_The Temporality of Political Obligation _offers a critique and reconceptualization of the ways in which our political obligations – what we owe to political authorities and communities, and the reasons why we ought to obey their rules – have been traditionally conceptualized, justified, and contested. Drawing from theories of time and temporality, Justin Mueller demonstrates some of the unacknowledged assumptions and theoretical blind spots shared among these ostensibly opposed positions, and the problems and contradictions that this neglect of time (...) poses. Enriching the literature on the philosophers Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze, Mueller demonstrates how their theoretical frameworks on time can be used to analyze a political problem that is usually confined to the concerns of normative liberal democratic theory. Politically, this book provides readers with the means to better identify and analyze the diverse temporalities they encounter in everyday life, and better understand their experiences of them. A welcomed and timely read which will be of interest to scholars involved in recent efforts to engage with the social and political dimensions and consequences of time and temporality. (shrink)

I discuss the general form of arguments that profess to prove that the view that things endure in tensed time through causally produced change (the dynamic view) must be false because it involves contradictions. I argue that these arguments implicitly presuppose what has been called the temporal parity thesis, i.e. that all moments of time are equally existent and real, and that this thesis must be understood as the denial of the dynamic view. When this implicit premise is (...) made explicit, the arguments turn out to be either circular, they presuppose what they profess to prove, or mere demonstrations of the fact that the dynamic view is incompatible with its own negation. Furthermore, I discuss the metaphysical consequences of accepting the temporal parity thesis, arguing that it deprives us of the means to provide natural explanations to empirical phenomena. (shrink)

‘On the 26th of January 1950, we are going to enter into a life of contradictions. In politics we will have equality and in social and economic life we will have inequality’. B. R. Ambedkar’s famous last speech to the Constituent Assembly on 25 November 1949 still resonates within contemporary Indian constitutional law, and even more so his following interrogation: ‘how long shall we continue to live this life of contradictions?’ Prima facie societal, the contradiction is however also (...) a temporal one, Indian constitutional law being founded on both the British traditional idea of ‘continuum’ and the American inspired revolutionary principles of ‘pursuance’ of a novel legal and social order. Two recent Indian Supreme Court decisions pertaining to the de-criminalisation of same sex relations ( Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India) and for the right of menstruating women to enter the Sabarimala Temple in Kerala ( Indian Young Lawyers Association v. Union of India) offer through their differing and sometimes dissenting opinions a glimpse at those temporal contradictions. Through an analysis of both decisions and in particular that of Chandrachud J. and Malhotra J.’s judgements, this article seeks to highlight two radically differing conceptions of temporality applied to constitutional issues, which can themselves be linked back to the transposition of the legal positivist discourse in India within the colonial era: on the one hand, an attempt to continue Common law’s empirical-based tradition and on the other hand, an (apparently) a-historical perception of Law drawn from neo-Roman civilian legal discourse and later normative positivism. If both branches of legal reasoning aim at protecting minorities’ rights, the value they inscribe to History within the realm of Law cannot be further apart. (shrink)

We argue that the temporal asymmetry of influence is not merely the result of thermodynamics: it is a consequence of the fact that modal structure of the universe must admit only processes which cannot give rise to contradictions. We appeal to the process matrix formalism developed in the field of quantum foundations to characterise processes which are compatible with local free will whilst ruling out contradictions, and argue that this gives rise to ‘consistent chaining’ requirements that explain (...) the temporal asymmetry of influence. We compare this view to the perspectival account of causation advocated by Price and Ramsey. (shrink)

Not only is freedom a shared concern of Sartre and Schelling, which would not be anything particularly unique, but for both philosophers, freedom must be articulated out of an ontological ground, or within the confines of an ontological system. A contradiction nevertheless appears to arise regarding the “orientation” of Sartre and Schelling’s respective “ontologies of freedom”: the freedom of Sartre, reflecting a contemporary stoic-inspired doctrine, is directed toward the future, while for Schelling, with affinities to the temporal logic of (...) psychoanalysis, freedom is oriented toward the past. This article presents both Sartre and Schelling’s ontological reasoning out of which either a progressively oriented freedom (the freedom to negate the present in the name of future “possibles”) or a retrogressively oriented freedom (the freedom to determine the ground of the present out of an indefinite, a-temporal becoming), before attempting to resolve this contradiction in the temporality of freedom by examining the position and role of the negative (of negation, contradiction, or nothingness), as either secondary or primary, within the ontology of each respective philosopher. (shrink)

Regarding the famous Sea Battle Argument, which Aristotle presents in De Interpretatione 9, there has never been a general agreement not only about its correctness but also, and mainly, about what the argument really is. According to the most natural reading of the chapter, the argument appeals to a temporal concept of truth and concludes that not every statement is always either true or false. However, many of Aristotle’s followers and commentators have not adopted this reading. I believe that (...) it has faced so much resistance for reasons of hermeneutic charity: denying the law of universal bivalence seems to be overly disruptive to logical orthodoxy – the kind of logical orthodoxy represented by what we now call classical propositional logic, much of which Aristotle clearly supports in many texts. I intend to show that the logical-semantic theses that the traditional reading finds in De Interpretatione 9 are much more conservative than they may seem to be at first glance. First, I will show that they complement, and do not contradict in any way, the orthodox definitions of the concepts of truth and statement that Aristotle advances in other texts. Second, by resorting in an anachronistic vein to concepts and methods peculiar to contemporary logic, I will show that a trivalent modal semantics conforming to those theses can be built for a standard formal language of the classical propositional calculus. It is remarkable that reasonable concepts of logical truth and logical consequence that may be defined on the basis of this trivalent modal semantics are coextensive with their orthodox counterparts, the concepts of tautology and tautological consequence of classical bivalent and extensional semantics. (shrink)

Les temporalités de l’action publique n’intègrent pas actuellement les temporalités propres au vivant, dans un contexte préoccupant de crise écologique. Au travers de l’étude des politiques territoriales de biodiversité du Nord-Pas-de-Calais, nous analysons ici ces contradictions temporelles. L’action publique demeure en effet dans une perspective anthropocentrée qui détermine la finalité et les moyens des politiques de biodiversité à partir de contraintes politiques et économiques propres aux sociétés. Elle reflète ainsi une perspective linéaire du temps avec des objectifs de résultats (...) court-termistes, notamment liés au développement du New Public Management, à la politique par objectifs et à la contrainte de résultats quantifiables sur le vivant. À l’inverse, le vivant se pense au travers du temps évolutif et indéterminé propre aux écosystèmes. Les pressions anthropiques – artificialisation des sols, pollutions, fragmentation du territoire, changement climatique, etc. - menacent toutefois aujourd’hui sa pérennité car elles provoquent une accélération de la disparition irréversible d’espèces et la fragilisation des écosystèmes. Cet article appelle à une convergence des temporalités de l’action publique et de la biodiversité, qui pourrait se penser au travers d’un futur écocentré. (shrink)

Hugh of Novocastro, Landolfo Caracciolo, John Baconthorpe, and some other medieval authors argued that there are real contradictions in nature. The background of this early fourteenth-century theory was the Aristotelian question of how to determine the instant of change between p and ~p. The argument was that these are simultaneously true at the temporal instant of change if it is an instant of changing. The author’s aim is to discuss the background of this view in Henry of Ghent’s (...) theory of instantaneous change from potentiality to actuality at that very instant. (shrink)

The main goal of this paper is to offer a reading of Reinhart Koselleck’s work as an ally of critical theory. My contention is that, despite customary accusations of Koselleck being an anti-Enlightenment historian detrimental to social criticism and emancipatory politics, his investigations on the semantic fabric of modern society may actually expand our resources for the critique of domination. In order to make this argument plausible, I reconstruct some antinomies that are at the basis of Koselleck’s work (state/society, language/reality, (...) experience/expectation) and discuss their critical potential. This analysis shows that, rather than a rejection of the spirit of critique, Koselleck contributes to the temporalization of the practice of critique as such: namely, a clarification of the contradictions and potentials of a reflexive practice imbued in the struggle between the need to comprehend the world as it is and the right to experiment with other forms of life. (shrink)

I offer some clarification concerning the kind of contradiction that Hoerl & McCormack's account could help explain and the scope of the metaphysical intuitions that could be explained by such a theory. I conclude that we need to know more about the sense in which the temporal reasoning system would represent time as a dimension.

This paper considers contradictory features of emotional or affective experience and expression in schizophrenia in light of the “Kretschmerian paradox”—the fact that schizophrenia-spectrum patients can simultaneously experience both exaggerated and diminished levels of affective response. An attempt is made to explain the paradox and explore its implications. Recent research on emotion in schizophrenia is reviewed, including subjective reports, psychophysiological measures of arousal or activation, and behavioural measures, focusing on flat-affect and negative-symptom patients. After discussing relevant concepts and vocabulary of emotion (...) (“affect”, “emotion”, “mood”, “feelings”, the “passions”), the need for a phenomenological approach focusing on subjective experience is proposed. Four modes of nonparanoid experience in schizophrenia are discussed: Bodily Alienation, Disengagement, Unworlding, and Subjectivisation. Each mode involves withdrawal from functional contexts—temporal, practical, and interpersonal—normally associated with emotional reactivity and expression; each may be accompanied by forms of non-emotional affectivity no less intense than the emotions they replace. Possible relationships between psychophysiological measures, expressive behaviour, and subjective emotional or affective response are considered. (shrink)

Cet article tente de répondre à la question suivante : en quoi et comment une autobiographie, en tant que récit de vie (life story) écrit par un auteur en vue de raconter son histoire (life history), peut-elle livrer à ses lecteurs une définition de l’identité personnelle de son rédacteur ? Partant d’une conception des temporalités comme modes de temporalisation, l’article distingue le temps (présent) de la narration, le temps (passé) de l’expérience vécue et remémorée et le « tiers-temps » (futur) (...) du projet « d’interprétation de soi par soi-même », inhérent à l’identité narrative, cœur d’une l’identité personnelle mise en récit, selon Ricœur. S’appuyant sur quatre autobiographies, l’article repère des formules argumentaires pouvant s’appliquer à l’« identité personnelle » de leurs auteurs : « Je suis innocent » (Rousseau) ; « Je suis ma névrose » (Sartre) ; « Je suis quelqu’un » (Beauvoir) ; « Je suis un universitaire issu des classes populaires anglaises » (Hoggart). Après avoir clarifié les liens entre « formes identitaires » et « identité personnelle », l’article montre les contradictions qui surgissent lorsqu’on veut combiner les déterminations de l’identité sociale avec les décisions singulières inhérentes à une identité personnelle. (shrink)

Hume argues that the idea of duration is just the idea of the manner in which several things in succession are arrayed. In other words, the idea of duration is the idea of successiveness. He concludes that all and only successions have duration. Hume also argues that there is such a thing as a steadfast object—something which co-exists with many things in succession, but which is not itself a succession. Thus, it seems that Hume has committed himself to a contradiction: (...) A steadfast object lacks duration because it is not a succession, but has duration because it co-exists with something which has duration. I am not going to discuss why Hume thinks these things. My goal is simply to show that what he thinks is consistent. To do so, I will offer a Humean temporal logic. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A CONTRADICTION IN SAINT THOMAS'S TEACHING ON CREATION THEODORE J. KONDOLEON Villanova University Villanova, Pennsylvania 0 THOSE FAMILIAR with Saint Thomas's writings is generally known that the Angelic Doctor changed his position on a number of philosophical issues during the course of his relatively short professional career. For instance, there is his opinion concerning the instrumental role of higher creatures in the creation of the universe-something he allowed as (...) possible in his Commentary on the Sentences but later rejected in his Disputed Question On the Power of God and in the Summa Theologiae. Another example is Thomas's view on the possibility of an actual infinite multitude, an opinion he accepted in the early Disputed Question On Truth but argued against in the Summa Theologiae.1 However, to change one's mind on a particular issue is not to contradict oneself, since to do that is to say or hold, in the same time frame, pwhile also saying or holding not p. However, in his Treatise on Creation in the Summa Theologiae, Saint Thomas does, at least once, contradict himself in what he has to say on the question of the demonstrability of the world's temporal beginning, a contradiction which, to my knowledge, has never previous1 On the question whether higher creatures can be instrumental causes in the creation of lower creatures see In Sent. IV, d. 5, q. 5, a. 3; De potentia Dei, q. 3, a. le and Summa Theologiae, I, q, 45, a. Sc. On the issue of an actual infinite multitude see D. Q. De veritate, q. 2, a. 9 and Summa Theologiae, 1, q. 7, a. 5. However, in the De aeternitate mundi-a work possibly written after Saint Thomas completed the first part of his Summa-Aquinas asserts, towards the end of this work, that no demonstration has as yet been forthcoming that God cannot produce a multitude that is actually infinite. 51 52 THEODORE J. KONDOLEON ly been noted. In what follows I intend to expose this contradiction and to see whether there is any possible way for him to escape it. I In article 1 of Question 46 of the Prima pars, Aquinas argues that it cannot be demonstrated that the world of creatures always existed, given that the actual existence of creatures depends upon the causal will of God and the only thing which God wills necessarily is Himself.2 Consequently, whether or not the world exists, or is created eternally or with a temporal beginning, are matters entirely up to God's free will.3 In the following article he argues that neither can the world's temporal beginning be demonstrated but that this is something known only by faith.4 It cannot be demonstrated from the world itself since demonstration proceeds by way of knowledge of the universal essences of things and universals abstract from the hie et nunc, or from the question of temporal origin.5 Nor can it be proved from the world's efficient cause-the divine will-seeing that God's will cannot be investigated by reason except as regards those things which God wills necessarily (and what He wills about creatures is not among 2 " Dicendum nihil praeter Deum ab aeterno fuisse. Et hoc ponere non est impossibile. Ostensum est enim supra quad voluntas Dei est causa rerum. Sic ergo necesse est esse sicut necesse est Deum velle ilia, cum necessitatis effectus ex necessitate causae dependeat, ut dicitur in Meta. Ostensum est autem supra quod, absolute loquendo, non est necesse Deum velle aliquid nisi seipsum." ST I, q. 46, a. le. Latin quotations from Saint Thomas appearing in the footnotes are from the Leonine edition. 3 " Non est ergo necessarium Deum velle quod mundus fuerit semper. Sed eatenus mundus est quatenus Deus vult illum esse, cum esse mundi ex voluntate dependeat, sicut ex sua causa. Non est igitur necessarium mundum semper esse: Unde nee demonstrative probari potest." Ibid. 4 " Dicendum quod mundum non semper fuisse sola fidei tenetur, et demonsrtative probari non potest; sicut et supra de mysterio Trinitatis dictum est." Ibid., a. 2c. 5 "Et hujus ratio est, quia novitas mundi non potest demonstrationem recipere ex parte ipsius mundi... (shrink)

The model presented by the authors can explain an inherent contradiction in people's naïve theory of time. In this commentary I suggest a way in which another paradox of our phenomenal temporality may be addressed along these lines. In the final section, I also discuss some concerns that may arise about the clear-cut distinction between humans and non-human animals.

At the end of the first hypothesis, Parmenides gets Aristotle to agree that being [οὐσίας] must be in time; that is, that being must partake in at least one of the temporal modes: either to have been in the past, to be in the present, or it will be in the future (140e-142a). If this is true, then “the one does not partake in being” (141e7-8), meaning temporal being—to which Aristotle agrees, saying “Apparently not” (141e9). Parmenides then gets (...) Aristotle to agree that “Therefore, ‘the one’ in no way is” (141e9-10). This, however, contradicts the very first premise that begins Parmenides’ entire gymnastic exercise, “if one is” (137c4). The problem with the previous conclusion—that to be is to be in time—is that in professing his assent to it, Aristotle, in fact, gainsays it. He performatively contradicts the very thing he wants to assert. Aristotle answers Parmenides question, “Therefore could something partake of being in any way other than in one of those ways?” (141e7-8) with a two-word answer in Greek: “οὐκ ἔστιν [It’s not possible].” We can, therefore, ask of the very claim Aristotle is making—that it is impossible for something to be and not be in time—when in time does it hold true? At what time is it “not possible [οὐκ ἔστιν]” for something to not partake of temporal being? Is it not possible only in the present moment, in the past, or in the future? If Aristotle’s assertion is to have any force it must hold always. It has the same tenselessness as mathematical propositions, like ‘1+1=2.’ Forms, like mathematical entities, must necessarily have atemporal existence. Accordingly, in atemporally maintaining that anything that is must be in time, Aristotle undermines his own assertion. He performatively contradicts the very thing that he wants to affirm. (shrink)

There are two contrasting views on the decision-making for life-sustaining treatment in advanced stages of dementia when the patient is deemed incompetent. One is to respect the patient's precedent autonomy by adhering to advance directives or using the substituted judgement standard. The other is to use the best-interests standard, particularly if the current judgement on what is best for the incapacitated patient contradicts the instructions from the patient's precedent autonomy. In this paper, I argue that the protracted clinical course of (...) dementia over many years requires the extended perspective of a progressive decision-making process—extended in both social space and time. The ongoing debate between these two competing views has missed this perspective by focussing on an exclusive disjunction between the competent former self and the incompetent current self. Drawing on theories of situated cognition in cognitive science, I will show that the cognition of a demented patient can be viewed as extended and embodied by her supportive social environment. As the disease progresses, the content of the mind of a demented person becomes partially constituted by such external resources along with her diminishing intrinsic mind. With this understanding, medical decision-making for a demented patient can be construed as a temporally and socially extended practice. A collective decision-making body consisting of the patient, her family and surrogates, and the clinician, should make progressive decisions as a whole over years of the disease course. Finally, I will provide a practical example of how this proposal can be applied in clinical practice. (shrink)

In terms of temporality of logic, the relation between "before" and "after" is an inverse relation, as is the relation between intension and extension. Reversal of temporality of human cognition is accompanied by corresponding reversal between intension and extension. Such reversal is based on lateral reversal of brain hemisphere locus of time information. A similar inverse relation exists between self as subject and self as object. Extreme objectification of self is associated with brain hemisphere lateral reversal of time information, indicating (...) that subject-object reversal is similar in nature to reversal of temporality of cognition. Dialectical nature of self is based on contradiction between self as subject and self as object. Synthesis arising from such contradiction may be regarded as reality of self. (shrink)

Hugh Mellor has proposed what appears to be a new solution to the problem of intrinsic change (Mellor 1998). Assuming endurantism and a B‐theoretic, nonpresentist view of time, facts are supposed to have only enduring things and atemporal properties (or relations) as constituents, but no times. The having of properties and relations is not relativised to times. Instead, the whole of a fact is conceived of as temporally localised. It will be argued that this interesting and novel proposal does not (...) succeed as an account of change in the intrinsic properties of things. The basic difficulty is that the view still leads into contradiction, since it makes it incomprehensible how one and the same thing can have both a property and some incompatible property. The having of these incompatible properties is treated as two facts. But to add that these facts have certain temporal locations is of no help for avoiding the contradiction. (shrink)

G. H. von Wright proposed that a temporal interval exemplifies a real contradiction if at least one part of any division of this interval involves the presence of contradictorily related (though non-simultaneous) states. In connection with intervals, two negations must be discerned: 'does not hold at an interval' and 'fails throughout an interval'. Von Wright did not distinguish the two. As a consequence, he made a mistake in indicating how to use his logical symbolism to express the notion of (...) real contradiction. The present paper aims to reconstruct and philosophically motivate von Wright's argument for the possibility of real contradictions. (shrink)

The homogeneity of time (i.e. the fact that there are no privileged moments) underlies a fundamental symmetry relating to the energy conservation law. On the other hand the obvious asymmetry between past and future, expressed by the metaphor of the arrow of time or flow of time accounts for the irreversibility of what happens. One takes this for granted but the conceptual tension it creates against the background of time''s presumed homogeneity calls for an explanation of temporal becoming. Here, (...) it is approached with the help of a claim to the effect that the instant (moment) itself has a structure isomorphic to that of time as a whole. Then the asymmetry of past and future in regard to temporal becoming is associated with the internal structure of the very moment, and not with external relations between different moments of time. In this paper ideas of ancient atomism and contemporary dialectics are brought together. It is for the sake of a contrast to what is known as logical atomism that I choose to call this view dialectical atomism. The latter admits dialectical contradictions and, so far as the logical status of contradictions is concerned, bears reference to paraconsistent logics. In the paper there is an outline of a method of converting any consistent axiomatic formal system into a paraconsistent theory. (shrink)

I argue that relations between non-identical times, such as the relations, earlier than, later than, or 10 seconds apart, involve contradiction, and only co-temporal relations are non-contradictory, which would leave presentism the only non-contradictory theory of time. The arguments I present are arguments that I have not seen in the literature.

The experience of time and temporally extended events is a fundamental property of mind, and of time-based media arts. In dealing with properties of time, does the operational logic of contemporary media production tools cohere with philosophical views on the experience of time? This article considers a range of views on the phenomenal experience of time as they relate to the production of time-based media. Embedded within our production technologies, the artist is faced with a new philosophical instrument: the production (...) timeline. The timeline utility in most time-based media software (and non-digital precursors) adopts the cinematic model as its operating metaphor; a series of frames, assembled one after the other in sequence. But the timeline brings new temporal complications such as reversibility, hierarchy and modifiability. The timeline also contorts time into a spatialized dimension, represented as a linear vector within the software interface. Automatic adoption of the linear timeline and the frame as the base unit of temporal thinking is problematic. J. M. E. McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time based on contradictions within a range of possible temporal modal logics is compared with approaches to animation and editing software, and also interactive media software and their unique approach to time as potential events is considered. (shrink)

In this paper I show that the existence of an infinite temporal regress does not undermine the soundness of Craigs version of the Kalam Cosmological Argument. To this end I shall focus on a particular complication that Craig raises against one of his arguments in support of a finite temporal regress. I will show that this complication can be made innocuous by extending the notion of A-theoretic time, which is presupposed by Craigs argument, to include a notion of (...) temporal becoming that is compatible with the existence of an infinite regress of temporal events. All this shows that God could have created an infinite temporal regress a finite time in the past without this entailing a contradiction. (shrink)

In this paper I suggest that becoming, Or passage, Is not merely paradoxical, But positively contradictory. On the assumption that events become, We are entitled to say that at certain times, Certain events are earlier or later, As the case may be, Than such temporal events as the characterization of events by presentness. But since temporal relations are permanent, They cannot be said without contradiction to obtain at any one time as opposed to another.

The purpose of this paper is to pick up the threads of a debate about the ontology of becoming in spacetime that was triggered by a provocative article published by Nicholas Maxwell in 1985. This debate is itself merely a recent episode in a long dialogue that goes back at least as far as the time of Parmenides and Heraclitus. Here is the question around which this debate centres: is change or becoming the distinguishing feature of the natural or physical (...) world, as suggested obscurely by Heraclitus and argued at length by Aristotle? Or is our usual uncritical belief in the reality of change the product of some sort of perceptual illusion or intellectual error, as believed by Parmenides and a small host of recent authors such as Gödel and Julian Barbour? I won’t be able to solve the whole of this momentous problem here. However, I intend both to set aside a few unwarranted assumptions which have for a long time dogged our thinking about the puzzle of becoming, and to assemble some tools which should aid in finding a solution to it. In particular, I will argue that we can do much better than is usually supposed in identifying structures which can both “live” within Minkowski spacetime and represent objective becoming. I shall also discuss whether such structures would necessarily contradict the Principle. (shrink)

This article is an inquiry into how the relationship between the principle of non-contradiction and the limits of thought has been understood by thinkers as diverse as Hegel, Heidegger, Levinas, and Graham Priest. While Heidegger and Levinas focus on the question of temporality and Priest takes a formal approach, all these philosophers effectively maintain that the principle of non-contradiction imposes a restriction on thought that disables it from adequately accounting for its own limits and thus what lies beyond those limits, (...) the implication being that the violation of the principle is necessary for such an accounting to take place. However, the ultimate argument here is that, contrary to Priest’s interpretation, Hegel’s philosophy can be convincingly read as supporting the idea that the mind’s ability to go beyond any particular limit of thought can actually be said to involve an adherence to a normative demand to locate and dispel the contradictions that emerge through the very setting of determinative limits. This is a non-formal consistency that evinces a “logic” that is unknowingly followed by the Heideggerian and Levinasian phenomenological philosophies of transcendence. (shrink)

The article aims to provide a semiotic interpretation of the sign of the Ecclesiastical Court within the legal framework from temporal and spatial perspectives. The starting point of the research is the idea that the history of the Russian Ecclesiastical Court is inextricably linked to the history of Russian society and secular court. Consideration of the pre-revolutionary ecclesiastical and secular law helps us explore principles of the ecclesiastical proceedings and organization, identify contradictions in understanding modern Ecclesiastical Court. Its (...) sign is not only limited to the legal interpretation. In his novel The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky F. M. gave the sign of the Ecclesiastical Court symbolic meaning and, thus, expanded it beyond the existing legal framework. The Ecclesiastical Court is one of the symbols of Russian spirituality which is reflected in the concept of “Russian soul”. Rational elements of the sign of Ecclesiastical Court as well as its sensual and metaphorical components, are analyzed using the category of Truth. Clearly, the Cross is sign-symbol for Christianity. But if applied to the concept of Ecclesiastical Court, the Orthodox Cross becomes a sign-index. As a result, several semantically heterogeneous meanings of the sign of Ecclesiastical Court are revealed and described. (shrink)

The paper re-expresses arguments against the normative validity of expected utility theory in Robin Pope (1983, 1991a, 1991b, 1985, 1995, 2000, 2001, 2005, 2006, 2007). These concern the neglect of the evolving stages of knowledge ahead (stages of what the future will bring). Such evolution is fundamental to an experience of risk, yet not consistently incorporated even in axiomatised temporal versions of expected utility. Its neglect entails a disregard of emotional and financial effects on well-being before a particular risk (...) is resolved. These arguments are complemented with an analysis of the essential uniqueness property in the context of temporal and atemporal expected utility theory and a proof of the absence of a limit property natural in an axiomatised approach to temporal expected utility theory. Problems of the time structure of risk are investigated in a simple temporal framework restricted to a subclass of temporal lotteries in the sense of David Kreps and Evan Porteus (1978). This subclass is narrow but wide enough to discuss basic issues. It will be shown that there are serious objections against the modification of expected utility theory axiomatised by Kreps and Porteus (1978, 1979). By contrast the umbrella theory proffered by Pope that she has now termed SKAT, the Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory, offers an epistemically consistent framework within which to construct particular models to deal with particular decision situations. A model by Caplin and Leahy (2001) will also be discussed and contrasted with the modelling within SKAT (Pope, Leopold and Leitner 2007). (shrink)

Dōgen's views of time are descriptively compared to the modern western philosophical view called "B-theory" and found to contain elements of each of the four main tenets of the B-theory. Furthermore, a fundamental incongruency is discovered. Even accounting for traditional Buddhist approaches to apparent contradictions, Dōgen's problems in this regard call into question the assumption of consistency that has characterized modern interpretations of his views on time.

The intensifying speed-up of contemporary economic, social and political life troubles democratic theorists because they assume that democracy depends on patience. This article turns to Martin Luther King, Jr. to challenge democratic theory’s temporal bias. I argue that King demonstrates that impatience, too, is a democratic virtue. Building on impatient knowledge, democratic impatience aides in overcoming undemocratic legacies, fosters democratic subjectivity and agency, ensures political accountability, and creates a more inclusive practice of democratic belonging. I furthermore show that King (...) reveals the temporal sophistication of democratic impatience, thereby contradicting the prevailing interpretation of self-defeating instantaneousness. In particular, democratic impatience’s temporal origins of centuries of injustice, human mortality, and the context of social acceleration provide a mature impetus for democratic action. Moreover, democratic impatience persists over time. On the one hand, it does so because injustice persists. On the other hand, democratic impatience contains within itself a subordinate operational patience. In other words, democratic impatience is always already somewhat ‘patient.’ King’s democratic impatience therefore not only redresses democratic theory’s shortcomings, but it also generates a renewed sense of democratic possibility in our age, as democratic impatience is well suited to help us in redressing the crises and injustices deepened or generated by social acceleration. (shrink)

The paper investigates Hobbes’s arguments that injustice is a kind of absurdity involving a “contradiction properly so called,” concluding that although those arguments are undermined by their reliance on a mistaken temporality assumption, Hobbes’s philosophy provides other means for establishing his desired conclusion.

I reject three theories of practical reason according to which a rational agent's ultimate reasons for acting must be unchanging: that one is rationally obliged in each choice (1) to be prudent--to advance all the desires one foresees ever having (the self-interest theory), rather than just those one has at the time of choice, or (2) to cause states of affairs that are good by some timeless, impersonal measure (Thomas Nagel), or (3) to obey permanent, universalizable deontic principles (Kant). Whether (...) a rational agent's reasons consist in her desires, in the goodness of certain states, or in deontic principles, her reasons now can ask her to take different, conflicting things as reasons later; and contradiction results of rationally obliging her not to take the new things for reasons. (shrink)

It is sometimes said that there are two, competing versions of W. V. O. Quine’s unrelenting empiricism, perhaps divided according to temporal periods of his career. According to one, logic is exempt from, or lies outside the scope of, the attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction. This logic-friendly Quine holds that logical truths and, presumably, logical inferences are analytic in the traditional sense. Logical truths are knowable a priori, and, importantly, they are incorrigible, and so immune from revision. The other, (...) radical reading of Quine does not exempt logic from the attack on analyticity and a priority. Logical truths and inferences are themselves part of the web of belief, and the same global methodology applies to logic as to any other part of the web, such as theoretical chemistry or ordinary beliefs about ordinary objects. Everything, including logic, is up for grabs in our struggle for holistic confirmation. The purpose of this paper is to examine the law of non-contradiction, and the concomitant principle of ex falso quodlibet, from the perspective of the principles advocated by the radical Quine. I show that he has no compelling reason to accept either of these. To put it bluntly, neither the law of non-contradiction nor the rule of ex falso quodlibet is empirically confirmed, and these principles fare poorly on the various criteria for theory acceptance on the methodology of the radical Quine. So the radical Quine is led rather quickly and rather directly into something in the neighborhood of Graham Priest’s dialetheism. (shrink)

In this paper I propose to study the different combinations between temporality and the idea of totality in the beginning of Classical German Philosophy. In order to do that I will analyze the image of liberation in the philosophical and practical articulation of a new mythology in the manuscript “The Oldest Systematic Program of German Idealism”, and the outlines of a theory of the Spirit in the documents written by Hegel in the first part of his Jena stage, more specifically, (...) in the fragments of the period 1803/04. For this purpose I will take as specific objects the figures of an “eternal unity” [dieewige Einheit] to come and of an “absolute becoming” [das absolute Werden] of Spirit. The hypothesis I intend to develop holds that the confrontation of these two images can lead to duplicated consequences: on the one hand, this comparison would make it possible to relativize the binary readings that oppose as terms of a simple contradiction both conceptual lineages, Idealism and Romanticism. On the other hand it would express an insurmountable tension between two ways of thinking about the relationship between time and totality. (shrink)

Discussion of von Wright's account of logic and time in relation to Marxist dialectics.

occurs first. The biological debate is conducted largely on a theoretical level. In this paper, I undertake to locate
the reason for the difference in temporal ordering. The question is whether the difference depends on alternative
interpretations of empirical data, on differing views about evolutionary mechanisms, or on different conceptual
frameworks. It will turn out that the latter is the case and that discerning two different notions of novelty solves
the apparent contradiction. Both concepts may apply to different cases in evolution. To settle (...) the dispute by
judging whether any of both concepts is empty or not has to be recommitted to science. (shrink)

In this Eddington Memorial lecture, Von Wright distinguishes two points of view from which a logician may study time. The one focuses interest on the order of temporal events and the macro-aspect of time, its flow from an indefinitely remote past through the present to an indefinitely remote future. The other focuses attention on the micro-aspect of time, the nature of the time medium, on questions of whether time is discrete or infinitely divisible or the internal structure of limited (...) time intervals. Von Wright takes the second point of view and as a result his study of time is different in some respects than that of other contemporary tense logicians. Assuming a Tractatus type ontology of possible worlds which can be totally described by stating the existence or non-existence of all possible states of affairs, Von Wright constructs several logical systems, one of discrete time ordering, another of discrete time division. He shows the latter, which is the most important for his purposes, to be formally related to certain systems of modal logic. An interpretation of this system yields an interesting definition of continuity of change and time. The definition is interesting because of its relation to another result which he derives, namely that this definition of continuity implies that the world sometimes will have to be described as being in two contradictory states at one time, a conclusion which he relates to Hegel's philosophy. This is an original and thought provoking essay.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Background: SNOMED CT is a large terminology system designed to represent all aspects of healthcare. Its current form and content result from decades of bottom-up evolution. Due to SNOMED CT’s formal descriptions, it can be considered an ontology. The Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) is a foundational ontology that proposes a small set of disjoint, hierarchically ordered classes, supported by relations and axioms. In contrast, as a typical top-down endeavor, BFO was designed as a foundational framework for domain ontologies in the (...) natural sciences and related disciplines. Whereas it is mostly assumed that domain ontologies should be created as extensions of foundational ontologies, a post-hoc harmonization of consolidated domain ontologies in use, such as SNOMED CT, is known to be challenging. Methods: We explored the feasibility of harmonizing SNOMED CT with BFO, with a focus on the SNOMED CT Clinical Finding hierarchy. With more than 100,000 classes, it accounts for about one third of SNOMED CT’s content. In particular, we represented typical SNOMED CT finding/disorder concepts using description logics under BFO. Three representational patterns were created and the logical entailments analyzed. Results: Under a first scrutiny, the clinical intuition that diseases, disorders, signs and symptoms form a homogeneous ontological upper-level class appeared incompatible with BFO’s upper-level distinction into continuants and occurrents. The Clinical finding class seemed to be an umbrella for all kinds of entities of clinical interest, such as material entities, processes, states, dispositions, and qualities. This suggests the conclusion that Clinical finding would not be a suitable upper-level class from an BFO perspective. On closer inspection of the taxonomic links within this hierarchy and the implicit meaning derived thereof, it became clear that Clinical finding classes do not characterize the entity (e.g. a fracture, allergy, tumor, pain, hemorrhage, seizure, fever) in a literal sense but rather the condition of a patient having that fracture, allergy, pain etc. This gives sense to the current characteristic of the Clinical Finding hierarchy, in which complex classes are modeled as subclasses of their constituents. Most of these taxonomic links are inferred, as the consequence of the ‘role group’ design pattern, which is ubiquitous in SNOMED CT and has often been subject of controversy regarding its semantics. Conclusion: Our analyses resulted in the proposal of (i) equating SNOMED CT’s ‘role group’ property with the reflexive and transitive BFO relation ‘has occurrent part’; and (ii) reinterpreting Clinical Findings as Clinical Occurrents, i.e. temporally extended entities in an organism, having one or more occurrents as temporal parts that occur in continuants. This re-interpretation was corroborated by a manual analysis of classes under Clinical Finding, as well as the identification of similar modeling patterns in other ontologies. As a result, SNOMED CT does not require any content redesign to establish compatibility with BFO, apart from this re-interpretation, and a suggested re-labeling. Regarding the feasibility of harmonizing terminologies with principled foundational ontologies post-hoc, our results provide support to the assumption that this does not necessarily require major redesign efforts, but rather a careful analysis of the implicit assumptions of terminology curators and users. (shrink)

Two of the most important outcomes of The Contradictory Christ include: identifying Christ as an unproblematically contradictory being as well as laying the foundations of an investigation of the logical consequences of the existence of Christ, qua contradictory, within a particular 'theory'. In light of the enormous reluevance of Beall’s The contradictory Christ for the study of inconsistency, my main concern here is to explore the effect of some methodological choices behind Beall’s proposal -this in order to recognize in more (...) detail the scope of Beall’s contribution. To do so, I will focus on three main questions: 1. What is required for the identification of a contradiction? 2. How can we recognize a true contradiction from either an apparent or a temporal contradiction? 3. If we identify a true contradiction within a theory, where can we actually go from there? (shrink)

Taking its departure from The Differend’s analysis of Auschwitz as a sign for the evental character of history, I argue that the looming ecological disaster we now face reveals both the continuing relevance and limits of Lyotard’s thought. While the form of political agency of the catastrophe to come involves a differend, this differend cannot be attached to a proper name, however problematic its mode of signification. This, however, suggests the even greater relevance of Lyotard’s treatment, in the conclusion of (...) The Differend, of capitalism in terms of temporal contradiction, as well as his theorization of oikos and ecology in subsequent works, where he distinguishes between the economic and the ecological. This distinction, I conclude, is rendered problematic by the catastrophe to come, as indeed is any attempt to draw an absolute distinction between “philosophical politics” and mere technocratic management or even to exclude speculation from the heart of philosophy. (shrink)

It seems a contradiction to hold of something both that it took a while and that no time elapsed or passed between its start and finish; there is a connection between the ideas of temporal extendedness and passage. The article develops this connection into a defense of the passage view of time and shows how without this sort of defense, conclusions of arguments putatively in support of the passage view may be reinterpreted as not in fact being expressions of (...) that view. (shrink)

Recently, philosophers with an interest in consciousness have turned their attention towards “fringe states of consciousness”. Examples include dreams, trances, and meditative states. Teetering between wakefulness and non-consciousness, fringe states illuminate the limits and boundaries of consciousness. This paper aims to give a coherent conceptualisation of deep meditative states, focussing in particular on phenomenal temporality during meditation. Advanced meditators overwhelmingly describe deep states of meditation as atemporal and timeless; however, they also report being continuously alert while meditating. I intend to (...) give a coherent interpretation of this apparent contradiction. After introducing some candidate interpretations, I shall argue that during (deepest) meditation, the subject experiences ‘pure duration’ without temporal structure. This, I argue, explains best why meditators describe deep meditation as ongoing but timeless awareness. A central part of the paper will expand on an account of phenomenal duration without phenomenal succession. The conclusion points towards some further avenues of research. (shrink)

Hoerl & McCormack posit two systems – the temporal updating system and the temporal reasoning system – and suggest that they explain an inherent contradiction in people's naïve theory of time. We suggest there is no contradiction. Something does, however, require explanation: the tension between certain sophisticated beliefs about time, and certain phenomenological states or beliefs about those phenomenological states. The temporal updating mechanism posited by H&M may contribute to this tension.

_Dialectic_ is now widely regarded as a classic of contemporary philosophy. This book, first published in 1993, sets itself three main aims: the development of a general theory of dialectic, of which Hegelian dialectic can be seen to be a special case; the dialectical enrichment and deepening of critical realism, viz. into the system of dialectical critical realism; and the outline of the elements of a totalizing critique of Western philosophy. The first chapter clarifies the rational core of Hegelian dialectic. (...) Chapter two then proceeds to develop a general theory of dialectic. Isolating the fallacy of 'ontological monovalence', Roy Bhaskar then shows how absence and other negating concepts such as contradiction have a legitimate and necessary ontological employment. He then goes on to give a synoptic account of key dialectical concepts such as the concrete universal; to sketch the further dialectical development of critical naturalism through an account of what he calls four-planar social being; and following consideration of the dialectical critique of analytical reason, he moves on to the real definition of dialectic as absenting absence and in the human sphere, the axiology of freedom. Chapter three extends and deepens critical realism’s characteristic concerns with ontology, science, social science and emancipation not only into the realms of negativity and totality, but also into the fields of reference and truth, spatio-temporality, tense and process, the logic of dialectical universalizability and on to the plane of ethics, where it articulates a combination of moral realism and ethical naturalism, whereby consideration of elemental desire involves commitment to the eudaimonistic society. This is then followed by a sublime discussion of key moments in the trajectory of Western philosophy, the tradition of which can now be seen to be based on what the author calls the unholy trinity of the epistemic fallacy or the reduction of being to knowledge, primal squeeze or the collapse of structure and alethic truth, and ontological monovalence. (shrink)

Definitions of syncopation share two characteristics: the presence of a meter or analogous hierarchical rhythmic structure and a displacement or contradiction of that structure. These attributes are translated in terms of a Bayesian theory of syncopation, where the syncopation of a rhythm is inferred based on a hierarchical structure that is, in turn, learned from the ongoing musical stimulus. Several experiments tested its simplest possible implementation, with equally weighted priors associated with different meters and independence of auditory events, which can (...) be decomposed into two terms representing note density and deviation from a metric hierarchy. A computational simulation demonstrated that extant measures of syncopation fall into two distinct factors analogous to the terms in the simple Bayesian model. Next, a series of behavioral experiments found that perceived syncopation is significantly related to both terms, offering support for the general Bayesian construction of syncopation. However, we also found that the prior expectations associated with different metric structures are not equal across meters and that there is an interaction between density and hierarchical deviation, implying that auditory events are not independent from each other. Together, these findings provide evidence that syncopation is a manifestation of a form of temporal expectation that can be directly represented in Bayesian terms and offer a complementary, feature‐driven approach to recent Bayesian models of temporal prediction. (shrink)

The causal indeterminacy suggested by quantum mechanics has led to its being the centerpiece of several proposals for divine action that does not contradict natural laws. However, even if the theoretical concerns about the reality of causal indeterminacy are ignored, quantum-level divine action fails to resolve the problem of ongoing, responsive divine activity. This is because most quantum-level actions require a significant period of time in order to reach macroscopic levels whether via chaotic amplification or complete divine control of quantum (...) events. Therefore, quantum-level divine action either requires divine foreknowledge of purportedly free or random events or imposes such limitations on divine actions that they become late, potentially impotent, and confused. I argue that the theological problem of divine action remains; even at its most promising, quantum mechanics offers insufficient resolution. This failure suggests a reexamination of the assumptions that God is temporal and lacks foreknowledge of future contingencies. (shrink)

The paper assumes that to be of practical interest process must be understood as physical action that takes place in the world rather than being an idea in the mind. It argues that if an ontology of process is to accommodate actuality, it must be represented in terms of relative probabilities. Folk physics cannot accommodate this, and so the paper appeals to scientific culture because it is an emergent knowledge of the world derived from action in it. Process is represented (...) as a contradictory probability distribution that does not depend on a spatio-temporal frame. An actuality is a probability density that grounds the values of probabilities to constitute their distributions. Because probability is a conserved value, probability distributions are subject to the constraint of symmetry and must be zero-sum. An actuality is locked-in by other actualities to become a zero-sum symmetry of probability values. It is shown that the locking-in of actualities constructs spatio-temporal locality, lends actualities specificity, and makes them a contradiction. Localization is the basis for understanding empirical observation. Because becoming depends on its construction of being, processes exist as trajectories. The historical trajectories of evolution and revolution as well as the non-historical trajectory of strong emergence are how processes are observed to exist. (shrink)

Philosophers have responded to McTaggart’s famous argument for the unreality of time in a variety of ways. Some of those responses are not easy to evaluate, since they involve, for example, sometimes murky questions concerning whether a certain infinite regress is or is not vicious. In this paper I set out a response that has not, I think, been advanced by any other author, and which, if successful, is absolutely clear-cut. The basic idea is simply that a tensed approach to (...) time can avoid McTaggart’s contradiction, and can also avoid any regress, vicious or otherwise, by specifying the times at which events have different tensed properties in a tenseless fashion — namely, by using dates. This answer to McTaggart’s argument is, however, open to four important objections. The first objection is that my answer to the second part of McTaggart’s argument is incompatible with something that McTaggart takes himself to have proved in the first part of his argument — the claim, namely, that “there can be no change unless some propositions are sometimes true and sometimes false.” The second objection is that the sentences that I claim can be used to specify when an event has a given tensed property do not in fact do so, since they turn out to be purely tenseless sentences. The third objection is that the sentences in question make use of tenseless verbs, and that it is not in fact possible to make sense of such verbs. The fourth and final objection is that it is not really possible to specify, in tenseless terms, when an event has a given tensed property, since dates have to be analyzed using the relation of temporal priority, and that relation, in turn, must be analyzed in terms of the tensed properties of pastness, presentness and futurity, so that the purportedly tenseless specification is implicitly tensed. I argue, however, that none of these four objections can be sustained. (shrink)