This chapter contains sections titled: Philosophy in Non‐Philosophy Departments Definitions and Wittgensteinean Themes Tradition and Philosophy's Pitfalls Science, Poetry, Real Politics, and History: Antidotes to Scholasticism, and Their Side Effects Institutional Structures and the Road Not Taken Acknowledgments References.

Re-Engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings is about new approaches to many of the big topics in philosophy of science today, but with a very different take. To begin with, we are urged to reject the received Cartesian-Laplacean myths: Descartes’ certainty and Laplace’s computational omniscience. Instead, Wimsatt re-engineers a philosophy for human beings with all their cognitive limitations. His approaches find their starting point in the actual practices of scientists themselves, which he strongly identifies with engineering practices as (...) the source of researchers’ solutions for dealing with a complex world. He aims to construct an understanding of scientific methodology around the central role of reduction. But he dismisses eliminative reductionism in favor of a heuristic-based realist view. Wimsatt’s world is a complex one, and this means that science needs to do away with all the absolute and simple answers, because they do not reflect the world we are living in. A complex world requires the mindset and tinkering of an engineer to uncover its reality. The appropriate response must be heuristics all the way down as we constantly seek out reliable inferences on often shifting ground. To this end, we aim for models and theories that are robust, just as engineers aim to build robust machines. And although errors occur and approaches are fallible, they allow us to continually adapt the heuristics applied and sharpen our perceptions so as to develop more refined tools for investigating and understanding the world. (shrink)

In , John Broome defends a very weak consequentialist account of the value of saving lives. This paper challenges the commitments of this kind of account and describes some reasons for saving lives that would appeal to a non-consequentialist.

Volume 28, Issue 2, March 2020, Page 415-417.

This book provides much new thinking on the phenomenon of whole person education, a phenomenon which features strongly in East Asian universities, and which aims to develop students intellectually, spiritually, and ethically, to master critical thinking skills, to explore ethical challenges in the surrounding community and to acquire a broad based foundation of knowledge in humanities, society and nature. The book considers different approaches to whole person education, including Confucian, Buddhist, and Chinese perspectives, Western philosophy and religion and (...) interdisciplinary approaches. Overall, the book provides a comprehensive overview of whole person education, why it matters and how to implement it. Moreover, although the examples in the book are from East Asia, the discussion and the values involved are universal, important for the whole world. (shrink)

This volume explores the issues at the center of many historical and contemporary reflections on community and sociality in Continental philosophy. The essays reflect on the thought of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Levinas, Arendt, Derrida, Badiou, Fanon, Baldwin, Nancy, Agamben and Laruelle. Continental Perspectives on Community brings the different approaches of these thinkers into conversation with each other. It discusses the possibility of how the concept of community can extend beyond the one and beyond any sense of unity and totality. (...) Additionally, the book shows how notion of community in plurality is at the heart of ethical and political reflections on alterity and race, of political philosophical reflections on the exception, and of ontological reflections on what it means for humans to be social. In this way, it offers an important contribution to the examination of how a community can be thought today. This book will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on social, political, and cultural issues in Continental philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 42.2 (2004) 226-227 [Access article in PDF] Will Dudley. Hegel, Nietzsche and Philosophy: Thinking Freedom. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xvii + 326. Cloth, $60.00. Clear and concise statements are among the virtues of Hegel, Nietzsche and Philosophy: Thinking Freedom, beginning with its title. The book develops an account of human freedom through close attention to Hegel's (...) and Nietzsche's thinking. That account affirms philosophy as a liberating activity that makes freedom ever more "comprehensive" by overcoming external constraints, both actual and theoretical. Hegel takes the project of realizing freedom over from Kant, who had himself advanced it beyond the legacy of "liberalism," and Nietzsche is read here as advancing beyond Hegel's perspective. A very considerable clarification of the structure and content of Hegel's thought about freedom is offered in the first four chapters, and many plausible imputations are made in the second four that illuminate important dimensions of Nietzsche's work. Finally, the role of philosophy as liberating activity is revealed in both "systems," albeit in very different conceptions of what that philosophical activity is like.The greatest strength of the book lies in its erudite and lucid unpacking of Hegel's adamantine thought. Abstract expositions of arguments are often accompanied by helpful examples taken from simple, familiar contexts. Unfortunately, the scope of this review is entirely inadequate to even a summary account of the many dialectics which Dudley reveals [End Page 226] in structural transparency, from the freedom of willing in the Philosophy of Right to freedom beyond willing in absolute Spirit. The body of this book contributes an excellent new commentary on Hegel's conception of freedom, while in his footnotes Dudley offers a rich counterpoint to his own themes in frequently lengthy excurses on much of the relevant literature.However, although Dudley notes at the outset (10-11) that Hegel's and Nietzsche's styles are so different as to require a different style of interpretive treatment, he seems to have forgotten this promise by the time he reaches his discussion of Nietzsche. Instead, Dudley breaks arguments down into their various elements, revealing symmetries to obtain between and among these, in the service of a quasi-dialectical method that sees Nietzsche's thought advance by overcoming its own internal inadequacies. Such a method of analysis seems well suited to Hegel, but it is less persuasive in treating Nietzsche's much more amorphous work, especially as any chronological approach to Nietzsche, which might ground such a developmental claim, is explicitly eschewed. Frequent extended quotation of Nietzsche throughout makes that incongruity of styles particularly strident.Dudley's admittedly Hegelian reading (176) of Nietzsche describes an arc of development in strategies for obtaining freedom: from the enslavement to simple material needs in "disgregation" (a coinage of Werner Hamacher's, apparently, who is cited, but not as the source of this term), through the partial freedom of the moral will, to the self-determined noble will, which itself is aufgehoben by the tragic will. The dynamics of this process are complicated, and laying them out constitutes the lion's share of the analysis. One must forge one's own will, we read, by "giving birth to oneself as a living whole," something accomplished by "integrating the chaos that results from the destruction of the moral will." This feat of "integration" is itself first accomplished by giving oneself "customs" which, however, soon become a new form of unfreedom; what ultimately is needed is "a complementary combination of nobility and modernity, of setting oneself apart from and holding oneself open to the chaotic stimuli beyond one's measure" (177). These are just the barest bones on which Dudley hangs a lot of flesh—not all of which appears natural there. Dudley articulates Nietzsche's ideas in sentences like these: "Recall that the sovereign, noble will is the offspring of the genius of giving birth applied by the individual to herself. Now the transformative destruction of this will results from such a reflexive application of the genius of impregnation; the individual transgresses... (shrink)

This collection of essays investigates the notions of life, living organisms, and human nature in Classical German Philosophy from a historical and conceptual perspective. Its 19 chapters move from the peculiarities of organic life to the peculiarities of the distinctly human life form and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of naturalistic accounts of life. In light of the growing interest in nature within current philosophical debates, the book provides an overview of what the philosophical epoch of Kant, Fichte, (...) Schelling, Humboldt, the Romantics, Hegel, and others can contribute to our understanding of life today. The collection of essays represents a plurality of approaches that reflects the pluralism of the tradition itself – highlighting the liveliness and polyphonic nature of the issues at stake and the ways in which they were approached in post-Kantian thought.In combining historical and philosophical investigation, the collection constitutes a unique resource for scholars and graduate students working in various areas related to the study of nature in philosophy, contemporary theories of science, and the humanities more generally. (shrink)

_Phenomenological Perspectives on Plurality_ offers twelve essays that discuss how the question of plurality is thought in contemporary continental philosophy. Its essays investigate how this issue influences topics in ontology, aesthetics, and social and political philosophy.

Organ donation and transplantation touch on profound, and at times elusive, values and beliefs. These involve personal identity, embodiment, the relationship between the individual and the community, and death. Different cultural and religious perspectives, reflecting deeply ingrained but often unspoken assumptions about human identity and responsibilities, subtly but profoundly affect attitudes to donation and transplantation.

This book offers a sustained, interdisciplinary examination of taste. It addresses a range of topics that have been at the heart of lively debates in philosophy of language, linguistics, metaphysics, aesthetics, and experimental philosophy. Our everyday lives are suffused with discussions about taste. We are quick to offer familiar platitudes about taste, but we struggle when facing the questions that matter--what taste is, how it is related to subjectivity, what distinguishes good from bad taste, why it is valuable (...) to make and evaluate judgments about matters of taste, and what, exactly, we mean in speaking about these matters. The essays in this volume open up new, intersecting lines of research about these questions that cross traditional disciplinary boundaries. They address the notion of aesthetic taste; connections between taste and the natures of truth, disagreement, assertion, belief, retraction, linguistic context-sensitivity, and the semantics/pragmatics interface; experimental inquiry about taste; and metaphysical questions underlying ongoing discussions about taste. Perspectives on Taste will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in aesthetics, philosophy of language, linguistics, metaphysics, and experimental philosophy. (shrink)

We live in a time of “cosmopolitan regard,” when there is widespread acknowledgement that every person has moral importance. At the same time, most of us affirm and practice particular regard for our family, friends and compatriots, despite knowing that in our contemporary world, every day, many people, in many places, are treated like nothing. Are cosmopolitan and particular regard fated to be irreconcilable features of our moral lives? Are the grounds for our moral duties to our fellow citizens fundamentally (...) different from, and potentially in conflict with, the grounds of our moral duties to others with whom we share no political association? What is required in the way of political morality by cosmopolitan regard? Does it require symmetry between our particular and universal obligations? Under what conditions may asymmetrical accounts of obligation be justified? Richard Vernon’s book makes an elegant contribution to debates in contemporary political philosophy about the moral basis .. (shrink)

Religious traditions can be sources of values and attitudes supporting the liberal polity in ways that political theorizing and conceptions of public reason often fail to recognize. moreover, religious traditions can give support through the ways reason is crucial to their self-understanding. one understanding of Judaism is examined as an example. Also, the particularism of traditions can encourage commitment to universally valid values and ideals. reason’s role in Judaism and other religious traditions makes possible constructive interaction between those traditions and (...) between religious and secular thought. exclusion of religiously grounded considerations from the discourse and deliberations of liberal polities can be counterproductively illiberal. (shrink)

Evolutionary theory is one of the most widely misunderstood and consistently rejected concepts in the whole of science. In Understanding Evolution, Kostas Kampourakis investigates the psychological dimensions of this popular discontent with evolutionary theory. At the heart of this persisting public disenchantment with the theory lies the thoroughly counterintuitive, even alien, nature of biological evolution. Historically, people have rejected evolution on religious, ethical, and existential grounds, but there is a psychological component to our aversion to evolution. It simply does not (...) resonate with human expectations about how the world should work. Kampourakis does an excellent job presenting evolutionary theory and summarizing the evidence for it. Ultimately, he argues that in spite of powerful emotional and instinctual forces arrayed against it, we have much to gain by allowing the evolutionary picture to enrich our understanding of the world. If we allow the full drama of the history of life on Earth to present itself to us, we can place ourselves within that drama and find ways to relate it meaningfully to our lives without psychological barriers mounted by disdain and discomfort. (shrink)

This chapter begins by defining natural theology in analytical philosophy, and next considers analytical philosophers's rejection of natural theology and the rise of analytical theism. The focus then turns to one of the most prominent arguments debated in recent discussions of natural theology, the so-called fine-tuning argument. The FTA is a sophisticated version of the traditional argument to design, one that appeals to the apparent ‘fine tuning’ of the fundamental constants of nature, such as the gravitational constant, such that (...) even a minute variation in these values would not have permitted the development in our universe of complex forms of life or, a fortiori, intelligent and sentient creatures. The chapter first presents a statement of the argument by two of its defenders – William Lane Craig and Robin Collins – and then looks at criticisms by such philosophers as Robin Le Poidevin and Graham Oppy. It concludes by asking whether the recent debates among analytic philosophers of religion have really advanced the case for natural theology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Europe and EmbodimentA Levinasian PerspectiveJames Mensch (bio)The question of Europe has been raised continually. Behind it is the division of the continent into different peoples, languages, and cultures, all in close proximity to one another. Their plurality and proximity give rise to the opposing imperatives of trade and war. Since ancient times, the need to promote trade and the desire to prevent war have driven the search for (...) a basis for European unity. Various candidates, from that of Roman law in ancient times to the current economic and regulatory union of today, have been tried. Such bureaucratic solutions, however, have not proved sufficient. They regulate external relations but do not touch what is within. This, however, is the difficulty: how do we understand nations and their relations from within? On an individual level, it is customary to speak of the inner as “subjectivity.” Such a term generally means the “subject” of experience, the unique and individual self that has experience. If we are to avoid the Cartesian conceptions of this self, we have to speak of such a subject as an embodied whole: an organic unity that is both conscious of its environment and distinguishes itself from the latter. Such an organic unity cannot be thought in terms of Descartes’s distinction between mind and body, the mind being nonextended and the body being extended. The body grasped simply as extended is inanimate. To use [End Page 41] the German term, it is a Körper, a material body among bodies. The corresponding term for the animate, living body is Leib. A living body is characterized both by its organic needs and its ability to satisfy these through its “I can” (i.e., its capability to act to fulfill such needs). Subjectivity, as embodied, has to be thought in terms of the latter.Such thoughts, however, only increase the difficulty of speaking of the subjectivity of nations. Nations are political concepts. To speak of them as organic unities seems to return us to a discredited analogy, where we say just as the body has a common boundary separating its inside from the outside, so a nation has its frontiers. Similarly, we assert that just as an organic unity embraces the mutually dependent functioning of its parts — e.g., its various organs and limbs — so the state consists of the interdependent functioning of its classes and professions. Paul employs this analogy in speaking of the body of Christ.1 It also appears in Plato’s division of the classes of the state. One can also see it at work in the division of castes in Hindu society. As such examples indicate, its focus on natural classes makes it an inappropriate analogy for the modern state, where citizenship rather than class is the dominant conception. What, then, would be an appropriate way to speak of the subjectivity of nations? In what follows, I am going to use Levinas’s conception of corporalité (Leiblichkeit in German) to answer these questions. My claim will be that it permits the extension of subjectivity to the national level. Such an extension, I will argue, is crucial for understanding the group of nations that we call Europe. It is what allows us to catch sight of Europe’s particular identity.Two Views of European IdentityThere is a certain paradox in attempting to speak of the identity of Europe. Given the spread of the scientific rationality that originated in Europe, it is often claimed that what distinguishes Europe is the universality of the rationality that defines it. Husserl, in the twentieth century, made this claim. Such universality, he writes, is “contained from the start in the idea of philosophy” that appeared in Greece.2 [End Page 42] Philosophy, for the Greeks, was a general term that included “all the special sciences” — mathematics, astronomy, and so on — that developed as part of it. All these make universal claims. What they assert is claimed to hold everywhere, without exception. As Husserl admits, “philosophy, together with all the special sciences, makes up only a partial manifestation of European culture.” But for Husserl, “this part is the functioning brain” of “European spiritual life.”3... (shrink)

ABSTRACT It can be summarized as the Why of Doing philosophy and the How of Doing Philosophy. For this purpose I deal with the notion of Consciousness. Not, to develop or advocate yet another idea about this notion, nor to present another speculation about how everything is conscious or that all thinI deal with a number of meta-philosophical issues and ideas. gs are physical, or any of the possible positions in between these two poles. I merely mention this (...) issue so as to illustrate what and how philosophy will deal with it. I then deal with some of the possible reasons and factors why certain individuals feel the intense need, motivation and obligation to philosophize. I focus on the Western tradition of philosophy and on original- and creative philosophers. In other words, I do not deal with those involved in academic institutions and professionals. The reason for this being that they teach, study, criticize and use the ideas of other thinkers and for academic related reasons, rather than those of original- and creative thinkers. I then deal with ideas about the nature and origins of our universe, as one possible universe, in a possible multiverse. Again, the reason for this is not to support or advocate any of the models, but to try and identify what is philosophically involved and to show how one will deal with them philosophically by questioning, argumentation and reasoning. Many people think when they talk about their every day lives, relationships and other aspects of their minute, little worlds, they are doing philosophy. Some of the fashionable issues that are favoured at the moment are: racism, gender, feminism, men and colonialism. Such people think their attitudes, beliefs and opinions about these flavour of the month topics are philosophy. Let them have their obsessions and concerns, let them turn them into academic subjects and qualifications, let them do post-doctorate research and write endless books about them, but do not involve me. How can I do philosophy as - there are things I do not know, there are things that I do notknow of and there are things that will be know and thought in future that I will never be aware of. Multi-sensory, embodied, consciousness (or mind) and minded or conscioussed, multi-sensory bodies of living organisms can said to be poles of a continuum (2 perspectives). Mind and body are often viewed in isolation, as unintegrated, dualistic phenomena, thus leading to false problems and -isms. I deal with issues concerning the origins of our universe for examplethe mediocrity principle and the anthropic principle, fine-tuning hypothesis. These three ideas, principles or hypotheses are of interest for a number of philosophical reasons, so I will mention what they are about. (shrink)

The articles in this issue of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy explore emerging technologies, medical innovations, and shifting moral norms, expanding present discussions around topics in bioethics both old and new. Some question whether novel definitions of death and harm change the moral permissibility of killing, particularly at the hands of a physician. Others question how increased or decreased abilities affect responsibility and achievement. Another illustrates how rhetorical appeals to character have been used to justify otherwise morally illicit (...) actions within the clinic. Together, these articles shed new light on topics in the field of bioethics. (shrink)

This introductory article outlines the themes and aims of this special issue, which offers new perspectives on early modern debates about agency in two ways: First, it recovers writings on agency and liberty that have been widely neglected or that have received insufficient attention, including writings by Anne Conway, Henry More, Ralph Cudworth, William King, Gabrielle Suchon, Elizabeth Berkeley Burnet, Mary Astell, and Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury. Second, it reveals the richness of early modern debates (...) about agency and liberty. (shrink)

This article examines the role of moods in aesthetic experience by focussing on film. It considers specifically the function of moods in relation to narrative and aesthetic perspectives which a film provides and which recipients are invited to adopt. I distinguish superficial transitory moods from profound enduring ones. This differentiation is important with regard to the question why moods in film matter and why they are different from emotions. I will focus on Lars von Trier’s film “Melancholia” and claim (...) that the moods of the leading characters can at one and the same time count as moods and perspectives on the world. Their moods are strongly connected to how they perceive their world, evaluate it, and “are” in the world. By being put into a mood that assails human beings holistically, viewers get acquainted with a perspective of a fictional character in an encompassing manner that includes mind and body. However, it will be discussed whether the viewers feel profound or superficial moods when engaging in the moods of the film and the characters and whether they are infatuated or can remain aesthetic distance. (shrink)

In Interpretations and Causes, some of the leading contemporary analytic philosophers discuss Davidson's new ideas in a lively, relevant, useful, and not always ...

Volume 28, Issue 4, July 2020, Page 845-847.

This book explains why universities, and academics within them, must engage with the diversity of knowledges and knowers that exist in the world. Through philosophical perspectives, theoretical frameworks and practical examples from around the world, the book searches for opportunities for renewal and inclusion in universities. It explains how higher education can better serve the purposes of social justice by re-evaluating the types of knowledge it promotes. Going beyond the identification and analysis of injustices in ways of knowing in (...) academia, the book offers insights and examples of practices in teaching, research and work with the community which aim to move towards justice on an epistemic level. It argues that inclusion in the domain of knowledge can lead to the generation of knowledges and understandings that are more robust and better equipped to address the pressing needs of the plural worlds outside the university. Contributions are included from authors working in varied disciplinary and cultural contexts in universities, who describe and explicate their work towards identifying epistemic injustice and finding spaces to advance knowledge justice in theory and in practice. The book will be beneficial to academics and those with an interest in the role of universities in serving the public good. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:160 BOOK REVIEWS or orthopraxis (which is revealed insightfully as a false dilemma [Chapter XII]), and the Church both in its struggle for human rights (Chapter XIII) and in its missionary activity (Chapter XIV). The translation of the work is quite adequate, though there are some places where it misses the nuance of Geffre's text, as when it asserts that "there is no knowledge..." (p. 14), instead of saying (...) that "it [discourse] is not a knowledge" (French edition, Paris, 1983; p. 23). It can also tend to render the text unintelligible, as when it speaks of "our habit of judging... the exclusive place of theological truth" (p.54), instead of "our habit of making judgment ••• the exclusive place of theological truth " (French edition, p.76·77). Then, there are moments when it simply says the opposite of what the author intends. Thus Thomas Aquinas is presented as one of those who tend to replace the authority of Scripture with the authority of the magisterium (p.48) instead of being distinguished from them (French edition, p.68), and scientific exegesis and historical method are credited with helping to " bridge the gulf " between exegetes and theologians (p.13), instead of being criticized for helping to " dig the ditch (creuser le fosse) " that separated them (French edition, p.21). Geffre concludes his book with an epilogue where he comments both critically and hopefully on the recent history of Catholic theology in France. In this he is able both to review the major themes of the book and to establish a challenging program for future work in hermeneutical theology. Despite the reservations I have mentioned concerning some of his views, I think it can be said that Ge:ffre's careful scholarship and insightful arguments, combined with is penetrating grasp of the contemporary theological scene which is evident in his copious notes and references, may represent one of the first flowers of the " new theological spring " of which he speaks. MICHAEL J. DODDS, O.P. Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology Berkeley, California Life and Faith: Psychological Perspectives on Religious Experience, by W. W. MEISSNER, S.J. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1987. Pp. xviii + 302. Bibliography. $24.95. Fr. Meissner is continuing his career-long research into the overlaps of psychoanalysis and religion, and in this book is broadening his perspectives to embrace several other areas of contemporary developmental psychology, in a wide.arching synthesis of broad generaliza· BOOK REVIEWS 161 tions. His underlying thesis is that psychoanalysis, especially in its later ego-psychology and object relationships developments, has insights to contribute to the psychology of religion, and, along with other psychologies of development, clarifies and concretizes the understanding of religion-as-lived, counterpointing the contributions of theology. The book has three sections. In the first section, the author reflects on a psychology of grace, and sets up a developmental schema of the steps toward spiritual identity, paralleling Freud's psychosexual stages and Erikson's psychosocial stages. He conceptualizes the psychospir· itual stages in terms of the theological virtues, partially subdivided into Gospel virtues, and two of the cardinal virtues. Thus his eight stages emerge as faith/hope, contrition, penance/temperance, fortitude, hu· mility, love of neighbor, service/zeal and charity. Prudence, presum· ably, would relate more to a Piagetian schema, although prudence would certainly also be affected by areas of psychological conflict, while justice would probably be considered a superego derivative. The second section of the book deals with faith/hope, the first stage of psychospiritual development. The author uses Kierkegaard's analysis of faith as his theological standard. Whether this understanding of faith, in which the formal motivation is absurdity, is preferable to a faith whose formal motive is "because nothing is impossible for God," is debatable. In any event, Kierkgaard's faith would seem to belong more to a stage of final purification than to any earlier developmental phases. In presenting the stages of faith development, Meissner uses Fow· ler's schema, based on -Piaget's and Kohlberg's studies, (cognizant of Rothman and Lichter's criticisms in terms of the influence of sociopolitical ideologies, but making no reference to Loevinger's critique from women's perspectives), along... (shrink)

According to Abrahamic religions, namely Judaism, Christianity and Islam, human beings exist on the earth for a common purpose, and they have patrilineally and matrilineally descended from a single couple, namely Adam and Hawa (Eve). The Qur’an unambiguously mentions: “O mankind! reverence your Guardian-Lord, who created you from a single person, created, of like nature, His mate, and from them twain scattered (like seeds) countless men and women; reverence Allah, through whom ye demand your mutual (rights), and (reverence) the wombs (...) (That bore you): for Allah ever watches over you.” Thus, it is incumbent upon human beings to live together in peace rather than constant hostility to fulfil the purpose of their existence on the earth. This paper endeavours to contribute to the understanding of the concept of ‘peaceful coexistence’ from the Islamic perspective. It specifically answers the following research questions: What is peaceful coexistence? What is necessary for peaceful coexistence? What are the fundamental principles that we must adhere to in order to coexist peacefully? The paper is structured into eight sections, beginning with introduction on the concept of ‘peace’ in Islam. The second section focuses on the main objectives of Islam. The third section is on the meaning of peaceful coexistence. The fourth and fifth sections are on the need for peaceful coexistence, and the necessary requirements and tools for peaceful coexistence respectively. The sixth section is on categorization of peaceful coexistence into: peaceful coexistence in marriage, peaceful coexistence of mankind, peaceful coexistence of the members of the Muslim ummah and peaceful coexistence of mankind and the environment. The seventh section is a summary of the Islamic principles of peaceful coexistence. The final section sums up the main conclusions drawn from this study. The translation of the ayat (verses) of the Qur’an related to this study is extracted from the work of Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur’an: Text and Translation unless stated otherwise. At the end of this paper, it is hoped that the readers will: first, appreciate the message of Islam as a universal religion and the need for mutual care, mutual respect, and mutual cooperation; and second, explore the methodology of the Qur’an and the Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) in managing human diversity. It is also hoped that this study will lead to a better understanding of peaceful coexistence as an integral part of Islam and one of the characteristics of the Muslim ummah. The findings of this study highlight the role of Islam in promoting peace and security. The study reveals that peaceful coexistence is a key factor in the success of human beings and it requires nurturing love, respect, care, and salam (a greeting of peace) in one’s relationship with others. (shrink)

This essay compares five different conceptions of the nature of work: capitalist, Christian, Buddhist, republican, and environmentalist. The capitalist perspective on the nature of work profoundly affects our common conceptions about the nature of work as well as our experiences with work. Nevertheless, there are also non-economic conceptions of the nature of work that are effective, influential, and contribute to a moral marketplace. The four non-economic traditions suggest ideals of what work ought to be, and ways through which one may (...) transform the experience of work while living in a democratic capitalist culture. Further, the fact that the four different non-economic traditions can agree in characterizing work as a calling gives credence to the notion that an interdisciplinary and interfaith conception about the ideals of work can be attained. (shrink)

Volume 27, Issue 6, December 2019, Page 1247-1251.

This volume brings together new work on the logic and ontology of plurality and a range of recent articles exploring novel applications to natural language semantics. The contributions in this volume in particular investigate and extend new perspectives presented by plural logic and non-standard mereology and explore their applications to a range of natural language phenomena. Contributions by P. Aquaviva, A. Arapinis, M. Carrara, P. McKay, F. Moltmann, O. Linnebo, A. Oliver and T. Smiley, T. Scaltsas, P. Simons, (...) and B.-Y. Yi . (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 138-139 [Access article in PDF] Erich H. Reck, editor. From Frege to Wittgenstein: Perspectives on Early Analytic Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. xv + 470. Cloth, $65.00. The volume is divided into four main parts: I: "Background and general themes," II: "Frege," III: "Frege to early Wittgenstein," and IV: "Early Wittgenstein." Part I includes (...) the following essays: Erich H. Reck, "Wittgenstein's 'great debt' to Frege: biographical traces and philosophical themes"; Gottfried Gabriel, "Frege, Lotze, and the continental roots of early analytic philosophy"; and Steven Gerrard, "One Wittgenstein?". Part II includes: Hans Sluga, "Frege on the indefinability of truth"; Sanford Shieh, "On interpreting Frege on truth and logic"; Marco Ruffino, "Logical objects in Frege's Grundgesetze, section 10"; and Joan Weiner, "Section 31 revisited: Frege's elucidations." Part III includes: Warren Goldfarb, "Wittgenstein's understanding of Frege: the pre-tractarian evidence"; Danielle Machbeth, "Frege and early Wittgenstein on logic and language"; Thomas Ricketts, "Wittgenstein against Frege and Russell"; and Cora Diamond, "Truth before Tarski: after Sluga, after Ricketts, after Geach, after Goldfarb, Hylton, Floyd, and Van Heijenoort." Part IV includes: Ian Proops, "The Tractatus on inference and entailment"; Juliet Floyd, "Number and ascriptions of number in Wittgenstein's Tractatus"; Matthew B. Ostrow, "Wittgenstein and the liberating word"; and James Conant, "The method of the Tractatus."Reck, while opposing the "widespread view" that Wittgenstein's "debt" to Frege was "rather minimal," warns the reader against going too far in the contrary direction (exemplified by Geach). Gabriel maintains (39) the thesis that "at least early analytic philosophy has its roots in the tradition of continental philosophy, especially in the philosophy of Hermann Lotze" (the founder of neo-Kantianism). Gerrard argues against the common distinction of an "early" and a "late" Wittgenstein.Sluga writes in favor of the significance of Frege's remark (rather neglected in the Fregean literature) that "the content of the word 'true' is altogether unique and indefinable." Shieh's "principal question," observing that Frege's philosophy of logic has been interpreted in two opposite ways: "semantical" (Dummett), and "antisemantical" (Ricketts), is: "Did Frege provide an explanatory justification of logical laws in semantic terms?" The "central result" of the essay is that "the substance of the disagreements between the antisemantical interpreters and their perceived opponents is not what they suggest it to be" (97). Ruffino focuses on the Fregean attempt to determine the nature of the extensions introduced by his (in)famous Axiom V, and compares Frege's handling of this issue with the seemingly analogous issue of determining the nature of numbers introduced by what is nowadays called "Hume's principle." Weiner attacks another crucial portion of Frege's work: Grundgesetze I §31, and proposes to read it as "elucidation" rather than as proof.Goldfarb intends to "cast doubt on the assessment of Frege's influence on Wittgenstein" expressed by several scholars. Goldfarb holds that Frege and Wittgenstein arrive at views that "have many similarities" but that they do it independently (187). Rather, in Wittgenstein "the basic framework and the basic stance are thoroughly inherited from Russell" (197). Macbeth argues that Frege and Wittgenstein have radically different conceptions of meaning: inferentialist and representative respectively. Ricketts argues that Wittgenstein's critique of Frege "is mounted from within his own distinctive approach to language and logic," so that "while Wittgenstein does not meet Frege on Frege's own terms, neither does he straightforwardly misunderstand Frege" (228). The content of Diamond's paper is more than hinted at by its long title.Proops aims at investigating "Wittgenstein's well-known, yet obscure, objection to the views of Frege and Russell on deductive inference and its justification," (283) an objection set out in Tractatus5.132: laws of inference are senseless, superfluous. Floyd intends to highlight the philosophy of arithmetic found in the Tractatus against a "tendency to pass over the Tractatus remarks on arithmetic in silence" (309). Ostrow points out that "it is not at once apparent" how the "Wittgensteinian liberation" is to be conceived (353), and his... (shrink)

The cambridge platonists exemplify the fear that newtonian natural philosophy subverts the status of traditional moral and religious beliefs, Which are strongly supported by the innate idea doctrine since it justifies them independently of the senses and the material universe. Isaac barrow, Friend and teacher of newton, Also employs the doctrine approbatively to support his metaphysics as a science of basic principles that constitute the foundation of natural science. Locke's rejection of the doctrine is analyzed and it is suggested (...) that the platonist's treatment of the active role of the mind in sensation could have been developed in eighteenth century britain if locke's polemic had not been so successful. (shrink)

In African countries there has been a surge of intellectual interest in foregrounding ideas and thinkers of African origin--in philosophy as in other disciplines--that have been unjustly ignored or marginalized. African scholars have demonstrated that precolonial African cultures generated ideas and arguments which were at once truly philosophical and distinctively African, and several contemporary African thinkers are now established figures in the philosophical mainstream. Yet, despite the universality of its themes, relevant contributions from African philosophy have rarely permeated (...) global philosophical debates. Critical intellectual excavation has also tended to prioritize precolonial thought, overlooking more recent sources of home-grown philosophical thinking such as Africa's intellectually rich liberation movements. This book demonstrates the potential for constructive interchange between currents of thought from African philosophy and other intellectual currents within philosophy. Chapters authored by leading and emerging scholars: recover philosophical thinkers and currents of ideas within Africa and about Africa, bringing them into dialogue with contemporary mainstream philosophy; foreground the relevance of African theorizing to contemporary debates in epistemology, philosophy of language, moral/political philosophy, philosophy of race, environmental ethics and the metaphysics of disability; make new interventions within on-going debates in African philosophy; consider ways in which philosophy can become epistemically inclusive, interrogating the contemporary call for 'decolonization' of philosophy. Showing how foregrounding Africa--its ideas, thinkers and problems--can help with the project of renewing and improving the discipline of philosophy worldwide, this book will stimulate and challenge everyone with an interest in philosophy, and is essential reading for upper-level undergraduate students, postgraduate students and scholars of African and Africana philosophy. (shrink)

Volume 28, Issue 2, March 2020, Page 413-415.

Some psychopathologic experiences have as one of their structural aspects the experience of restructured temporality. The general argument is that one of the universal microstructures of experience, namely, lived time offers a particular perspective relevant to certain psychopathologic experiences. Lived time is connected with the experience of the embodied human subject as being driven and directed towards the world in terms of bodily potentiality and capability. The dialectical relationship between the embodied human subject and the world results in a sense (...) of lived time (personal time), a lived time that is intimately synchronized with the time of others (intersubjective time). Some experiences of acute suffering, and in particular acute melancholic suffering, can dramatically alter the temporal microstructure of experience to the extent that personal lived time becomes disordered. Normally, past and future withdraw on their own according with their nature of "not being." The future is characterized as openness to change and movement. The absence of this openness is the closing of the future; without this openness, the future appears static and deterministic. When the future is experienced as static, then one longer has the possibility of "things getting better," nor does one have any possibility of relinquishing or escaping from the past because a static future does not allow openness to change and movement. In short, both past and future become static. With the presence of melancholic suffering and the absence of temporal movement, a sense of hopelessness may arise in the individual because suffering without temporal movement becomes, from the sufferer's perspective, eternal suffering. (shrink)

This paper examines Ronald Dworkin's claim that the right to free speech does not include a right to circumstances that encourage citizens to speak nor a right to competent and sympathetic understanding on the part of listeners. Drawing on familiar arguments for the existence of other human rights, the paper challenges Dworkin's claim. Even if, however, the challenge fails and it is not possible to show that there is such a right, that is not the end of the story. It (...) is argued that democratic societies should try to foster conditions in which citizens are encouraged to speak and are listened to sympathetically in the interests of the well-being and flourishing of the polity. The important role education has to play in this is explored. (shrink)

화이트헤드의 과정철학과 합생 개념을 중심으로 기업가정신을 비판적으로 고찰하고 대안적 개념을 제시하는 것이 이 논문의 목적이다. 사실상 기업가정신에 대한 기존의 연구는 개별적인 주체, 혹은 그가 갖고 있는 특별하게 뛰어난 성격과 역량에만 배타적으로 초점을 두어왔다. 실체 철학을 기반으로 기업가정신을 연구할 경우에 당연히 이와 같은 결론에 도달할 수밖에 없다. 그런데 최근 들어 일군의 학자들이 기업가-되기라는 개념을 중심으로 기업가정신에 대한 연구를 새롭게 혁신할 필요성을 제기한다. 이들의 기업가-되기 연구는 과정철학의 무한한 잠재력에 비추어 볼 때, 연구의 폭과 깊이가 대단히 제한적이다. 우리는 화이트헤드의 철학적 개념을 차용해서 합생적 (...) 기업가-되기라는 개념을 정초하고 이 개념의 이론적 체계화를 시도한다. 이 과정에서 합생적 기업가-되기가 프로네시스, 가추법, 창조성, 미적 가치라는 네 가지 개념을 포섭해냄으로써 그 잠재력이 더욱더 풍요롭게 전개될 수 있음을 보여준다. (shrink)