agentive modality in terms of conditionals. We suggest that the best recent accounts face counterexamples, and more worryingly, they take some agentive modality for granted. In particular, the ability to perform basic actions features as a primitive in these theories. While it is perfectly acceptable for a semantics of agentive modal claims to take some modality for granted in getting the extension of action claims correct, a metaphysical explanation of agentive (...) modality cannot, at least not in the way that conditional approaches to agentive modality do. We argue that this problem was present even in the classical conditional analysis. By a pessimistic induction, we suggest that, probably, no conditional approach to agentive modality will succeed. (shrink)

To solve this problem , they usually use an intermediate layer of retarding materials such as Ta, w or Mo as a penetration barrier to improve the thermal stability of the Si/Cu layer . In the characterization of Si/Ta/Cu nanoparticles and multilayer systems, there is an effect of negative bias voltage on the improvement of the electrical and structural properties of the permeation barrier of the Ta sputtering layer in the Si/Ta system. Surface processes of the Si layer, including burning, (...) are carried out by plasma and ion beam technology. This kind of integrated circuits with their unique characteristics in the nanometer scale have various applications of mesoscopic systems. (shrink)

Note: The field-effect tunnel transistor nMOS is an experimental type of transistor. Even if its structure is very similar to a metal-oxide semiconductor field-effect transistor nMOS , the basic switching mechanisms in these two transistors differ from each other; nMOS instead of exhibiting thermionic emission modulation, changes through a quantum tunnel modulation 12> They change through a dam. The field-effect tunneling transistor nMOS, as an alternative to conventional CMOS by enabling the voltage supply (VDD) with ultra-low power consumption, enables energy-efficient (...) computing during the sub-threshold slope (SS) range. This type of device has a reverse-bias gate structure, which is usually called a tunnel field-effect transistor nMOS. For low power applications, nMOS is considered. This device has less static leakage current than a MOSFET and is more resistant to SCEs. The most outstanding feature of nMOS is the capacity to produce a reverse subthreshold swing (SS) of less than the 60 mV/decade thermal limit (at 300 K), which is related to common reverse mode nMOSs. A pseudo-thermal SS is achievable because the drain current in nMOSs is generated by source-to-channel carrier injection, which is often under the band tunneling radius. It is placed in the quantum mechanical band (BTBT). Transistor speed nMOS is proportional to the current. The higher the current, the faster the transistor will be able to amplify and charge (the sequential capacitor voltage). For a given transistor speed and maximum acceptable subthreshold leakage, the subthreshold slope thus defines a minimum threshold voltage. Decreasing the threshold voltage is an essential part of the idea to scale the constant amount of nMOS to overcome some challenges associated with the nMOS structure, such as its need for ultra-sharp doping profiles; however, such devices may suffer from gate leakage due to the presence of large vertical fields in the nMOS transistor structure. (shrink)

Fullerenes are nanometer-sized molecules that, in their simplest form, form 60 carbon atoms of a graphite layer with a three-dimensional structure. 60 Unlike diamond and graphite, whose molecules are continuous, fullerenes are closed molecules: they are like C60 and... (60) fullerenes, which are also called buckyball and buckytube, include nanotubes, nanofibers, fullerene has a structure similar to graphite, but instead of completely hexagonal sections, carbon atoms are placed in the vertices of the 5th or 7th polygons.

Electron beam lithography provides the possibility of precise control of nanostructure characteristics that form the basis of various nanotechnologies. The nanostructure fabrication and measurement group advances lithography precision at the nanometer scale and creates processes for manufacturing innovative devices and standards in physical fields ranging from photonics to fluids.< /span>Such measurements create a positive feedback loop for the fabrication and measurement of nanostructures.Electron beam lithography is used for pattern standards for atomic force correlation microscopy and ultra-resolution optical microscopy, with highthroughput (...) precision localization and process parameter characterization and optimization. (shrink)

Nanosupercapacitors, also called electrochemical supercapacitors or nanocapacitors, thus emerge as promising fuel sources with astonishingly fast charge release rates. Incredibly fast charging occurs. Created to improve power execution (high-speed capability), they still depend on similar inherent breakpoints. About the electrical characteristics and the manufacturing process of a nanocapacitor structure using (metalinsulator-carbon-metal nanotube layers). This structure shows high capacitance and the possibility of extremely high integration density due to the unique structure of the nanotubes. Nanoscale patterns and a high aspect ratio (...) are obtained by electron beam lithography to make these vertical nanostructures. This structure can be used to replace capacitors that use a silicon pillar structure in dynamic random access memory (DRAM) or as a nanoscale capacitor for various nanoelectronic devices. .To build nano supercapacitors, high voltage and high energy density developed multilayer nanostructure technologies to make an improvement in capacitor performance. Controlled sputtering techniques can deposit ultra-smooth submicron layers of dielectric and conductive materials. Using this technology, high voltage nanosupercapacitors with an order of magnitude improvement in energy density may be achievable.. Dielectrics and new materials that are well understood for use with this technology. Nano supercapacitors developed with multi-layer nanostructure technology are inherently solid and show excellent mechanical and thermal properties. >Dielectric materials and exchanges design with more layers. Nanostructure multilayer capacitors will be developed and specified. (shrink)

Note: Many types of nanosensors are designed using CP nanomaterials for nanobiological applications. (Conductive surface) The oxidation of conductive polymeric materials is easily altered by redox mechanisms, and the charge transfer properties of these materials are affected by structural parameters, such as diameter and dimensions. CP materials are able to provide sensitive and rapid responses to specific biological and chemical species. Techniques such as chemical polymerization are often used to make CP nanomaterials. Manufacturing strategies can be divided into three categories: (...) hard mold synthesis, soft mold synthesis, and mold-free synthesis. The most widely used conductive polymers in nanosensors are nanomaterials made from CP due to their unique chemical and electrical properties resulting from the properties of their pie-electron nanosystem. Many modeling and functionalization technologies are being developed to control the location, distribution, amount, or structure and orientation of biological nanomolecules at the nanomaterial level. Therefore, our level of contact between biological nanomolecules and nanomaterials is of particular importance in countless applications. Covalent and non-covalent modifications are two general methods for coupling biological molecules and CP nanomaterials. Covalent functionalization is a chemical process in which a strong bond or relationship between nanomaterials and biological molecules is formed. In many cases, surface chemical modifications are required to create active groups that can bind to biomolecules. Unlike covalent functionalization, in the non-covalent method, nanomolecules can be removed without destroying the geometric and electronic structure on the surface. Nanomaterials are formed. Conclusion : The large surface-to-volume ratio in nanostructures and the high potential for signal amplification provide ideal conditions for marking and detecting biological elements in the structure of nanosensors. (shrink)

Nanowires are less than 100 nm in diameter and can be as small as 3 nm. Typically, nanowires are more than 1000 times larger than their diameter. This huge difference in length-to-diameter ratio compared to nanowires is often referred to as 1D materials. This leads to unique properties not seen in bulk materials, The minute size of nanowires means that the quantum mechanical effects of are of great importance. "Quantum Wires" They use quantum mechanics to produce wires with a wide (...) range of unique electrical properties. These features include quantum tunneling, which allows wires made of carbon nanotubes to conduct very high with electrons passing through the wire in a ballistic manner. > In the immersion method, nanowires have enough time to transfer from the particles of nanowires to the holes ; The step of forming uniform nanoparticles is done slowly and finally uniform nanowires are formed. (shrink)

The development of biosensors to measure the concentration of dissolved oxygen in the blood began. This sensor is also called COBD because it covers the surface of the electrode with an enzyme whose constituent is sometimes called (electro-calorie). Later, it helped oxidize glucose. This sensor was used to measure blood sugar. In the same Bapvshandn electrode, an enzyme that has the ability to convert urea into ammonium carbonate in the electrode material ++ ion, NH4, was used to create biosensors that (...) could measure the urea in the blood or urine. Each of these two early biosensors used a different transducer in its signal conversion section . In the first type, blood sugar was measured by measuring the electric current generated (ammetric),while in the urea sensor, the urea concentration was measured based on the electric charge created sensors are made (.Potentiometric) may someday the patient without having to visit a doctor and only on the basis of information that a COBD or Doctor-Board-on-Chip provides, the type of disease has been detected. And then injected into the blood. This will drastically reduce the dosage of the required drugs directly from the side effects of the Effect-Side drug , because the drug is very low and is also sent to the required place in the body. The drug acts directly on a biosensor that converts the biological response into an electrical signal and consists of two main components: the receptor and the detector. The ability to select one biosensor is determined by the receiving section. Enzymes, antibodies, and lipid layers are good examples of receptors. The task of the detector is to convert the physical or chemical changes by detecting the material to be analyzed into an obvious factor that the detectors can select in the type of reaction of the electrical signal. They do not have the perfect .They are electrochemical, optical, piezoelectric, and thermal. In the type of electrochemistry the action takes place in one of the following ways: amperometric, potentiometric, and impedance. The most common electrodes used in the potentiometric type include: the Glass electrode, the Selective-Ion ion electrode, and the FET sensitive-Ion ion field-effect transistor or ISFET. In general, a biosensor consists of an immobilized static biological system, such as a cell bundle, a micro enzyme, or an antibody, and a measuring. In the presence of a certain molecule, the biological system changes the properties of the environment. (shrink)

Nano fullerenes with the ability to store electrostatic energy that can be used as nano supercapacitors with very high capacity. Also, with these nanotubes, the nervous network can be repaired. Carbon nano fullerenes are allotropes of carbon such as diamond and graphite. These compounds are made of carbon and take on spherical and elliptical shapes. Those that are spherical are called buckyballs.Fullerenes do not have much chemical activity. The width of the graphite plate is about a few nanometers. The length (...) of the nanotubes ranges from a few micrometers to less than a meter. Their unique molecular structure creates unusual macroscopic properties. Nano supercapacitor can store 100 times more energy than previous devices of its kind. Finally, such devices can store waves of energy from renewable sources such as wind and deliver that energy to the power grid when needed. In general, nanoelectric supercapacitors can store large amounts of energy, but they tend to charge slowly and wear out quickly. Meanwhile, capacitors have a longer life and can be discharged quickly, but store much less total energy. In order to make nano supercapacitors, nanostructured arrays of electrostatic capacitors can be created.Electrostatic nanocapacitors are the simplest type of electronic energy storage device. They store electrical charge on the surface of two metal electrodes separated by an insulating material. The electrical storage capacity of the nano supercapacitor is directly proportional to the surface area of these sandwich-like electrodes. (shrink)

FinFEET nanotransistors are field-effect nanotransistors (metal-oxide-semiconductor) that are made on asubstrate. The gate is located on two, three, or four sides of the channel or is wrapped. The channel forms adouble gate structure. These devices are given the general name "finfets" because the source/drain region formsfins on the silicon surface. FinFET devices, compared to flat technology and using nanowires in the structureand (complementary metal oxide and semiconductor), < a i=8>have significantly faster switching and highercurrent density.Due to the reduction of the (...) scale of semiconductor components and integrated circuits to thenanometer range, in the FinFET nanotransistor, the reduction of scale causes more short channel effects, lessgate control, an exponential increase in leakage currents, severe process changes, and power densities tobecome unmanageable. The connection between the carbon and metal nanotubes used to connect the sourceand the drain forms the Schottky barrier (SB) in a FinFET nanotransistor. The formation of Schottky barriers inthe source and drain of a transistor causes a significant decrease in the drain current of FinFET nanotransistors. (shrink)

Micro and nano-electromechanical systems ( MEMS / NEMS ) are devices in which the physical motion of a micro or nano-scale structure is controlled by an electronic circuit or vice versa. MEMS and NEMS can be used to build sensitive sensors and stable timing devices. Nano System is a function at the molecular scale. This includes both current work and more advanced concepts. In its core meaning, nanotechnology refers to the predicted ability to make items from the bottom up, using (...) techniques and tools that are produced to make complete, high-performance products. Nano System Introduced the idea of nano-scale "assembly" that could make its own copy. Other aspects of the desired complexity with atomic control in Nano Systems Nano Systems are very widespread and practical. Nanocomputers and nanoassemblers are also a subset of Nano Systems. Nanoparticles are the main components of all nanosystems. To produce nanoparticles with the help of nanotechnology, changes can be made in atoms by controlling the properties. When materials are studied at the nanoscale, the reactions and behavior of atoms are compared to those at the molecular level. (shrink)

Philosophical analyses of causation have been centred on the question of what causation is. More precisely speaking, philosophers tend to address four different issues: metaphysical (what is causation out there?), epistemological (how can a causal claim be established and assessed?), conceptual (what does the word ‘cause’ mean?), and methodological (what methods ought one to use in order to establish and assess causal claims?). This chapter argues that the practical issue of causation (what is a causal claim for in practice?) is (...) highly relevant to the metaphysical, epistemological, conceptual, and methodological issues of causation. Any philosophical enquiry into causation without an examination of this practical issue is incomplete. In other words, a promising approach to causation ought to take all of the metaphysical, epistemological, conceptual, methodological, and practical issues into account. (shrink)

The causal closure of the physical poses a familiar causal exclusion problem for the special sciences that stems from the idea that if closure is true, then fundamental physical properties do all the causal work involved in bringing about physical effects. In this paper I aim to show that the strongest causal closure principle that is not ruled out by some simple physics in fact allows for a certain kind of downward causation, which in turn makes room for robust special (...) science autonomy. I focus on the case of vector composition, arguing that it involves irreducibly multilevel causation. To give a complete causal explanation of what goes on in cases that involve the effects of multiple forces, we need to appeal not only to the fundamental properties that generate those forces, but also to geometric properties that determine how multiple vectors compose. However, if all the causal work involved in such cases were due to fundamental physical properties, there would be a one-level explanation available. Hence, I argue, it cannot be the case that fundamental physical properties do all the causal work. The extra causal work, I suggest, comes from the fact that the causal powers bestowed by fundamental physical properties have irreducibly geometric manifestation conditions. I defend the resulting form of downward causation as a solution to the problem of special science autonomy, and discuss two potential accounts of its source, in terms of the debate between kinematic and dynamic theories of the origins of spacetime symmetries. (shrink)

This paper presents and critically discusses the “logos approach to quantum mechanics” from the point of view of the current debates concerning the relation between metaphysics and science. Due to its alleged direct connection with quantum formalism, the logos approach presents itself as a better alternative for understanding quantum mechanics than other available views. However, we present metaphysical and methodological difficulties that seem to clearly point to a different conclusion: the logos approach is on an epistemic equal footing among alternative (...) realist approaches to quantum mechanics. (shrink)

We examine Sophie Gibb’s emergent property-dualist theory of mental causation as double-prevention. Her account builds on a commitment to a version of causal realism based on a powers metaphysic. We consider three objections to her account. We show, by drawing out the implications of the ontological commitments of Gibb’s theory of mental causation, that the first two objections fail. But, we argue, owing to worries about cases where there is no double-preventive role to be played by mental properties, her account, (...) which solely affords mental properties a double-preventive role, is incomplete and vulnerable to a causal exclusion objection. We propose a friendly modification to her theory of mental causation that is consistent with her theory’s ontological commitments. Specifically, we sketch an account on which mental properties have a more pronounced causal-structuring role that is not exhausted by the role Gibb assigns them as double-preventers. The result is a novel emergentist theory of mental causation. (shrink)

A recent, seemingly appealing version of the powerful qualities view defines properties’ qualitativity via an essentialist claim and their powerfulness via a grounding claim. Roughly, this approach holds that properties are qualities because they have qualitative essences, while they are powerful because their instances or essences ground causal-modal facts. I argue that this theory should be replaced with one that defines the powerfulness of qualities in terms of both a grounding claim and a ‘meta-grounding’ claim. Specifically, I formulate and defend (...) a view on which qualities are powerful just if instances of those qualitiesat least partiallyground dispositionsin virtue of the essences of those qualities. (shrink)

Do powers have parts? Mereological thinking is typically guided by two different metaphors: building versus carving. The building picture treats wholes as constructed from fundamental bits; the carving treats wholes as the result of carving some interconnected space. After considering some suggestions for how to view powers as built from other components, this chapter opts for the carving picture and suggests that a mereology of powers can be generated by carving the underlying space of an interconnected web of fundamental powers. (...) The space of powers is a network of manifestation/triggering connections that can be modelled graph-theoretically where the identity of a fundamental power is importantly tied up with its position in the overall structure. This chapter considers the idea that powers are completely identified by their position in the structure (as pandispositionalists have thought), which then places limits on the sorts of structures that powers theorists can help themselves to. This chapter also considers another novel suggestion on the identity of powers borrowed from non-well-founded set theory. It shows how to identify principles governing ‘carving’ the web into groups of closely connected powers, such that one group can naturally be called ‘part’ of another group, and explore the resulting mereology. (shrink)

This article investigates the causal efficacy of social properties, which faces the following puzzle. First, for both intuitive and scientific reasons, it seems social properties have causal import. But, second, social properties are also characteristically extrinsic: to have some social property depends, in typical cases, on what one’s society is like around them. And, third, there is good reason to doubt that extrinsic properties make a genuine causal contribution. After elaborating on these three claims, I defend the following resolution to (...) the puzzle: social causation occurs at the level at which social properties are intrinsic. (shrink)

My interest in this chapter is to investigate this crossroad as applied to mental properties, considered powers. In particular, I scrutinize the possibility of taking the phenomenal property of feeling pain as a complex power or disposition. This possibility comes in handy in discussing panpsychism, the view that the ultimate elements of reality are phenomenal properties, which would ground physical properties as well.

Analyzing causation in terms of Woodward's interventionist theory and describing the structure of the world in terms of causal powers are usually regarded as quite different projects in contemporary philosophy. Interventionists aim to give an account of how causal relations can be empirically discovered and described, without committing themselves to views about what causation really is. Causal powers theorists engage in precisely the latter project, aiming to describe the metaphysical structure of the world. In this paper, I argue that interventionism (...) can benefit from incorporating considerations about causal powers. I describe a previously undiscussed problem for Woodward's definition of an intervention variable that arises when interventionist causal models include disjunctive variables. This problem is solved not by excluding disjunctive (or logically compound) variables per se, but by excluding variables whose values represent disjunctions of too different causal powers. This suggests that interventionism and causal powers theories may be less distant from each other than is often assumed. (shrink)

The bulk of the literature concerning the governing role of non-Humean laws has been concentrated on the alleged incapability of higher order nomic facts to determine the regularities in the behaviour of actual objects, the so-called Inference Problem. Most recently Ioannidis, Livanios and Psillos (2021) argue that an adequate solution to the Inference Problem requires an answer to the question of how nomic relations manage to ‘tell’ properties what to do. Ioannidis et al. dub the difficulty that all extant accounts (...) of governing laws face to give such an answer, the Governing Problem and introduce a Dualist Model, according to which the specific behaviour of things in the world is the outcome of both the thin powers things have to be subjected to laws, and certain nomic features of the world. The aim of this paper is to show that the most plausible form of the Dualist Model can provide the basis for a novel version of the Powerful Qualities View about properties. To this end it presents ways of developing two aspects of the Dualist Model. It defends the view that nomic relations must be relata-specific in order to play their theoretical role within the Model and provides arguments for the view that natural properties should have the minimum (compatible with the core tenets of the Model) modal strength. (shrink)

What this chapter labels "the naïve view of powers" roughly holds that there is a strict correspondence between powers, their bearers, manifestations and activations, on one hand, and causal processes and their causes and effects, on the other hand. The naïve view of powers seems to run afoul of the possibility that powers compose. Therefore, most power theorists are inclined to reject it. This chapter develops an account of the composition of powers that can actually preserve the naïve view of (...) powers. First, the naïve view is introduced. Then five cases of composition are examined, and it is briefly shown how such cases have led many philosophers to reject the naïve view (or some relevant portion of it). This is followed by an account of the composition of powers. This account is grounded on a distinction between component and derivative powers and on certain dependence relations holding between the latter and the former. This account is able to deal with the cases of composition presented and preserve the naïve view of powers. Finally, some objections and replies are anticipated. This chapter deals with the threat of overdetermination and (briefly) with the distinction between component and resultant forces-which is orthogonal to that between component and derivative powers. (shrink)

Neo-Aristotelian views of goodness hold that the goodness of something is strictly connected with its goal(s). In this article, I shall present a power-based, Neo-Aristotelian view of goodness. I shall claim that there are certain powers (i.e., Goodness-Conferring Powers, or GC-powers in short) that confer goodness upon their bearers and upon the resulting actions. And I shall suggest that GC-powers are strongly teleological tendencies. In Section 1, I shall present the kernel of Neo-Aristotelian conceptions of goodness. In Section 2, I (...) shall introduce strongly teleological powers and tendencies. In Section 3, GC-powers will be characterized. I shall also examine a number of options with regard to their number and features and how to single out their goodness value. In Section 4, I shall focus on good agents and on three distinct ways in which they may be good: tendential goodness, actual goodness, and purely actual goodness. Relatedly, among the actions connected with a certain GC-power, I shall also distinguish between primary and secondary actions and between pure and impure actions. In Section 5, good actions will be examined. Actions may be good in three distinct ways. Indeed, actions may be endowed with primary goodness, secondary goodness and preventative goodness. In Section 6, I shall face the remaining problems. (shrink)

I defend the thesis that, if there are substances, substance causation (i.e., causation by substances) is the only sort of causation in the universe – or the only fundamental sort. Subsequently, I develop an account of substance causation that is partly grounded on a peculiar interpretation of absolute change (i.e., of entities' coming and ceasing to be) and qualitative change, on some ontological assumptions about modes (i.e., individual properties that ontologically depend on their bearers) and powers. Finally, I reply to (...) some objections against substance causation in general (e.g., C. D. Broad's objection against causes' being non-essentially-dated entities) and to some possible objections against my own account and I briefly explore three advantages given by the acceptance of the latter. (shrink)

Nanowires ( SiNWs) have high mobility and surface-to-volume ratio, which makes them easy to control using a weak electric field. These one-dimensional nanostructures are created from nanowires with a diameter in the range of nanometers and a length of more than a micrometer. It has been done in the manufacture of nanowires through regular one-dimensional arrays with the help of different physical and chemical methods. Methods such as the use of electron beam or lithography method, heavy ion irradiation, laser, chemical (...) and electrochemical methods such as water heat and spontaneous assembly methods used to make the membranes of molds can also be used . In making one-dimensional nanostructures such as Oligophenylene vanillin nanowires The electro-accumulation method consists of three general steps: firstly, the creation of a porous template as a suitable substrate and framework for the accumulation of nanowires, secondly, the growth of nanowires along the cavities of the template, and thirdly, removing the template and separating the nanowires from it. The nanowires are directly dependent on the characteristics of the mold surface such as the size distribution of the holes, the density of the holes and the superiority of the surface of the nano-holes. In order to control the properties of Oligophenylene vanillin nanowires, parameters that are effective in the formation and optimization of the diameter of the holes and the thickness of the mold should be considered. (shrink)

An increase in the surface-to- volume ratio and changes in geometry and electronic structure have a strong impact on the chemical interactions of matter, and for example, the activity of small particles changes with changes in the number of atoms (and thus the size of the particles). Unlike today's nano-transistors, which behave based on the movement of a mass of electrons in matter, new devices follow the phenomena of quantum mechanics at the nano scale, in which the discrete nature of (...) electrons cannot be ignored. By reducing all the horizontal and vertical dimensions of the transistor, the electric charge density increases in different areas of the nano-transistor , or in other words, the number of electric charges per unit area of the nano-transistor increases. (shrink)

Graphene nanomemories have been developed molecularly, providing excellent programmable nanoscale memory performance compared to previous graphene memory devices and a memory window. Large (12V), fast switching speed (1 microsecond), shows strong electrical reliability. Graphene molecular nanomemories show unique electronic properties, and their small dimensions, structural strength, and high performance make them a charge storage medium for Nano memory applications. We use a set of techniques involving a solution of nanoparticles, which creates a very thin layer on the target substrate and (...) is used as a sacrificial layer during the nanopatterning process. (shrink)

In smart electronic nano-structures, the concept of Nano -assemblies is summed up in all the information and codes necessary to produce an entity similar to itself. We have a very small machine that knows how to produce similar to itself , which in nano science is called a "nano-assembler". It is interpreted.

Note: NI_nanoparticle nickel nanoparticles is a strong conductor of electric current and its surface is shiny and polished. This element belongs to the group of iron and cobalt elementsUsing particles from the microscale to the nanoscale provides benefits for various scientific fields, but because a large percentage of their atoms is on the surface, nanomaterials can be highly reactive and pose risks. have a potential for humans. Nanoparticles are of great interest due to their wide application, both in industry and (...) in the natural sciences. While natural materials have constant physical properties regardless of size, the size of a nanoparticle determines its physical and chemical properties. Therefore, the properties of a material change as its size approaches the nanoscale and the percentage of atoms on the surface of the material becomes significant. The important feature of all nano structures is that in which the number of surface atoms is more than the number of volume atoms. This ratio increases with decreasing nanoparticle size. Therefore, the size of the nanoparticle is considered its most important feature. The range of activity of nanoparticles depends on the nature and shape of the nanostructure. However, if the energy of the nanoparticle field is comparable to the energy of electromagnetic radiation and if in a certain range a wavelength with the occurrence of chemical reactions in materials Under irradiation, significant changes will be made in the activity of nanoparticles up to 100 nm in size. is the nanometer expected to be used for storage. Given the relatively large (physically speaking) storage devices we have now and the fact that we need gigabyte sizes in various areas, there is a high potential for activity in this There is a context. Each quantum dot consists of a discrete ball of several hundred atoms that can have one of two magnetic states. This allows them to contain a single bit of information (zero or one), as is customary in machine computing. In conventional hard disks, the data bits must be spaced far enough apart that they do not overlap. Quantum dots act as completely independent units that are not structurally connected, so they can become somewhat closer to each other. One of the new information storage tools is the use of nickel quantum dots in nanometer sizes, which are expected to be used to store terabytes of data. (shrink)

Oligophenylene vanillin nanowires (Si Silicon / Germanium Gi) , narrow structures whose diameter is only a few billionths of a meter but thousands or millions of times longer. They exist in various forms—made of metals, semiconductors, insulators, and organic compounds—and are used for applications in the fields of electronics, energy conversion, optics, and chemical sensing. Because of their extreme thinness, Oligophenylene vanillin nanowires with a (Si Silicon / Germanium Gi) structure are essentially one dimensional. Nanowires are quasi-one-dimensional materials, "their two (...) dimensions are on the nanometer scale." This one-dimensionality confers distinct electrical and optical properties. (shrink)

In the immersion method, nanowires have enough time to transfer from nanoparticle particles to cavities ; The formation step of uniform nanoparticles is done slowly and finally uniform nanowires are formed. Structural study with FESEM in the immersion method of single-stranded nanowires in all porosities and in a large area of nanowire particles are formed. Changing the Sr / Fe ratio does not change the morphology of the nanowires. And spectroscopy of nanowires with a ratio of Sr / Fe states (...) within the nano-particles inside (nanowires uniform) elements Fe and Sr of ferrite strontium in spectroscopy nanowires uniform is seen in the sample of nanoparticles Sr / Fe to value Its stoichiometry is closer to that of nanoparticles in electromagnetic composition, while due to the lower solubility of uniform strontium nanowire nanomolecules compared to iron nitrate and the consequent presence of less strontium ions in reaction with electromagnetic nanoparticles. There is more Fe ion in the final structure. Electro-magnetically active particles are used to separate uniform nanowires at ambient temperature . In the application of nanowires in nanoscale electronics or some other applications, it is necessary to separate the nanowires from alumina particles . (shrink)

In a nMOS graphene field effect transistor, the resistance between two electrodes can be transferred or controlled by a third electrode. In a multilayer graphene field effect nMOS transistor, the current between the two electrodes is controlled by the electric field from the third electrode. Unlike the bipolar transistor, it is capacitively connected to the third electrode and is not in contact with the semiconductor. Three electrodes in the structure of the nMOS graphene field effect transistor are connected to the (...) source, drain and gate, and this action increases the switching speed (doping) in the nMOS graphene transistor circuit. (shrink)

The advance of mechanism in science and philosophy in the 17th century created a great interest to machines or automata. Leibniz was no exception - in an early memoir Drôle de pensée he wrote admiringly about a machine that could walk on water, exhibited in Paris. The idea of automatic processing in general had a large role in his thought, as can be seen, for example, in his invention of the binary code and the so-called Calculemus!-model for solving controversies. In (...) metaphysics, the idea of an automata was expressed most clearly in the 1695 article New System of the Nature of Substances and their Communication, and the ensuing correspondence with, among others, Foucher, Bayle, Lamy, Jaquelot and Masham. In the article Leibniz discusses the soul as a spiritual machine in the context of pre-established harmony, arguing that God can "give to a substance at the outset a nature or internal force which could produce in it an orderly way (as in spiritual or formal automaton; but a free one, in the case of a substance which is endowed with a share of reason) everything that is going to happen to it, that is to say, all the appearances or expressions it is going to have, and all without the help of any created thing." The basic idea of Leibniz's spiritual machine is that the soul or entelechy is an autonomous and spontaneous unity, consisting of internal active force and producing its own perceptions (both confused and distinct). It is a self-moving machine, driven by its perceptions and appetites, but it follows (without being conscious of it) a lawful series or programme created by God. The entelechy remains the same despite undergoing an infinite number of changes. To Foucher he explained that each state of the individual substance is a consequence of its preceding one, "as if there were only God and the substance in the world". Despite this, the spiritual machine is related not only to God, but through the pre-established harmony to bodies or natural machines. However, as it is not dependent on them, the spiritual machine is superiot to natural machines. In this paper I concentrate on three moral themes related to the spiritual machine: moral deliberation, moral identity and the goal of moral action. All these themes are more or less implicit in the New System, but are discussed in more detail in the ensuing correspondence after the publication of the article. Finally, the themes are given an extended discussion especially in the second book of New Essays on Human Understanding (1704, published 1765), written partly at the same time as some of the correspondence and unpublished related material. I will first give an overview of Leibniz's position concerning the spiritual machine or automaton in the New System and then go on to explore the three moral themes one by one, as they feature in the subsequent correspondence and in the New Essays. I will show that the three topics are essential to the function of the spiritual machine – to Sophie Charlotte Leibniz wrote: "...let us say that everything in bodies happens mechanically, or in accordance with laws of motion, and that everything in the soul happens morally, or in accordance with perceived good or evil." There are many texts that anticipate the views in the New System (notably the unpublished memoir De Affectibus of 1679) and Leibniz continued to discuss its themes later on (in addition to correpondence, for example, in Theodicy of 1710 and Monadology and Principles of Nature and Grace of 1714). Here I focus on the short-term development of Leibniz's views on the topic (around 1695-1705), but I argue that his basic view of the spiritual machine did not change much after finishing the dialogue with Locke in 1704. (shrink)

On a highly influential way to think of modality, that I call ‘relationalism’, the modality of a state is explained by its being composed of properties, and these properties being related by a higher-order and primitively modal relation. Examples of relationalism are the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong account of natural necessity, many dispositional essentialist views, and Wang’s incompatibility primitivism. I argue that relationalism faces four difficulties: that the selection between modal relations is arbitrary, that the modal relation cannot belong to any logical order, (...) that to explain how the modal relation can relate properties of different adicities additional ideological complexity has to be introduced, and that not all modal constraints are relational. From the discussion, I will extract desiderata for a successor theory of modality. (shrink)

Anne Conway’s commitment to the moral responsibility of creatures, or created beings, is seemingly in tension with her unique metaphysics. Conway is committed to individual moral responsibility. Conway insists that an innocent person ought not be punished for someone else’s sin. Interesting recent work highlights a unique aspect of Conway’s position that creatures are multiplicities: not only are creatures integrated into the larger whole of creation, but also their parts are mutually integrated into one another. The latter, which I will (...) call ‘ontological overlap,’ renders the boundaries between creatures unclear. However, creatures must be distinct enough from each other to provide a proper subject for individual moral responsibility. This contribution suggests that Conway’s account of vital power can resolve an apparent tension between ontological overlap and individual moral responsibility and, more broadly, that Conway has a relational metaphysics of moral subjecthood. (shrink)