What is Heidegger talking about when he says that being conceals itself? This is the first study to systematically address that question. Katherine Withy analyses texts from across Heidegger's philosophical career and sorts the various phenomena of concealing and concealment that Heideggerdiscusses into a highly-structured taxonomy. The taxonomy clarifies the relationships and differences between such phenomena as lethe, the nothing, earth, excess, the backgrounding of the world, and un-truth, as well as speaking falsely, talking idly, secrets, mysteries, seeming, andinauthentic discovering. (...) But in relating and differentiating these phenomena, the taxonomy shows that none of them is the self-concealing of being.Having established what the self-concealing of being is not, Withy establishes what it is. She argues that being conceals itself in that it shows up to us as lacking the sorts of contrast cases that render entities determinate and intelligible. This novel and powerful interpretation of theself-concealing of being explains why the secondary literature to date has discussed it in vague and metaphorical terms, as well as why Heidegger tends to collapse being's self-concealing into the concealment of lethe. Withy's interpretation is both a clarification of and a corrective to Heidegger'snotoriously difficult and sometimes misleading discussions of being as self-concealing. (shrink)

Historically as well as contemporarily, the relationship between religion and democratic pluralism in the Muslim world has been problematic. In the Muslim world, both governments and popular movements are using religious documents (the Qur'an and the hadith) to inspire political and social change. In the process, the fusion of religion and politics that characterizes revivalist Islam has impeded the development of both democracy and religious pluralism. An area of particular concern has been the reluctance of Muslim countries to implement international (...) standards of human rights as defined in the United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Since the adoption of the UDHR in 1948, there has been disagreement in the Muslim world about the relevance of this document for Islamic countries. The reactions have ranged from an angry rejection of human rights as destructive to Islam to claims that Islamic law guarantees the same rights as those embodied in the United Nation's documents. The two most influential international Islamic statements on Human Rights (the Universal Islamic Declaration on Human Rights and the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights) attempt to reconcile Islamic law and modern norms of human rights. These documents claim that human rights are an inherent part of Islam. Such arguments are cause for concern because since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, documents proposing regional alternatives to international law almost always entail the weakening of international standards. The incorporation of the Cairo Declaration into the UN corpus means that what were once informal, regional obstacles to implementing the protections guaranteed by the UDHR have become formal, regional norms that legitimate Islamist restrictions on rights. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Chinese Gleams of Sufī Light: Wang Tai-yü's Great Learning of the Pure and Real and Liu Chih's Displaying the Concealment of the Real Realm, with a New Translation of Jāmī's Lawā'iḥ from the Persian by William C. ChittickE. N. AndersonChinese Gleams of Sufī Light: Wang Tai-yü's Great Learning of the Pure and Real and Liu Chih's Displaying the Concealment of the Real Realm, with a New Translation of (...) Jāmī's Lawā'iḥ from the Persian by William C. Chittick. By Sachiko Murata, with a foreword by Tu Weiming. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000. Pp. xiv + 264.Contacts between China and the Near East are at least as old as civilization but have been relatively little studied. This has led to a lack of attention to Chinese Islam. Yet, Islam has been a profoundly influential force in China for centuries. In Chinese Gleams of Sufī Light, Sachiko Murata has stepped forward to bring a wider awareness to the interactions between Chinese Islam and native Chinese philosophic traditions. (Murata is also the author of The Tao of Islam [1992] and, with Islamicist William Chittick, The Vision of Islam [1994]). [End Page 257]The present book adds greatly to our understanding. It includes a translation of The Great Learning of the Pure and Real, by Wang Tai-yü (ca. 1590-ca. 1658) and facing-page versions of William Chittick's English translation of the fifteenth-century Gleams (Lawā'iḥ) by 'Abd al-Rahman Jāmī and Murata's English translation of Liu Chih's (ca. 1662-ca. 1730) Chinese version of the same work. (Here, incidentally, I follow the book in using the Wade-Giles system.) One can see, comparing the translations, howLiu recast Jāmī's work in Chinese philosophic language, paraphrased some difficult passages, summarized others, and added his own commentaries.Interestingly, Liu eliminated Jāmī's Persian poetry. Murata thinks this is because Liu wanted to focus on the hard ideas; I suspect that it was because Liu realized that Persian prosody and imagery were too far from Chinese poetry to please his audience.Both Wang and Liu belonged to what must have been a rather loose but some-how connected circle of Chinese Islamic scholars. Both, also, almost necessarily used language fairly widespread in Chinese philosophy. Terms such as "emptiness" and "transformation" had many Chinese resonances, some most un-Islamic (Neo Confucian and Buddhist, for instance).Neither Chittick nor Murata give any glosses for key philosophical terms in either source language. Their philosophical and religious provenance, Chinese or Muslim, is correspondingly unclear.What is clear is that Neo-Confucianism had a strong influence on these scholars. Haqiqa "reality" is often translated as li "principle." Pen-jan "root nature" is used for the Arabic compound "essence and attributes." These examples are discussed in the introduction (p. 19). "Annihilation" becomes "conquering" (pp. 148-149). This is strange, because "Annihilation" (fana') is a technical term in Sufism for the disappearance of the self in God; it is an Arabic term, and literally means something like. "passing away." It signifies the forgetting or loss of self, such that only contemplation of the Divine remains. It is as close to the Divine as humans can get since, in Islam, humans cannot be absorbed into Allah (as, in Buddhism, they can be absorbed into Nirvāṇa or the Buddha-nature). "Conquering" seems a rather strange way to express this in Chinese. Perhaps Chinese Muslim readers of the time had developed this specialized sense for it.There are, of course, debatable translations here to contend with (both from Persian and Arabic to Chinese and from Persian and Chinese into English), but it appears that real incommensurability is involved. It was very difficult to use the language of Chinese philosophy in the seventeenth century, influenced as it was by centuries of Neo-Confucian thought, to talk about a radically different religion characterized by an infinitely powerful and wise God, aware of all futures, close to the believer and yet cut off.The inevitable result is to wedge the Arabic and Persian philosophy, so heavily informed by Neoplatonic essentialism and other... (shrink)

¿Why is it that Human Rights must be respected if it seems fashionable the apology for scorning them? This paper intends a review of how is it that Human Rights and the Humanitarian Right have developed, and of why they are not just moral ideals but a universal system of right, not without lacks, but also with plenty of developments. In that order of ideas three devices created to make the Human Rights exigible are analyzed. Such devices are: The incorporation (...) of the International Right in the internal right; the Office of the High Commissioner of United Nations for Human Rights; and the actions that could be accomplished by the States in relations of cooperation with a particular country. In Colombia, since 2003, among the imperfect situation of the International Right, the Human Rights have made the biggest advances to obtain the condition of being exigible. But, despite of such development a lot is still necessary for an acceptable degree of respect of Human Rights in Colombia. Each year a great deal of people die because of political reasons. And, unfortunately, in the last years the Colombian government has promoted legislation very encouraging of war and humanity crimes impunity. Supposedly the government effort is directed to achieve peace and reconciliation among Colombians, but such objective will be reached with great difficulty following such path. The reasons for those difficulties are basically three: Justice Simulation; a preservation of the power of the mobs, and a concealment of the responsibility of the state. But, ¿Does these difficulties mean that there is nothing to be done to find a civilized exit to the Colombian crisis? No. As is pointed out in this article, there are three considerations of logical, historical and political character that allow thinking the following: It is no reasonable to think in dismantling the Social State of Right for preserving the State of right; and a society that deliberately leaves to impunity great crimes of the past can hardly create confidence and guarantee the rights to justice and life for the great crimes of the future. Because of all of this making the Human Rights the minimum common denominator of all political parties, the State and the whole society would be a key to achieve the overcoming of social exclusion in our country and to generate just foundations for a democratic coexistence. (shrink)

The United Nations ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ lays out 17 Sustainable Development Goals to address a range of global issues related to the future of the planet and human well-being. Critics, however, argue that the Agenda, a complex product of multi-stakeholder governance, in its drive to accommodate many competing voices, is overloaded with weakly defined, overlapping and contradictory issues, concepts and buzzwords. These serve to gloss over actual concrete global problems and forces, concealing an underlying (...) free-trade ideology. In this paper, using Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis, we draw attention to the nature of the documents used to communicate the Agenda. These documents comprise an edifice of self-referential texts that rely heavily on infographics, bullet points, charts and tables. Such formats appear to helpfully simplify, distil information and break things down into workable components. But, we show, through the affordances of these formats, the the vagueness of buzzwords, contradictions and lack of clear causalities can be glossed over, presenting the Agenda as a highly technical, engaging, and above all moral process. These formats are important, therefore, for the legitimization and rhetorical power of the Agenda, necessary for its take-up by governments and organizations around the world. (shrink)

Philipp Rosemann - Heidegger's Transcendental History - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.4 501-523 Heidegger's Transcendental History Philipp W. Rosemann 1. Introduction: "Aletheia Is Not A Greek Word" John D. Caputo has argued that Heidegger's account of the development of Western metaphysics—a story of continuous decline from heroic Greek times to the total oblivion of Being in the technological age—needs to be "demythologized." This does not mean to discard altogether Heidegger's often insightful (...) historical analyses; yet it is necessary to recognize that his conception of history can be read at another level than that of the narrative of the ever-increasing logocentrism of Western thought. Read "critically," Caputo suggests, Heidegger makes claims about transcendental history; not about certain facts in the history of Being, but about the a priori structure rendering these facts possible. Aletheia, then, "is no longer a Greek word." Un-concealment is the "Wesen of history, the process of letting history be, which can never be itself something historical." Caputo's interpretation makes sense. The later Heidegger famously acknowledged that his etymological understanding of aletheia as un-concealment is not historically verifiable in even the earliest Greek texts: "[w]e must acknowledge the fact," he writes in 1964, "that aletheia, unconcealment in the sense of the clearing of presence, was.. (shrink)

No contemporary philosopher has argued more consistenily or more convincingly for a God of becoming than Charles Hartshorne. Boehme looms largein the historical background of his dipolar theology: both classical theism, which sees God as supreme actuality and most strictly absolute, and pantheism, whichsees in God only supreme potentiality and universal relativity, are correlated in his panentheism. The ultimate contraries are united in the divine relativity,where eternal permanence and temporal process are both preserved in a tension that, logically, precedes them.Hartshorne (...) has been reluctant to develop relationships to earlier and "simpler" representatives of his type of philosophical theology. Berdyaev, on the other hand, is ready to acknowledge Boehme as the real founder of his own philosophy of freedom. The affinity between the two stands out sharply when they explore the problem of evil, tragedy within divinity, or the Unground as Nothingness which gives rise to Something and the entire theogonic process. Berdyaev sees Boehme as one of the rare thinkers who broke with the optimistic rationalism of Western thought to construct a more spiritual philosophy of tragedy.Heidegger's revolt against Western ontology and Christian theology has certain affinities to Boehme's thought. We may point to but one aspect here, the central basic question of metaphysics, which is foolishness to Christian theology: "Why is there any being at all and not rather nothing?" This question and Heidegger's "Nothingness" have obvious connections with Boehme's question and his "Nichts." For both. Nothingness is a primordial and fundamental working. It is found in Being itself rather than outside it. It gives rise through primordial discord to Being. To be sure, Heidegger develops his dialectic far beyond anything suggested by Boehme when he interprets his Dasein as suspended in dread over das Nichts. But Heidegger's profoundly dialectical conception of Being has obvious relations to the non-Being of Boehme: Nothingness or nihilation is present in all beings and is the essence of Being itself. It is the dynamic power of Being thai gives rise to Being. Self-negation is always present in the coming-into-presence of Being. For both Boehme and Heidegger Nothingness is required for the "letting-be" of beings, for the un-concealment of Being. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false ES-CO X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabla normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} The analysis of Heidegger’s conception of language serves as a starting point and common thread to explain his aesthetics theory and the linkage and relationship between aesthetics and ontology, and between aesthetics and truth, understood as aletheia, (...) as an “out of oblivion”, as “un-concealment.” Second, we analyze the constitutive characteristics of Da-sein, as being-in-the-world, from the point of view of language. Third, considering the historical horizon as ontologically constitutive of Da-sein, we try to explain from real life what does this temporality mean and what does create mean, as well as why the creation of a work of art occupies an important place in relation to Heidegger’s proposal. We finally ask what is poetry to Heidegger and in what ways it is inseparable from the truth (aletheia). And we try to interpret the scope of Poetry (Dichtung) in relation to aesthetics and of language in relation to the truth. Lenguaje, olvido del ser, aletheia (verdad), desocultación, Dichtung (Poesía), poiesis, creación, estética, ontología fundamental, vida auténtica o autenticidad. (shrink)

Beginning with his work in the mid-1930s, Heidegger's later thought is generally considered to pose severe interpretative difficulties, even for those well acquainted with Being and Time. It is often claimed that his later thought either defies reconstruction because of its arcane nature or that it should not be reconstructed because doing so compromises its subtleties. It is argued that this 'availability problem' with Heidegger's later thought is not insurmountable, at least not with regard to one of its major strands, (...) his views on the relation of art to truth. An interpretation of 'The Origin of the Work of Art' is proposed that views its major arguments as extensions of Heidegger's view on truth and the nature of worlds in Being and Time. To this end, a new account of the relationship of two pairs of terms crucial to the understanding of the ontological significance of the work of art and its truth is offered: (a) 'earth' and 'world' and (b) 'concealment' and 'un-concealment'. What emerges is a Kant-like claim that a necessary condition for the possibility of worlds is that things stand to be taken up into worlds in virtue of a character they have abstracted from their involvements in any one world. Artworks, if they are 'true' art, show this by allowing the thing that they are to support a wide range of possible understandings, displaying the fact that no one set of understandings can exhaust the 'thingly' nature of the work. In addition to clarifying that aspect of Heidegger's account of truth that requires un-concealment to depend on residual concealment, this understanding of the structure of the artwork accounts for the power Heidegger ascribes to certain art to inaugurate worlds. I conclude by making some suggestions, against the background of the interpretation of the art essay, on how to understand the 'turn' in Heidegger's thought as a deepening inquiry into the nature of truth. (shrink)

Heidegger develops his reading of a-lētheia as privative un-concealment (Unverborgenheit) in tandem with his early phenomenological theory of truth. He is not simply reinterpreting a word, but rather reading Greek philosophy as having a primordial understanding of truth which has itself been concealed in interpretation. After shedding medieval and modern presuppositions of truth as correspondence, the existential truth-experience shows itself, no longer left puzzlingly implicit in unsatisfactory conventional readings of Greek philosophy. In Sein und Zeit §44, Heidegger resolves interpretive (...) difficulties in Parmenides through his interpretation of alētheia and philologically grounds this reading in Heraclitus’s description of the unconcealing logos. Although this primordial sense of the word has already been obscured in Plato and Aristotle, the structural gradation of their theories of truth conserves the primordial pre-Socratic sense of truth as the experience of unconcealment. (shrink)

This article is a phenomenological analysis of the Urdu poem Tum ek gōrakh dhandā hō by the Pakistani Sufi poet Nāz Khayālawī (d. 2010). It approaches the poet's engagement with perplexity ( ḥayrah ), as an ontological feature of reality, through the lens of Heidegger's understanding of truth where concealment ( lēthe ) is central to the event of unconcealment ( alētheia ). The article demonstrates how a Heideggerianphenomenological exploration enables us to uncover the dynamic of un/concealment (or un/veiling) in (...) the Sufi tradition's understanding of Being and intelligibility. The rich possibilities of interpretative pluralism and polysemy—through the explorative nonfinality evoked by Being as ḥayrah —are explored as well. The article's argument not only allows for fresh extensions of Heidegger's phenomenological approach to unexplored cultural and historical territory, but also adds to Heidegger scholarship's recent tentative attempts at bringing together Heidegger and Sufi poetry. (shrink)

The article refers to the issue of freedom from a philosophical perspective. First of all, it discusses Plato’s metaphor of the cave in Politeia, in which the philosopher writes of freedom in its individual and collective forms. Then the article indicates how the metaphor was read by such contemporary philosophers as Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt, who interpret Plato’s metaphor from existential-phenomenological and political perspectives. Heidegger stresses the freedom of a human being, who in the light of the subjective existential (...) experience begins to live objectively in an authentic way. He frees himself up from the impersonal-I. A person, who experienced the truth as un-concealment, is not enslaved anymore to the impersonality of the crowd. He is able to face his own mortality and to take responsibility for his own fate. A special expression of freedom is shown in his care for others, even if it means risking one’s life. Hannah Arendt interprets Plato’s metaphor from the perspective of political philosophy. Her assessment becomes some kind of memento. What if the prisoners of the cave simply do not want to leave their place? Does the philosopher have a right forcefully to pull them out of the cavern? What is better, the attitude of Socrates, who dialogues with people or the attitude of Plato, who simply lectures the mob? In this way Arendt refers to the concept of freedom, as it is sketched in Plato’s cave. At the same time, she argues with Heidegger’s interpretation of the Platonic metaphor. Heidegger stresses the freedom of a human being, who in the light of the subjective existential experience begins to live objectively in an authentic way. He frees himself up from the impersonal-I. Human, who experienced the truth as un-concealment and freedom, is not enslaved anymore with the impersonality of the crowd, which reject individualism and authenticity. He is able to face his own mortality and to take responsibility for his own fate. A special expression of so understood freedom is shown in his care for others, even if this way he risks his own life. Hannah Arendt interprets Plato’s metaphor rather from the perspective of political philosophy. Her assessment, rooted in the very foundation of the political-philosophical thought becomes some kind of memento. What if the prisoners of the cave, simply do not want to leave their place? Does the philosopher have a right to forcefully pull them out of the cave of shadows? What is better, the attitude of Socrates, who dialogues with people and treats them as equal partners or the attitude of Plato, who simply lectures the mob? (shrink)

Echoes of No Thing seeks to understand the space between thinking which Martin Heidegger and the 13th-century Zen patriarch Eihei D ogen explore in their writing and teachings. Heidegger most clearly attempts this in Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) and D ogen in his Sh ob ogenz o, a collection of fascicles which he compiled in his lifetime. Both thinkers draw us towards thinking, instead of merely defining systems of thought. Both Heidegger and D ogen imagine possibilities not apparent (...) in the world we currently inhabit, but notably, find possible, through a refashioning of thinking as a soteriological reimagining that clears space for the presencing of an authentic experience in the space which emerges between certainties. Jenkins elucidates this soteriological reimagining through a close reading of both authors' conceptions of time and space, and by developing a practice of listening that is attuned to the echoes that resonate between the two thinkers. While Heidegger often wrote about new beginnings (as well as about gathering oneself, preparing the site, clearings, and practicing) in preparation for the evental un-concealing of truth, nowhere is this as present as in the enigmatic, difficult, and in fact beautiful, Contributions. To call a text beautiful, especially a work of philosophy, risks committing an act of disingenuity, and yet Contributions, like Jacques Derrida's Glas or Walter Benjamin's unfinished Arcades Project, rises to this acclaim through its very resistance to a system, its refusal to be easily digested, or even understood. Contributions is unfinished, partial, even at times muttered; it is the beginning of a thinking which takes place on a path and as such cannot imagine--or refuse--its final destination. It invites us to take up towards, but not to insist on, its thinking; it is a "turn" away from the reason and logic of a technologized world and returns philosophy--as a thinking--to a place of wonder and awe. D ogen's Sh obogenz o, from another culture and time entirely, is also a beautiful text, for similar reasons. The Sh obogenz o, gathered first as a series of talks given by Eihei D ogen (and later composed as written texts) details the process of understanding which leads, for D ogen, to a position of pure seeing, or satori, and yet these talks are not simply rules for monks, nor merely imprecations and demands for a laity; rather, they open a being's thinking to the possibility of something purely other and work as a transition across worlds that also opens us to an other world. What both thinkers illustrate, as do the other thinkers drawn on in this project--most notably, those philosophers associated with the Kyoto School, who were both intimately aware of D ogen's work, and studied, or studied with, Heidegger--is that world is not a fixed, stable entity; rather it is a fugal composition of possibility, of as yet untraversed--and at times un-traversable--spaces. Echoes of No Thing seeks to examine, within the lacunal eddies of be-coming's arrival, that space between which both thinkers point towards as possible sites of new beginnings."--https://punctumbooks.com/titles/echoes-of-no-thing-thinking-between-heidegger-and-doge n/, accessed 06/05/2020. (shrink)

F.W.J. von Schelling’s positive philosophy of mythology and revelation questions how one can move from the natural (the negative or mythology) to freedom (the positive or revelation), i.e. from the natural to the supernatural. The move from nature to freedom surpasses the traditional metaphysics of presence. Being is not simply the presencing of nature but the result of a decisive deed surpassing and supplementing nature. Nature can do nothing other than presence. Freedom, however, could also not be. It could remain (...) in concealment and must not necessarily presence as nature does. The origin is a supplement because an unnecessary excess extraneous to nature. In other words, origins always supplement the natural, i.e. they are supernatural and revelatory. Origins bring something novel, i.e. something original, into being but origins themselves remain in non-being and consequently remain un-revealed. The origin cannot exist, i.e. cannot become present, because it is always qualitatively Past. The origin never was but always already has been . Primal repetition was freedom’s subjection of nature to the Past and a deferral of this deed’s consequences to the indefinite Future. (shrink)

Studies on the 1616 and 1633 actions brought against Galilei by the Index and the Inquisition generally presumed that part of the documentation was still to be unveiled. This assumption was frequently accompanied by the hypothesis that some available documents were forgeries, merely composed to justify the 1633 condemnation. New documents from the Archive of the Roman Inquisition, including a censure of Saggiatore, official acts concerning the public dissemination of the verdict, and applications for permission to read Galilei¹s works, show (...) that the 1984 edition of his trial was not exhaustive. It is argued, however, that these documents were not concealed intentionally by the Holy Office and their not being found so far has been mainly due to the poor organisation of the Archive. Gianfranco Catelli, Gouhier e la cosiddetta dottrina della terza nozione primitiva In questo studio non si condivide l’opinione, dominante per molti decenni, che il cosiddetto dualismo cartesiano sia dovuto ad un “malinteso”, che può chiamarsi originario, dato che a rimanerne coinvolti furono alcuni tra i primi seguaci della filosofia di Cartesio. Una presa di posizione, questa, che, già sviluppata in altri precedenti lavori, viene qui riproposta relativamente a H. Gouhier, lo studioso che più di ogni altro, con ricchezza di documenti e sottigliezza di analisi interpretative, ha sostenuto la tesi del “malinteso” e ha individuato nella dottrina della terza nozione primitiva la spiegazione autenticamente cartesiana del rapporto sussistente tra anima e corpo. Una interpretazione di cui nel presentge studio si mostra tutta la debolezza, soprattutto se la si considera alla luce dell’altra dottrina, anch’essa cartesiana, ma di gran lunga più articolata, che fa del rapporto tra anima e corpo un nesso da spiegarsi in analogia al rapporto che nel linguaggio intercorre tra il segno e il suo significato. (shrink)

Ricoeur elaborates a trend of thought about history which shows that behind the analysis of the great periods or historical legalities, the notion of event [happening]remains obscured. From my point of view, the event is the undoubtedly haphazard irruption of an excess which causes the failure of constituted knowledge and obliges to construct a new truth of the situation, i.e., a new way of comprehending it. Ricoeur speaks of representance, and not of reference or representation. Representation being the hegemonic mode (...) of thought which accompanies the advent of modernity, in which the subject of conscience -which is after all always selfconscience- becomes grounding substance. From my point of view, the recoeurian concept of representance surpasses, the presentation/representation device, inasmuch as it gives all its power to what conceals itself form presentation. In fact, there is no relation of production o reduplication between historical narration and past events. The concept of representance distinguishes itself from that of representation because the reference to past is metaphoric. And this metaphor is characterized by a seeing as which has its correlate in a being as. It is a being and not being at the same time. In this article the concepts of event, representance trace and historical truth are bound toghether.Ricoeur elabora un pensamiento sobre la historia que muestra que tras el análisis de los grandes períodos o de legalidades históricas, queda oscurecida la noción de acontecimiento. Desde mi punto de vista, el acontecimiento es la irrupción, sin duda azarosa, de un exceso que hace fracasar los saberes constituidos y obliga a construir una nueva verdad de la situación, esto es, una nueva manera de entenderla. Ricoeur habla de representancia y no de referencia o representación. Siendo la representación el modo hegemónico del pensamiento que acompaña el advenimiento de la modernidad, en donde el sujeto de la conciencia -que en definitiva siempre es autoconciencia- se vuelve sustancia fundante, el concepto ricoeuriano de representancia, desde mi punto de vista, supera el dispositivo presentación/representación, en la medida en que le da toda su potencia a lo que se substrae a la presentación. En efecto, entre el relato histórico y los acontecimientos pasados no hay una relación de producción o reduplicación. El concepto de representancia se diferencia del de representación porque la referencia al pasado es metafórica. Y esta metáfora se caracteriza por un ver como que tiene su correlato en un ser como. Esta es la vez un ser y un no-ser. En este artículo, se vinculan los conceptos de acontecimiento, representancia, huella y verdad histórica. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A WAY OF LOOKING AT HEIDEGGER HUGO MEYNELL University of Calgary Calgary, Alberta IN THE FOLLOWING essay I w;ant to examine some of rthe ba1Sic ~deas of Heidegger from SIOmething of a " transcendiental Thomist " pevspective, 1 as represented by Bernard Lonergian's " generalized empirical method." I believe that there are a nlllmber of important insights :to be gained from Heidegger's work but that it contains a fow (...) very perilous oversights as well. To my mind, Heidegger shows with more conviction and power than any other thinker how our anxieties and our trivi1al everyday concerns are apt to shut us out from 1apprehending the deep my;stery of things, and how great art :and poetry, together with a,sustained thinking-through of the nmbure of consciousness :and of the woJ.'11d 1 wihich it reveals, have the power of opening up this mystery to us again.. I ailso agree with Heidegger when he says that the technicaiL fanguages of the scieDJoes and of traditional metaphysics as weH al'le, to a consiiew, one has to dismantle the conceptual appa- :vaitus which we take for granted, an appara;bus wherein the answers are given or presuppos,ed, but the questions al'e never e1q>erienced any more-least of all those aborut orur own nature, desbiny, and state in the wol'l1d. In asking these questions, we must be constantly ·aware of the limitations which aiccrue mom our particular historical sitruation.5 These were not sufficiently taken account of in the dassicaJ. phenomenology of Husserl, with its "transcendental subjectivity " based on an allegedly "d!isintel'ested observer." For all. its determination to 11eturn :to" the things themselves," this phenomerno~ogy did not attend sufficiently to the manner in which its own aims :and IJ[>ocedures we:ve determined historicaUy.6 Husserl, as he himself aJC1knowledged, was very much in the tradition of Descartes, who was trying to find an uns:hakabJe basis for the practice of phll.osophy. But it is just this basis which Heidegger seeks to prut into qruestion.7 We have to a.sk what is the decisiY.e matter for,thinking: "Is it consciousness and its objectivity or is it the Being of beings in its unconcealedness and concealment?" 8 Access to the things themselves is best thought of in true Greek fashion as " aletheia, the unoonceaJ.edness of what is present, iits being revealed, its showing itself." 9 (A,s he quite often does, Heidegger is here making capital out of ·an etymological point; " aletheia," the Greek word for """.t-1.,, • • 1 " i-th. " cealm t),..,ruuu, iI.S eqwv:a1ent to a- e ei,a, non~con · en. So what is basic to truth, irt must be inferred, is not the 00['rectness of assertions, or their cor11espondence with states of a:fiaim, or the :agreement of subjoot and object express1 ed by them; it is the self-showing which is necessary for things if 5 Cf. Krell, "Introduction," 21. 6 Ibid., 13. 7 Cf. Walter Biemel, Martin Heidegger (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), 8-9; Krell, 31. On the alleged errors of Descartes, see BT 123-33. sHeidegger, On Tflrne and Bemg (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 79; Krell, 14. oHeidegger, loc. cit., Krell, 13. 616 HUGO MEYNELL they 1arie to become objects of assertions.at all.10 The £.act is that.rulil (lO!l'respondence, " rudequation "11 or whatev. (shrink)

Resumen: El artículo pretende desarrollar una serie de argumentos descriptivos que indaguen en torno a la relación que puede establecerse entre el sentido de ser cuerpo y la re-significación que puede asumir su expresión contemporánea desde la noción de excritura, propuesta por el filósofo francés Jean-Luc Nancy. Si hay pensamiento es porque hay un sentido que siempre nos da que pensar algo. Al entender aquello, la comprensión definida tradicionalmente desde las formas explicativas y estructuralmente racionales se transforma en un estar (...) ahí sensible de manera diferente a los modos racionales aprendidos culturalmente. Para la deconstrucción, el sentido vendría a ser aquel tocar proveniente desde una exterioridad no pensable. Al pensar de otra manera, siempre estaremos en el límite de nuestras condiciones, ya sea por las formas en que hemos construido nuestras relaciones productivas o simplemente por nuestra existencia en el mundo. Lo que toca desde la exterioridad no pensada, es justamente, el sentir en tanto una llamada a estar en dicha afección, en el extrañamiento de tener una sensación afectiva. La excritura en este contexto se enfrenta al pensamiento como confrontación permanente de significaciones históricas y relativizadas culturalmente.: This article aims to develop a series of descriptive arguments that explore the relationship that can be established between the sense of being of a body and the re-signification which can assume its contemporary expression from the notion of concealed thinking proposed by the French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy. We could argue that if there is thought it is because there is a meaning that always gives us something to think about. Once we understand this, the comprehension traditionally defined from the explanatory and structural rational forms, it is transformed in a “being there”, in a sensible and different way to the cultural and rational modes culturally learned. For its deconstruction, the sense what become that touching coming from a non-thinkable exteriority. If you want to think differently, we are always at the limit of our conditions, either because of the ways in which we have built our productive relationships or simply because of our human way of being in the world. What touches from the “not thought exteriority”, is precisely, the feeling as a call to be in that affection -a sort of appropriation of meaning-, in the estrangement of having an affective sensation. Concealed thinking in this context faces the thought as permanent confrontation of historical meanings and culturally relativized. (shrink)

L'expérimentation de nouvelles formes de communication politique conduit souvent à regarder l'interner comme un lieu de parole et de dialogue. Mais les médias informatisés sont aussi, et avant tout, un lieu où se définissent les objets et les postures politiques. En particulier, la volonté de mettre à disposition les éléments d'un débat possible tourne souvent à la mise en visibilité, moins de la parole, que de sa possibilité. Car cette thématique de la parole libérée dissimule la réalité d'un ensemble de (...) formes écrites et documentaires, arrière-plan de la discussion qui va jusqu'à se substituer à elle.Experimenting with new forms of communication often leads to watching the intern as a place of speech and dialogue. But the media are also computerized and, above all, a place to define the objects and political posturing. In particular, the desire to provide the elements of a possible debate often turns to set visibility, less speech than of its possibility. For this theme speech released conceals the reality of a set of written forms and documentary background to the discussion that will take its place. (shrink)

Pour résister à la destruction de la vérité qui menace la pensée contemporaine, on se propose de revenir à la thèse de Husserl : à la position d’un point de vérité qui s’identifie à l’évidence absolue de l’ego cogito, telle qu’il se donne dans sa chair. Mais cette évidence apodictique n’est pas forcément adéquate : il faut alors se demander ce que doit être la vérité de l’ego pour s’entrelacer à de la non-vérité et ce que doit être la chair (...) pour que l’auto-donation incarnée de l’ego se dissimule à elle-même. Une reconstruction transcendantale de la théorie merleau-pontyenne du chiasme tactile permettra de répondre à ces interrogations.In order to resist the destruction of Truth in contemporary Thinking, we need to come back to Husserl. According to him, there is a point of Truth which is identical to the absolute self-evidence of the Ego Cogito, giving itself in its own Flesh. However, this apodictic self-evidence is not necessarily adequate. What could be the Truth of the Ego, if it intertwines itself with Non-Truth ? And what could be the Flesh, if the carnal self-giving of the Ego could conceal itself to itself ? A transcendental reconstruction of the Merleau-Pontyan theory of the tactile chiasm will help us to answer those questions. (shrink)

Le catalogue est une forme de base de la littérature grecque. Elle se trouve, pour nous, la première fois chez Hésiode , se recristallise, en prose, dans l’opposition à la forme sérielle qu’Aristote oppose aux formes bouclées des périodes en prose. Or, on peut suivre sa tradition jusque dans l’antiquité dite tardive. Les Vies de philosophes et de sophistes de l’historien Eunape de Sardes peuvent l’illustrer que cette continuité est toujours comprise comme un recours aux catalogues hésiodiques ou autres de (...) l’époque archaïque. Nous procédons selon trois critères : premièrement, la tendance hésiodique de cacher un récit dans une énumération prétendument sobre se retrouve dans la suite de vies, qui se transforment peu à peu en histoire cohérente; deuxièmement le style sériel de la prose hérodotéenne ou d’Hypéride, lui-même héritier de la forme catalogique, se retrouve chez Eunape; troisièmement Eunape évoque comme modèle le Catalogue des femmes et présente son histoire comme une suite du catalogue des âges tel qu’il le lit dans Les Travaux et les Jours d’Hésiode.The Iron Age is over: Eunap of Sardes and the ‘Catalogic’ Pattern. In Greek literature, the catalogue is a basic pattern of epic song from the work of Hesiod onwards. Aristotle recognises this pattern by distinguishing a serial prose-style, as distinguished from a rounded prose-style, and this special pattern continues to be used even in what is called “late” Antiquity. That the writers were fairly aware of both the pattern and its origin, can be demonstrated by analysing “The Lives of Philosophers and Sophists” by Eunap of Sardes . Our study uses three criteria: firstly, the same Hesiodic tendency to conceal a story under what is presented as a mere list or enumeration, can be found in Eunap’s catalogue of Lives, which transform themselves slowly into a history of 4th century neoplatonistic philosophy; secondly, Eunap uses the same serial prose-style as do Herodotus or Hypereides, the heirs of the catalogic pattern; thirdly, Eunap himself mentions the “Catalogue of Women” as a possible model, and presents his history as a continuation of Hesiod’s catalogue of Ages in “Works and Days”. (shrink)

In one of the essays in his recent book on Christianity, La déclosion (2005), Nancy discusses the relationship between Judaism and Christianity. Nancy opens this discussion with a reference to Lyotard’s book on this relationship: Un trait d’union (1993). Both Lyotard and Nancy examine a very early figure in the emergence of Christianity from Judaism—whereas Lyotard focuses on the epistles of Paul, Nancy reads the epistle of James. Lyotard concludes that the hyphen in the expression ‘Judeo-Christian’ actually conceals ‘the most (...) impenetrable abyss within Western thought’. With this abyss, Lyotard refers to the point of departure of Judaism: the event in which a Voice has left behind letters, inaugurating an interminable work of interpretation. For Nancy, however, it is rather Christianity, and therefore, Western culture, which is deconstructive in nature. Its composition is co-original with a decomposition, and therefore, with an openness. In James, Nancy finds an emphasis on praxis, in such a way that existence is to be understood as transcendent within itself. With this reading of James, Nancy seems to deny that there is a fundamental difference between Judaism and Christianity. In order to clarify the differences between Lyotard and Nancy, it is shown that, in Lyotard’s view, an unsublatable alterity comes with aisthèsis, whereas in Nancy’s view, alterity comes with existence as such. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Unverborgenheit is truth in Heidegger's Greek-inspired view that happens in Entbergen, or bringing forth. Technology is a way of bringing forth and the truths brought forth in ancient and contemporary science-based technologies are essentially different, the latter being destined by enframing or Gestell that is the essence of contemporary science and technology. Here I give an etymological-ecological-feminist interpretation to the essences of ancient and contemporary technologies as ontogeneses and their unconcealments. A turning point is also identified, on the basis (...) of Carolyn Merchant's eco-feminist account of the mental-spiritual change due to technical change of earth-bound practices, specifically mining, during the commercial revolution and the rise of contemporary science. As Heidegger's wording strongly hints to mountains as salvaging the not-yet-concealed, and human relation to mountains as finding the concealed, Merchant's account of the female nature, or Mother Earth, and male science as penetrating her dark plots for secrets to be exploited by humans, and its connection to mining practices, seems in some respects to clarify Heidegger's somewhat dark notions of unconcealment and truth. RESUMEN Unverborgenheit es la verdad en el pensamiento heideggeriano de inspiración griega, esto ocurre en el Entbergen, o desocultamiento. La tecnología es una forma de desocultar, y las verdades desocultadas por las tecnologías de base científica en la antigüedad y en la época contemporánea son esencialmente diferentes; la última estaría determinada por lo dispuesto, o Gestell, que sería la esencia de la ciencia y tecnología contemporáneas. En este texto presento una interpretación etimológico-ecológico-feminista de las esencias de la tecnología antigua y contemporánea como ontogénesis y sus desvelamientos. También se puede apreciar un punto crucial en la aproximación eco-feminista de Carolyn Merchant al cambio mental-espiritual debido al cambio tecnológico de las prácticas ligadas a la tierra, en especial la minería, durante la revolución comercial y el surgir de la ciencia contemporánea. Como la terminología de Heidegger sugiere fuertemente a las montañas como salvando lo todavía no oculto, y a las relaciones humanas con las montañas como encontrar lo oculto, el enfoque de Merchant sobre la naturaleza mujer, o Madre Tierra, y la ciencia masculina que penetra en sus oscuras parcelas en busca de secretos para ser explotados por la humanidad, y su conexión con las prácticas mineras, parece clarificar en ciertos aspectos las oscuras nociones heideggerianas de desvelamiento y verdad. (shrink)

Si les analyses merleau-pontiennes sont aujourd’hui fréquemment utilisées dans les études postcoloniales, notamment les analyses du corps, on n’a toujours pas prêté suffisamment attention à l’importance qu’eut pour sa pensée la confrontation avec la réalité du colonialisme, au fil de divers voyages vers la moitié des années 1950. Dans l’article, il s’agit en particulier de faire émerger le rôle exemplaire qu’au pu avoir la confrontation avec la réalité de Madagascar, en 1957, et ses effets en retour sur un certain nombre (...) de catégories philosophiques et politiques. Outre la reconstruction historique des circonstances de ce voyage, l’article se focalise sur trois notions centrales dont cette « épreuve de l’étranger » aura permis de faire apparaître la nature dialectique : les notions d’altérité, d’universalité, et d’autodétermination. L’altérité n’est plus une relation frontale, mais résulte d’une expérience de « décentrement » ; l’universalité doit être problématisée, en direction d’un « universel latéral » tandis que l’idée même de l’autodétermination soulève des questionnements autant politiques qu’ontologiques : dans la lutte pour une indépendance immédiate des colonies, Merleau-Ponty soupçonne le spectre d’une pensée libérale qui masque les liens de dépendance qui persistent sous d’autres formes. If Merleau-Pontian analyses – notably the analyses of the body – are, today, frequently used in post-colonial studies, sufficient attention was not always paid to the importance that the confrontation with the reality of colonialism had for his thought in the course of various travels during the mid-1950’s. This article is concerned, in particular, with shedding light on the exemplary role that the confrontation with the reality of Madagascar in 1957 could have had, and its effects in return on quite a number of philosophical and political categories. More than a historical reconstruction of the circumstances of that journey, the article focuses on three central notions whose dialectical nature is made apparent by this “experience of the foreign”: the notions of alterity, universality, and self-determination. Alterity is no longer a frontal relation, but results from an experience of “decentering,” universality must be problematized in the direction of a “lateral universality,” and the very idea of self-determination raises questions as much political as ontological. In the struggle for an immediate independence for the colonies, Merleau-Ponty senses the specter of a liberal thought that conceals the relations of dependence that persist in other forms. Se oggi le riflessioni merleau-pontiane, in particolare sul corpo, sono utilizzate di frequente negli studi postcoloniali, non si è mai prestata sufficiente attenzione all’importanza che ebbe, per il pensiero di Merleau-Ponty, il confronto con la realtà del colonialismo nel corso dei diversi viaggi effettuati dal filosofo verso la metà degli anni ’50. In quest’articolo ci proponiamo di far emergere il ruolo esemplare che poté avere il confronto con la realtà del Madagascar nel 1957 e le sue ripercussioni su un certo numero di categorie filosofiche e politiche. Oltre che sulla ricostruzione storica delle circostanze di questo viaggio, l’articolo si concentra su tre nozioni di cui questa esperienza avrebbe permesso di far apparire la natura dialettica: le nozioni di alterità, di universalità e di autodeterminazione. L’alterità non è più una relazione frontale, bensì risulta da un’esperienza di “decentramento”; l’universalità deve essere problematizzata nella direzione di un “universale laterale”, mentre l’idea stessa di autodeterminazione solleva un interrogarsi tanto politico che ontologico: nella lotta per un’indipendenza immediata delle colonie, Merleau-Ponty intravvede infatti lo spettro di un pensiero liberale volto a mascherare i legami di dipendenza per farli così persistere sotto altre forme. (shrink)

A. Comte et J.-S. Mill s’accordaient sur la nécessaire « scientificisation » de la politique. Ce consensus masque pourtant un désaccord profond sur le contenu à donner à cette « scientificisation ». La question de l’assujettissement des femmes jette une lumière particulièrement vive sur la nature de ce différend. D’une part, on montrera comment le rôle que Comte faisait jouer à la considération des facteurs biologiques dans les explications sociologiques na va pas sans remettre en cause le statut de Comte (...) comme fondateur d’une sociologie autonome. D’autre part, on montrera que le biais environnementaliste qui caractérise la méthodologie millienne ne doit pas nécessairement nous la faire abandonner.A. Comte and J.-S. Mill shared a common belief in the necessary « scientificisation » of politics. However, this consensus conceals a real disagreement as to the real content to be given to this « scientificisation ». The issue of the subjection of women sheds a new light on the nature of this disagreement. Firstly, I will show how the role Comte ascribed to the consideration of biological factors in sociological explanations is inconsistent with the received view according to which he is to be regarded as the founding father of an autonomous sociology. Secondly, I will analyze the assumptions on which Millian methodology rests and try to show that its environmentalist bias is no reason to give it up. (shrink)

Balthasar a acquis la réputation d'un théologien de la Beauté du divin. C'est en phénoménologue qu'il conçoit l'expérience esthétique : comment réussit-il à en faire le fondement d'une théologie esthétique ? « Dieu par lui-rnême a pris une figure » : telle est l'expression centrale de cette esthétique. Elle est influencée au plan théologique par la conception de la Révélation chez Karl Barth : le croire est corrélatif au voir ; et d'autre part au plan philosophique, par le concept de (...) phénomène chez Martin Heidegger : le phénomène est ce qui se montre soi-même par soi-même. L'Écriture est traitée comme une figure, une image phénoménale, dont la médiation se poursuit dans l'Église pour désigner et attester la figure singulière de révélation qu'est le Christ. La difficulté de l'entreprise est de mettre en œuvre une médiation qui n'aboutisse pas à identifier figure du monde et figure de révélation, mais qui n'empêche pas non plus la manifestation de l'être divin en son apparaître sensible, car le mystère de la beauté consiste dans une telle donation de soi-même. Sur ce terrain, Balthasar prend congé d'Augustin et entre en débat avec Karl Rahner. Mais, dans la chair du Christ, Dieu se dévoile en se voilant suprêmement. La figure accède à sa vérité au prix d'une auto-dissimulation. La chair du Christ doit-elle parvenir à ce degré d'idéalité, finalement se « déhistoriser », pour laisser transparaître la vérité de l'Être qui s'offre en elle à notre perception sensible ? C'est la limite paradoxale d'une esthétique fondamentale qui paraît plus propre à inspirer une attitude confessante qu'à se définir conceptuellement.Balthasar acquired the reputation of a theologian of divine Beauty. It was as a phenomenologist that he conceived the aesthetic experience : how did he succeed in founding an aesthetic theology ? « God, of his own doing, took a countenance » : such is the main expression of this aesthetic. It is influenced on a theological level by the conception of Karl Barth’s Revelation : Believing is correlative to seeing ; and on the philosophical level, by the concept of phenomenon with Martin Heiddegger : the phenomenon is that which shows itself by itself. Writing is treated as a figure, a phenomenal image, of which the mediation is continued in the Church to designate and attest the unique figure of revelation, which is Christ. The problem with the undertaking is to put into effect a mediation that does not conclude in identifying the figure of the world and the figure of revelation. It does not prohibit the manifestation of the divine being in its sensitive apparition, for the mystery of beauty consists in the giving of oneself. In this light, Balthasar leaves Augustine and enters into discussion with Karl Rahner. In the flesh of Christ, however, God unveils himself by completely hiding himself. The figure approaches its truth at the price of a self-concealment. Must the flesh of Christ come to such a degree of idealization, finally to de-historicize itself, in order to allow the truth of Being to shine through, a truth that offers itself through that flesh to our sensitive perception ? This is the paradoxical limit of a fundamental aesthetic that seems to be more proper to inspire a confessing attitude than to define itself conceptually. (shrink)

The crux of the dispute between formalism and intuitionism, it is held, is not whether certain entities exist or not, but how the term function shall be used in mathematics. The identification of effective definition with general recursion fails because an undefined function lies concealed beneath the requirement of a finite number of substitutions, and a fresh characterization of effective definition is sought in terms of a hierarchy of ordinal recursions.A correspondence exists between primitive recursive properties and direct proofs, (...) of irrationality and transcendence for instance, and between general recursive properties and indirect proofs.Mathematics is a concept creating activity and the distinction between a formal mathematics devoid of meaning, at one level, and a meaningful metamathematics at the next is considered to be untenable.RésuméLa controverse entre les formalistes et les intuitionistes ne repose pas, considére‐t‐on, sur l'existence ou la non‐existence de certaines entités, mail sur l'usage du terme fonction en mathématiques. L'identification de la définition effective avec la récursion générate n'est pas valable parce qu'une fonction indéfinié est dissimulée sous la nécessité d'un nombre fini de substitutions, et une nouvelle caractérisation de définition effective est recherchée sous forme de hiérarchie de récursions ordinates.II existe, d'une part, une correspondance entre les propriétés primitives récursives et les preuves directes, d'irrationalité et de transcendance par exemple, et, d'autre part, entre les propriétés récursives générates et les preuves par l'absurde.Les mathématiques sont une activité créatrice de concepts, et la distinction entre les mathématiques formelles dépourvues de sens et, sur le plan supérieur, une méta‐mathématique chargée de sens, ne semble pas justifiée. (shrink)

To dwell in finitude. The first movement of human existence as residential settlement in Jan Pato?ka’s phenomenological thought Resumen: El presente estudio se centra en la interpretación del primero de los tres movimientos de la existencia humana postulados por el fenomenólogo checo Jan Patocka, como un procedimiento orientado a ocultar la originaria alteridad del Ser y, consecuentemente, a favorecer el habitar humano en el mundo. La propia estructura de nuestra percepción y nuestra relación original con los otros formarían parte de (...) ese mecanismo de inserción residencial que caracteriza al movimiento de “anclaje” o “enraizamiento”. Palabras clave: Patocka, habitar, movimiento de la existencia, enraizamiento.: The present work focuses on the interpretation of the first of the three movements of human existence postulated by the Czech phenomenologist Jan Patocka, as a procedure tending towards the concealing of the original alterity of Being and, in consequence, to favour human dwelling in the world. The structure of our perception itself and our original relation with the others would form part of that residential insertion that characterizes the movement of “anchorage” or “rooting”. Keywords: Patocka, dwelling, movement of existence, rooting. (shrink)

I distinguish between the deep culture and the manifest culture, the relationship between the two constituting a circle, which constitutes the circulation of a radical theology of culture. The deep culture surfaces in the manifest, and the manifest draws upon the depths; neither one without the other. My hypothesis is that religion is an expression of the deep culture and for that reason, religion is not accidentally violent; religion is violent in virtue of something essential to religion. Religion is playing (...) with the fire of the concealed depths, of the unconditional, of the impossible, of the undeconstructible. Religion is the best way to save the world, but it also the best way to burn it down. It is both of these things and in virtue of the same property. This is not to say that religion is structurally violent, always and necessarily violent. It is structurally ambiguous, dangerous, on the verge of violence, whipsawing between radical violence and radical non-violence, between martyrdom and murder. Religious beliefs are not the cause of the violence but often a façade for deeper, visceral nationalism or ethnic hatred, The reaction of Christian right to the contemporary world is naive and simplistic but not superficial; it reflects a visceral fear of the postmodern world. Religion is a matter of being claimed by something unconditional, which means it should have the good sense not to lay claim to it. We should never trust anything that has not passes through that apophasis. Before any claims we make, we are laid claim to in advance by the unconditional, the undeconstructible, which Schelling calls the prius, the “un-pre-thinkable”. The unconditional in the optimal sense is love, which is an expenditure made without the expectation of a return, like loving one’s enemies, which is impossible, the impossible. But love does not get a pass. What would we not do for love? In that question is concentrated all the ambiguity of love, all the courage of the martyr, but no less the violence of the suicide bomber. (shrink)

Our aim in this article is to put into practice, in the field of social sciences, the principles that Husserl displayed in his book from 1936, "The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology”. In that seminal work, Husserl reflected on the mathematization of nature and produced an historical meditation on the essence of geometry. Here we will try to extend the reach of Husserlian postulates in order to deal with economics and, more specifically, with the theory of money. We (...) think that, in certain social sciences, and in particular in those with a clear mathematical penchant like economics, the use of formalization often helps to cover an uncritical use of phenomenologically ungrounded idealizations. This fact ultimately results in a massive concealment of the true sense of some of its principal phenomenanamely, money. It is worth mentioning that this concern does not have its roots only in phenomenology, for even academic monetary theory openly acknowledges that we lack an understanding of the meaning of money which could help us clarify and prevent financial crisis and economic collapses. Crisis, in short, are not the result of a deep understanding of the concept of money; on the contrary, they highlight the fact that we don’t really know what money is. Thus, our goal here is to illustrate the possibilities offered by the phenomenological method in its application to the question of money. It is in this sense that the research taking place here can be understood as a “phenomenological critique of monetary theory”.En el presente artículo se pretende llevar a cabo una aplicación de los principios que Husserl lleva a cabo en su obra de 1936, “La crisis de las ciencias europeas y la fenomenología transcendental”, a las ciencias sociales; concretamente, al concepto de dinero. En su obra de 1936, Husserl puso el énfasis en la matematización de la naturaleza, centrándose sobre todo en la meditación histórica sobre la geometría. Pero en el caso de algunas ciencias sociales, como la economía, la utilización libre de construcciones idealizadoras fenomenológicamente infundadas, como en el caso del dinero, está teniendo como resultado un enorme encubrimiento de sentido del fenómeno monetario. Esto no es vivido tan solo desde la feno-menología: desde la propia teoría monetaria se reconoce que estamos faltos de una comprensión del sentido del dinero que nos ayude a clarificar y prevenir de manera suficiente las crisis financieras. Estas crisis no son fruto de que hayamos comprendido demasiado bien el concepto de dinero, sino de que todavía estamos faltos de una comprensión profunda del sentido del dinero. Aquí pretendemos ilustrar las posibilidades que el método fenomenológico ofrece, aplicado al caso del dinero. En este sentido, pueden considerarse las investigaciones que tienen lugar aquí como “crítica fenomenológica de la teoría monetaria”. (shrink)

Augustine often pairs the words locutio and sensus in his efforts to interpret the books of the Heptateuch. Locutiones are un-Latin expressions in the Latin text of the Bible, which point to a Greek or Hebrew idiom behind the Latin. In each case, Augustine tries to decide whether or not a sensus, an intelligible meaning, can be found that explains the locutio. In some cases, he writes confidently that the idiom does not conceal a meaning. In other cases, he suspects (...) that it does; sometimes he can discover the meaning, sometimes not. This study demonstrales Augustine’s profound respect for the Old Latin text, as well as his effort to make sense of the text, without violating the rules of grammar or reason. Within these boundaries, he took delight in the biblical text and its mysteries. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Heidegger and Dao: Things, Nothingness, Freedom by Eric S. NelsonJean-Yves Heurtebise (bio)Heidegger and Dao: Things, Nothingness, Freedom. Eric S. Nelson. London: Bloomsbury, 2024. Pp. viii + 256. Paper $103.50, ISBN 978-1-350411-90-6.On the Way: from Heidegger to Nagarjuna via Lao-ZhuangAfter having reviewed Eric S. Nelson’s 2017 Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century German Thought (for the Journal of Chinese Philosophy) and his 2020 Daoism and Environmental Philosophy (for (...) Monde Chinois Nouvelle Asie), reviewing now, for Philosophy East & West, Nelson’s 2024 Heidegger and Dao: Things, Nothingness, Freedom, which develops on the insights of his two previous opuses, is both a real pleasure and a true challenge. It’s a pleasure to read again Eric S. Nelson’s scholarly prose with its own specific conceptual style and distinctive philosophical rhythm. It’s a challenge to give a meaningful and fair overview of a conceptually complex, scholarly rich, and thought-provoking book.No one can speak better about the aim and goals of Nelson’s book than the author himself--following the wayist way of spontaneous ziranity, we will thus let the book speak for itself:Its primary thesis is that, entangled with Daoist and other intercultural sources, Heidegger’s path proceeds from the paradigmatic Occidental philosophy of available givenness and mere presence--which conceals the open spacing of things and seeks to logically exclude and dialectically subordinate negativity and the nothing--to nothingness, emptiness, and the clearing in their coming to presence and withdrawal in absence or, to accentuate its mutable verbal sense, presencing-absencing. […] Zhuangzi’s vision of free and easy wandering indicates ways of practicing philosophy as contesting and unraveling fixations. These practices allow rethinking Heidegger’s pathways and reimagining for ourselves things, nothingness, and world in the specificity of our existential condition.(p. 10)These lines can give already a good indication about what the reader will be provided with: a Heideggerian reading of Daoism nurturing and enriching a Daoist reading of Heidegger; a Daoist reinterpretation of the late Heidegger feeding and complexifying a Heideggerian Pre-Socratic reinterpretation of early Daoism; a continuous feedback loop leading to a process of mutual symbiosis and multiple conceptually creative hybridizations. Ziran and Dao are used to unlock the concealed potentialities of overdetermined Western concepts such as Nature and Ethos while the Heideggerian deconstruction of “Western metaphysics” is [End Page 1] used to de-Eurocentricize our understanding of Daoist and Buddhist thoughts about Thing and Nothingness.The book is divided in two parts: the first part deals with the concept of Thing, the second with the concept of Nothingness. Thing and Nothingness seem to be the perfect antithesis but the magic of Nelson’s reading of their tri-cultural Daoist, Buddhist and Heideggerian conceptualization is to dissipate the classical, ontological antinomy between Being and Non-Being to explore what’s both beyond and below: the natural source of life emergence, coming and returning to a Nothing that is Everything via a Thing that is never Anything (a ready-made and exchangeable object in the universal trading scheme of capitalist general equivalence) but always Something (this and that in particular, in their own specific rhythm of coming back and forth, from and to their source of un-nothingity).The first five chapters evoke the issue of the encounter of Heidegger and Daoist thinking in relation to the deconstruction of Thingness. In the first chapter, Nelson proposes a cross-cultural perspective about the Nature of the Thing linking Heidegger’s critique of the reduction of Things’ Presence to Functional Tools to the Daoist extended conception of Things in terms of Multitude (wanwu 萬物), in which objects, living beings, and spirits participate in the fabric of reality. Chapter 2 examines the connection between Heidegger’s and Daoism’s understanding of “nature” as manifesting a distinct yet similar attention to things’ autopoiesis: following the natural disclosing and unfolding of “things” entails a specific way to think and be in the world. In chapter 3, a comparison is established between Heidegger and Laozi with respect to the notion of void and emptiness: the fact that what powers the utility of a thing is what... (shrink)

À partir d’une approche anthropologique des prises en charge médicales de la tuberculose et du paludisme, ainsi que des conceptions et usages de la prévention dans des milieux urbains d’Afrique de l’Ouest , ce texte interroge la nature du métier de soignant. Après nous être penchés sur les spécificités de ce type d’étude anthropologique en milieu médical, nous nous attachons à décrypter les processus d’occultations des singularités du malade qui caractérisent les messages et discours de prévention. Dans les structures de (...) santé, sont étudiées les négociations des normes de diagnostic et de traitement à l’œuvre ; les attitudes des soignants qui oscillent entre sur- et sous-estimations des risques sanitaires ; et le hiatus entre la demande et les besoins réels de formations continues. Enfin, nous nous penchons sur la rencontre entre les soignants et les malades qui peut se trouver transformée par les spécificités de la maladie et de son traitement. On constate alors que les fondements de la professionnalisation tendent à disparaître au profit d’un mode de régulation du rapport au malade, au collègue et plus largement au savoir médical qui témoigne de l’émergence d’une culture soignante qui est, de fait, une culture organisationnelle. Elle se caractérise à la fois par la délégation des tâches à des non-professionnels, la production et la résolution des conflits mettant en évidence des réseaux clientélistes ainsi que par une routinisation des gestes.Drawing on an anthropological approach of tuberculosis and malaria care in West African cities , and on an analysis of prevention modes, this paper examines the characteristics of medical work. We first examined the conditions of an anthropological field study in health care centres. The concealment of both patients’ singularities and populations’ specificities targeted in the prevention messages were then studied. The negotiation of diagnosis and treatment standards, and the under- and over-estimations of nosocomial risks were also analysed. We also focused on the gap between demands and actual needs for training, and on the relationships between health care providers and patients, which can be modified by the specificities of the disease. We noticed a decay of professionalization, a kind of regulation of relationships between health care workers and patients, and among medical staff, which expresses an emerging medical culture, which is also an organizational culture. Its main features are the delegation of tasks to non-professionals workers, a strategy of conflict management based on clientelism, and the development of routine action. (shrink)

In one of the essays in his recent book on Christianity, La déclosion (2005), Nancy discusses the relationship between Judaism and Christianity. Nancy opens this discussion with a reference to Lyotard’s book on this relationship: Un trait d’union (1993). Both Lyotard and Nancy examine a very early figure in the emergence of Christianity from Judaism—whereas Lyotard focuses on the epistles of Paul, Nancy reads the epistle of James. Lyotard concludes that the hyphen in the expression ‘Judeo-Christian’ actually conceals ‘the most (...) impenetrable abyss within Western thought’. With this abyss, Lyotard refers to the point of departure of Judaism: the event in which a Voice has left behind letters, inaugurating an interminable work of interpretation. For Nancy, however, it is rather Christianity, and therefore, Western culture, which is deconstructive in nature. Its composition is co-original with a decomposition, and therefore, with an openness. In James, Nancy finds an emphasis on praxis, in such a way that existence is to be understood as transcendent within itself. With this reading of James, Nancy seems to deny that there is a fundamental difference between Judaism and Christianity. In order to clarify the differences between Lyotard and Nancy, it is shown that, in Lyotard’s view, an unsublatable alterity comes with aisthèsis, whereas in Nancy’s view, alterity comes with existence as such. (shrink)

En este artículo, expondré el concepto heideggeriano de phýsis entre los años 1927-30. Este concepto aparece en la doctrina de la Welteingang des Seienden, en el marco de una ‘radicalización de la ontología’, proyecto metafísico que luego hará crisis y llevará a Heidegger a reinterpretar la pregunta por el sentido del ser como pregunta por la verdad del Ser. Mostraré que la cuestión de la phýsis aporta elementos en esa crisis y posterior cambio de enfoque, en el ámbito filosófico-histórico y (...) en el fenomenológico. Mi hipótesis es que el empleo del concepto de phýsis en el contexto de la doctrina de la Welteingang des Seienden es un recurso especulativo que pretende aclarar el sentido en que el ente natural es, pero sin aparecer dentro del mundo, en términos de ‘tránsito’ desde el completo ocultamiento (phýsis) al desocultamiento (alétheia). Esto tendrá consecuencias respecto a la evaluación de la tradición metafísica, entendida como un preguntar por la phýsis en el doble sentido de ente en totalidad y ser de lo ente o esencialidad. (shrink)

continent. 1.1 (2011): 60-67. At the beginning of Martin Heidegger’s lecture “Time and Being,” presented to the University of Freiburg in 1962, he cautions against, it would seem, the requirement that philosophy make sense, or be necessarily responsible (Stambaugh, 1972). At that time Heidegger's project focused on thinking as thinking and in order to elucidate his ideas he drew comparisons between his project and two paintings by Paul Klee as well with a poem by Georg Trakl. In front of Klee's (...) Saints from the Window and Death of Fire —though we wouldn’t absolutely understand what we were seeing—he writes, “we should want to stand…a long while.” In a similar manner, of Trakl’s poem “Septet of Death”—although it is likely we are unsure in what we hear—Heidegger states that, “we should want to hear…[it] often.” Heidegger further states that in appreciating these, “we “should abandon any claim that [they] be immediately intelligible” (1). So also we must we approach, Heidegger continues, the realm of theoretical physics, in which the difficult work of Werner Heisenberg, be listened to “without protest” and without “any claim that he be immediately understood.” These works, like his own project, merit the time they take to be originally (mis)understood. But this is not necessarily true for philosophy, Heidegger advises, because, “That thinking is supposed to offer ‘worldly wisdom’ and perhaps even a ‘way to a blessed life’” (1). Philosophy is in the unique position of being both abstract (what do we talk about when we talk?) and at the same moment, useful. There are demands that it make sense, that it be, grounded, immediate, and most importantly, rational. Heidegger draws these comparisons between the works of Klee and Trakl and Heisenberg not to claim that philosophy is totally irresponsible. He does not claim that the poet, the painter, nor the physicist have acted irresponsibly. Rather, he would say, they are rising to the highest levels of intelligibility, though it is perhaps an intelligibility that is commonly unavailable to us. In Trakl’s case, as we shall see, mastery is the end result of difficult words. Instead, Heidegger seems be making pleas: for a period of uninterrupted unintelligibility (pure unintelligibility); and that there is a time (that time is now) when, “thinking is…placed in a position which demands of it reflections that are far removed from any useful, practical wisdom” (1-2). Heidegger argues that philosophy requires a period of time in which, instead of focusing on the practical—or even on the worldly—the discipline draw its “determination” instead from the place of painting and poetry and physics. In doing so, “we should have to abandon any claims to immediate intelligibility” (2). But Heidegger doesn’t offer this as a way out. We still have to turn up, we “still have to listen, because we must think what is inevitable, but preliminary” (2). The point for Heidegger, is not to listen to a series of propositions, but instead to “follow the movement of showing” (2). I. … Maybe we're here only to say: house, bridge, well, gate, jug, olive tree, window— at most: pillar, tower … but to say them, remember, oh, to say them in a way that the things themselves never dreamed of existing so intensely.… Rainer Maria Rilke, “The Ninth Elegy” There is little more fundamental, preliminary, in the world than language. We use language, in the form of speech, constantly, whether we are saying anything or not. “Man speaks,” Heidegger writes, and goes on to describe in his essay “Language” (2001) the constant speaking that we do. “We are always speaking, even when we do not utter a single word aloud, but merely listen or read, and even when we are not particularly speaking or listening but are attending to some work or taking a rest” (187). Speaking is expression, an utterance of something internal. It is a recognition of a world. It is a way of communicating thought and it is an activity that we all do, inevitably. Speaking separates the human from the animal world, and despite advances in primatology that seek to give ‘voice’ to primates and other non-human animals, it can safely be said that our form of communication—what we call speech and know as language—is the most advanced, the most complicated. We use it to present and represent the world around us; through actual utterances (vocalization) or through the written word or through ‘unvoiced thoughts’ and dreams. We use language, but more specifically speech—naming—to transmit moods, thoughts, desires, aversions, and feelings. These expressions, mere utterances, nearly always find a source in words, whether spoken or not. Heidegger writes that this common view of language means “that only speech enables man to be the living being he is as man. It is as the one who speaks that man is—man” (187). Speaking then—utterance—surrounds us constantly, whether in the form of careful thought—in the form of an academic paper, say—or in the half mutterings and forgotten thoughts of a nearly remembered dream. Like scaffolding, the apparatus of speech sustains and explains the world, making, in a sense, the world rational, making it apparent. When we speak, we describe, and in doing so, name the world. We use words, through this process of naming, to interpret and sustain the world we see, and the world we imagine. Like Rilke’s naming of jug, and bridge, and window, and stream, we describe—and inscribe upon—the world through an activity of naming. Are we here, perhaps, to name? Is it possible not to name? Is it possible to regard and to view and to look around without naming what we see? Is it possible to feel—to experience—world without giving utterance to that feeling, that process? Sadness, grief, joy, ecstasy, hunger, thirst. Desk, light, room, pen, book, world. White, black, tomorrow, today. Each of these words is a name given to a thing I see in front of me, or a concept that I imagine (in the case of tomorrow or world). What arises in my mind has already existed. If I imagine it, it is named. The word for ‘tomorrow’ and ‘desk’ and ‘light’ precedes me, and precedes my concept of it. The idea of it is already pre-informed, and I must, in a certain sense, bend my ideas to it. When I imagine a table, I imagine my own table (or I imagine an idea of table) but that imagining must follow certain general rules; while, perhaps, it might not always require four legs and a horizontal surface, it must, at least not be, say, a pool of water, or a pile of excrement. It must have some tableness to it to be a table. It must, with Heidegger, table. Otherwise, speech is reduced to gibberish. For Heidegger however, the discussion of language points to something deeper than its “scientific and analytic” study as a communicative device. Indeed, Heidegger seeks to understand language not in reference to man or woman, not as an utterance of humanity, but in reference to itself. In doing so he abandons the conversation—that is, he casts away the traditional arguments surrounding philosophy of language; that it is a means of expression; that it is a human activity; and that it is somehow a representation of something that is—in order to seek to understand language as language, on its own terms. Heidegger is not a philosopher of language, but a philosopher of world, of being. Despite these “correct ideas” holding sway “over the whole field of the varied scientific perspectives on language…they ignore completely the oldest natural cast of language” (191). What is this “oldest natural cast of language? It is the act of language itself. Language is language and language speaks. “Most often,” Heidegger writes, “and too often, we encounter what is spoken only as the residue of a speaking long past” (195). Speech, as we normally encounter it, is like Echo herself calling out to Narcissus, doomed to repeat what has already been said, a mere remnant of what was once language, a trace left behind in the gathering silence of becoming. In both the essay “Language” and in his three lecture course “The Nature of Language” (1982), Heidegger attempts to unpack the seeming tautology of language as language. In each, he focuses on poetry as a way out, or into, a true discussion of the oldest natural cast of language. Poetry is pure speech. In poetry, language is brought to language and language speaks ( Die Sprach spricht ). In the act of poetry, the act of pure speech, the poet names (on the surface not different from how I name this table, this computer) but in the poet naming, the naming does not “hand out titles,” “apply terms,” but rather the naming is a call, a calling forth of entities that bring them into their own, allow them to take their place purely, without compromise. This calling, Heidegger (2001) states, “here calls into a nearness. But even so the call does not wrest what it calls away from the remoteness, in which it is kept by the calling there. The calling calls into itself and therefor always here and there—here into presence, there into absence” (196). II. Window with falling snow is arrayed, Long tolls the vesper bell, The house is provided well, The table is for many laid. Wandering ones, more than a few, Come to the door on darksome courses. Golden blooms the tree of graces Drawing up the earth’s cool dew. Wanderer quietly steps within; Pain has turned the threshold to stone. There lie, in limpid brightness shown, Upon the table bread and wine. Georg Trakl “A Winter Evening” Heidegger is often given short shrift as an abysmally difficult writer, as one that makes no sense and is needlessly difficult. In doing this though, we forget sometimes his eloquence, his simple beauty in writing. Of the above opening stanza, “Window with falling snow is arrayed/ Long tolls the vesper bell.” he writes (2001), This speaking names the snow that soundlessly strikes the window late in the waning day, while the vesper bell rings. In such a snowfall, everything lasts longer. Therefore the vesper bell, which daily rings for a strictly fixed time, tolls long. The speaking names the winter evening time (197). The speaking names the winter evening time. It is almost impossible to comment on that one line by Heidegger. It is as though it must exist on its own completely, without elucidation—as though in front of it we must stand as we do in front of a painting by Klee, that is, we must abandon any claim . Silent and devoted. The speaking of the poem here is not clearly different from common speech ( rede ) yet there is, via Heidegger, an invitation to experience that auracular quality of light and stillness that a gentle, dusk tinged snowfall gives; words evoking a quality so clear, so poignant that, in a sense, Heidegger’s work, at this moment, has been done. But what does this naming accomplish? What does the call call? Remember, it is not the poet that calls, but the naming which calls. The poet has only brought the words forward; it is now the words— snow, vesper bell, window— that take new life in the pure language of the poem. Entities are called forth into presence, like the speaking that names the winter evening time. Not to be present amongst us now, however; naming ‘table’ in the poem does not place it in front of us in this room. Rather, the naming places entities into a gathering which is also a sheltering. The naming brings them to be. In an act of appropriation, things come to be purely as their own, unimpeded by a predetermined expectation. They are called to themselves into an arrival. In Being and Time (1962), Heidegger famously describes the movement between present-at-hand and ready-to-hand in his analysis of the hammer, and of equipment in general. This analysis is already known, if not always clear, to most readers of Heidegger. Briefly, a hammer is ordinarily zuhanden or ready-to-hand; it is part of the background of the world, equipment used and never thought about, like this desk, this sheet of paper, this room. Our interaction with it is temporary and it is historically different for each entity and each relation. We need a hammer, we use a hammer. If all goes according to plan, the hammer remains ready-to-hand; it remains, in a sense, undisclosed and certainly unobtrusive. Our world is undisturbed by the hammer. Only when the hammer or the car or the computer is broken (or sometimes unused or unrecognized or missing) does it intrude into our world, become conspicuous as an object present-at-hand, or vorhanden . In this case, we reach for the hammer, it is broken and we suddenly notice it’s being, broken though it is. The thing which was always ready to hand—handy—is suddenly abstract, something to be examined, if only in its absence or disfunction. This can be exhibited for all entities, and it is important to note that in this analysis the zuhanden / vorhanden split is not restricted to a specific form of constructed material; zuhanden does not refer to the car, and vorhanden the sunset. No entity is ever exclusively ready-to-hand or present-at-hand; they are instead, interpenetrated with each others mode of being, one informing the other in a way that both brings things forth into the world—discloses is the word Heidegger chooses—and at the same time conceals them. As one mode is coming to be so another mode is withdrawing. This flux and movement between modes is precisely what brings the world forward, and what makes it manifest. It exists beyond where we tread and before man took dubious control of the world. We go to find a book or turn on the computer and it is missing or broken and we become aware of the object, as though for the first time. We walk to the water to glimpse the sunset and miss it, or it is less than stellar; in the sunset’s grayness, we become aware of it’s being sunset. The thing is disclosed in its withdrawal. Echoing Heraclitus, we can say that as something is coming to be, it is already becoming something other. Of similar importance to the fact that things are never all of one, or all of the other, they are also never alone. The hammer is never a single object, but is in relation always to the whole. Heidegger (1962) states, Equipment—in accordance with its equipmentality—always is in terms of its belonging to other equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room. These ‘Things’ never show themselves proximally as they are for themselves…What we encounter as closest to us…is the room; and we encounter it not as something ‘between four walls’ in a geometrical, spatial sense, but as equipment for residing…it is in this that any ‘individual’ item of equipment shows itself. Before its does so, a totality of equipment has already been discovered (97). Equipment resides—dwells—in its relations, in its proximal being to other beings. Within the structure of totality, a series of relations is always occurring. The hammer is on the workbench in the carpenter’s hand in the workshop in the village under the sky and under the sun. It doesn’t stop there. Equipment surrounds us and the focus is not on what it does, or what one does with it—the carpenter with the hammer, the writer with laptop—but with the fact that it is. Equipment occurs in relation and is always occurring around us overhead, underfoot, by the stream and in the city. There is a constant exchange of relations happening, and as this occurs, so the world occurs, so the world both discloses and withdraws, into and out of itself. In a very real sense, language is also equipment. It is the thing that we use most often without thought, it is ready-to-hand (except when it’s not.) As we re- cognize the world around us, as we offer names for things and make lists, we are using language much like we might use a hammer, that is, bluntly. Most of the time it is invisible and we draw on it without wondering how we are going to say something. When language does intrude, it does so in an awkward moment, that moment when we can’t remember the right word, when we forget a phrase. At that second, it “speaks itself as language,” it reveals itself as malfunctioning equipment, and we “undergo” an experience with language, in Heidegger’s famous formulation. Language is not a tool anymore that we use to bludgeon an object, but something instead that we submit to, that we experience. In “The Nature of Language,” Heidegger (1982) writes, But when does language speak to us as language? Curiously enough, when we cannot find the right word for something that concerns us, carries us away, oppresses or encourages us. Then we leave unspoken what we have in mind and, without rightly giving it a thought, undergo moments in which language itself has distantly and fleetingly touched us with its essential being (59). The poet’s words become themselves, become appropriate, only when they no longer function in the prosaic world; they instead intrude as they come to be. Language itself brings itself to language. Names, like the entities they indicate, are always becoming something else. As noted above, language, through the poet, has brought forth entities from words previously “known.” I thought that I knew snow, but through Trakl’s re- presentation of the word, language calls forth a new image of snow, indeed calls forth snow itself. The vesper bell tolls longer, the table is for many laid. In bringing forth things , language has brought the world to presence. In everyday naming, word occludes world, preventing, in its everydayness, its coming forth, its disclosing. But what is this world that word has been brought forth into? In the same way that language speaks, world worlds. World, left alone, un-interfered with, comes into itself. It worlds. Again, this sounds like a tautology, but it is essential to Heidegger’s thought (and in my mind is more of a “god killer” than Nietzsche.) One of the most overlooked (and under-appreciated) aspects of Heidegger is his later examination and enthusiasm for the “fourfold,” or the system through which things come to be, through which things thing in a world worlding. The fourfold is the interaction of earth and sky, mortals and gods. Things come to be in the interstices and gathering of the fourfold. The fourfold provides both a place of being, and a sheltering, a place to dwell. Heidegger writes that “the things that were named, thus called, gather to themselves sky and earth, mortals and divinities. The four are united primally in being toward one another, a fourfold.” The poet has called, through the act of pure naming, things to come forth. In the purity of the fourfold—that is, when that is all that there is, when there are no other distractions, definitions, things—entities themselves can come to be. It is important to note that Heidegger is not saying that there are four formal things in the world, autonomous entities unto themselves. He is not evoking a pre-Socratic formula as to what makes up the world; instead, the four mirror each other constantly. (Heidegger calls this the ‘mirror-play.’) They interpenetrate in the same way that the modes of being of things interpenetrate themselves. There is no discrete exclusivity in being or the fourfold. What makes up things is not a precise recipe of the four main components; what makes up things is the action of the fourfold coming together, the movement of the fourfold which is a becoming. Heidegger (2001) writes that “this gathering, assembling, letting stay is the thinging of things.” And he later adds that “thinging, things are things. Thinging, they gesture—gestate—world” (197). Language brings the world to be. It works not again as a recipe added to things, but instead it is a bridge, or more precisely, a relation. Language relates world to thing, brings world to thing. In a sense, it does not say anything; rather it allows, or calls in its movement. Heidegger (2001) writes that, The intimacy of world and thing is not a fusion. Intimacy obtains only where the intimate—world and thing—divides itself cleanly and remains separated. In the midst of the two, in the between of world and thing, in their inter, division prevails: a dif-ference (199). It is in this inter that language prevails. Language is difference, it is the differential aspect between world and thing that brings world to thing. In the final stanza of Trakl’s poem “The Winter Evening,” Trakl evokes this difference in the second line when he writes, “Pain has turned the threshold to stone.” Christopher Fynsk, in his essay “Noise at the Threshold,” draws attention to this point when he writes “it is the figure of the threshold that is language itself, inasmuch as language is defined as the articulation of difference by which difference comes about” (25). Language, as used in the pure language of the poem, draws together world and thing, bridging relation between entity and world. The calling of language calls world to thing, world to being. Heidegger (2001) describes this difference as unique; “of itself, it holds apart the middle in and through which world and things are at one with each other” (200). III. Neither reading nor writing, nor speaking—and yet it is by those paths that we escape what has been said already, and knowledge, and reciprocity, and enter the unknown space, the space of distress where what is given is perhaps not received by anyone (99). Maurice Blanchot The Writing of Disaster So far, we have allowed Heidegger to put forward what language does, how it functions as a relation and how it operates as a threshold, as a bridge. What interests me is what happens beyond language, beyond the relation. What happens to the thing without the naming, without the poet, or even without the everyday chatter—Fynsk calls this ‘noise’—intruding on being? If language allows things to become by bringing thing to world, what happens when we remove this bringing, this threshold turned to pain? In “The Nature of Language,” Heidegger examines the work of the poet Stefan George, specifically “The Word”: Wonder or dream from distant land I carried to my county’s strand And waited till the twilight norn Had found the name within her bourn— Then I could grasp it close and strong It blooms and shines now the front along… Once I returned from happy sail, I had a prize so rich and frail, She sought for long and tidings told: “No like of these depths unfold.” And straight it vanished from my hand, The treasure never graced my land… So I renounced and sadly see: Where word breaks off no thing may be. That final line, “Where word breaks off no thing may be” is evoked on nearly every page of Heidegger’s essay. It is the line to which he returns over and over and bears repeating. Where word breaks off no thing may be. Where naming ends, no thing. We can interpret this in two ways (at least.) Where word—naming—breaks off, then there is nothing . Or, as I choose to read it, where word breaks off no thing may be. In this I see a hint forward, a marker left behind by Heidegger. What could this look like? What does no thing look like? Like a zen koan ( there is no mirror ) it is as thrilling and horrifying as contemplating what preceded the Big Bang. Because language as naming wasn’t always here; we weren’t always here. One or maybe two aspects of the fourfold (depending on your view of gods) were not always here, and there is no guarantee that we will always be around. What then? Heidegger (1982) describes the landscape that the poet finds, “It names the realm into which the renunciation must enter: it names the call to enter into that relation between thing and word which has now been experienced” (65). The poet, in renouncing, allows for the “may be” of “where word breaks off no thing may be.” This “may be” becomes “a kind of imperative, a command which the poet follows, to keep it from then on.” No thing is lacking. Where word breaks off, there may be, a totality, a completion. If we place the emphasis on may be , we make it affirmative, make it positive. One allows it. No thing is where the word, that is the name, is lacking. If we remove then (if we can remove) the word, the name, than that is where no thing is, that is where no thing may blossom, enrich, belong, become. What is no thing? Heidegger writes that “thing is anything that in any way is.” And just after this he writes that the “world alone gives being to the thing.” But what happens if there is no word? Word, in this formulation can be seen as an enframing, a challenging of language. By naming, by drawing a perimeter around an object, we hold it, by its definition (that is a brick) to an ordered future. If we borrow from Heidegger’s essay “The Question Concerning Technology” (1993) the idea of this standing-reserve of an ordered future, we see that “everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering” (322). What happens if there is no naming of the thing? Silence perhaps. Stillness. We can name—and do name—that which we know. We equate knowledge with knowing the name of something. A brick is a brick, a hammer is a hammer, the universe is the universe. By naming a thing, we create, and draw its parameters, the parameters of the thing, not as thing thinging in the fourfold, but as blunt object apparent. In the four dimensions relatively available to us, we observe (and name) that the brick takes up possibly six by four by two inches and is, in the sense that it currently occupies this time slot. It fulfills its destiny, its being, its brickness, it bricks . But what happens when we remove the name for this brick. We no longer know what to call this no-thing (if indeed we can even arrive at the point of uncalled calling.) In fact the it (this brick) is no longer a thing in the sense that by not naming—by removing the name—it still occupies the same dimension but is indiscernible from the world. It simply is , un-reliant, un- needed by me. By removing the subject (me) from it (the brick) do I not then also remove the object—or at least the duality objectifying it? Why is this important? Why does this matter? I have not really removed anything. I have not changed any thing , per se . The brick still occupies the same space in geographic and temporal dimensions. I have literally not even touched the brick sitting on my desk. But what I have done is removed the name, removed the word (the bridge, according to Heidegger) and in this (again, if this is even possible) there is something vertiginously liberating, not only for me (and my way of thinking) but also for the brick itself. Like the poet who calls the thing forward, by refusing to name, by avoiding any thing that demands me to name it, I release the thing into the fourfold. I am no longer challenging the thing to be there for me ; I do not en frame it through language. Rather I, in an act of extreme responsibility, am refusing the challenge. By refusing the name (refusing to name) one allows, (or no one allows no thing) the brick to be all things , to manifest its manifold being, to incorporate all things into its thinging . It becomes, quite literally, every thing . Because, in its infinite manifestness, it incorporates everything; the mud that gave it its current being, the water that formed the mud, the sun, the stars, the universe and it also allows it to become mud again, to become landfill, to become again, water and sun and stars and universe in an endless, infinite cycle of coming to be some thing (else). Perhaps this is what Heidegger is suggesting when he talks about the stillness at the end of his essay, “Language” (2001): The dif-ference stills particularly in two ways: it stills the things in thinging and the world in worlding. Thus stilled, thing and world never escape from the dif-ference. Rather, they rescue it in the stilling, where the dif-ference is itself the stillness (206). It is in this stillness that I can imagine a gellasenheit (here I mean both “releasement in the Heideggarean sense, as well as Meister Eckhart’s use of the term meaning “letting the world go and giving oneself to God”) of thing and world, a releasing into the stillness and silence of no thing beyond where word breaks off. It is here where I may no longer be, and yet no thing is, but may be. (shrink)

Resumen: En la obra de Kafka no hay figura más frecuente que la de un hombre doblado sobre si mismo, bajo el peso de fuerzas primitivas, al que Benjamín define el arquetipo de la deformidad. Partiendo de esta sugerente imagen benjaminiana y analizando el progresivo encorvamiento de las formas que afecta no sólo los protagonistas de la ficción kafkiana, sino también sus ambientes, este trabajo quiere ofrecer un lectura en clave estético-juridica de El proceso, la cual demuestre como detrás de (...) la geometría curvilínea que estructura la novela se esconda una genealogía del derecho moderno distinta de aquella visible en el discurso jurídico oficial. Abstract: In Kafka's work there is no figure more frequent than that of a man bent over himself, under the weight of primitive forces, which Benjamin defines the archetype of deformity. Starting from this suggestive Benjamin's image and analyzing the progressive bending of forms that affects not only the protagonists of Kafkaesque fiction but also their environments, this essay wants to offer an aesthetic-juridical reading of The Trial, which proves as the curvilinear geometry that structures the novel conceals a genealogy of modern law distinct from that visible in official legal discourse. (shrink)

The four essays collected in this dossier are directed upon the contemporary understandings of blackness, as an ontology, a phenomenology, or a historicity. In the order of their presentation they encompass and situate what seems first to limit black being or overflow it, but which, when questioned, that is, disclosed, or unconcealed, does not fit into this logos, nor is ordered by it, even making what is most discernable about blackness in its past, future, or present, seem imaginary, moored in (...) a non-present,and presence, but in ways which make the non-being that marks blackness as sign, affect, or speaking being, unthinkable except as an appearing, a manifestation, an identity.As a dossier directed upon the present philosophical understanding of blackness, each paper seeks to unanchor blackness from the meanings and presuppositions that it normally calls forth. Beyond what is discernable, or ready-made, each paper addresses structures that make (and have made) blackness discernable as the always given to be seen, as meaningless speech, as pathology, as a concept beyond reason.The dossier opens with a question: what kind of disturbance does blackness present to being? Why does it seem to madden reason, or call forth frenzy? In Calvin Warren’s essay, “The Karen Call,” what comes into correlation with blackness are various kinds of emergency that structure white thought and presence but that belie witnessing and intelligibility, and in whose chain of significations can be discerned an ontological privilege that constitutes the world. To appear emergent, it seems, all blackness has to do is become one with the myth that bans or compromises it; a manifestation in which subject-object relations are already polarized by the dangers that deploy it in dramas of emergency. Once blackness becomes emergent, there is no escape, for it comes up against what Warren, reading Heidegger against the grain, suggests is a racial destiny of Being. To appear black is forthwith to resemble an es gibt that is indissociable from threat, falsehood, fantasy, and obliteration. To that extent, blackness attests to a kind of ontological emergency without surcease or hope, and one whose trace remains in every moment or glimpse; whose technical modality and structure always returns us to the call that is neither speech nor gaze, word nor symbol, but represents an extimacy that is undeconstructable, beyond utterance, meaning, or reparation.Such extimacy seems to induce a crisis in the philosophical notion of being itself. In Axelle Karera’s essay, “Paraontology,” the question asked is why blackness cannot be contained or fitted into ontology itself; or, if philosophy is ontology, why does blackness seem to signify an irreducible resistance to it?How does such resistance occur? If blackness can only be presented as “paraontology,” a word that seems to shelter ontology at the same time as it presents the search for a new order of being, what does the para teach us about blackness as disorder, resistance, or identity? What is its philosophical genealogy and affiliation, and why does the para itself seem to never get beyond its own conciliation, or filiation to philosophy, whose ordering and racist historicity thereby remains the seme and mark of the para as interval, trope, and index? Or, put more simply, can blackness ever resist its own resistance as trope, conjuncture, or representation? Retracing that genealogy through the work of Oskar Becker, Karera uncovers a surreptitious repetition in black uses of the word, in whose weave can be discerned a fascist interference that not only undermines the fugitivity of the resistance so claimed, but one that unwittingly repeats a fascist ontology of world, history, and being.1 It’s a startling, deeply disturbing claim. But the apparent echoing of the Heideggerian bell in black significations of ontology suggests that what is being reabsorbed here is not so much a radical difference but a concept that remains justified and in fee to, pardoned and annulled by, a white notion of being. What, then, can it mean to think blackness as para? Nothing more than a philosophical confusion that confuses l’être qui fuit, that is, the lack that Lacan says cannot be completed or resisted, for an appositional fantasy of displacement. Here everything that is deemed black has to be made meaningful in apposition to ontology, but everything that is black must also, it seems, always return apposition to the white para of ontology; to be black and appositional would, it seems, produce only the disavowal of the philosophical genealogy that always already determines it.One would be right to distrust such claims—the moralism of the refusal, and the scandal of the faux resistance by which the para hides behind its own whited-out screen.In the third contribution to the dossier, the question asked is what would it mean for blackness to repair itself, to let go or retrieve and so redeem its own historical conjuncture? How do we refer to an irreparable past, that is, a past that keeps on coming back, but one that has no sign or signified, no memory that can recapture or reveal it, or simply rejoin us to it without remainder? Rinaldo Walcott’s essay, “‘Retrospective Significance,’” revisits the reparations debate as a question of black being. Instead of repair, he finds desolation and emptiness, or what he calls a staggeringly incoherent rhetoric of coherency. It’s a paradox that addresses what it means to remember or to forget a nothing; if blackness is nothing, how does one reconnect with it, bond with it, compensate it in its historic devastation? What would it mean to receive meaning from such devastation, to express it if this nothingness is absolute, or absolutely valueless? If ontology is a structure, then blackness, Walcott suggests, expresses nothing less than a “slave-ness” that continues to confront and disturb us absolutely, irrevocably. As such slave-ness is the trace that remains as a sign of the irreparable. As a trace, and not a sign, slave-ness becomes the primordial signifier of being, nation, history, and diaspora. But it is what makes it irrecuperable that defines its value and difficulty for the very language of reparation. Walcott pursues this difficult, enigmatic thread through the work of black thinkers on diaspora and identity. He concludes: black being cannot be dissociated from the disturbance it offers value, conscience, and any thought of alterity.The final and fourth contribution returns to the question of blackness as the trace or thread (the monstration) of being. How does one follow the thread (montrer) of blackness if it is always already withdrawn from being? David Marriott’s essay, “Ontology and Lalangue,” evokes Lacan’s concept of lalangue in pursuit of this enigmatic equivocation between letter and signifier, philosophy and psychoanalysis. Showing how both discourses have sought to master this exorbitance as master and/or free it as slave, I show how blackness is extinguished by the very words used to precipitate it into being. The slavish audacity of this lalangue is then shown to disarticulate, or more exactly, withdraw from ontology, but only so that whiteness can be presented and proclaimed all the more as the un-representable truth and logic of Dasein. This way of excluding blackness while preserving whiteness is not only central to philosophical and psychoanalytic understandings of language, Marriott argues, but this way of manifesting itself without manifesting itself is also crucial to the racialization of the logos as such.What is essential here is the way a meaning that is beyond meaning or representation is inserted into a problematic of mastery and servitude that advances-conceals a racial genealogy but in ways that makes the being of blackness an enigma. As such, blackness becomes an exorbitance that is always effaced in its monstration. More, its revelation must necessarily be unrecognized as the very locus of knowledge and truth. In that sense, what would it mean to figure, or to speak, this n’est pas without the consolation of being, meaning, truth, or logic? What would it mean to represent it as situated or defined by the language of ontology? Is black speaking being always in a relationship to and simultaneously the manifestation of a lalangue of lalangue? (shrink)

The place of Glissant’s philosophy of decolonisation in relation to Fanon and Césaire has been theorised by some authors, but the emphasis has not been placed on the fact that Glissant refers to both his predecessors as examples of the absence of a link between the two tactics of resistance – un détour [a tactical diversion] and un retour [a return]. For Glissant, both Césaire and Fanon are still diverters and not properly producers of a new reality, of a real (...) Caribbean territory and history. Thus, following previous analyses by commentators, but departing from them (or adding a new layer, the layer of spatiality that should be combined with a traditional analysis of temporality), this chapter defends the idea that Glissant locates his decolonial thought between Césaire and Fanon: it neither advocates a reconstruction that points to a past located elsewhere (Africa), nor recommends the rejection and replacement of the here/now with a different, unknown spatiality and temporality. For Glissant, the locus of resistance is located in the present and in the possibilities of decolonisation already contained in the Caribbean, although concealed and understated. This chapter begins by showing what is, according to Glissant, the necessary conjunction between the different tactics of resistance, then focuses on some of Césaire’s and Fanon’s texts in order to show why they do not offer this necessary link. The final section comes back to Glissant to analyse the notion of l’antillanité as the possibility of truly focusing on a here/now as a multilayered strategy of resistance. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:220 THEATRE AND RELIGIOUS HYPOTHESIS* We are placed in this world, as in a great theatre, where the true springs and causes of every event are entirely concealed from us.... David Hume La collection des idées s'appelle imagination, dans la mesure où celleci désigne, non pas une faculté, mais un ensemble des choses, au sens le plus vague du mot, qui sont ce qu'elles paraissent: collection sans album, (...) pièce sans théâtre, ou flux des perceptions.. Gilles Deleuze In Part III of Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion the character Demea contests the analogy drawn by Cleanthes between an orderly world and a coherent, articulate speech, stating that, When I read a volume, I enter into the mind and intention of the author: I become him, in a manner, for the instant; and have an immediate feeling and conception of those ideas, which revolved in his imagination, while employed in that composition. To begin reading Hume's Dialogues with such false and naive premises would inevitably result in a failure to pick up on all the different voices in this text. In fact, no written text can really enable a reader "to enter into the mind and intention of the author." Moreover, such a predisposition on behalf of a naive reader will become further complicated by the processes of 'distanciation' and avoidance of a central point of view, which are brought into play by Hume in this text, where religion is being considered from a purely speculative point of view. Hume has in fact given the reader a clue in the introduction as to how 221 to approach reading the Dialogues. when Pamphilus, the narrator, expounds to his friend Hermippus the advantages of presenting a discussion in the form of a dialogue rather than as a direct statement. He argues that by using a dialogue it is possible to avoid any overtones of an author addressing his reader, or a pedagogue his pupil (D 127). Confronted with a text that is paradoxically both lucid and unclear, any reader whose attitude is still limited by certain metaphysical categories might very well want to know who is actually Hume's spokesman and who he is really addressing in this discussion on the nature and existence of God. These questions are in fact related to traditional oppositions, such as that between a central and subsidiary point of view in a dialogue; between the essential and non-essential of a discussion. In his Dialogues, Hume creates a second degree of separation between himself and the characters involved in the discussion by using the literary process of 'distanciation', when he introduces the fictitious character Pamphilus, who tells Hermippus of the discussions he has heard. From this point of view the style of the text is immediately more disconcerting than Cicero's De Natura Deorum, (which inspired Hume's text), as Cicero does identify himself with his narrator, such that any effect of distanciation is far smaller. Cicero's narrator does, however, emphasize that the multiplicity of points of view in this text results in a certain degree of scepticism and suspension of judgement: "Though it is possible that they are all of them false, it is impossible that more than one of them is true" (p. 71). As Hume does in his Dialogues, Cicero here tries to avoid imposing a 222 central point of view or a single authoritative angle to his discussions, as if given by a teacher; in fact, "in a discussion of this kind our interest should be centred not on the weight of the authority but on the weight of the argument" (p. 73). Thus, wearing the mask of Pamphilus, Hume can play an ironic role, without having to give a central point of view, by having his character present the idea that "reasonable men may be allowed to differ, where no one can reasonably be positive" (D 128). These two texts therefore use the same process of disassociation from a central truth by using a supposedly neutral narrator. When reading the Dialogues one can rely neither on the authority of the author, as he has hidden himself away in the shadows backstage, nor on that... (shrink)

English Abstract This paper examines arguments made by the Argentinean philosopher Risieri Frondizi in his essay “On the Unity on the Philosophies of the Two Americas” regarding the legitimacy of unifying the philosophic traditions of the Americas. It argues that the present situation is much as it was in the 1950’s: the two largest philosophical communities of the Americas are still generally isolated from each other and the integration of these communities is a legitimate aspiration. The paper then examines the (...) concern, mentioned by Frondizi, that Pan-Americanism is political propaganda concealing U.S. imperialism in Latin America. It concludes that Frondizi’s arguments in favor of unifying American philosophies should encourage philosophers across the Americas to integrate the philosophical traditions of the Americas through a dialogue that explicitly addresses the United States’ history of anti-democratic actions in Latin America. Resumen en español Este articulo examina los argumentos formulados por el filósofo argentino Risieri Frondizi en su ensayo “Sobre la unidad de las filosofías de las dos Américas” con respeto a la legitimidad de la unificación de las tradiciones filosóficas de las Américas. Argumenta que la situación actual es tanto como lo fue en la década de 1950: las dos comunidades filosóficas más grandes de las Américas en general siguen siendo aislados unos de otros y la integración de estas comunidades es una aspiración legítima. Este articulo entonces se examina la preocupación, mencionada por Frondizi, que el panamericanismo es un tipo de propaganda política que oculta el imperialismo de EE.UU. en América Latina. Llega a la conclusión de que los argumentos de Frondizi en favor de unificación de las filosofías de las Américas deben fomentar los filósofos de las Américas para integrar las tradiciones filosóficas de las Américas a través de un diálogo que aborde explícitamente la historia de las acciones anti-democráticas en América Latina de los Estados Unidos. (shrink)

La perception à travers l’imaginationDans le présent travail, je mets en relation les lectures de Wittgensteil et de Gadamer avec les manuscrits de Merleau-Ponty avec l’intention de traverser la construction du « concept de représentation » et de réfléchir sur les questions suivantes : quel lieu occupe la dimension esthétique dans l’expérience humaine? Dans l’expérience esthétique, faut-il retrouver autant le profil émotionnel que le profil cognitif? Le point de départ est que l’esthétique ne doit pas être comprise comme une simple (...) perception par les sens; ce qu’aucun discours sur l’esthétique ne peut occulter est sa nécessaire implication de l’horizon problématique de la perception, à partir de l’étymologie même du terme, dérivé du grec aisthesis.Un tel terme porte en lui autant le champ subjectif instable des sensation que le champ stable et tendanciellement structuré des discriminations perceptives.L’affirmation théorique est que l’expérience de la rencontre d’une oeuvre d’art dévoile un monde et à peine cessons-nous de voir une oeuvre d’art comme objet pour la voir comme un monde que nous nous rendons compte que l’art se révèle être l’expédient pour clarifier le sens de notre rapport perceptif avec le monde, cette syntonie perceptive entre l’essence du monde et le sentir des sujets, cette processualité expressive dans laquelle activité et passivité sont les horizons, qu’on peut certes distinguer dans la description, mais qui coopèrent à l’intérieur d’elle-même.Perception Through ImaginationIn the present work, I bring the lectures of Wittgenstein and Gadamer into contact with the manuscripts of Merleau-Ponty with the intention of going over the construction of the “concept of representation” and of reflecting on the following questions: what place does the aesthetic dimension occupy in human experience? In aesthetic experience, is just as necessary to recognize the emotional profile as the cognitive profile? The point of the departure is that aesthetics must not be understood as a simple perception by the senses. That which no discourse of aesthetics may conceal is its necessary implication of the problematic horizon of perception, following the actual etymology of the term, derived from the Greek aisthēsis.This term contains just as much the subjective and unstable field of sensation as it does the stable field of perceptual discriminations that tend to be structured. The theoretical affirmation is that the experience of the encounter with a work of art unveils a world. No sooner do we stop seeing the work of art as an object and start seeing as a world, then we realize that art reveals itself to be the expedient that clarifies the meaning of our perceptual relationship with the world, this perceptual syntony between the essence of the world and the sensing of subjects, this expressive processuality in which activity and passivity are horizons that can certainly be distinguished in description, but that cooperate internally. (shrink)

«Weizsäcker et les autres »Merleau-Ponty lecteur du GestaltkreisConçu comme un élément de l’essai « Percezione, corpo e movimento. L’estetica antropologia dell’espressione nell’inedito Le monde sensible et le monde de l’expression di Maurice Merleau-Ponty » (publié dans le n° 12 de Chiasmi international), le texte « Weizsäcker et les autres » examine la plus importante – et la moins reconnue – des dettes théoriques merleau-pontiennes. Cette source « occultée » recouvre le rôle important dans l’encadrement des questions de l’expression et du (...) mouvement dans la philosophie merleau-pontienne. En approfondissant les consonances théoriques entre certains chapitres centraux de la Phénoménologie de la perception, Le monde sensible et le monde de l’expression et Der Gestaltkreis de Viktor von Weizsäcker, nous avancerons l’hypothèse d’une connaissance approfondie de la part de Merleau-Ponty du texte cardinal de l’anthropologie médicale des années quarante.“Weizsäcker et les autres”Merleau-Ponty reads the GestaltkreisConceived as a part of the essay “Percezione, corpo e movimento. L’estetica antropologia dell’espressione nell’inedito Le monde sensible et le monde de l’expression di Maurice Merleau-Ponty” (published in Chiasmi International, no. 12), the text of “Weizsäcker and the Others” examines the most important – least recognized – of Merleau-Ponty’s theoretical debts. This “concealed” source covers Weizsäcker’s important role in the framing of questions of expression and movement in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. By treating in depth the theoretical resonances between certain central chapters of The Phenomenology of Perception, Le monde sensible et le monde de l’expression (The Sensible World and the World of Expression), and Viktor von Weizsäcker’s Der Gestaltkreis, we will advance the hypothesis that Merleau-Ponty had a profound knowledge of the cardinal text of medical anthropology of the 1940s. (shrink)

Throughout, the paper examines the concept of the unexpected. Heraclitus, Kostas Axelos, and Bernard Stiegler are invoked to decipher the impossible-possibility encapsulated in Heraclitus’ Fragment 18. The term ‘unhoped-for’ signifies the ‘un-passable’ or ‘un-traversable,’ akin to an insurmountable enigma. Aporia, or a difficult-to-resolve impasse, is associated with this sense. The unexpected challenges all expectations, revealing the hidden truth within aporia. The ‘methodology’ to transcend the aporon echoes Heidegger’s pursuit as Being tends toward self-concealment. This exploration urges us to consider the (...) utterly unforeseen and discover possibilities in the impossible itself, emphasizing the need to be radically open to the as-yet undiscovered. With this in mind, the paper considers Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of absolute deterritorialization, the question of utopia, and engages with an array of contemporary continental thinkers to highlight the transformative potential of crisis, exhaustion, and uncertainty. The image of the spiral is invoked as a metaphor for the creativity inherent in thought itself. (shrink)

Pour prouver que l'Instinct est une réalité scientifiquement établie, l'auteur procéde comme suit. Répondant à ceux qui prétendent qu'il n'a jamais été possible d'en donner une définition satisfaisante, il cite trois formules qui décrivent avec toute la clarté désirable les conditions observables de certains comportements nettement innés et spécifiques, instinctifs donc; Il réfute les raisonnements d'auteurs qui, dissimulant l'action de l'Instinct derriére le rôle rempli par des facultés auxiliaires, mémoire, intelligence, ont cru par cet artifice pouvoir prétendre que „l'Instinct n'est (...) rien“. Il analyse des raisonnements qui ont été élaborés pour démontrer que certains Instincts, considérés comme degrés inférieurs et transitoires, sont pratiquement aussi savants, aussi parfaits que ceux acceptés comme tels! Il cite des faits qui montrent que des Insectes vivant à l'état larvaire dans des troncs d'arbres, prévoient, au moment de se chrysalider, quelles seront leur forme et leurs aptitudes, et agissent en conséquence, bien que rien n'ait pu les éclairer à cet égard; Il montre que l'Instinct n'est pas un simple réflexe, qu'il ne dépend pas des sécrétions hormonales et, par l'exemple des Canaris et des Castors du Rhône; il fait voir qu'il est indélébilement inscrit dans la mentalité de l'espéce, et peut se réactiver aprés avoir été inutilisé par des centaines de générations. Il établit enfin que, pour agir comme ils le font, les Animaux doivent être dotés d'une science innée, que rien dans leur passé individuel ne leur enseigne et que l'Instinct est donc, dans sa nature intime, la connaissance héréditaire, virtuelle peut-être, d'un plan de vie spécifique.To prove that instinct is a scientifically established fact, the author proceeds as follows. Replying to the argument that it has never been possible to give a satisfactory definition of instinct, he quotes three formulae stating clearly the observable conditions of modes of behaviour which are incontestably innate and specific and therefore instinctive. He refutes the captious arguments of authors who, concealing the action of instinct behind the part played by auxiliary faculties , try to demonstrate by this artifice that “instinct is nothing” . He criticizes the arguments adduced to demonstrate that certain instincts, considered to be inferior and transitory stages of development are practically as adequate and as skilful as those considered perfect. He quotes facts showing that larvae living in trunks of trees at pupation, act in accordance with their future shape and aptitudes — as if they could foresee these — though nothing could have instructed them in this matter. He demonstrates that instinct is not a simple physiological reflex, that it does not depend on hormonal secretions and, by the example of the Canary-birds and the Beaver , he shows that instinct is ineffaceably stamped in the species mentality, and can reappear after a period of inactivity of several hundreds of generations. Finally he demonstrates that, to be able to act as they do, the animals must be endowed with an innate knowledge which nothing in their individual past can have taught them, and that instinct essentially is: the hereditary knowledge of a specific mode of life.Zum Beweis, dass der Instinkt ein wissenschaftlich begründeter Begriff ist, geht der Autor in folgender Weise vor. Antwortlich des Argumentes, dass es niemals gelungen ist eine befriedigende Definition des Instinktbegriffes anzugeben, gibt der Autor drei Zitate, woraus ganz deutlich die wahrnehmbaren Verhaltensumstände hervorgehen, welche unstreitig angeboren und spezifisch und deshalb instinktiv sind. Er lehnt die Auseinandersetzungen ab von Autoren, welche unter Zurücksetzung der Instinktsaktivität hinter der Funktion der nebensächlichen Aktivitäten wie Gedächtnis und Intelligenz, mittels dieser Manipulation zu beweisen versuchen dass der Instinkt nichts ist. . Er kritisiert die Argumente aufgeführt zum Beweis, dass gewisse Instinkte, betrachtet als subordinierte und vorübergehende Entwicklungstufen, genau so geeignet und fähig sind wie die als perfekt betrachteten Instinkte. Er führt Tatsachen auf, welche zeigen, dass Larven welche sich in Baumstrünken aufhalten sich bei der Verpuppung benehmen in Übereinstimmung mit ihrer künftigen Erscheinungsform und Lebensweise, alsob sie es vorhersehen könnten — obwohl gar keine Instruierung stattgefunden haben könnte. Er zeigt, dass der Instinkt nicht ein einfacher physiologischer Reflex ist, dass er unabhängig ist von Hormonalregulierungen, und mit den Kanarienvögeln und Bibern , als Beispiele zeigt er, dass der Instinkt unauslöschlich eingeprägt ist in der Mentalität der Art, und wieder erscheinen kann nach einer Periode von Inaktivierung von verschiedenen Hunderten von Generationen. Schliesslich konstatiert er, dass die Tiere, dank der Zielstrebigkeit der Handlungen, ausgestattet sind mit einer angeborenen Kenntnis, welche Kenntnis nicht in ihrem vorübergegangenen individuellen Leben angelehrt sein kann, und dass der Instinkt wesentlich ist: die erblich determinierte Kenntnis eines speziellen Lebensplants. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Mask of Enlightenment: Nietzsche’s ZarathustraKathleen Marie HigginsThe Mask of Enlightenment: Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, by Stanley Rosen; 286 pp. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, $18.95 paper.In Ecce Homo Nietzsche remarks that he wants to be read the way good old philologists read Horace. Stanley Rosen has fullled this Nietzschean wish. His Mask of the Enlightenment interprets Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra with astute attention, and it delivers on Rosen’s (...) stated aim of avoiding both the obscurantism of postmoderns and the selective attention of analytic philosophers. It is philological in the best sense, balancing its consideration of detail with a sense of the book’s larger context, as well as the context of textual predecessors to whom Nietzsche refers and responds.Rosen reads Nietzsche as a fundamentally political thinker, who seeks to transform humanity’s collective circumstances. The ultimate goal of this effort [End Page 193] is “to breed a new race of mankind” that would supersede the decadent existing race (p. 56). This positive aim, however, requires the destruction of the existing race to make room for the new one.Zarathustra, according to Rosen, is an artistic statement of these aspirations and a tactic for achieving them. From the beginning, Zarathustra calls for the appearance of the superman and the destruction of contemporary European culture. Aware of how far his contemporaries are from the superman, Zarathustra utilizes a double rhetoric, concealing his real intent from all but the select few.Zarathustra addresses noble lies to the crowd, which make his doctrines appear to be afrmative and salvational, but try to seduce the majority to their own self-destruction. Preaching the coming of the superman and the doctrine of eternal recurrence (the view that time recurs cyclically), Zarathustra’s real purpose is to accelerate nihilism and hasten the destruction of current European culture. This aim, however, is concealed by the seemingly afrmative character of these doctrines.Zarathustra’s esoteric message rests on Nietzsche’s materialistic reductionism, according to Rosen. Nietzsche understands reality, fundamentally, to be nothing but chaotic uctuations among accumulating points of force. Even the expression “will to power” suggests a more coherent ontological structure than reality exhibits. The doctrine of “will to power” is an exoteric idea that conceals Nietzsche’s belief that the world is a chaos of uctuating points of force. Will, subjectivity, and physics are all illusions that disguise a cruel and uncaring world.The doctrine of eternal recurrence, in its esoteric sense, reects this vision. Claiming that the sequence of temporal events recurs endlessly, the doctrine is an image for the universe’s spontaneous being, which has no inherent value. This vision is nihilistic, for it implies the illusory status of our subjective selves, any sense of progress, and even our scientic theories. If reality is ultimately chaos, our lives are meaningless.So understood, the doctrine of eternal recurrence is not obviously compatible with Zarathustra’s call for the superman. The superman project is doomed to fail, since eternal recurrence implies that the condition of decadence will recur, even if a superman is generated at some point. Eternal recurrence is also incompatible with amor fati, the love of fate that Zarathustra preaches. Eternal recurrence is an image of chance, of the random happening of force-points, while amor fati is a deterministic vision. Chance and necessity are the same in their human signicance. Both deny human freedom. Chance means that our behavior arises from the un-ordered movements of force points.One of the achievements of Rosen’s book is its mapping of such tensions within Zarathustra, tensions that motivate the drama of the book. These tensions are numerous. Zarathustra preaches the superman to those he seeks as followers, but followers are inherently incapable of the superman’s creative [End Page 194] spontaneity. Zarathustra’s bombast, used to attract attention, is in tension with the subtlety of his actual message. The activism implied by Zarathustra’s preaching is at odds with the fatalism of amor fati. The rank-ordering of human types, a feature of Zarathustra’s elitism, is incompatible with his inner doctrine that the world is chaos.Rosen concludes that some of these tensions... (shrink)

Resumen: Este estudio da cuenta del análisis crítico del discurso realizado en una investigación mayor aplicada a 151 docentes técnicos, que se desempeñan en los niveles diferenciados de liceos de Educación Media Técnico Profesional con alto nivel de vulnerabilidad. Esta fase buscó establecer representaciones discursivas acerca de los estudiantes, cuando los docentes relacionan los conceptos de EMTP, pobreza y familia. El corpus fue analizado desde el modelo Tridimensional de Fairclough. Los resultados reproducen dos discursos sociales, el del Estado y el (...) de la familia, ocultando una dominación al instalar una falsa autonomía social en las poblaciones de estudiantes más pobres, proyectadas en un determinismo, cuando no se ven posibilidades de superar la pobreza.: This study gives an account of the critical discourse analysis carried out in an investigation, more applied to 151 technical professors, who work in the differentiated levels of secondary vocational schools with high level of vulnerability. This phase sought to establish discursive representations towards students, when teachers relate the concepts of EMTP, poverty and family. The corpus was analyzed from the three-dimensional model Fairclough. The results reproduce two social discourses, that of the state and that of the family, concealing a domination by installing a false social autonomy in the poorest student populations, projected on a determinism, when there is no chance of overcoming poverty. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Epistemologies and the Limitations of Philosophical Enquiry: Doctrine in Madhva VedantaChristopher BartleyEpistemologies and the Limitations of Philosophical Enquiry: Doctrine in Madhva Vedanta. By Deepak Sarma. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005. Pp. xiii + 101.Epistemologies and the Limitations of Philosophical Enquiry: Doctrine in Madhva Vedanta, by Deepak Sarma, purports to discuss the possibility of philosophical evaluation of a tradition of thought and practice, in this case the Dvaita (...) school of Vedānta to which the author belongs, that upholds a "strict insider epistemology." (Although the work bears the subtitle "Doctrine in Madhva Vedanta," for information about beliefs and epistemology the reader would be better advised to consult Deepak Sarma's An Introduction to Madhva Vedanta [Ashgate, 2003].)The present reviewer is not privy to the "insider-outsider debate" apparently current in some centers of Religious Studies, and I state at the outset that I cannot see what all the fuss is about. If one is not a member of a private club, one probably doesn't care about what goes on within its walls. If a tradition is closed to nonmembers, successfully concealing its beliefs and practices (in the manner of some versions of Freemasonry), that's the end of the matter. If texts are really not accessible (p. 6), the activities that the philosopher can pursue are not just "severely restricted"! If what a tradition involves is public (even allowing for esoteric elements revealed only to initiates and for rituals of restricted participation), there are still "outsiders," but they are not debarred from appreciation, discussion, and critical philosophical [End Page 126] analysis of its truth claims. Albeit a middle-aged male member of the Church of England, I can understand (in the conventional sense of the term, which is the only one it has) the Dvaitin adoption of the unusual reading "atat tvam asi" (Chandogya Upanishad 6.8.7 et seq.).What is meant by "insider epistemology"? Sarma says:[T]here are two kinds of communities that uphold insider epistemologies. One is centred around experiential data and claims that outsiders can neither know nor understand what it is like to be an insider. The other simply does not permit outsiders to access root texts. Though actual communities are likely to lie somewhere between these two, or combine elements from each, this bivalent taxonomy is useful as a heuristic device [sic]. (p. 9)The Madhvas, insofar as they deny noninitiates access to some of their basic texts, belong to the second group. (Members of the first are what can politely be called eccentric.) Madhvāchārya, the founder, prohibited outsiders from reading certain texts and from learning from teachers. These restrictions on eligibility, it is claimed, "insulated his position from criticism and evaluation."Even if outsiders' views of core Madhva school doctrines are deemed irrelevant by insiders, Sarma's assertion that Madhvāchārya's views are immune to rational consideration by people who do not belong to the same tradition will astonish anyone familiar with medieval Vedāntic debates. The second chapter describes the historical context in which Madhvāchārya's "insider epistemology" was established. The problem here for the author's insistence on some particularly exigent sort of Dvaitin exclusivity is that there is nothing strikingly un-Vedāntic about that tradition's claims where eligibility for hearing and understanding Scripture (shruti) is concerned. As the author makes clear, Vedāntic theological enquiry, the systematic elucidation of the Upanishads and Brahma-sūtras in the context of dialectic between rival schools, was the preserve of males born into the higher three castes who could understand Sanskrit. This constraint is sometimes intensified by sectarianism, where cultic initiation is additional to caste-based qualification. In the latter respect, the Madhvas are comparable to Shrī Vaishnavas and sundry Shaiva cults. But none of this impeded a plethora of rational disputation! Had the Madhva school prohibited outsiders from "accessing its texts altogether," argument could never have gotten off the ground. But it certainly did. Moreover, the restrictions on eligibility or qualification (adhikara) to study Scripture amount to the claim that there are moral and intellectual preconditions for a proper understanding of some subject matter. At its most... (shrink)

Può il brusio di una voce essere anche il luogo di una lingua? E vale questa topica anche nel caso in cui la voce sia quella di uno strumento musicale? Queste domande sono alla base della indagine sulla tecnica compositiva della tintinnabulatio, inventata e sperimentata dal musicista estone Arvo Pärt . I tintinnabuli consistono di due elementi apparentemente contraddittori: la sonorità pastosa dello zvod e l’armonia della triade perfetta. Muovendo da un disco ricevuto in dono e dalla interpretazione in parte (...) inedita di un passo di san Paolo, l’autore cerca di individuare il punto di articolazione dei tintinnabuli, quella “grana” dove – come disse una volta Roland Barthes – una lingua incontra una voce. Il problema musicale sottende le interminabili discussioni trinitarie dell’Oriente cristiano – qui per sfortuna solo accennate – e si manifesta nella figura dell’iconografo medievale Andrej Rublëv, cui il regista russo Tarkovskij ha dedicato, nel 1966, un denso e ispiratissimo film. Could the rustling of a voice be also the place of a language? And does it happen all the same, when the voice at issue is that of an instrumental body? Such questions are the basic ones for any inquiry into Arvo Pärt’s tintinnabuli—the technique invented and experienced by the famous Esthonian composer . It consists of two seemingly conflicting elements: the doughy resonance of the zvot ; and the harmony of the perfect triad. The present paper moves from the personal memory of listening Pärt’s elegy Silouans Song. The delicate instrumental piece is said to conceal a prosodical calque of the voice of the famous staretz Silouan the Athonite . Silouan’s song —to use Barthes’ words—is the very place where “a language does meet a voice”. Some interpretive consequences lead off such a meeting: from a misunderstanding of a Pauline passage to the art of sacred Icons; and from the Trinitarian controversies of Byzantine church fathers to the medieval painter St.Andrej Rublëv and his most famous icon: “The Holy Trinity”. A work where—as Andrej Tarkovski has shewed in his celebrated movie of 1966—Abraham’s oak is a like a bell concealing the threefold person of God. (shrink)