Is God a person, like you and me eventually, but only much better and without our human deficiencies? When you read some of the philosophers of religion, including Richard Swinburne, Alvin Plantinga, or Open Theists, God appears as such a person, in a sense closer to Superman than to the Creator of Heaven and Earth. It is also a theory that a Christian pastoral theology today tends to impose, insisting that God is close to us and attentive to all of (...) us. But this modern account of God could be a deep and even tragic mistake. One God in three persons, the formula of the Trinity, does not mean that God is a person. On this matters we need an effort in the epistemology of theology to examine more precisely what we can pretend to know about God, and especially how we could pretend to know that God is person. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Why Can't a First Mover Be Accidentally Moveable?Bolstering Aquinas's Case for Divine Immutability in the Face of Objections from Theistic PersonalistsMats WahlbergIntroductionIn his book An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, Brian Davies coined the term "theistic personalism" in order to have a name for a kind of monotheism that is quite widespread, but that differs significantly from the "classical theism" of the Church Fathers, the (...) great medieval theologians, and the Reformers.1 Theistic personalists claim that the personal nature of the biblical God cannot be reconciled with some of the core tenets of classical theism, in particular the doctrines of divine immutability, timelessness, and simplicity. Although personalists typically agree with the classical tradition that God exists necessarily and is the ultimate explanatory principle, they also claim that he is changeable and metaphysically composed. God's attributes or properties are distinct from each other and from God himself, and God can be causally affected by events in the created world. Some of the most influential figures within contemporary analytic philosophy of religion—thinkers like Richard Swinburne, Alvin Plantinga, and William Lane Craig—defend personalism of various shades.Within contemporary systematic theology, theistic personalism is also [End Page 1305] dominant. The long-standing tendency to contrast (unfavorably) a "Hellenistic," "static" conception of God with a "biblical," "dynamic" conception is evidence of this, as is the common tendency to historicize God's being along Hegelian lines. Karl Barth, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Robert Jenson, Eberhart Jüngel, Jürgen Moltmann, and many other theologians have rejected core elements of classical theism, such as God's immutability and impassibility. It is fair to say that most contemporary theologians regard the idea that God suffers alongside his creation as almost axiomatically true, and this view entails that God can change.2In book I of the Summa contra gentiles [SCG], St. Thomas Aquinas attempts to build a philosophical case for classical theism. He starts with two Aristotelian arguments from motion, presented in chapter 13, whereby he claims to establish that there is an immutable First Mover. Taking himself to have proved this, Aquinas then systematically unfolds the other doctrines of classical theism, using divine immutability as a key premise. In chapter 14, St. Thomas describes his modus operandi: "In order to proceed by the way of remotion about knowledge of God, let us take as principle that which is already manifest by what we have said above, namely that God is altogether unchangeable [quod Deus sit omnino immobilis]."3Prima facie, this seems to be a promising method. If divine changelessness can be proved at the outset from the mere fact that there is motion, then the road to classical theism lies open. Given divine immutability, it readily follows that God lacks beginning and end, and perhaps also that God is eternal in the sense of being altogether timeless, as Aquinas argues in chapter 15. At the very least it follows that God lacks passive potentiality, since change is the actualization of some potential (ch. 16). From the lack of potentiality, furthermore, it follows that God is pure act, and from this it follows that he lacks any kind of composition whatsoever, so he is altogether simple.This is basically how Aquinas argues in SCG I. The success of Aquinas's case for classical theism depends, however, on whether the crucial premise of divine immutability can be proved without reliance on any of the other divine attributes that I have just mentioned. Theistic personalists claim that [End Page 1306] this cannot be done, and that the controversial divine attributes of classical theism can be proved only in a circular way, relying on one attribute (such as divine simplicity) in order to prove another (such as divine immutability), and vice versa.In this article, I will try to show that this accusation is false, and that God's changelessness can be demonstrated without assuming divine simplicity, eternity, or any other divine attribute that is at issue between classical theists and personalists. Immutability can, if this is true, function as the cornerstone in a case for classical theism, in the way that Aquinas suggests. In what follows, I will do... (shrink)

In his recent paper, Page (International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 85, 297–317, 2019) raised the question of what, if anything, is it that distinguishes an account of a personal God, i.e., an account to which classical theists are committed, from an account of God as a person, i.e., an account of deity to which personal theists are committed. Page himself proposed ‘a criterial approach’ to understanding what is for God to be a person, according to which God is a (...) person iff God meets some criteria of personhood, for example, having self-consciousness and being rational. In the paper, first, I argue that the criterial approach doesn’t allow us to draw a clear distinction between classical theism and theistic personalism. Then I provide my own proposal how this distinction could be made, according to which classical theism and theistic personalism are instantiated by two different ontological models. The classical theist thinks of deity as a self-sustaining (substance-like) virtue that is the efficient and final cause of all beings that are different from it, whereas the theistic personalism understands deity as an underlying subject for some properties which exist independently of it. (shrink)

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This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction European Personalism American Personalism Conclusion Works cited.

The article is concerned with personalistic philosophy of the USA developed throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century. Although, in the narrow sense, USA Personalism is mostly associated with B.P. Bowne and his followers, the characteristic frame of personalistic philosophizing can be found in the views of such philosophers as: transcendentalists (R.W. Emerson, A. Alcott, W. Whitman), St. Louis Hegelians (W.T. Harris, H.C. Brokmeyer), number of Harvard philosophers (J. Royce, W.E. Hocking), and also G. Howison. Greatly influenced by theistic (...) worldviews, German idealism and pursuit of combining idealism with practical relevance, personalists in the USA have expressed their ideas in two main lines of thought. First, in the philosophy of religion they try to build idealistic philosophical systems based on Theism. Second, in the social philosophy personalists try to clarify special place of the person in human society. At the turn of nineteenth century personalist discussion on the ontological status of human personality became important event in the philosophical life of USA. The problem has been set between two possibilities: either person has no substantiality beyond God or its substantiality is independent from Him. Further development of Personalism in the USA doesn’t achieve comparable significance and by the end of XX century it quit its existence as independent philosophical movement. (shrink)

The paper gives a brief outline of the social and political philosophy of Jacques Maritain. His political philosophy is based on Christian vision of human dignity, Christian ethics and on the principles of personalism. In his political philosophy Maritain argues, that authentic democracy is possible only if we are able to see its true Christian roots. He distinguishes between „state“ and „body politic“, while man as an individuality is of a rank inferior to the state, but as a personality (...) he is of a rank superior to it. According to Maritain the body politic should be persona_listic, communal, pluralist, theistic or Christian. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Note of Interpretation: Theistic Finitism as an Aesthetics of Religious NaturalismAndrew Stone Porter (bio)In our cosmological construction we are, therefore, left with the final opposites, joy and sorrow, good and evil, disjunction and conjunction—that is to say, the many in one—flux and permanence, greatness and triviality, freedom and necessity, God and the World. In this list, the pairs of opposites are in experience with a certain ultimate (...) directness of intuition, except in the case of the last pair. God and the World introduce the note of interpretation.—Alfred North Whitehead1Theistic finitism, the position that God is not omnipotent, is the most tenable solution to the problem of evil—but it also necessitates a slide toward immanence. Among the ranks of the finitists we find philosophers such as William James,2 process thinkers such as Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne,3 theological personalists such as Edgar Brightman (and, Rufus Burrow argues, his pupil Martin Luther King, Jr.),4 feminist disability theologians like Julia Watts Belser,5 and popular religion writers such as Harold Kushner.6 Like many others, Kushner found in finitism not an answer to an abstract theological puzzle, but an existentially necessary salve for the despair that nearly overtook him when his three year-old son was diagnosed with a terminal degenerative disease. No loving, all-knowing, all-powerful creator would ever allow such [End Page 70] a thing to happen, Kushner reasoned. If God is not all-powerful, then God need not be the author of our pain, but a friend who hurts with us as we bear it. Rather than sadistic puppeteer, a finite God becomes “the fellow-sufferer who understands.”7 As Jürgen Moltmann put it, “the one who cannot suffer cannot love either. So [God] is also a loveless being.”8 Or, as Dietrich Bonhoeffer reflected as he awaited execution in a Nazi concentration camp, “Only the suffering God can help.”9However, when one strips away divine omnipotence, one must also bid adieu either to God’s omniscience or creator-hood: for an omniscient creator, crafting the world with full knowledge of how everything would unfold, would be ipso facto omnipotent. We are left, then, with the following alternatives: we could posit a God who pressed the “create world” button not knowing what would happen (which seems irresponsible, calling into question God’s goodness)—as Tim Bayne puts it, “If future contingents fall outside the scope of God’s knowledge, then creation was a massive gamble.”10 We may share Albert Einstein’s famous distaste for a God who plays dice with the universe. The other alternative is that God’s knowledge and power are partial, that the Divine is merely one being/force among many. But if God is “just a stranger on the bus, trying to make his way home,”11 then in what sense can we say that God is God at all?This paper offers a construal of theistic finitism as a form of religious naturalism with an aesthetics of empathetic solidarity. That is, when we relinquish belief in God’s omnipotence, instead imagining that God is struggling and suffering along with us, we relinquish as well belief in an overbearing “supernatural realm” or “order” governing/underlying all things. To see God in this way, as Whitehead says, is to “introduce the note of interpretation.” And that note, I suggest, is a musical note, specifically a blues note.12 To call the loving [End Page 71] friendship we experience “God” is an aesthetic choice, an informed way of interpreting life in order to move through it with companionship, tenderness and care. A naturalistic religiosity, in Carol Wayne White’s phrasing, “can be a mode of reflecting on, experiencing, and envisioning one’s relationality with all that is.”13 In this way theology becomes, as Belser puts it, “a grammar of the imagination.”14 As a blues aesthetics of empathetic solidarity, theistic finitism may be considered a form of religious naturalism particularly well-suited to our present moment, mired as it is in cascading crises and careening into catastrophe. I suggest that, as young spiritual seekers exit churches in search of more meaningful community... (shrink)

"This is a strong and sophisticated treatment of Martin Luther King, Jr., that makes an important contribution. It reflects Burrow's immense knowledge of personalist philosophy and the thought of King." —Gary Dorrien, Reinhold Niebuhr Chair of Social Ethics, Union Theological Seminary "This scholarly, courageous, insightful work, which fuses so successfully King's academic career with his heritage from the Black Church, is a much needed addition to Martin Luther King studies and breaks new ground for all of us who pursue truth (...) of the 'whole' King. No book more clearly illustrates how pervasive an influence the philosophy of personalism was on King's life and thought. It is an obligatory read." —Ira G. Zepp, Jr., Professor Emeritus, McDaniel College Although countless books have been devoted to the life and work of Martin Luther King, Jr., few, if any, have focused on King's appropriation of, and contribution to, the intellectual tradition of personalism. Burrow argues that King's adoption of personalism represented the fusion of his black Christian faith and his commitment not only to the social gospel of Walter Rauschenbusch, but most especially to the social gospel practiced by his grandfather, his father, and black preacher-scholars at Morehouse College. Burrow devotes much-needed attention both to King's conviction that the universe is value-infused and to the implications of this ideology for King's views on human dignity and his concept of the "Beloved Community." Burrow also sheds light on King’s doctrine of God. He contends that King's view of God has been uncritically and erroneously relegated by black liberation theologians to the general category of "theistic absolutism" and he offers corrections to what he believes are misinterpretations of this and other aspects of King’s thought. He concludes with an application of King’s personalism to present-day social problems, particularly as they pertain to violence in the black community. (shrink)

Oliver Crisp proposes “chastened theism” as a theologically realist alternative to classical theism and theistic personalism. I critique his chastened theism and propose the alternative of Christian Pure Act theism, a “chastened” version of theological nonrealism.

One of the counterarguments to the hiddenness argument that gains the popularity in the recent years refers to the inconceivability of God. If God is transcendent, state the proponents of the argument, then we do not know if the divine love is expressed in the openness to personal relationships with finite beings, as the first premise of the hiddenness argument claims. They accuse J. L. Schellenberg of shaping the concept of God on the model of modern concepts of person. In (...) response I am indicating at the fact that even though there is a danger of anthropomorphism in Schellenberg’s writings, personalistic theism is bound to accept the first premise of the hiddenness argument. I justify my thesis by referring to the scholastic principle that allows to attribute to God all perfections and by arguing in favour of the thesis that personhood is one of the perfections. (shrink)

Joshua Matthan Brown contrasts the concept of God assumed by most analytic philosophers, what he refers to as theistic personalism, with that of the apophatic conception of God endorsed by Eastern Christian thinkers. He maintains that the most powerful and economical response to contemporary arguments for atheism is to reject theistic personalism and adopt apophatic theism. Apophatic theists believe there is a lot we cannot say about God, taking the divine nature to be completely ineffable. Brown (...) develops a coherent account of divine ineffability and provides reasons for adopting this oft misunderstood view. Importantly, he draws upon apophatic theology, and its commitment to divine ineffability, to proffer an undercutting defeater for virtually every contemporary argument for the nonexistence of God. Along the way he anticipates and responds to several significant objections. (shrink)

Henry Longueville Mansel (1820-1871), Anglican theologian and philosopher, has wrongly been remembered as a Kantian agnostic whose ideas led to those of Herbert Spencer. Francesca Norman's book provides a thorough revisioning of Mansel's theology in context and reveals the personal basis of Spencer's animus towards Mansel. Mansel is revealed as an orthodox Anglican theistic personalist whose ideas inspired Newman to write his Grammar of Assent. Located in context, Mansel's personal connections with leading Tory figures such as Lord Carnarvon and (...) Benjamin Disraeli are explored. Key controversies with Frederick Denison Maurice and John Stuart Mill are interpreted with reference to the party political elections of 1859 and 1865. Norman offers a vital vision of nineteenth-century theology, philosophy, and politics. (shrink)

Personhood theism is the view that God exists and is a person. It is often claimed that, whatever conclusions might be reached abstractly by philosophers and theologians, Christianity as lived out practically embodies belief in personhood theism. In this article, I critically examine this claim and argue that Christian prayer and liturgical practice does not in fact embody this belief and that the claim that it does begs the questions against the non-personhood theist.

The paper refers to the argument from hiddenness as presented in John Schellenberg’s book The Hiddenness Argument and the philosophical views expressed there, making this argument understandable. It is argued that conditionals (1) and (2) are not adequately grounded. Schellenberg has not shown that we have the knowledge necessary to accept the premises as true. His justifications referring to relations between people raise doubts. The paper includes an argument that Schellenberg should substantiate its key claim that God has the resources (...) to accommodate the possible consequences of openness to a relationship with finite persons, making them compatible with the flourishing of all concerned and of any relationship that may come to exist between them. At the end of the text, I propose to treat the argument as a rejection of an anthropomorphic God. (shrink)

In this volume, Charles Taliaferro and Jil Evans promote aesthetic personalism by examining three domains of aesthetics - the philosophy of beauty, aesthetic experience, and philosophy of art - through the lens of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, theistic Hinduism, and the all-seeing Compassionate Buddha. These religious traditions assume an inclusive, overarching God's eye, or ideal point of view, that can create an emancipatory appreciation of beauty and goodness. This appreciation also recognizes the reality and value of the aesthetic experience (...) of persons and deepens the experience of art works. The authors also explore and contrast the invisibility of persons and God. The belief that God or the sacred is invisible does not mean God or the sacred cannot be experienced through visual and other sensory or unique modes. Conversely, the assumption that human persons are thoroughly visible, or observable in all respects, ignores how racism and other forms of bias render persons invisible to others. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:New Perspectives on Advaita Vedānta: Essays in Commemoration of Professor Richard De Smet, SJGodabarisha MishraNew Perspectives on Advaita Vedā nta: Essays in Commemoration of Professor Richard De Smet, SJ. Edited by Bradley J. Malkovsky. Leiden: Brill, 2000. Pp. x + 187.New Perspectives on Advaita Vedānta: Essays in Commemoration of Professor Richard De Smet, SJ., intended as a tribute to Professor Richard De Smet (1916-1997) on his eightieth birthday, (...) turned out to be a posthumous memorial volume due to his sad demise. It comprises eight essays apart from an Introduction by the editor, Bradley J. Malkovsky, who provides an overview of De Smet's life and works. Select scholars of international eminence who are acquainted with the intellectual acumen of De Smet have contributed to this volume, thereby honoring and perpetuating the memory of this Jesuit priest-professor, who significantly contributed to the understanding and interpretation of the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara. The introductory essay offers a detailed picture of the scholarly pursuits of De Smet, whose philosophical journey spanned six decades. He spent much of his life seriously exploring avenues for translating intercultural philosophical dialogue into reality. This essay throws much light on the lesser-known areas of De Smet's life—religious, political, and philosophical as well as academic.Though born in Belgium, De Smet preferred to live in India, and he was one of the very few Christian priests who strove to discover the unity in Hindu and Christian [End Page 610] spirituality, through and beyond the theology of both religions. In his early years he studied Thomas Aquinas, Augustine, and Bonaventure, and this helped him to understand the philosophy of Śaṅkara at a deeper level. He felt that Śaṅkara's Advaita is a theology based on revelation rather than pure philosophy upheld through personal experience or independent reason. In pursuing his interest in interreligious dialogue, De Smet worked actively toward dispelling the notion that the Church is blindly dogmatic and has no intellectual face worth the name. He traveled much and had intellectual interaction with many celebrated Hindu monks and academicians on theological and philosophical issues. He introduced Upaniṣadic studies in many Christian Ashrams and spoke to Catholic parishes on the rich heritage of Indian spirituality. To establish a genuine space for his approach to doing Indian philosophy he founded the Association of Christian Philosophers of India in 1975 and for a long time served as its chairman. He authored six books and a number of essays, and his ongoing project dealing with the encounter of Vedānta and Christian theology since Roberto de Nobili remains unfulfilled due to his demise.De Smet considered the system of Śa71E45;kara to be the most profound metaphysical system in Indian philosophy. He was convinced of the similarity between Aquinas and Śaṅkara to the extent of believing that Christian personalism presupposed a nondualist metaphysics. For him, Pure Brahman is more than a vast ocean of pure consciousness; it is also capable of love, causation, and grace—but in such a way that its simplicity, plenitude, and transcendence are not compromised. He felt that even Para Brahman, which may transcend the ordinary human mode of personhood, is not totally impersonal. The supreme reality freely chooses to be a world creator, and so forth, without undergoing any change. Śaṅkara does not deny the existence of the world when he uses negations in describing the world. De Smet feels that Śaṅkara was a radical valuationist who measured everything in relation to the absolute value, the Brahman (p. 16).If personalism, the concept of love, and also to some extent the theory of creation as presented by De Smet are to be very strictly viewed, then there is no alternative but to conclude that he was only engaged in doing some type of theistic Vedānta, like Viśiṣṭādvaita, but not Advaita. De Smet seemed to be stretching Advaita a little too far in trying to see its total affinity with theology and striving to accommodate personalism and so forth through his reading of and commitment to Christianity. Para Brahman in an. Śaṅkara's Advaita is not... (shrink)

This paper looks first at the scope of religious experience, offering some representative examples of phenomena that typically give rise to spiritual experiences. This leads on a consideration of the phenomenology of such experiences – the particular way in which they present themselves to the conscious subject. Lastly, the paper tackles the vexed question of the source of such experiences, and suggests that this is best understood in terms of a (certain kind of) theistic framework.

To mark the 70th anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the author embarked on an attempt to analyze the theoretical and historical framework that contributed to the adoption of the document. The first part of the article discusses the development of the philosophy of personalism from Mounier to Maritain and analyzes Maritain’s views on human rights. In the second part of the article, the author shows the decisive influence of the personalists Charles Malik and (...) Rene Cassin on the adoption of the document, which clearly bears the mark of the Christian personalistic discourse and notions. (shrink)

This article has a twofold purpose: first, it explores how Leonardo Polo's personalist anthropology enriches and enhances neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics and second, it highlights how this specific personalist approach brings new perspectives to servant leadership. The recently revived neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics tradition finds that MacIntyre's scholarship significantly contributes to virtue ethics in business—particularly his conception of practices, institutions, and internal/external goods. However, we argue that some of his latest insights about the virtues of acknowledged dependence and human vulnerability remain underdeveloped (...) because of the underlying anthropology that neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics relies on. To overcome this limitation, we introduce Polo's transcendental anthropology as a possible foundation of a personalist approach that enriches virtue ethics. To do so, we address how transcendental anthropology can enrich two central aspects of virtue ethics, namely (1) the understanding of human beings and their flourishing and (2) the relationship of virtue to praxis and human work. Finally, to address the practical implications for business leadership and work that can derive from assuming transcendental anthropology, we address how servant leadership acquires a new perspective in light of this personalism and its logic of gift, highlighting interpersonal self-giving as a way of service. (shrink)

Personalist Economics: Moral Convictions, Economic Realities, and Social Action examines the nature of the worker and consumer from a personalist perspective, comparing that body of knowledge to what is received from conventional economics. A running theme throughout this book is that personalist economics is attentive to both aspects of human material need - physical need and the need for work as such - in a way that does not disregard human wants. Accordingly, this book is more concerned about the philosophical (...) base and description of the economy's significant characteristics than social economic policy. Personalist Economics explores four dimensions of particularly acute human physical need: unemployment, poverty, homelessness, and death. In addressing these four aspects of need, the book delves into the second and third domains of social economics: description of the significant characteristics of the economy, and social economic policy. In the same way, Personalist Economics explores two types of economic cooperation - supra-firm alliances and inter-firm partnerships - as means for addressing certain aspects of human material need. This book concludes with a lengthy discussion of the challenges facing personalist economics in the years ahead. (shrink)

Some virtue ethicists are reluctant to consider principles and standards in business ethics. However, this is problematic. This paper argues that realistic Personalism can be integrated into virtue-based business ethics, giving it a more complete base. More specifically, two principles are proposed: the Personalist Principle (PP) and the Common Good Principle (CGP). The PP includes the Golden Rule and makes explicit the duty of respect, benevolence, and care for people, emphasizing human dignity and the innate rights of every human (...) being. The CGP entails cooperation to promote conditions which enhance the opportunity for the human flourishing of all people within a community. Both principles have practical implications for business ethics. (shrink)

The detailed analysis of a particular quasi-historical numerical example is used to illustrate the way in which a Bayesian personalist approach to scientific inference resolves the Duhemian problem of which of a conjunction of hypotheses to reject when they jointly yield a prediction which is refuted. Numbers intended to be approximately historically accurate for my example show, in agreement with the views of Lakatos, that a refutation need have astonishingly little effect on a scientist's confidence in the ‘hard core’ of (...) a successful research programme even when a comparable confirmation would greatly enhance that confidence. Timeo Danaos et dona ferentis. (shrink)

The third and purportedly final attempt to outline a personalism appropriate for a post-modern, post Marxist cultural phase, linked to but independent of Grant's (English, U. of Victoria, British Columbia) Literature and Personal Habits (1992) and Spirituality and the Meaning of Persons (1994). Concerned here with the idea of the person in relation to the politics of culture, he considers certain relationships between literature and religion to find clues about persons and human community. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., (...) Portland, OR. (shrink)

Notwithstanding the fact that care ethics has received increased attention, it has also faced much criticism. One of the focal points of critics is the normativity of care. Only when the objective normative basis of care is sufficiently clarified can care practices be evaluated and optimized from an ethical point of view. We emphasize that two levels of normativity can be identified: the context level and the foundational anthropology level. The personalist approach to care ethics is normatively stronger, at least (...) on one level, namely the foundational anthropology level. This personalist approach to care ethics indicates in which direction action must be taken so that human action may be considered ethically sound. (shrink)

In a famous argument, William L. Rowe proposed that, since probably there are pointless evils but since, if God exists, there are no pointless evils, probably there is no God. Some defenses against this argument use a cognitive‐limitations premise. But the skepticism in such defenses may spread in unintended and undesired ways. In this chapter, I argue that their skepticism leaves skeptical theists without good reason to think: (1) that any actions they may regard as morally impermissible are sins, (2) (...) that they understand the concept of divine goodness or have an I‐Thou relationship with God, (3) that they have any inkling of God's reasons or intentions in designing or bringing about or sustaining the physical universe, assuming God did or does, and (4) that various alleged occurrences are miracles. In sum, I argue that, insofar as certain key theistic concepts are concerned, skeptical theists find themselves without good reason to think that the God of their faith is not beyond their comprehension. (shrink)

Church-ethical statements in the context of contemporary medicine often give rise to a lot of controversy and commotion. Just think of the debates about medically assisted reproduction, genetics, prenatal diagnosis, stem cell research, organ donation, palliative sedation or euthanasia. Paul Schotsmans notes that many of these statements are inspired by a well-defined ethical model, specifically the act-deontological model. He argues that a more dynamic ethical model (personalism based on Western-European value-systems) creates space for a humane integration of the new (...) medical possibilities. With this book, he seeks to indicate how Christian faith can be an inspiration for an open-minded, humane and dynamic health care. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Is God Relevant to Determining What is Right or Wrong? Divine Revelation and Morality Submission and Autonomy Fanaticism Rewards and Punishments Morality and Happiness Transformative Ideals An Objection to Religious Motivation Notes.

Emmanuel Levinas has provided the philosophical basis for psychologies commensurate with the ethical basis of human existence; however, introducing psychologists to his work is frustrated by a number offactors. One of these factors is his use of theistic language in his philosophical writings. Two problems are discussed regarding this language. First, contemporary psychology, including the area ofpsychology of religion, rejects any theistic language as incompatible with an empirical science. Second, it is suggested that many persons, including psychologists, are (...) not in the cognitive developmental stage at which they can understand Levinas’s writings about God. Further, it is also suggested that psychology’s history warns against creating a psychological school or division based in Levinas’s thought. The article concludes with general discussion regarding how psychology can apply Levinas’s thought while leaving God and Levinas behind. (shrink)

This volume is Mounier's final definition of personalism. First published less than a year before his death in 1950, it is a beautifully written, clear yet unsystematic statement of personalism.

The main thrust of this essay is to examine how Maduabuchi Dukor’s theory of theistic or spiritual or comprehensive humanism (2010:p.77) or what I choose to call theistic pluralism, can be made the basis for deconstructing and resolving the crisis created by monistic and monotheistic orientations in the African psyche and on the African continent. The need for such demolition and resolution exercise is intensified by the fact that theistic or pluralistic humanism promotes the temperament of—live and (...) let live(i.e. the Igbo onye biri ibeya biri) as against the monistic and monotheistic orientations which propagate a “thread bare kind of humanism” (p. 63).Consequently, my critique of monotheism is basically focused on the African condition. As of today and with the aftermath of double strands of colonization Africa is beset with the Triple Heritage problem. The razor of my critique is pointedly directed at the expression triple heritage, which not only portrays the psychological state of the African, but in actual fact determines the totality of the African condition in contemporary times. In launching my attack on the triple heritage concept, I go through the window of monotheism. Therefore, my critique of monotheism is intended for the following reasons:1) to explore the metaphysics of monotheism, which I hereafter refer to as theistic monism, and bring to the open the consequences of such orientation in a pluralistic society;2) to examine the metaphysics of Traditional African Religion (ATR), which in agreement with Maduabuchi Dukor, I hereafter christen theistic humanism or theistic pluralism, with a view to showing that African traditional thought system is antithetical to the monotheistic culture of the Arab and the Caucasian;3) to query the rationale behind juxtaposing metaphysical systems that are antithetical to one another, in the name of triple heritage;and4) to suggest way(s) of drastically ameliorating the anomaly on ground. (shrink)

Juan Manuel Burgos presents his own version of personalism, which is nevertheless well rooted in the personalist tradition. He has been developing his project for years and is among a group of world-renowned personalists who study the complexity and mystery of the human person. His new book deals with the relationship between personalism and metaphysics. He poses the question of whether personalism can be considered a first philosophy. The answer is positive: it is indeed a sectorial first (...) philosophy, which may or may not be supported by traditional metaphysical projects, especially Thomistic ones. Not every personalist has to agree with its final thesis, although its position is well-founded and deserves much scholarly attention. It provokes further questions and opens up new areas of personalist discussion. This book confirms that personalism is a dynamic and growing school of thought that goes beyond describing the mere phenomena of the person and seeks deeper reasons for his being. I highly recommend this book as a new step to help us better understand the reality of the human person. (shrink)

How can we, or should we, talk about God? What concepts are involved in the concept of a Supreme Being? This book is about the search to reconcile modern metaphysics with traditional theism--focusing on the seminal work of Austin Farrer who was Warden of Keble College, Oxford until his death in 1968, and one of the most original and important philosophers of religion of this century. Conti traces the evolution of Ferrar's thought and shows why he preferred a "personalist" approach (...) over Aristotle's metaphysics of "being.". (shrink)

This paper examines the ethical implications of healthcare resource allocation during the first wave of COVID-19 in Italy, from 21 February to 31 May 2020, with a focus on the utilitarian principles that prioritized age-based resource allocation. By comparing this approach to an ontological personalist bioethics framework, the study aims to offer a more equitable strategy for healthcare allocation applicable to any pandemic. Data from governmental reports, healthcare policies, and ethical guidelines were analyzed, revealing that Italy’s utilitarian method led to (...) significant ethical concerns, particularly regarding age discrimination. In contrast, the ontological personalist approach emphasizes the dignity and intrinsic worth of each individual, irrespective of age or health condition. The findings demonstrate that this personalist framework fosters a more balanced and fair allocation of resources, respecting human dignity and offering a universally applicable alternative to age-based prioritization. Ultimately, the study suggests that integrating ontological personalist principles into healthcare policies could enhance ethical decision-making in future pandemics, ensuring that resource allocation practices align more closely with human rights and individual dignity. (shrink)

After briefly describing the philosophy of personalism this article assesses each of three normative leadership paradigms in terms of five major themes of this phenomenological philosophy. Servant leadership appears to be closest to personalism. The critical ingredient for servant leadership is also personalism’s starting point, i.e. the dignity of each human person. A genuine servant leader works with his followers in building a community of participation and solidarity. However, some claim that servant leaders are subject to manipulation (...) by their followers. If so, and if transformational leaders, when too successful, gain too much power or manipulate using bogus empowerment, a superior approach might be provided by a combination in which a morally tough servant leader adopts certain transforming behaviors of Bass’s altruistic transformational leader. The leader and the followers would focus on a jointly formulated and refined vision, avoiding manipulation by any party through a mutual commitment to participation, solidarity of community, and respect for each person. (shrink)

Christians who are theistic evolutionists and Christians who are proponents of intelligent design very frequently criticize one another on the basis that the other’s position is theologically suspect. Ironically, both camps have accused the other of being deistic and thus sub-Christian in their understanding of God’s relation to creation. In this paper, I consider the merit of these charges. I conclude that, although each position has both deistic and nondeistic forms, theistic evolution in its treatment of life’s history (...) is typically deistic, whereas intelligent design typically is not. (shrink)

While the existence of horrendous evils has generally been taken to be evidence against the existence of God, some philosophers have suggested that it may be evidence for the existence of God. This paper introduces three main kinds of theistic arguments from horrendous evils: the argument from objectively horrifying evils, the pragmatic argument from evil, and an argument from reasonable responses. For each of these arguments, I will first reconstruct a standard version of the argument, before suggesting ways the (...) argument may be challenged, or further developed. (shrink)

Ethical Personalism proposes to reflect on the person from at least three levels: ontology, epistemology, and ethics. Articulating the ontological and inalienable value of the human person, i.e., her dignity, from various philosophical and religious angles and traditions, the contributors show not just what it means to be a human person, but also what it takes to live accordingly. Hence, beyond the purely theoretical elaboration on ethical personalism that reposes the crucial debates between relativism and realism on the (...) one hand, and consequentialism and deontology on the other, this volume offers a range of insights useful for addressing concrete and practical matters that we, as humans, are confronted by in our everyday life. Ethical Personalism unequivocally affirms the necessity of (re)placing the person in the centre of our project of society, economic plans, political settings, and environment policies. (shrink)

The bioethics of four principles, named as principlism, began in 1979 with the work of Principles of Biomedical Ethics by Tom Beauchamp and James F. Childress and has been widely criticized since the 80s. In recent years four rival approaches towards principlism have been specified in this critique. These include: a) impartial rule theory, developed by K. Danner Clouser; b) casuistry, represented by Albert Jensen, and c) virtue ethics, developed by Edmund D. Pellegrino. The critique of principlism presented by K. (...) Danner Clouser, Bernard Gert was not only defended by T. Beauchamp and J.F. Childress themselves, but also by others, including B. Andrew Lustig, David DeGrazia, and Henry Richardson. The discussion has not weakened but continued till the present time. It was presented extensively in the June issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. We want to join the discussion from the position of personalistic bioethics. (shrink)

Philosophical personalism has generated a very powerful field of study in the twentieth and twenty first centuries but has not produced a systematic exposition. This book fills this big gap by offering for the first time a full systematic personalistic vision of the human person. This ambitious volume offers a pedagogical and integrated exposition of philosophical personalism, answering vital questions about human identity and existence in a way that the reader can achieve an integrated view of the person. (...) The book points to the real life of each person so that, by partially unraveling the mystery of the personal being, it becomes a philosophical guide for life. For these reasons, the book can be used both for academic purposes, as a manual of philosophy of man or for personal enlightenment. Divided in five parts, the first part of the book works as an introduction, offering an overview of the human person and of the notion of person. The second part describes the internal structure of the human being addressing topics as corporeity as a personal fact; sensibility and the senses; affectivity; intelligence; freedom understood as choice and self-determination and, finally, the personal self. The third part analyses the person in action and some special types of action such as work and language. The fourth part deals with interpersonal relationships beginning with I-You relationship and following with the family and the social structure. Finally, part five deals with the so-called ultimate questions, that is, those that decide the final meaning of each person's life, namely, time, death, immortality, and religion. (shrink)

In a posthumously published paper, Fr. W. Norris Clarke, S.J., declares that Thomistic personalism is the most creative and fruitful development in twenty-first century Thomism. I agree with Clarke, and I would also add that Thomistic personalism is the most creative and fruitful development in twenty-first centurymoral and political philosophy. Thus, in this paper—focusing on clarification and exhortation—I (i) identify the main commitments of personalism; (ii) identifyweak, moderate, and strong versions of Thomistic personalism; and (iii) suggest (...) that Thomistic personalism is a vocation for the twenty-first century that requirescollaboration between specialists from diverse backgrounds. (shrink)

It is widely believed that the Divine Command Theory is untenable due to the Euthyphro Dilemma. This article first examines the Platonic dialogue of that name, and shows that Socrates’s reasoning is faulty. Second, the dilemma in the form in which many contemporary philosophers accept it is examined in detail, and this reasoning is also shown to be deficient. This is not to say, however, that the Divine Command Theory is true—merely that one popular argument for rejecting it is unsound. (...) Finally, some brief thoughts are presented concerning where the real problems lie for the theory. (shrink)

R. A. Gorban. Personalistic Anthropology of Czeslaw Stanislaw Bartnik. The article suggests the conception of Personalistic anthropology of Czeslaw Stanislaw Bartnik, a modern Catholic philosopher and theologian, one of the founders of the Polish Personalist School. The author reveals that the Polish thinker clarifies the anthropologic theological model based on the principles of Personalism, in which the Person of Christ is the main hypostasis being an individual personality and a communal person, that is the Church. Stanislaw Bartnik believed that (...) anthropology must completely base on Christology, as humanization of a man has to fully actualize itself only in Christ. The theologian works out the definition of a communal personality, in which both an individual person and community gain the same considerable importance, as a human being finds the fullness of its personal dimensions only in a community, where it achieves its fullness. Accentuating mutual interdependence of personalities, he thinks society to be an anthropological environment that molds a personality, enabling it to realize its potential and reach the fullness of human existence, as it would be impossible without personal relations that are established within a community. In his works, written in different years, Stanislaw Bartnik generates the idea that a communal anthropology, which is complemented by a communal anthropology of salvation in the earthly dimension, is constituent of an individual anthropology. That is why it is important to build up a full-fledged anthropology based on Personalism and theology, as the theory and practice of Christian Perstonalist model help actualize the fullness of a man’s perfect personality in all its dimensions and manifestations. In conclusion, anthropology must become a universal science about a man as an individual and community. (shrink)

The personalist approach is an important contribution to the resolution of the re_levant problems of contemporary bioethics. After the period of universally expanded principalism, which was followed by its many-sided criticism, the bioethics finds itself unable to act effectively . In this situation personalism comes up with new insights, which make finding acceptable resolutions of moral dilemmas of contemporary biomedicine, as well as other natural sciences possible.

Generative Artificial Intelligence (GAI) has the potential to automate, integrate or augment human creativity. Current literature reveals that organizations adopting such disruptive technology can both boost or hinder human creativity. Such ambiguity poses an ethical dilemma for decision-makers: while managers are pressured to adopt GAI quickly for optimization, holding on to their economic responsibilities, they must also ensure that its deployment is ethically enrooted and yields people-centered outcomes. This work seeks to discuss and inform managerial decision-making upon GAI deployment, by (...) elucidating how ethically-salient dimensions of human creativity can be safeguarded and supported through GAI adoption. To do so, we draw on Personalism and its account of human creativity, as tied to inner morality and intrinsic dignity of the person. By this way, we present a model that highlights how three core dimensions—uniqueness, relationality, and unpredictability—are essential to preserve the human element in creative tasks in GAI adoption. Overall, this normative work contributes to enhance our knowledge on personalism within organizational studies, to shed new light on how organizations can safeguard the ethical nexus between human creativity and human intrinsic dignity, and to highlight how humanism in business can support people-centered AI deployment. (shrink)

My paper highlights one Personalist aspect of St. Anselm's Platonic perspective, namely the ontological priority and interpenetration of persons. The paper first discusses Anselm's metaphysical Platonism, then charts the Anselmian path towards God, through participation in the divine attributes. It then focuses on images of persons, and their degree of being. I argue that, at least for certain human relationships marked by strong love or friendship, Anselm regards the image of the person as mediating the being of the person imaged.