Abstract. For the past two decades, I have been developing an integrative Christian marriage theory, based in part on a grounding concept of natural law and an overarching theory of covenant. The natural law part of this theory starts with an account of the natural facts, conditions, interests, needs, and qualities of human life, interaction, and generation—what I call the “premoral” goods or realities of life. It then identifies the natural inclinations of humans to form enduring and exclusive monogamous marriages (...) and to preserve these units as the central site for intimacy, procreation, and nurture of children. In this paper, I first summarize this natural law theory of marriage and then compare it to the formulations of other modern Christian thinkers. I also defend this theory against various modern critics of natural law—in part by reinterpreting some traditional natural law teachings that in my view have been misunderstood, in part by looking at the interesting convergences between the insights into sex, marriage, and family life offered by contemporary Christian theological ethicists and by evolutionary biologists and biological anthropologists. (shrink)

True Darwinian Ethics -/- Darwin’s model for the evolution of morality as presented in Descent of Man (1871) is shown to comprise three major stages that are here referred to as empathic premorality, tribal morality, and universalizing morality. Empathy, the key component of Darwin’s “social instincts” that started moral evolution, is here recognized as the principal cognitive device that conveys epistemic credibility to moral agency. The two constitutive elements of the tribal morality are conscience that Darwin conceived of as (...) a conflict between a lasting social motive and an immediate selfish impulse, and true altruism that evolved as a result of group (community) selection. Darwin’s genius recognized the uniqueness of group selection in human evolution as being dependent on mental faculties and speech that facilitated habit formation through praise and blame form other group members, with empathy as a gauge of others’ emotional reactions. Contrary to repeated claims, Darwin did not derive morality from reciprocity that he (and his contemporaries) considered to be “a low motive”, and adduced it only as a mechanism of habit formation. The universalizing morality was brought about by the increasing powers of intellect that led to respecting individual lives (rather than group interests only) and extending humane concerns beyond one’s group, ultimately to all sentient beings, which places Darwin among the spiritual fathers of modern humanitarianism. In terms of substantive ethics, Darwin’s views support moral individualism that requires to treat each subject according to his/her individual characteristics rather than any group membership. Darwin’s moral individualism and universalism have been elaborated by Peter Singer as the principle of equal consideration of interests and the expanding circle of ethics, respectively. Darwin’s model of moral evolution, which starts with intuitive but epistemically reliable moral agency and then allows for its rational improvement, provides a way out of the moral subjectivism of evolutionary ethics that reduces morality to an adaptation to social life. The primary or core morality that relies on empathy and implements reciprocity supports welfare (wellbeing) of a group and its members. Welfare (which has been defined by Darwin) is a basic “terminal” (ultimate) value that constitutes an objective, measurable fact. Since the primary morality supports welfare, it is objectively good, which justifies an ethical reasoning that such morality ought to be extended (with appropriate adjustments) to all sentient beings. Confusion over the status of morality is largely due to the lack of appreciation of its complexity: not only had its motivational apparatus (known as the moral agency) evolved by superposition of many emotional and pure cognitive mechanisms, but it has subsequently been co-opted to implement prudential, religious and possibly other norms that are accidental and sometimes contrary to its original social function. Those secondary morality norms are now enforced by the moral agency but lack moral objectivity and thus may support the perception of moral subjectivism and relativism. In short, true Darwinian ethics is based on the scientific axiology that recognizes evolutionary origins of all values, requires respecting all values that are experienced by each and every subject according to its individual characteristics, and calls for a critical assessment of each and every received morality. (shrink)

This essay examines the relationship between human choice and Rand's ethical standard for moral goodness and obligation. It shows that the neo-Aristotclian interpretation of Rand's ethics—an interpretation that does not accept the doctrine of "premoral choice" but instead claims that flourishing as a rational animal is the telos of human life and choice—is crucial to the viability of her ethical theory. The defenders of premoral choice confuse the conceptual order with the real and, despite their intentions, make Rand's ethics into (...) a voluntarist ethics, that is, an ethics in which reason is subordinate to will. (shrink)

Talion and the Golden Rule are usually considered expressions of successive historical stages in the development of morality. The conventional wisdom is that talion-lex talionis-is a form of social control corresponding to a fairly early stage of the development of human communities. From a purely historical point of view, talion is a rule of punishment for crime according to which the retribution should strictly correspond to the harm inflicted. The rule goes back to the archaic custom of blood vengeance which (...) it supplanted. In contemporary normative research, talion is frequently interpreted more broadly as a rule of equal recompense. This is historically incorrect, but in theoretical analysis it is permissible as a general idea of a special type of control of human interrelations. It is precisely in this context that we understand the accepted opinion that as social relations develop and become richer talion is pushed to the periphery of human relations by another, more refined normative form, the Golden Rule, the appearance of which marks the emergence of morality in the contemporary sense of the word. Thus, talion is seen as a premoral form of social control, although if it is taken in the indicated strict sense then, historically, it antecedes not so much morality as institutionalized law. (shrink)

What is the concept of human dignity derived from? Does it have its foundation in the emotions or in reason? By dint of a differentiation between a premoral, sittliche orientation in acting and a moral orientation, which is due to an external evaluating moral community, the author comes to the conclusion that human dignity finds its foundation in both the emotions and rationality. This has important implications for the task of a theological ethics insofar it is concerned with the concept (...) of human dignity and its enforcement. (shrink)

A moral geography -- Democracy, the moral psychology, and the moral individual -- Premoral and moral culture -- Two forms of antimoralism -- Love and money: the contracting role of the family -- Moral reform and pseudo-moralism -- Cool -- Vengeance and the erosion of law -- The academy -- Science and morality.

La philosophie de Charles Taylor a récemment fait l'objet de plusieurs critiques mettant en question tant l'ontologie morale proposée par Taylor que le modèle politique qu'elle soutient. Par exemple, O. Flanagan a souligné les difficultés posées par le fait de concevoir les agents moraux comme devant nécessairement procéder à des évaluations fortes. D. Weinstock a défendu l'idée que les institutions politiques libérales que critique Taylor sont en réalité plus propices au développement de cette capacité d'évaluation forte que la poursuite d'un (...) bien commun par le biais des institutions politiques dont les communautaristes sont généralement vus comme les défenseurs. Pour sa part, Will Kymlicka a soutenu que contrairement à ce qu'affirme Taylor, la philosophie morale contemporaine ne nie pas l'existence de distinctions qualitatives et qu'elle centre la moralité sur le respect des besoins des autres pour permettre à chacun de réaliser son intérêt prémoral pour la bonne vie. (shrink)

‘비디오게임 하는 것’은 어떤 윤리적 모델을 통해 새로운 방식으로 게임행위를 평가할 수 있는지에 대한 질문을 제기하도록 만들었다. 이러한 맥락 속에서 고전적인 윤리학적 모델 (덕 윤리, 의무론, 공리주의)은 궁극적으로 오직 ‘현실적 행위’에만 적용되고, 비디오 게임의 ‘가상적 행위’에 적용되지 않는다는 논증은 “놀이 무도덕주의” (Ostritsch 2018) 테제로 귀결된다. 이는 특히 노골적인 ‘폭력의 행위’의 경우의 게임 행위가 도덕적으로 판단될 수 있고 그래야만 한다는 공적 토론의 크게 우세한 직감(直感)에 의해 반박되어 왔다. 이러한 양자의 논의 속에 프리드리히 실러 (Friedrich Schiller)의 고전적 놀이 이론에 따른 중간적 입장이 (...) 있다. 이 입장은 실러의 ‘놀이의 전-도덕성’ (pre-morality) 개념과 ‘놀이와 놀이가 아닌것’, ‘현실적인 것과 도덕적으로 평가될 수 있는 행위’를 잇는 개념적-전체적 연관짓기에서 기인한다. 이에 따라, 비록 맥락을 떠나서 도덕적 판단의 주제가 될 순 없을지라도, 다른 행위와의 연관성으로 인해, 게임 행위는 반드시 최소한의 규범적 요구사항을 충족해야만 한다는 주장이 개진될 것이다. 주요하게 논의되고 스캔들화 되는 예시인 ‘Grand Theft Auto’는 이러한 접근 방식의 범위 및 한계를 보여줄 것이다. 결론적으로, 비디오 게임 윤리학의 적절한 이론적 모델과 관련한 질문에 있어, 상황윤리에 대한 지지와 도덕률에 도입에 대한 반대가 강조될 것이다. (shrink)

Modern versions of utilitarianism have been called consequentialism: in order to evaluate the goodness or badness of human actions one must consider—in one way or in another—their consequences. This consequentialism appears to be opposed on many counts to traditional natural law ethics: norms such as one should never kill innocent persons and never commit adultery stand in conflict with a view which holds that in some cases good results may outweigh the bad consequences of such and other actions. In the (...) years of the Second Vatican Council and the following period, several moralists began to use a somewhat weakened form of consequentialism called proportionalism, which came to be accepted by a good number of authors. It aims at determining the moral rightness or wrongness of actions not by their “material character” but by considering circumstances, intentions, and results, presenting itself as a revolutionary revision of natural law ethics since, in situations of conflict, it wants to free us from “the tyranny” of the “material object” of our actions. Proportionalism distinguishes between premoral disvalues or evil and moral values. The former are the things we want to do for our well-being or convenience and, as proportionalists assert, have no absolute character, while the latter are the ends we pursue in given circumstances. If there is a proportion between the premoral disvalues of our acts and the ends or consequences achieved, the acts are good. (shrink)

In this book, Garth L. Hallett offers the best book of its kind available today. Unlike many other apologiae for proportionalism, Hallet fully engages numerous contemporary moral philosophers, among them Robert Merrihew Adams, Alan Donagan, Judith Thomson, and Alan Gewirth, in addition to engaging Catholic theorists including Aquinas, Germain Grisez, and John Finnis. Hallet also merits commendation for breaking ranks with other proportionalists, particularly Peter Knauer, about not a few matters, most significantly the extent to which proportionalism governs the moral (...) life and the importance of the distinction between the "moral" and the "premoral.". (shrink)