In a brief and deeply interesting 2017 Acta Analytica paper, Peter Baumann argues that there are cases of necessarily incompatible but mutually consistent desires, that this is a common problem, and that there is no solution in sight. I’ll argue that Baumann fails to note certain non-trivial assumptions that must be made for the possibility of consistent incompatible desires; if consistent incompatible desires do exist then they’re sometimes beneficial; and if they are sometimes involved with problematic outcomes then the (...) mere presence of incompatibility and consistency does not cause the subject to frustrate the (more) beneficial desire. In short, if there is a problem of consistent incompatible desires then it is not the problem that Baumann identifies. (shrink)

The problem of artificial precision is a major objection to any theory of vagueness based on real numbers as degrees of truth. Suppose you are willing to admit that, under sufficiently specified circumstances, a predication of “is red” receives a unique, exact number from the real unit interval [0, 1]. You should then be committed to explain what is it that determines that value, settling for instance that my coat is red to degree 0.322 rather than 0.321. In this (...) note I revisit the problem in the important case of Łukasiewicz infinite-valued propositional logic that brings to the foreground the rôle of maximally consistent theories. I argue that the problem of artificial precision, as commonly conceived of in the literature, actually conflates two distinct problems of a very different nature. (shrink)

This article responds to Daniel Coren’s very insightful critical discussion of Baumann. It clarifies and defends the view that there is a problem of mutually consistent but necessarily incompatible desires. Distinguishing explicitly between semantic and syntactic consistency, one can show that the problem remains under each interpretation of “consistent.”.

The business practices of multinational corporations raise many provocative moral issues and offer a touchstone for some fundamental ethical concepts. This essay identifies a wide range of problems but centers on the matter of consistency in corporate policy between foreign and domestic practices and the kind of generality of standards that is required to achieve consistency. Two considerations are singled out for illustrative discussion: wage scales and bribes. Proposals are offered for achieving consistency and generality in each (...) case, the principle of contextual generality for the first and the notion of structural universals for the second. (shrink)

The author highlights the different ways in which countries measure standards of human rights and social justice within their borders and in other countries.

The religious legitimacy of medical practice was an issue of serious contention amongst medieval Jewish scholars. For Nahmanides, altering the patient's fate through manipulation of natural causality amounts to circumventing divine judgment. For Maimonides, however, human accomplishment is part of God's providential design; this view generally prevails in contemporary Jewish bioethics. But the doctrine of deligitimizing human intervention continues, even while unacknowledged, to underlie certain contemporary positions. These include arguments within Jewish bioethics about end-of-life decisions, which are therefore imbued with (...) inconsistencies. It is suggested that, given the overall endorsement of modern medicine, the Nahmanidean approach must be explicitly confronted. Keywords: euthanasia, Jewish bioethics, Nahmanides, naturalism, nature, Maimonides, providence CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The meaning of the wave function is an important unresolved issue in Bohmian mechanics. On the one hand, according to the nomological view, the wave function of the universe or the universal wave function is nomological, like a law of nature. On the other hand, the PBR theorem proves that the wave function in quantum mechanics or the effective wave function in Bohmian mechanics is ontic, representing the ontic state of a physical system in the universe. It is usually thought (...) that the nomological view of the universal wave function is compatible with the ontic view of the effective wave function, and thus the PBR theorem has no implications for the nomological view. In this paper, I argue that this is not the case, and these two views are in fact incompatible. This means that if the effective wave function is ontic as the PBR theorem proves, then the universal wave function cannot be nomological, and the ontology of Bohmian mechanics cannot consist only in particles. This incompatibility result holds true not only for Humeanism and dispositionalism but also for primitivism about laws of nature, which attributes a fundamental ontic role to the universal wave function. Moreover, I argue that although the nomological view can be held by rejecting one key assumption of the PBR theorem, the rejection will lead to serious problems, such as that the results of measurements and their probabilities cannot be explained in ontology in Bohmian mechanics. Finally, I briefly discuss three $$\psi$$ -ontologies, namely a physical field in a fundamental high-dimensional space, a multi-field in three-dimensional space, and RDMP (Random Discontinuous Motion of Particles) in three-dimensional space, and argue that the RDMP ontology can answer the objections to the $$\psi$$ -ontology raised by the proponents of the nomological view. (shrink)

Current theories of massless free particle assume unitary space inversion and anti-unitary time reversal operators. In so doing robust classes of possible theories are discarded. In the present work theories of massless systems are derived through a strictly deductive development from the principle of relativistic invariance, so that a kind of space inversion or time reversal operator is ruled out only if it causes inconsistencies. As results, new classes of consistent theories for massless isolated systems are explicitly determined. On the (...) other hand, the approach determines definite constraints implied by the invariance principle; they were ignored by some past investigations that, as a consequence, turn out to be not consistent with the invariance principle. Also the problem of the localizability for massless systems is reconsidered within the new theoretical framework, obtaining a generalization and a deeper detailing of previous results. (shrink)

It is common in the literature on classical electrodynamics (ED) and relativity theory that the transformation rules for the basic electrodynamical quantities are derived from the hypothesis that the relativity principle (RP) applies to Maxwell’s electrodynamics. As it will turn out from our analysis, these derivations raise several problems, and certain steps are logically questionable. This is, however, not our main concern in this paper. Even if these derivations were completely correct, they leave open the following questions: (1) Is the (...) RP a true law of nature for electrodynamical phenomena? (2) Are, at least, the transformation rules of the fundamental electrodynamical quantities, derived from the RP, true? (3) Is the RP consistent with the laws of ED in a single inertial frame of reference? (4) Are, at least, the derived transformation rules consistent with the laws of ED in a single frame of reference? Obviously, (1) and (2) are empirical questions. In this paper, we will investigate problems (3) and (4). First we will give a general mathematical formulation of the RP. In the second part, we will deal with the operational definitions of the fundamental electrodynamical quantities. As we will see, these semantic issues are not as trivial as one might think. In the third part of the paper, applying what J. S. Bell calls “Lorentzian pedagogy”—according to which the laws of physics in any one reference frame account for all physical phenomena— we will show that the transformation rules of the electrodynamical quantities are identical with the ones obtained by presuming the covariance of the equations of ED, and that the covariance is indeed satisfied. As to problem (3), the situation is much more complex. As we will see, the RP is actually not a matter of the covariance of the physical equations, but it is a matter of the details of the solutions of the equations, which describe the behavior of moving objects. This raises conceptual problems concerning the meaning of the notion “the same system in a collective motion”.. (shrink)

The theory that ``consistency implies existence'' was put forward by Hilbert on various occasions around the start of the last century, and it was strongly and explicitly emphasized in his correspondence with Frege. Since (Gödel's) completeness theorem, abstractly speaking, forms the basis of this theory, it has become common practice to assume that Hilbert took for granted the semantic completeness of second order logic. In this paper I maintain that this widely held view is untrue to the facts, and (...) that the clue to explain what Hilbert meant by linking together consistency and existence is to be found in the role played by the completeness axiom within both geometrical and arithmetical axiom systems. (shrink)

It is common in the literature on electrodynamics and relativity theory that the transformation rules for the basic electrodynamical quantities are derived from the hypothesis that the relativity principle (RP) applies for Maxwell’s electrodynamics. As it will turn out from our analysis, these derivations raise several problems, and certain steps are logically questionable. This is, however, not our main concern in this paper. Even if these derivations were completely correct, they leave open the following questions: (1) Is (RP) a true (...) law of nature for electrodynamical phenomena? (2) Are, at least, the transformation rules of the fundamental electrodynamical quantities, derived from (RP), true? (3) Is (RP) consistent with the laws of electrodynamics in one single inertial frame of reference? (4) Are, at least, the derived transformation rules consistent with the laws of electrodynamics in one single frame of reference? Obviously, (1) and (2) are empirical questions. In this paper, we will investigate problems (3) and (4). First we will give a general mathematical formulation of (RP). In the second part, we will deal with the operational definitions of the fundamental electrodynamical quantities. As we will see, these semantic issues are not as trivial as one might think. In the third part of the paper, applying what J. S. Bell calls “Lorentzian pedagogy”—according to which the laws of physics in any one reference frame account for all physical phenomena— we will show that the transformation rules of the electrodynamical quantities are identical with the ones obtained by presuming the covariance of the coupled Maxwell–Lorentz equations, and that the covariance is indeed satisfied. As to problem (3), the situation is much more complex. As we will see, the relativity principle is actually not a matter of the covariance of the physical equations, but it is a matter of the details of the solutions of the equations, which describe the behavior of moving objects.. (shrink)

It is common in the literature on classical electrodynamics and relativity theory that the transformation rules for the basic electrodynamical quantities are derived from the hypothesis that the relativity principle applies to Maxwell's electrodynamics. As it will turn out from our analysis, these derivations raise several problems, and certain steps are logically questionable. This is, however, not our main concern in this paper. Even if these derivations were completely correct, they leave open the following questions: Is the RP a true (...) law of nature for electrodynamical phenomena? Are, at least, the transformation rules of the fundamental electrodynamical quantities, derived from the RP, true? Is the RP consistent with the laws of ED in a single inertial frame of reference? Are, at least, the derived transformation rules consistent with the laws of ED in a single frame of reference? Obviously, and are empirical questions. In this paper, we will investigate problems and. Abstract First we will give a general mathematical formulation of the RP. In the second part, we will deal with the operational definitions of the fundamental electrodynamical quantities. As we will see, these semantic issues are not as trivial as one might think. In the third part of the paper, applying what J. S. Bell calls “Lorentzian pedagogy”---according to which the laws of physics in any one reference frame account for all physical phenomena---we will show that the transformation rules of the electrodynamical quantities are identical with the ones obtained by presuming the covariance of the equations of ED, and that the covariance is indeed satisfied. Abstract As to problem, the situation is much more complex. As we will see, the RP is actually not a matter of the covariance of the physical equations, but it is a matter of the details of the solutions of the equations, which describe the behavior of moving objects. This raises conceptual problems concerning the meaning of the notion “the same system in a collective motion”. In case of ED, there seems no satisfactory solution to this conceptual problem; thus, contrary to the widespread views, the question we asked in the title has no obvious answer. (shrink)

Arif Ahmed has recently argued that causal decision theory is dynamically inconsistent and that we should therefore prefer evidential decision theory. However, the principal formulation of the evidential theory, Richard Jeffrey’s Logic of Decision, has a mixed record of its own when it comes to evaluating plans consistently across time. This note probes that neglected record, establishing the dynamic consistency of evidential decision theory within a restricted class of problems but then illustrating how evidentialists can fall into sequential incoherence (...) outside of this class. Uncovering the evidentialist’s own dynamic inconsistencies reveals, contra Ahmed, that sequential choice considerations do not significantly favor the evidentialist’s theory over the causalist’s. (shrink)

Formalism in the philosophy of mathematics has taken a variety of forms and has been advocated for widely divergent reasons. In Sects. 1 and 2, I briefly introduce the major formalist doctrines of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These are what I call empirico-semantic formalism, game formalism and instrumental formalism. After describing these views, I note some basic points of similarity and difference between them. In the remainder of the paper, I turn my attention to Hilbert’s instrumental formalism. (...) My primary aim there will be to develop its formalist elements more fully. These are, in the main, its rejection of the axiom-centric focus of traditional model-construction approaches to consistency problems, its departure from the traditional understanding of the basic nature of proof and its distinctively descriptive or observational orientation with regard to the consistency problem for arithmetic. More specifically, I will highlight what I see as the salient points of connection between Hilbert’s formalist attitude and his finitist standard for the consistency proof for arithmetic. I will also note what I see as a significant tension between Hilbert’s observational approach to the consistency problem for arithmetic and his expressed hope that his solution of that problem would dispense with certain epistemological concerns regarding arithmetic once and for all. (shrink)

The paper is devoted to the problem of describing reality in the language of mathematics and logic in connection with intellectual intuition. The question raised is how the basic requirements of mathematical theory and logic will change if some of the multiverse models of modern physics are taken as the basis. Mathematics is considered in the context of various historical approaches. It is shown that some of the well-known requirements of a formal theory (such as consistency) may begin (...) to play a different role if the multiverse hypothesis is accepted. In the framework of theories based on the idea of multiple worlds, the logical consequence, the natural law of Duns Scotus, the law of excluded middle, and other well-known facts of classical logic which in some cases cause controversy due to their intuitive unacceptability are resolved. The paper discusses an approach based on paraconsistent logics: such logics can be considered the first to correspond to multiverse theories. (shrink)

Three experiments examine the effect of base rate consistency under direct experience. Base rate consistency was manipulated by blocking trials and setting base rate choice reinforcement to be either consistent or inconsistent across trial blocks. Experiment 1 shows that, contrary to the usual finding, participants use base rate information more than individuating information when it is consistent, but less when it is inconsistent. In Experiment 2, this effect was replicated, and transferred in verbal questions posed subsequently. Despite experience (...) with consistent base rates increasing sensitivity to base rates in word problems, verbal responses were far from normative. In Experiment 3, participants’ use of base rates was once again moderated by its consistency, but this effect was itself moderated by the diagnosticity of base rate information. Participants were highly accurate in estimating experienced base rates. These studies demonstrate that base rate usage is complex and a function of how base rates are presented (experienced versus summary statistics) and response format (choice proportions versus probability estimates). Knowledge of base rates was insufficient for proper usage in verbal word problems. Although choice proportions showed a sophisticated sensitivity to experienced base rate information, participants seemed unable to demonstrate a similar sophistication when given typical word problems indicating that base rate neglect is a function of information representation and not an inherent processing bias. (shrink)

The article describes the problem of the consistency of the medical conscience clause in the Polish legal system. In the first part of the paper, I outline an account of conscience as the ultimate norm of morality. In its second part, I discuss the meaning of conscience clause and its legal status. Part three examines some criticisms of the clause in its present form. The main criticism is that the clause is self-referential, which in some cases leads to (...) absurdity. (shrink)

Kurt Gödel, mathematician and logician, was one of the most influential thinkers of the twentieth century. Gödel fled Nazi Germany, fearing for his Jewish wife and fed up with Nazi interference in the affairs of the mathematics institute at the University of Göttingen. In 1933 he settled at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, where he joined the group of world-famous mathematicians who made up its original faculty. His 1940 book, better known by its short title, The Consistency (...) of the Continuum Hypothesis, is a classic of modern mathematics. The continuum hypothesis, introduced by mathematician George Cantor in 1877, states that there is no set of numbers between the integers and real numbers. It was later included as the first of mathematician David Hilbert's twenty-three unsolved math problems, famously delivered as a manifesto to the field of mathematics at the International Congress of Mathematicians in Paris in 1900. In The Consistency of the Continuum Hypothesis Gödel set forth his proof for this problem. In 1999, Time magazine ranked him higher than fellow scientists Edwin Hubble, Enrico Fermi, John Maynard Keynes, James Watson, Francis Crick, and Jonas Salk. He is most renowned for his proof in 1931 of the 'incompleteness theorem,' in which he demonstrated that there are problems that cannot be solved by any set of rules or procedures. His proof wrought fruitful havoc in mathematics, logic, and beyond. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a problem for regarding the reflective equilibrium and original position methods as consistent. I do not prove that there is an inconsistency, but there is a puzzle of how the two methods can be made consistent. The concern about inconsistency is because the former method allows for a kind of historical bias, as noted by T.H. Irwin, whereas the latter method seeks to guard against historical bias.

In this paper, we study consistent enlargement of a solution. By computing it, one actually evaluates the extent to which the solution would have to be expanded in order to be well-defined and consistent. We show that the union of stable matchings and the matching recommended by a single-valued, well-defined, individually rational, and consistent solution is a minimal consistent enlargement of the core. Although individual rationality is sufficient it is not a necessity. Next, we show that for any fixed order (...) on the set of agents in the society, the union of stable matchings and the serial dictatorship matching is a minimal consistent enlargement of the core. (shrink)

After a brief survey of the different meanings of consistency, the study is restricted to consistency understood as non-contradiction of sets of sentences. The philosophical reasons for this requirement are discussed, both in relation to the problem of sense and the problem of truth. The issue of mathematical truth is then addressed, and the different conceptions of it are put in relation with consistency. The formal treatment of consistency and truth in mathematical logic is (...) then considered, with particular attention paid to the relation between syntactic and semantic properties of sets and calculi. After the crisis of mathematical intuition and the dominance of the formalistic view, it seemed that consistency could totally replace the requirement of truth in mathematics, also in the sense that the existence of "objects" of axiomatic systems could be granted by their consistency. A rejection of this claim is presented, whose central point is a detailed analysis of the theorem that any consistent set S of sentences of first order logic has a model. A critical scrutiny shows that this model is very peculiar, being offered by the elements of the same language that is being interpreted, and the satisfiability conditions for any sentence being constituted by the mere fact of belonging to S. Though not being insignificant from a metatheoretical point of view, this theorem fails to endow consistency with an "ontological creativity", that is, with the capability of providing a model ontologically distinct from the language itself. A final discussion regarding the different "ontological regions" and the referential nature of truth clarifies the different aspects of the whole issue discussed. (shrink)

The practice of mathematical word problem is ubiquitous and thought to impact academic achievement. However, the underlying neural mechanisms are still poorly understood. In this study, we investigate how lexical consistency of word problem description is modulated in adults' brain responses during word problem solution. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging methods, we examined compare word problems that included relational statements, such as “A dumpling costs 9 dollars. A wonton is 2 dollars less than a dumpling. How (...) much does a wonton cost?” and manipulated lexical consistency and problem operation. We found a consistency by operation interaction in the widespread fronto-insular-parietal activations, including the anterior insula, dorsoanterior cingulate cortex, middle frontal gyrus, and intraparietal sulcus, such that inconsistent problems engaged stronger activations than consistent problems for addition, whereas the consistency effect was inverse for subtraction. Critically, these results were more salient in the less successful problem solvers than their more successful peers. Our study is the first to demonstrate that lexical consistency effects on arithmetic neural networks are modulated during reading word problem that required distinct arithmetic operations. More broadly, our study has strong potentials to add linkage between neuroscience and education by remediating deficits and enhance instruction design in the school curriculum. (shrink)

The process of elaborating EU legislation includes the activity of translation. Drafting and translation cannot be considered separately but are rather two complementary activities whose aim is the quality of legislation. In order to achieve the required quality of legislation, one guiding principle is consistency of terminology. This study examines the particular case of two terms in German that appeared in the EC Treaty: Entscheidung and Beschluss. The inconsistent use of the two terms was the source of interpretative problems, (...) as observed in Case C-370/07 Commission v Council. A comparison of the contested provisions in the EC Treaty and the provisions in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union shows that the terminological inconsistency has been corrected. After the examination of this case, we elaborate on the impact of terminological consistency on interpretation as reflected in requests for preliminary rulings. (shrink)

The problems of the philosophy of language, of the explanation and understanding, of the translation andinterpretation of texts,stand at the forefront ofthe philosophical works of the great theoretician from the field of phenomenological hermeneutics Paul Ricœur. The philosopher takes the opportunity to present his viewpoint on these issues in the book On Translation, which is precisely concerned with the problems recounted above. Thevolume consists of three essays written in the 1990s: «Translation as Challenge and Source of Happiness», «The Paradigm of (...) Translation», «A Passage: Translating the Untranslatable». The authorhimself is experienced in translation, having produced a French version of the principal work of E. Husserl Ideas, Volume 1 while imprisoned in Germany during World War II. Unlike a simplereproduction of a text in a different language, for Ricœur translation is a mission topromotea cultural dialogue,a mission that demandsfrom the translator readiness to «immerse into the foreign language»and an aptitude for «linguistic sensitivity». (shrink)

The Consistent Histories (CH) formalism aims at a quantum mechanical framework which could be applied even to the universe as a whole. CH stresses the importance of histories for quantum mechanics, as opposed to measurements, and maintains that a satisfactory formulation of quantum mechanics allows one to assign probabilities to alternative histories of a quantum system. It further proposes that each realm, that is, each set of histories to which probabilities can be assigned, provides a valid quantum-mechanical account, but that (...) different realms can be mutually incompatible. Finally, some of its proponents offer an “evolutionary” explanation of our existence in the universe and of our preference for quasiclassical descriptions of nature. The present work questions the validity of claims offered by CH proponents asserting that it solves many interpretational problems in quantum mechanics. In particular, we point out that the interpretation of the framework leaves vague two crucial points, namely, whether realms are fixed or chosen and the link between measurements and histories. Our claim is that by doing so, CH overlooks the main interpretational problems of quantum mechanics. Furthermore, we challenge the evolutionary explanation offered and we critically examine the proposed notion of a realm-dependent reality. (shrink)

The problem of evil might better be called "the problem of problems." That there is "evil" in the world can be expressed most generally by saying that there are problems with the way things are, that at least something is not the way it should be. I shall propose that the various possible resolutions of the problem of evil correspond to varying approaches that people generally take to the problems in their lives. In this way, a connection (...) can be made between the problem of evil as discussed by professional philosophers - a problem concerning the consistency of beliefs - and the problem as often discussed by other writers - a problem concerning the proper response to the "evil" that we find around and within us. In the course of demonstrating the parallel between the philosophical and the practical problem, I shall elaborate on the contrasting points of view of exoteric and esoteric religion, and I shall conclude with an attempt to explain why the problem remains a problem. (shrink)

Kant's theory of judgment involves his answer to the question "How is knowledge of the pattern underlying intentional strategies of objective - true and justified - representation of empirical events possible?" When we problematize this question, the problem of the scope of our notion of consistency in empirical reasoning emerges. We will argue in this article that Kant's theory includes a thesis about the circular nature of our patterns of consistency, based on the ability to protect the (...) conceptual presuppositions that harmonize knowledge of truth as opposed to falsity in any paradigm of theoretical reflection. This thesis allows Kant to develop a foundationalism about the knowledge of the content of judgments (the ability to recognize conceptual correctness or rule consistency) without committing to a static and transcendent view of the ideal object of our assertion strategies. In our view, this view is still one of the most competitive in describing the necessary - though not static - status of the propositions of empirical science. (shrink)

Despite the skepticism of many mathematicians and logicians as to the possibility of any test which will show conclusively the consistency or independence of the members of a postulate set, several methods have nevertheless been devised and employed, e.g., the empirical methods of Russell and Huntington, the internal method of Hilbert, and the reflective method of Royce. However, with the possible exception of Hilbert's method, these techniques require us to forsake the purely formal or abstract mode of analysis, and (...) instead to rely in some sense on “concrete representations” or “interpretations” or “modes of action” which are said to “satisfy” the postulates in question. In short, they are all interpretational methods—and here is the crux of the problem. “Is it possible,” queries Weiss, “that the only way we can determine whether a set is consistent is by seeing all the postulates actually exemplified in some object? If so, we must arbitrarily assume that the object is self-consistent, so that the proof of consistency must ultimately rest on a dogma. As independence rests on consistency there are therefore no satisfactory proofs as yet of either independence or consistency.” The question “is thus answered,” according to Young, “only by reference to a concrete representation of the abstract ideas involved, and it is such concrete representations that we wished especially to avoid. At the present time, however, no absolute test for consistency is known.” Moreover, “suppose,” says the late Dr. Eaton, “that the system has no interpretation: how can the consistency independence … of the postulates be shown? There should be some analytic way—purely in the realm of the abstract, without interpretation—of establishing these properties of a set of postulates. This is an important problem that awaits solution.”. (shrink)

In response to a recent rebuttal of Okon and Sudarsky presented in Griffiths, we defend the claim that the Consistent Histories formulation of quantum mechanics does not solve the measurement problem. In order to do so, we argue that satisfactory solutions to the problem must not only not contain anthropomorphic terms at the fundamental level, but also that applications of the formalism to concrete situations should not require any input not contained in the description of the situation at (...) hand at the fundamental level. Our assertion is that the Consistent Histories formalism does not meet the second criterion. We also argue that the so-called second measurement problem, i.e., the inability to explain how an experimental result is related to a property possessed by the measured system before the measurement took place, is only a pseudo-problem. As a result, we reject the claim, defended in Griffiths, that the capacity of the Consistent Histories formalism to solve it should count as an advantage over other interpretations. (shrink)

The aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective judgment on those propositions has recently drawn much attention. Seemingly reasonable aggregation procedures, such as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure an equally consistent collective conclusion. The literature on judgment aggregation refers to that problem as the discursive dilemma. In this paper, we motivate that many groups do not only want to reach a factually right conclusion, but also want to correctly evaluate the reasons for that conclusion. (...) In other words, we address the problem of tracking the true situation instead of merely selecting the right outcome. We set up a probabilistic model analogous to Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006) and compare several aggregation procedures by means of theoretical results, numerical simulations and practical considerations. Among them are the premise-based, the situation-based and the distance-based procedure. Our findings confirm the conjecture in Hartmann, Pigozzi and Sprenger (2008) that the premise-based procedure is a crude, but reliable and sometimes even optimal form of judgment aggregation. (shrink)

Restorative justice conferences that operate as sentencing mechanisms involve the making of a trade-off between empowering lay participants to make their own decisions, and the requirements of consistency and proportionality, which are established principles of sentencing. In current restorative justice practice, this trade-off tends to be made more in favour of consistency and proportionality, at the expense of the empowerment of lay participants.Empowerment is central to key benefits of restorative justice, such as reducing recidivism and increasing victim satisfaction. (...) However, its importance to the effectiveness of restorative justice is not always properly acknowledged. In addition to this lack of acknowledgment, there are both conceptual and practical problems with the principles of consistency and proportionality (particularly in the way that they are presented when considered in relation to restorative justice) that are often overlooked. As a result, the tendency is for assumptions to be made about the necessary supremacy of these principles over empowerment. This paper urges more acknowledgement of the importance of empowerment in restorative justice, together with a greater appreciation of the problems with consistency and proportionality, with a view to challenging assumptions about the way that the trade-off must be made. (shrink)

The scope of noninvasive prenatal testing (NIPT) could expand in the future to include detailed analysis of the fetal genome. This will allow for the testing for virtually any trait with a genetic contribution, including “non-medical” traits. Here we discuss the potential use of NIPT for these traits. We outline a scenario which highlights possible inconsistencies with ethical decision-making. We then discuss the case against permitting these uses. The objections include practical problems; increasing inequities; increasing the burden of choice; negative (...) impacts on the child, family, and society; and issues with implementation. We then outline the case for permitting the use of NIPT for these traits. These include arguments for reproductive liberty and autonomy; questioning the labeling of traits as “non-medical”; and the principle of procreative beneficence. This summary of the case for and against can serve as a basis for the development of a consistent and coherent ethical framework. (shrink)

The Frauchiger–Renner Paradox is an extension of paradoxes based on the “Problem of Measurement,” such as Schrödinger’s Cat and Wigner’s Friend. All these paradoxes stem from assuming that quantum theory has only unitary physical dynamics, and the attendant ambiguity about what counts as a ‘measurement’—i.e., the inability to account for the observation of determinate measurement outcomes from within the theory itself. This paper discusses a basic inconsistency arising in the FR scenario at a much earlier point than the derived (...) contradiction: namely, the inconsistency inherent in treating an improper mixture as a proper, epistemic mixture. This is an illegitimate procedure that is nevertheless endemic if quantum theory is assumed to be always unitary. In contrast, under a non-unitary account of quantum state reduction yielding determinate outcomes, the use of a proper mixture for measurement results becomes legitimate, and this entire class of paradoxes cannot be mounted. The conclusion is that the real lesson of the FR paradox is that it is the unitary-only assumption that needs to be critically reassessed. (shrink)

RésuméLe degré de consistance d'un objet résulte de ses moyens de résister à l'assaut de l'extérieur.Il y a la consistance des ětres, la consistance des notions et la consistance des valeurs. Une notion peu consistante est celle dont le sens varie d'un discours à l'autre. Une valeur très consistante inspire une conduite indépendante des convenances particulières et favorables à l'accord des esprits.Les problèmes les plus fondamentaux sont des problèmes de hiérarchie selon la consistance et surtout des problèmes de promotion, passage (...) à un degré supérieur .Notion complémentaire: le degré de précarité.ZusammenfassungDer Grad der Konsistenz eines Gegenstandes ergibt sich aus dessen Widerstandskraft gegen äussere Einwirkungen.Es gibt die Konsistenz der Wesen, die Konsistenz der Begriffe und die Konsistenz der Werte. Ein wenig konsistenter Begriff kann je nach der Aussage, die ihn enthält, verschiedenen Sinn haben. Ein sehr konsistenter Wert begründet ein Verhalten, welches unabhängig ist von den besonderen Umständen, sogar wenn sie ungünstig sind für die Übereinstimmung der Geister.Die fundamentalsten Probleme sind diejenigen der Hierarchie bezüglich Konsistenz, und vor allem diejenigen der Beförderung, des Überganges von einer Stufe zu einer höhern .Komplementärer Begriff: Grad der Prekarität.The degree of consistence of an object results from its possibilities of resisting external attacks.There are: the consistency of beings, the consistency of notions and the consistency of values. A notion is not very consistent if its contents vary from one utterance to another. A very consistent value gives rise to behaviour independent of personal conveniency and conductive to the agreement of the minds.The most fundamental problems are those concerned with hierarchy according to consistence, and above all those concerned with promotion, the passing to a higher grade .Complementary notion: the degree of precariousness. (shrink)

A particular family of imagination-based epistemologies of possibility promises to provide an account that overcomes problems raised by Kripkean a posteriori impossibilities. That is, they maintain that imagination plays a significant role in the epistemology of possibility. They claim that imagination consists of both linguistic and qualitative content, where the linguistic content is independently verified not to give rise to any impossibilities in the epistemically significant uses of imagination. However, I will argue that these accounts fail to provide a satisfactory (...) basis for an epistemology of possibility as they fall victim to, what I call, the problem of modally bad company. In particular, I will argue that there is a deep methodological problem that these accounts face: to deliver the significant epistemology of possibility that they promise, they have to rely on problematic prior knowledge of necessities. (shrink)

Against the charge that Kant's doctrine of radical evil is inconsistent and alien to his practical philosophy, my aim is to show its necessity within the critical system. First, I undermine the alleged vacuity of Kant's notion of evil by showing that, already in the Groundwork, an evil will is the necessary conceptual correlate of a good will. "Good" and "evil" characterize the agent's form of willing and represent the source of value of right and wrong actions. Then, I show (...) how the doctrine of radical evil derives from Kant's notion of evil. That evil lies at the level of an individual Gesinnung is the result of Kant's radicalizing the use of transcendental freedom. That there is a propensity to evil in the whole species is the result of Kant's naturalizing the principles of his moral psychology. Although Kant is not clear about this distinction, the consistency of his doctrine depends on indicating that an "evil Gesinnung" and the "propensity to evil" are not equivalent concepts. Rather, they refer to different units of moral analysis, the individual and the whole species, and represent a failure to comply with different types of moral obligation: the duty to realize the good and the duty to realize the highest good. The correlation between units of moral analysis and types of obligation explains the isomorphism that Kant detects between them, as well as their logical independence, without which the individual's choice of Gesinnung would be analytically contained in the species' choice of moral nature . Finally, to account for the problem of moral self-constitution I argue for the necessity of assuming a transcendental volitional structure, the unity of acknowledgement or "I will". At the different levels of analysis, this structure organizes the will's manifold intentions according to unifying principles that allow it to recognize them as its own. Although Kant does not mention it, the "I will" is a necessary assumption to account for the continuity of choice and for its possible imputation to an agent. (shrink)

This paper addresses the problem of finding a Bayesian net representation of the probability function that agrees with the distributions of multiple consistent datasets and otherwise has maximum entropy. We give a general algorithm which is significantly more efficient than the standard brute-force approach. Furthermore, we show that in a wide range of cases such a Bayesian net can be obtained without solving any optimisation problem.

In their insightful article, ‘The Disvalue of Death in the Global Burden of Disease’, Solberg et al argue that there is a potential incoherence in the way disability-adjusted life years are calculated. Morbidity is measured in years lived with disability in a way quite unlike the way mortality is measured in years of life lost. This potentially renders them incommensurable, like apples and oranges, and makes their aggregate—DALYs—conceptually unsound. The authors say that it is ‘vital’ to address this problem, (...) that ‘[n]eglecting [it] is not an option’, and that ‘one cannot add YLLs and YLDs together in [their] current form’.1 Though one might object to their argument in various ways, let us assume the authors are correct that there is a potential inconsistency here. I want to ask why we should be troubled by that. Now, this question may scarcely seem worth asking. Consistency and coherence are regarded as non-negotiable in so many domains that of course we should demand them in a measure such as the DALY. And this desire for coherence is clearly shared by both the architects of the DALY and their critics.2 3 I think, though, that things are more complicated. In 2012, I wrote an article discussing the epidemiological perspective from which DALYs should be calculated.4 Simplifying greatly, here is the problem: both YLDs and YLLs can be calculated either from prevalence data or from incidence data. The most natural way to calculate YLDs bases them on prevalences, because when we think about morbidity our initial thought is of people who are suffering. The most natural way to calculate YLLs bases them on an incidence measure, because when …. (shrink)

I consider the problem of existence of virtual objects, mainly their mode of existence, while omitting the issue of the criteria of their existence. I present and analyze the concepts of modes of existence of virtual objects proposed in the literature of the subject, and then I demonstrate my own position on the issue. My position on the existence of virtual objects has certain points coinciding with the already postulated views, but at the same time it differs from them (...) in some basic aspects. In my view virtual objects are “born” in human individual consciousness as the objects of specific creative states of the mind. So initially they are private objects belonging to the individual subjective sphere. However, their final and ready forms emerge in complex processes of objectifying and autonomizing the respective private conscious states and their objects. In these processes the private objects are transformed into objects intersubjectively accessible and existing in the collective cultural sphere. In both their forms, initial and final, virtual objects are non-material entities: first subjective, then objective. The ontic status of virtual objects is very similar to the status of intangible ideas and all the non-material objects created by the human mind. The main difference consists in that virtual objects are expressed by the use computers programmes, while other non-material objects created by human beings are expressed by use of words, pictures, literature and art works, etc. (shrink)

This paper considers briefly the approach to the problem of evil by Alvin Plantinga, Richard Swinburne, and John Hick and argues that none of these approaches is entirely satisfactory. The paper then develops a different strategy for dealing with the problem of evil by expounding and taking seriously three Christian claims relevant to the problem: Adam fell; natural evil entered the world as a result of Adam's fall; and after death human beings go either to heaven or (...) hell. Properly interpreted, these claims form the basis for a consistent and coherent Christian solution to the problem of evil. (shrink)

In ‘Anthropocentrism and the Problem of Evil’ Timothy Chappell argues that one cannot advance the following two criticisms of Christianity at the same time: (1) Christianity is an implausibly anthropocentric religion, and (2) Christianity has no convincing answer to the problem of natural evil. I demonstrate that Chappell’s argument is unsuccessful by providing three possible, and consistent, interpretations of (1) and (2).

The problem of the creation of artificial man and the creation of artificial intelligence are issues that have now become not just potential, but also actual scientific tasks. The original genetic kinship of philosophy and literature as forms of human culture and meaning formation made it possible to comprehend the most important problems in works rich in ideological content and beautiful in form. The subject of the research is the philosophical aspects of the problem of the creation of (...) artificial man in the classic works of fantasy literature of the XIX-XX centuries. This goal is achieved by consistent consideration and comparison of philosophical and anthropological ideas that can be isolated from the works of Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Mary Shelley, Herbert George Wells and M.A. Bulgakov. Hermeneutical method as interpretation and reconstruction of meanings, comparative historical analysis, philosophical comparative studies are used as the methodological basis of this historical and philosophical research. The novelty of the research lies in the historical and philosophical reconstruction of the problem of creating an artificial person, posed for the first time on the pages of the world art classics. The very idea of creating an artificial man was a continuation of the God-fighting aspirations of the Renaissance and the embodiment of the ardent desire to become not only on a par with the Creator, but also to surpass Him. When creating the image of the homunculus, Goethe also had in mind the contrivance, artificiality and fruitlessness of many enlightenment ideas, because the enlighteners questioned the very existence of God, putting a scientist-creator in His place. Goethe's idea of the futility and danger of experimenting with human nature was later developed by Mary Shelley, H. G. Wells and Mikhail Bulgakov. Wagner's homunculus and the creation of Dr. Frankenstein are the closest to the idea of man that prevailed in the philosophy of Modern times and educational pedagogy. Powerful notes of philosophical foresight of many plot moves of the coming history of mankind sound in the novel by Wells (the creation of Dr. Moreau) and the story of Bulgakov (Sharikov). (shrink)

In this concise text, Roy Bhaskar sets out to diagnose, explain and resolve the "problems of philosophy". _Plato Etc._ reviews all the main areas of the subject: the theory of knowledge and philosophy of science; the philosophy of logic and language; the philosophies of space, time and causality; the philosophy of the social and life sciences and of dialectic; ethics, politics and aesthetics; and the history and sociology of philosophy. Among the issues discussed are the problems of induction and universals, (...) the question of relativism, Heidegger’s "scandal of philosophy", the nature of moral truth and the conundrum of free will and determinism. The last two chapters consist of a synoptic account of the development of Western philosophy from the pre-Socratics to poststructuralism. _Plato Etc._ seeks to revindicate the philosophical project, and to demonstrate that the author’s "dialectical critical realism" has the categorical power to remedy the problem fields of philosophy. The book serves both as a critical introduction to philosophy and as an invaluable resource for the scholar. (shrink)