이 논문은 약한 결합 형식을 갖는 두 준선형 논리와 그것들의 누승적 확장 논리 사이의 동치 관계와 이러한 논리 체계 중 한 논리 체계의 표준 완전성을 다룬다. 좀더 구체적으로 먼저 논리 IWAUBUL을 약한 결합 형태를 갖는 준선형 논리 WAUBUL의 누승적 확장으로 소개하고 이 체계의 대수적 의미론을 다룬다. 특히 우리는 IWAUBUL이 WAUIBUL 체계와 동치라는 것을 보인다. 다음으로 우리는 관련된 약한 결합 힝식을 만족하는 누승적 미카놈을 소개한다. 마지막으로 이 논리를 위한 대수적 조건들에 바탕을 둔 표준 완전성을 다룬다.

An involutive micanorm-based logic with a weak form of associativity is introduced and its finite standard completeness is addressed. More precisely, we first introduce the logic WAuIBUL as a [0, u]-continuous wau-uninorm analogue of the involutive logic IBUL. We next discuss its algebraic semantics. We then introduce involutive wau-uninorms as involutive uninorms with weak u-associativity in place of associativity and deal with related properties. We last provide finite strong standard completeness for WAuIBUL using a construction (...) of Yang-style. -/- 약한 형식의 결합 원리를 만족하는 누승적인 미카놈에 기반한 논리 체계를 소개하고 그 체계의 유한 표준 완전성을 다룬다. 보다 구체적으로 논리 체계 WAuIBUL을 누승적 유니놈 논리 IUML의 [0, u]-연속인 wau-유니놈 일반화로 먼저 소개한다. 그리고 이 체계의 대수적 완전성을 다룬다. 다음으로 결합 원리 대신에 약한 u-결합 원리를 만족하는 누승적 유니놈으로 누승적 wau-유니놈을 소개하고 그 성질을 다룬다. 마지막으로 유한 집합 위에서 WAuIBUL의 표준 완전성을 보인다. (shrink)

An algebraic proof is presented for the finite strong standard completeness of the Involutive Uninorm Logic with Fixed Point ($${{\mathbf {IUL}}^{fp}}$$ IUL fp ). It may provide a first step towards settling the standard completeness problem for the Involutive Uninorm Logic ($${\mathbf {IUL}}$$ IUL, posed in G. Metcalfe, F. Montagna. (J Symb Log 72:834–864, 2007)) in an algebraic manner. The result is proved via an embedding theorem which is based on the structural description of the class (...) of odd involutive FL$$_e$$ e -chains which have finitely many positive idempotent elements. (shrink)

Involutive Stone algebras were introduced by R. Cignoli and M. Sagastume in connection to the theory of $n$-valued Łukasiewicz–Moisil algebras. In this work we focus on the logic that preserves degrees of truth associated to S-algebras named Six. This follows a very general pattern that can be considered for any class of truth structure endowed with an ordering relation, and which intends to exploit many-valuedness focusing on the notion of inference that results from preserving lower bounds of truth values, and (...) hence not only preserving the value $1$. Among other things, we prove that Six is a many-valued logic that can be determined by a finite number of matrices. Besides, we show that Six is a paraconsistent logic. Moreover, we prove that it is a genuine Logic of Formal Inconsistency with a consistency operator that can be defined in terms of the original set of connectives. Finally, we study the proof theory of Six providing a Gentzen calculus for it, which is sound and complete with respect to the logic. (shrink)

This paper considers standard completeness for fixed-pointed involutive micanorm-based logics. For this, we first discuss fixed-pointed involutive micanorm-based logics together with their algebraic semantics. Next, after introducing some examples of fixed-pointed involutive micanorms, we provide standard completeness results for those logics.

In this paper we provide a finite axiomatization (using two finitary rules only) for the propositional logic (called $L\Pi$ ) resulting from the combination of Lukasiewicz and Product Logics, together with the logic obtained by from $L \Pi$ by the adding of a constant symbol and of a defining axiom for $\frac{1}{2}$ , called $L \Pi\frac{1}{2}$ . We show that $L \Pi \frac{1}{2}$ contains all the most important propositional fuzzy logics: Lukasiewicz Logic, Product Logic, Gödel's Fuzzy Logic, Takeuti and Titani's (...) Propositional Logic, Pavelka's Rational Logic, Pavelka's Rational Product Logic, the Lukasiewicz Logic with $\Delta$ , and the Product and Gödel's Logics with $\Delta$ and involution. Standard completeness results are proved by means of investigating the algebras corresponding to $L \Pi$ and $L \Pi \frac{1}{2}$ . For these algebras, we prove a theorem of subdirect representation and we show that linearly ordered algebras can be represented as algebras on the unit interval of either a linearly ordered field, or of the ordered ring of integers, Z. (shrink)

In this paper, we show that the finite model property fails for certain non‐integral semilinear substructural logics including Metcalfe and Montagna's uninorm logic and involutive uninorm logic, and a suitable extension of Metcalfe, Olivetti and Gabbay's pseudo‐uninorm logic. Algebraically, the results show that certain classes of bounded residuated lattices that are generated as varieties by their linearly ordered members are not generated as varieties by their finite members.

It is well known that MTL satisfies the finite embeddability property. Thus MTL is complete w. r. t. the class of all finite MTL-chains. In order to reach a deeper understanding of the structure of this class, we consider the extensions of MTL by adding the generalized contraction since each finite MTL-chain satisfies a form of this generalized contraction. Simultaneously, we also consider extensions of MTL by the generalized excluded middle laws introduced in [9] and the axiom of weak (...) cancellation defined in [31]. The algebraic counterpart of these logics is studied characterizing the subdirectly irreducible, the semisimple, and the simple algebras. Finally, some important algebraic and logical properties of the considered logics are discussed: local finiteness, finite embeddability property, finite model property, decidability, and standard completeness. (shrink)

This paper will develop ideas from [44]. We will generalize their work in two directions. First, we provide axioms for justification logics over the base logic B and show that the logic permits a proof of the internalization theorem. Second, we provide alternative frames that more closely resemble the standard versions of the ternary relational frames, as well as a more general approach to the completeness proof. We prove that soundness and completeness hold for justification logics over a wide (...) variety of base logics. Finally, we will strengthen Belnap’s variable sharing for the justification logic context, demonstrating that the justifications are properly relevant justifications. (shrink)

In this paper we carry out an algebraic investigation of the weak nilpotent minimum logic and its t-norm based axiomatic extensions. We consider the algebraic counterpart of WNM, the variety of WNM-algebras and prove that it is locally finite, so all its subvarieties are generated by finite chains. We give criteria to compare varieties generated by finite families of WNM-chains, in particular varieties generated by standard WNM-chains, or equivalently t-norm based axiomatic extensions of WNM, and we study their (...) standard completeness properties. We also characterize the generic WNM-chains, i. e. those that generate the variety [MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL W]ℕ[MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL M], and we give finite axiomatizations for some t-norm based extensions of WNM. (shrink)

This new edition of work that has evolved over the past seven years completes the derivation of the form of The Standard Model from quantum theory and the extension of the Theory of Relativity to superluminal transformations. The much derided form of The Standard Model is established from a consideration of Lorentz and superluminal relativistic space-time transformations. So much so that other approaches to elementary particle theory pale in comparison. In previous work color SU(3) was derived from space-time (...) considerations. This book shows that the SU(2) U(1) Weak Interaction sector follows directly from the extension of Lorentz transformations to superluminal (faster-than-light) transformations. In fact, ElectroWeak symmetry is shown to have an SU(2) U(1) U(1) symmetry that naturally includes WIMPs (Weakly Interacting Massive Particles), a candidate for Dark Matter. Thus the form of the Standard Model is dictated by space-time considerations fulfilling a dream of Einstein. Using a new matrix formulation of Logic - Operator Logic - we show that Dirac-like equations can be constructed. This edition also derives broken SU(4) four fermion generations as well as a non-Higgsian (Dimensional Mass Generation) derivation of fermion and ElectroWeak gauge boson masses from GL(4). The program of the book is completed by reprinting the book Quantum Theory of the Third Kind, which describes Two-Tier quantum field theory. This theory yields finite results (No Feynman diagram calculations diverge!) in The Standard Model and Quantum Gravity calculations to all orders in perturbation theory. Lastly, the book also contains a description of Operator Logic, Probabilistic Operator Logic, Quantum Operator Logic (for q-number statements). A comprehensive derivation of the form of The Standard Model from geometric considerations. (shrink)

Logics of significance have been proposed in an attempt to overcome the shortcomings of classical logic as a model of reasoning in the presence of nonsignificant (e.g., meaningless, ill-formed, unverifiable) sentences. Many-valued logicians have addressed this problem by introducing logics with infectious truth values. Cases in point are the weak Kleene logics B3 (paracomplete weak Kleene logic) and PWK (paraconsistent weak Kleene logic). Over time, it has become clear that the valid entailments of these significance logics obey (...) variable inclusion patterns that link them to other, usually better known, logics—such patterns, however, allow for disturbing exceptions. Logics of pure (left or right) variable inclusion have been introduced with an eye to removing these exceptions. In this paper, we consider the pure left variable inclusion companion of classical logic and give a complete description of its subclassical extensions. We also provide relative axiomatizations and characteristic (sets of) matrices for each one of these extensions, as well as syntactic descriptions (in terms of variable inclusion criteria) for the valid entailments of some of them, and determine in each case the algebra reducts of the Suszko-reduced matrix models. (shrink)

We examine 'weak-distributivity' as a rewriting rule $??$ defined on multiplicative proof-structures (so, in particular, on multiplicative proof-nets: MLL). This rewriting does not preserve the type of proof-nets, but does nevertheless preserve their correctness. The specific contribution of this paper, is to give a direct proof of completeness for $??$: starting from a set of simple generators (proof-nets which are a n-ary ⊗ of &-ized axioms), any mono-conclusion MLL proof-net can be reached by $??$ rewriting (up to ⊗ and (...) & associativity and commutativity). (shrink)

In the present paper, we start studying epistemic updates using the standard toolkit of duality theory. We focus on public announcements, which are the simplest epistemic actions, and hence on Public Announcement Logic without the common knowledge operator. As is well known, the epistemic action of publicly announcing a given proposition is semantically represented as a transformation of the model encoding the current epistemic setup of the given agents; the given current model being replaced with its submodel relativized to (...) the announced proposition. We dually characterize the associated submodel-injection map as a certain pseudo-quotient map between the complex algebras respectively associated with the given model and with its relativized submodel. As is well known, these complex algebras are complete atomic BAOs . The dual characterization we provide naturally generalizes to much wider classes of algebras, which include, but are not limited to, arbitrary BAOs and arbitrary modal expansions of Heyting algebras . Thanks to this construction, the benefits and the wider scope of applications given by a point-free, intuitionistic theory of epistemic updates are made available. As an application of this dual characterization, we axiomatize the intuitionistic analogue of PAL, which we refer to as IPAL, prove soundness and completeness of IPAL w.r.t. both algebraic and relational models, and show that the well known Muddy Children Puzzle can be formalized in IPAL. (shrink)

A possible world semantics for standard modal languages is presented, where the valuation functions are allowed to be partial, the truth–functional connectives are interpreted according to weak Kleene matrices, and the necessity operator is given a “weak” interpretation. Completeness and incompleteness results for some (axiomatic) systems are then established. Extensions of these modal logics in which figure “statability” operators are also examined.

An algebraic setting for the validity of Pavelka style completeness for some natural expansions of Łukasiewicz logic by new connectives and rational constants is given. This algebraic approach is based on the fact that the standard MV-algebra on the real segment [0, 1] is an injective MV-algebra. In particular the logics associated with MV-algebras with product and with divisible MV-algebras are considered.

This paper continues the investigation, started in Lávička and Noguera : 521–551, 2017), of infinitary propositional logics from the perspective of their algebraic completeness and filter extension properties in abstract algebraic logic. If follows from the Lindenbaum Lemma used in standard proofs of algebraic completeness that, in every finitary logic, intersection-prime theories form a basis of the closure system of all theories. In this article we consider the open problem of whether these properties can be transferred to lattices of (...) filters over arbitrary algebras of the logic. We show that in general the answer is negative, obtaining a richer hierarchy of pairwise different classes of infinitary logics that we separate with natural examples. As by-products we obtain a characterization of subdirect representation for arbitrary logics, develop a fruitful new notion of natural expansion, and contribute to the understanding of semilinear logics. (shrink)

This paper introduces and explores a conservative extension of inquisitive logic. In particular, weak negation is added to the standard propositional language of inquisitive semantics, and it is shown that, although we lose some general semantic properties of the original framework, such an enrichment enables us to model some previously inexpressible speech acts such as weak denial and ‘might’-assertions. As a result, a new modal logic emerges. For this logic, a Fitch-style system of natural deduction is formulated. (...) The main result of this paper is a theorem establishing the completeness of the system with respect to inquisitive semantics with weak negation. At the conclusion of the paper, the possibility of extending the framework to the level of first order logic is briefly discussed. (shrink)

We investigate in intuitionistic first-order logic various principles of preference relations alternative to the standard ones based on the transitivity and completeness of weak preference. In particular, we suggest two ways in which completeness can be formulated while remaining faithful to the spirit of constructive reasoning, and we prove that the cotransitivity of the strict preference relation is a valid intuitionistic alternative to the transitivity of weak preference. Along the way, we also show that the acyclicity axiom (...) is not finitely axiomatizable in first-order logic. (shrink)

In abstract algebraic logic, the general study of propositional non-classical logics has been traditionally based on the abstraction of the Lindenbaum-Tarski process. In this process one considers the Leibniz relation of indiscernible formulae. Such approach has resulted in a classification of logics partly based on generalizations of equivalence connectives: the Leibniz hierarchy. This paper performs an analogous abstract study of non-classical logics based on the kind of generalized implication connectives they possess. It yields a new classification of logics expanding Leibniz (...) hierarchy: the hierarchy of implicational logics. In this framework the notion of implicational semilinear logic can be naturally introduced as a property of the implication, namely a logic L is an implicational semilinear logic iff it has an implication such that L is complete w.r.t. the matrices where the implication induces a linear order, a property which is typically satisfied by well-known systems of fuzzy logic. The hierarchy of implicational logics is then restricted to the semilinear case obtaining a classification of implicational semilinear logics that encompasses almost all the known examples of fuzzy logics and suggests new directions for research in the field. (shrink)

Part 1 [Hodes, 2021] “looked under the hood” of the familiar versions of the classical propositional modal logic K and its intuitionistic counterpart. This paper continues that project, addressing some familiar classical strengthenings of K and GL), and their intuitionistic counterparts. Section 9 associates two intuitionistic one-step proof-theoretic systems to each of the just mentioned intuitionistic logics, this by adding for each a new rule to those which generated IK in Part 1. For the systems associated with the intuitionistic counterparts (...) of D and T, these rules are “pure one-step”: their schematic formulations does not use □ or ♢. For the systems associated with the intuitionistic counterparts of K4, etc., these rules meet these conditions: neither □ nor ♢ is iterated; none use both □ and ♢. The join of the two systems associated with each of these familiar logics is the full one-step system for that intuitionistic logic. And further “blended” intuitionistic systems arise from joining these systems in various ways. Adding the 0-version of Excluded Middle to their intuitionistic counterparts yields the one-step systems corresponding to the familiar classical logics. Each proof-theoretic system defines a consequence relation in the obvious way. Section 10 examines inclusions between these consequence relations. Section 11 associates each of the above consequence relations with an appropriate class of models, and proves them sound with respect to their appropriate class. This allows proofs of some failures of inclusion between consequence relations. Section 12 proves that the each consequence relation is complete or weakly complete, that relative to its appropriate class of models. The Appendix presents three further results about some of the intuitionistic consequence relations discussed in the body of the paper. For Keywords, see Part 1. (shrink)

A non-monotonic logic, the Logic of Plausible Reasoning (LPR), capable of coping with the demands of what we call complex reasoning, is introduced. It is argued that creative complex reasoning is the way of reasoning required in many instances of scientific thought, professional practice and common life decision taking. For managing the simultaneous consideration of multiple scenarios inherent in these activities, two new modalities, weak and strong plausibility, are introduced as part of the Logic of Plausible Deduction (LPD), a (...) deductive logic specially designed to serve as the monotonic support for LPR. Axiomatics and semantics for LPD, together with a completeness proof, are provided. Once LPD has been given, LPR may be defined via a concept of extension over LPD. Although the construction of LPR extensions is first presented in standard style, for the sake of comparison with existing non-monotonic formalisms, alternative more elegant and intuitive ways for constructing non-monotonic LPR extensions are also given and proofs of their equivalence are presented. (shrink)

This paper proposes a new topic in substructural logic for use in research joining the fields of relevance and fuzzy logics. For this, we consider old and new relevance principles. We first introduce fuzzy systems satisfying an old relevance principle, that is, Dunn’s weak relevance principle. We present ways to obtain relevant companions of the weakening-free uninorm systems introduced by Metcalfe and Montagna and fuzzy companions of the system R of relevant implication and its neighbors. The algebraic structures (...) corresponding to the systems are then defined, and completeness results are provided. We next consider fuzzy systems satisfying new relevance principles introduced by Yang. We show that the weakening-free uninorm systems and some extensions and neighbors of R satisfy the new relevance principles. (shrink)

In the present paper we show that any at most countable linearly-ordered commutative residuated lattice can be embedded into a commutative residuated lattice on the real unit interval [0, 1]. We use this result to show that Esteva and Godo''s logic MTL is complete with respect to interpretations into commutative residuated lattices on [0, 1]. This solves an open problem raised in.

Writing, the exigency of writing: no longer the writing that has always (through a necessity in no way avoidable) been in the service of the speech or thought that is called idealist (that is to say, moralizing), but rather the writing that through its own slowly liberated force (the aleatory force of absence) seems to devote itself solely to itself as something that remains without identity, and little by little brings forth possibilities that are entirely other: an anonymous, distracted, deferred, (...) and dispersed way of being in relation, by which everything is brought into question – and first of all the idea of God, of the Self, of the Subject, then of Truth and the One, then finally the idea of the Book and the Work so that this writing (understood in its enigmatic rigor), far from having the Book as its goal rather signals its end: a writing that could be said to be outside discourse, outside language. – Maurice Blanchot ( The Infinite Conversation , xi) The Compendium * Beginning with the idea and practice of writing, and moving to the subject or self, then to truth and the One, and arriving at the Book and the Work, Blanchot’s words reflect the trajectory of the following work of writing. True to the embeddedness of the subject in the work of writing, the term “Compendium” has been a metonym for me over the past few years as I have thought about the concept of totality alongside its expression in figures such as the One, the Whole, or the All. In the following I aim to share some of the content of this metonym, and to enrich it by making some distinctions. 1 Here the term “Compendium” will refer to a concept of totality that is ontological (pertaining to being, and the copula) and also textual (pertaining to the symbolic, and the signifier-signified relationship). The Compendium is a figure for thinking the world as a Book, in the broadest sense—an approach to reality that is by no means new, but one that is due for renewal. 2 In partial answer to the question of the Compendium we will say that the word ‘Compendium’ stands in for expressions which seek to totalize, or concepts which seek to approach the concept of ‘everything,’ particularly when these expressions are bound up in the question of the Book (both the book as a physical object and the Book as a metaphysical figure: a way of thinking about the work in and of writing). The question of the Compendium is strongly associated with the physical and metaphysical form of the Book, like the mysterious and symbolic books which are opened in the Biblical book of Revelation, the book of life and the book of death, which together constitute an important couplet. 3 Parataxis & Hypotaxis There are two helpful distinctions that will bring us closer to an answer to the question “What is a Compendium?” The first distinction is between two figures in and for writing: parataxis and hypotaxis . Typically paired in contrast to one another as literary techniques, with parataxis indicating a side-by-side placement of textual elements and hypotaxis referring to subordinate arrangements of textual elements, the two figures can be understood as having a philosophical significance in addition to their practical function as devices for writers. For us these two terms will remain between philosophical theory and writing practice, and serve as a perspective for our writing and creation of texts. Here I take texts to refer to anything from the concrete written words in a book, to the ontological text of the world that we experience. Parataxis , as a figural way of thinking about the ontological structure of texts, refers to texts which are tightly woven and interdependent – texts within which each sentence bears the weight of the entire work. Parataxis often involves repetition, great density, and fragility. One of the best examples of this sort of text is Theodor Adorno’s posthumous magnum opus , Aesthetic Theory . In addition to the text itself, the translation history of the book may also help us to better understand parataxis and its relation to hypotaxis . The final published version of Aesthetic Theory , in German, was a text that Adorno intended to revise and rewrite, but this intention was never realized because of his untimely death. Where the German text of Aesthetic Theory certainly exemplifies the concept of parataxis , the first English edition took this densely woven text and carved Adorno’s lengthy paragraphs and lengthy sentences into manageable ‘bite-sized’ pieces of English text. The first translator took further liberty and inserted headings and new paragraph breaks where there were none in the original. Aesthetic Theory was eventually retranslated by Robert Hullot-Kentor and is now available in a form that is much more faithful to the original work. 4 The pertinent idea that this translation history points to is the distinction between parataxis and hypotaxis . Where parataxis describes texts which are repetitive, densely woven, and often fragile, hypotaxis describes texts which are hierarchical and in which the primary relation is linear – the latter of which is very similar to the first English translation of Aesthetic Theory . On the other hand, the original German text that Adorno wrote was very dense, often repetitive, and contained long sections of text unbroken by paragraphs or headings. This example of parataxis was then turned towards hypotaxis through the initial translation which took a text that was, in many ways, nonhierarchical and nonlinear, and artificially subjected it to a hierarchy that was not its own (and here I take the word of Fredric Jameson who comments on the two translations in a note at the beginning of his book Late Marxism ). 5 The point here is not about translation, but rather the distinction between parataxis and hypotaxis precisely as they are figures for discourse, written or otherwise. The concept of parataxis looks far more postmodern and rhizomic than the concept of hypotaxis which remains very modern and arborescent. This is a more figural way of talking about the distinction. However, if we wanted to take a more precise and analytical approach we could say that on the level of form parataxis involves a relationship between sentences and paragraphs in which each part bears an equally crushing responsibility to present the whole content of the text. As well, on the level of content, parataxis requires that each concept in a work take on the full conceptual weight of the total work. Continuing the analysis, we could say that parataxis describes texts in which there is no (or very little) linear or causal move from antecedent to consequent, whether in content or form. Instead, parataxis describes texts which weave together concepts via conjugations or associations. The concept of hypotaxis , on the other hand, requires that texts submit themselves to hierarchy, one example of which is logical argumentation. The contingency of the conclusion upon premises in hypotaxis is certainly distinct from the repetition, re-presentation, and conjugation of concepts in parataxis , and I think that this is evident in the difference between the writing styles prevalent in contemporary Analytic philosophy and Continental philosophy. It is not the case that the distinction between parataxis and hypotaxis absolutely corresponds with the writing styles of Continental and Analytic philosophy (respectively). There are thinkers who take exception to this pattern, such as Badiou’s more formal approach in the discourse of Continental philosophy to give one example. However, when Analytic philosophy takes its writing lessons from the sciences, and seeks to do philosophy via the clean linear move from antecedent to consequent, then I think that Analytic philosophy writes with hypotaxis in mind. On the other hand, when Continental (particularly German and French) philosophy takes its writing lessons from narrative or poetry then Continental philosophy writes with parataxis in mind. It is not fair to say that all those writing Continental philosophy are looking to narrative and poetry for stylistic direction, just as it is not the case that all those writing Analytic philosophy have mathematics and science as their writing format, however there are some striking ways in which the differing epistemologies of Continental and Analytic philosophy encourage writing with parataxis and hypotaxis in mind (respectively). For some, writing with parataxis or hypotaxis in mind is a conscious decision and a product of stylistic self-consciousness, and for others it is an unconscious discursive and epistemic requirement that must be met in order to be involved in a particular discourse. Before moving on to our second distinction, and then an examination of the question of the Book, it is important to point out that both totality and figurations like the One, the Whole, and the All, come out of very human desires to totalize or to actualize our being-towards-totality. The relationship between identity and totality then can be construed, with Heidegger in mind, as striving toward wholeness, completion, or fulfillment, each of which is a quality of compendia. 6 Compilation & Selection The first distinction between parataxis and hypotaxis pertains to both form and content, and to both the mechanics of writing and the ideas to which writing refers. The second distinction pertains to both as well. In the process of writing and in the process of perception as well, there is a tension between compilation and selection . To begin with, in the work of theory-writing there is compilation, and this is because writing theory requires a broad perspective and certain measure of totalization. On the other hand, writing theory requires that the writer select an idea or a combination of ideas to individuate out of a radical and infinite multiplicity of identities and combinations. The concern here is not primarily for the writing of a theory about a specific idea, like a secondary work or a reference text. But rather the concern is with the writing of grand theories: Marx and Marxism, Derrida and Deconstruction, Husserl and Phenomenology, Sartre and Existentialism, Saussure and Structuralism —each of which strives along a trajectory towards being all-encompassing, whether it intends to or not. Today, we could even say that Speculative Realism has embarked on this journey, and perhaps now we could say that the discourse of Speculative Realism has reached the inevitable point after which a grand theory leaves the hands of its writer or writers and becomes a possession of the collective consciousness of the academy, or (perhaps now) the mass consciousness of the blogosphere—and this is a true pharmakon , a poison and a cure, a blessing and a curse. 7 When we write theory, whether the scope is that of a grand theory or a particular theory, we write in the tension between compilation (making good on the desire to be all encompassing) and selection (being required to decide and discern and to judge what is included in the work and what is deleted or appended or abridged or given over to ellipses). Generally speaking, the work of theory-writing often comes out of a desire to totalize, that is, to develop a theory of everything that is able to apprehend new experiences and ideas while still remaining whole. I grant that this is not a universal desire, and that not everyone who sits down to write a work (or book) of theory does so because of their will-to-totality, but it remains that this drive to totalize does condition a great many writers of theory (especially those who seek to develop grand theories like those mentioned previously). At the beginning of his book of interviews, Between Existentialism and Marxism , Sartre is quoted as saying, after completing the first volume of his Critique of Dialectical Reason : “I no longer feel the need to make long digressions in my books, as if I were forever chasing after my own philosophy. It will now be deposited in little coffins, and I will feel completely emptied and at peace—as I felt after Being and Nothingness . A feeling of emptiness: a writer is fortunate if he can attain such a state. For when one has nothing to say, one can say everything .” 8 This is where our two initial distinctions come to bear on the being-towards-totality as it is expressed in the concrete practice of writing: the first being between parataxis and hypotaxis , and the second being between compilation and selection. Where this second distinction is concerned there is a certain paradox at play given that selection is inescapable, and compilation is unachievable. Selection is inescapable (with the figure of the Compendium in mind) because, even when the imperative to compile is followed to excruciating lengths, selection still has the last word. This is why the Compendium is a figure rather than some material thing that can actually be accomplished or actualized. No matter how far one goes along with the will-to-archive and the will-to-compile, it is only ever a question of minimizing selection and never eliminating it. This leads to the second point, which is that total compilation is unachievable. The closest thing to total compilation that we have before us is the ontological and textual fabric of the world. Even in the case of the world, compilation cannot be enacted in a total fashion because of the need to include both the sphere of the actual and the sphere of the possible or potential. This as another way in which compilation is always-already selection, and further evidence that total compilation is practically impossible. Discursive Figuration and Total Writing Rather than figuration referring to a figure of speech or an image, here the term points to a way in which to think about the work of writing, both the work put into writing, and the work that is the result of writing: the finished yet incomplete final piece. As figures or figurations, the Book and the Compendium are ways of thinking about the work of writing and the human desire for the wholeness, completion, and fulfillment that are made manifest in the completed form of the book (whether a published or printed or saved document put to rest by the author). These two figures bear more strongly upon works that seek to be all-encompassing, and works that strive towards expressions of totality such as the One, the Whole, or the All. Moving on to the topic of the subtitle, and on a more prescriptive note, I would say that there is more hope for theory-writing to be found in parataxis than hypotaxis . Part of the reason for this claim is the poststructuralist critique of hierarchies, and yet another part is the compelling line of thinking called “weak thought” (in theology by John D. Caputo, and in philosophy by Gianni Vattimo, among others). 9 The consequences of these two convictions are such that if one is to strongly assert the truth of a grand theory without leaving the realm of hierarchy-critique and weak thought, then one must write paradoxically with parataxis in mind, and in so doing write weakly and non-hierarchically. This does not mean avoiding a sort of topography or topology when writing theory, rather it means avoiding both subjugation and oppression in thought by pursuing a nonviolent sort of ontology. In order to do this, theory writing does not present itself as an exercise in logical analysis where one mechanically moves from a set of premises (via contingency) to the inevitable conclusion (via necessity). Instead, theory approaches the idea of a Compendium. Given that the figural Compendium places parataxis and compilation above hypotaxis and selection, then the question becomes: is placing one part of a binary term before another not just another way of selecting, or another expression of hypotaxis ? Counter to the urge to resign oneself to the reign of selection, with some qualification one can nonetheless write without deciding whether selection and hypotaxis should be subservient to compilation and parataxis (which is to say that writing-without-decision is somewhere between and beyond possibility and impossibility). This dilemma can be disarmed by stating that theory writing is not about primacy, and not about having-decided-beforehand, both stylistically and also where content is concerned. This is the paradox of writing: always striving along a trajectory ( telos ) towards totality via parataxis and compilation, but always being drawn back to finitude and making selections, and placing one idea before another with hypotaxis in mind. In light of this paradox, the question of the Compendium as a figure for discourse and a figural Book has resonance with Jacques Derrida’s essay on Edmund Jabès’ Book of Questions , found in his Writing and Difference . The Question of the Book “Little by little the book will finish me.” 10 Derrida quotes Jabès, and proceeds to outline the reflexive relationship between the author of the book and the book itself, each of which are subjected to the other through a sort of chiasmus, both ontological and textual (not that the two are entirely separable). The Book, for Derrida like Blanchot in the introductory quotation, “infinitely reflects itself” and “develops as a painful questioning of its own possibility”, and in light of this we can draw an association with the painful tension between the practical reality of selection and the ideal trajectory of compilation. 11 This tension in writing, between the will to total compilation and the necessity of abridgment, is an ontological tension between part and whole just as it is a textual tension between signifier and signified. The ontological tension in writing that Derrida expresses in his essay on Jabès is between everything and nothing – a contradiction which Derrida finds in Jabès’ Book of Questions and also in the divine, in God. When one writes between compilation and selection one writes towards totality, and here we can follow Derrida who states that the lapse in signification, presumably in the signifier-signified discrepancy, is a “ rupture with totality itself” and furthermore that this lapse cannot be rectified through deductive reason or even philosophical discourse. 12 This rupture with totality, found in the troubled relation between signifier and signified, can also tell us a lot about the Book and about writing. Given an understanding of writing as an ontological act that strives towards (but never accomplishes) totality, we can see the written book as the manifested and given body of that striving. Perhaps in other disciplines or even other schools of philosophy there is a cultural climate within which the article is prized above the book, but I am fairly confident, especially when referring to the grand theories of Continental thought, that there is a respect for the book as a uniquely meaningful object capable of apprehending totality. Derrida writes, Between the too warm flesh of the literal event and the cold skin of the concept runs meaning. This is how it enters into the book. Everything enters into, transpires in the book. This is why the book is never finite. It always remains suffering and vigilant. 13 Here the vitality of the literal event is compromised by the deadening weight of the concept, and the figure of the Book assists in this lapse of meaning. The Book is a totalizing object, much like the figure of the Compendium, and yet this totalization lacks its final object of completed totality both because the figural Book is necessarily incomplete, and because the physical book is always-already a product of selection. Instead of achieving its end of being a place where everything takes place, it suffers from the lapse of writing, the discrepancy between event and concept. Derrida continues his exposition on Jabès by bringing to light yet another reflexive relation, a reversal of the relationship between the Book and the world. Derrida writes that, for Jabès, “the book is not in the world, but the world is in the book.” 14 In addition to what was stated before, I take figuration to mean that the concepts employed, such as the Book or the Compendium, are not subject to the supposed rigor of analysis that is so prized by Enlightenment or Capitalist realisms. The figure of the Book and the figure of the Compendium cannot be held accountable to standards imported from scientific method, given an understanding that these standards require a concept to be replicable, consistent, falsifiable, measurable, and so on… This is an important point to make, especially in the present atmosphere within which theory must justify itself under conditions that are not its own. Instead of being held to these standards, figuration serves as a way in which to think about writing that leaves thought open to idealistic speculation, imperfect analogies, and most importantly the ever-present gain and loss that occur in the relationship between thought and being. By extension the figural way of addressing writing indulges in enough generalization to accommodate the excess/lack relationship between the ideal form of the Book or the Compendium, and the manifested and given body of a text (as it is practically completed and closed). Here we speak against the hostile atmosphere which would have theory submit itself to hierarchical rigor, rather than Blanchot’s “enigmatic rigor”, by being explicit about the discursive conditions and epistemic conditions under which theory operates. To write with parataxis in mind is, to a certain degree, to write with weakness as one’s methodology (with weak thought being in opposition to hypotaxis and hierarchy as much as weak thought can be in opposition to anything). Rather than asserting the strength of hierarchical theory, and rather than employing antagonistic argumentation with the goal of refutation different discursive and epistemic conditions for theory writing must be cultivated (and these are by no means new). First the critical and theoretical spirit reveals itself as being concerned with the task of complication—especially the complication and critique of binaries, dichotomies, dualities, polarities, paradoxes, parallaxes, hybridities, and especially antinomies. Second, theory positions itself as a sort of showing or revealing, rather than being ultimately focused on coming to full agreement or disagreement. This is where figuration can help theory-writing, both by placing emphasis on teleologies and trajectories (like parataxis and compilation), and by shifting focus away from pure primacy, power, or absolute origin. Figuration then, assists theory writing by placing the concern of theory outside of the concerns of the hard or soft sciences, and into the realm of thought or the idea. To speak of ‘the’ Compendium or ‘the’ Book, here, is to generalize not regarding the perfect form of the Compendium or Book, but to engage speculatively with an abstract idea which remains singular and yet complicated by multiplicity. The question of the Book that Derrida asks through Jabès is a question of everything and nothing, totality and nonbeing, and this question is a concern for writing and a concern for the figure of the Compendium so defined by the tension between compilation and selection, and parataxis and hypotaxis . On the note of nonbeing, we can look to the final page of Derrida’s first essay on Jabès in Writing and Difference and notice the introduction of his neologism, différance (with an ‘a’). Derrida writes: Life negates itself in literature only so that it may survive better. So that it may be better. It does not negate itself any more than it affirms itself: it differs from itself, defers itself, and writes itself as différance . Books are always books of life (the archetype would be the Book of Life kept by the God of the Jews) or of afterlife (the archetype would be the Books of the Dead kept by the Egyptians). 15 This introduction of différance into the equation of the Book, alongside ontological affirmation and negation, hearkens back to the discussion of the symbolic lapse earlier in his essay. Differing and deferring, the Book is always a Book of Life and a figure for the intersection of the vital (life) and the total in writing. In a way, the writer of the Book may be someone who lives life, and in another way the writer of the book-as-object may be someone who engages in the act of writing, both practically (by inscribing words on paper, or typing script on a computer) and ontologically or symbolically (by investing their existence and inexistence into a work worthy of the figural Book). In addition to the writer as writer, the writer also serves as an editor, and the editorial role alongside the idea of the Compendium shows the editor to be one who collects and compiles, while being restrained by eventual selection and decision. Beyond this the editor of works and texts, in both the Book and the world, is engaged in a process of inscribing notation—of annotating (on) the Compendium. Eternal commentary is a feature of the textual Compendium, just as open-ended totality describes the ontological Compendium. The writer as writer does not simply write texts, but rather engages in a profoundly ontological act of inscribing their existence into the world, and the writer as editor does not merely annotate or alter texts as they are, but rather comments upon the text of the world. In/Conclusion So as we create texts, and as we write and create theory, let us be and remain attentive to the figure of the Compendium and the figure of the Book. These two concurrent metonymies are essential for total writing (grand theories, etc.), and may be forgettable for those concerned with fragmentary or hierarchical writing (which are valid in their own right). From the ontological and symbolic text of the world and phenomenological experience, to concrete texts such as books or mixed media, the figure of the Compendium and the figure of the Book are important for the actualization of the human will to be all-encompassing. The figure of the Compendium teaches writers of theory that the repetition, density, and fragility of parataxis offers a strong sort of weakness which does not become yet another variety of oppressive and hegemonic thought. Rather than write with hypotaxis in mind, subjugating one thought to another via cause and effect or antecedent and consequent, I would hope that theory-writing could guiltlessly indulge in the dialectical and contradictory conjugation of ideas, and take this as a legitimate methodology. Rather than being ashamed of showing resonances or giving way to abridgment or ellipses, it is my own authorial (but not authoritative) conviction that one need not give up on totalizing and constructing grand theories because of the fact that complete totalization is impossible, and one need not give up on totalizing and constructing grand theories because of the worry of violence, for the Book and the Compendium lack their completed object and are ever incomplete trajectories. NOTES * UPDATED 7/19/13: we've updated the HTML version to reflect the (correct) PDF version. Our apologies to the author—eds. 1. I would like extend thanks to Dr. Peter Schwenger of the University of Western Ontario for his comments on this paper and his hospitality as it was presented as a Theory Session at the Centre for Theory and Criticism on October 26th 2012. I would also like to thank Andrew Weiss for conversation and critique. 2. I should clarify my use of the term ‘figure’ at the outset. Given the use of the term by Jean-Francois Lyotard in Discourse, Figure (and also Gilles Deleuze in Francis Bacon ), I should state clearly that my use of the term will not correspond to the term ‘figure’ understood as the representation of an object. Instead, my use of the term ‘figure’ and its variations (‘figural’, ‘figurative’, ‘figuration’) will refer to the illustrative or metaphorical use of the Compendium or the Book as models or ways of thinking about writing and discourse. 3. Cf. Revelations 20:12-15. 4. Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory , Trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (London & New York: Continuum Press, 1997). 5. Fredric Jameson, Late Marxism: Adorno, or the Persistence of the Dialectic (London & New York: Verso, 1990), ix-x. 6. I have written about this concept of being-towards-totality elsewhere in two pieces of writing: the first is called Notes on the Compendium (an unfinished draft) which addresses some very wide theoretical concerns, being structured as a sort of itinerary or archive, and the second is Dialectics Unbound (Punctum Books, 2013) which outlines a concept of totality without the violence of totalization. While these works are more concerned with ontological totality, here I would like to focus on the idea of the Compendium as a textual totality. 7. Cf. Louis Morelle, “Speculative Realism: After Finitude and Beyond, A vade mecum” in Speculations: Journal of Speculative Realism . Issue 3 (Brooklyn, New York: Punctum Books, 2012), 241-272. 8. Jean-Paul Sartre, Between Existentialism and Marxism . Trans. John Matthews (London & New York: Verso, 1974), 9. 9. Cf. John D. Caputo, The Weakness of God (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2006). 10. Jacques Derrida, “Edmond Jabès and the Question of the Book” in Writing and Difference . Trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 65. 11. Ibid, 65. 12. Ibid, 71. 13. Ibid, 75. 14. Ibid, 76. 15. Ibid, 78. (shrink)

Dugundji proved in 1940 that most parts of standard modal systems cannot be characterized by a single finite deterministic matrix. In the eighties, Ivlev proposed a semantics of four-valued non-deterministic matrices, in order to characterize a hierarchy of weak modal logics without the necessitation rule. In a previous paper, we extended some systems of Ivlev’s hierarchy, also proposing weaker six-valued systems in which the axiom was replaced by the deontic axiom. In this paper, we propose even weaker systems, (...) by eliminating both axioms, which are characterized by eight-valued non-deterministic matrices. In addition, we prove completeness for those new systems. It is natural to ask if a characterization by finite ordinary logical matrices would be possible for all those Ivlev-like systems. We will show that finite deterministic matrices do not characterize any of them. (shrink)

We present epistemic multilateral logic, a general logical framework for reasoning involving epistemic modality. Standard bilateral systems use propositional formulae marked with signs for assertion and rejection. Epistemic multilateral logic extends standard bilateral systems with a sign for the speech act of weak assertion (Incurvati and Schlöder 2019) and an operator for epistemic modality. We prove that epistemic multilateral logic is sound and complete with respect to the modal logic S5 modulo an appropriate translation. The logical framework (...) developed provides the basis for a novel, proof-theoretic approach to the study of epistemic modality. To demonstrate the fruitfulness of the approach, we show how the framework allows us to reconcile classical logic with the contradictoriness of so-called Yalcin sentences and to distinguish between various inference patterns on the basis of the epistemic properties they preserve. (shrink)

The present paper deals with the predicate version MTL of the logic MTL by Esteva and Godo. We introduce a Kripke semantics for it, along the lines of Ono''s Kripke semantics for the predicate version of FLew (cf. [O85]), and we prove a completeness theorem. Then we prove that every predicate logic between MTL and classical predicate logic is undecidable. Finally, we prove that MTL is complete with respect to the standard semantics, i.e., with respect to Kripke frames on (...) the real interval [0,1], or equivalently, with respect to MTL-algebras whose lattice reduct is [0,1] with the usual order. (shrink)

Axiomatizations are presented for fuzzy logics characterized by uninorms continuous on the half-open real unit interval [0,1), generalizing the continuous t-norm based approach of Hájek. Basic uninorm logic BUL is defined and completeness is established with respect to algebras with lattice reduct [0,1] whose monoid operations are uninorms continuous on [0,1). Several extensions of BUL are also introduced. In particular, Cross ratio logic CRL, is shown to be complete with respect to one special uninorm. A Gentzen-style hypersequent calculus (...) is provided for CRL and used to establish co-NP completeness results for these logics. (shrink)

A possible world semantics for standard modal languages is presented, where the valuation functions are allowed to be partial, the truth--functional connectives are interpreted according to weak Kleene matrices, and the necessity operator is given a "weak" interpretation. Completeness and incompleteness results for some (axiomatic) systems are then established. Extensions of these modal logics in which figure "statability" operators are also examined.

The role played by the symmetric structure of a group of finite Morley rank without involutions in the proof by contradiction of Frécon 2018 was put in evidence in Poizat 2018; indeed, this proof consists in the construction of a symmetric space of dimension two (“a plane”), and then in showing that such a plane cannot exist.To a definable symmetric subset of such a group are associated symmetries and transvections, that we undertake here to study in the abstract, without mentioning (...) a group envelopping them. This leads us to consider axiomatically defined structures that we callsymmetrons(preferably todyadic symmetric setsas was done in Lawson & Lim 2004).Glauberman's$Z^*$-Theorem allows to elucidate completely the structure of the finite symmetrons: each of them is isomorphic to the set of symmetries associated to a symmetric subspace of a finite group without involutions, which is far from being uniquely determined. In fact, there exist non-isomorphic finite groups which have the same symmetries, and also finite symmetrons which are not isomorphic to the symmetries of a group.The situation is not so clear in the case of symmetrons of finite Morley rank, or even algebraic, which are the main objects of study of this paper. But in spite of the fact that a symmetron be a structure much weaker that a group, we can extend to symmetrons some well-known results concerning groups of finite Morley rank: chain condition, decomposition into connected components, characterisation of the generic definable subsets, elliptic generation, etc. These properties are new even in the case of a symmetric subspace of a group, and allow to bypass the computations made by Frécon during the construction of his paradoxical plane.Moreover, assuming the Algebricity Conjecture, we generalize Glauberman's Theorem to the finite Morley rank context. (shrink)

Built on the foundations laid by Peirce, Schröder, and others in the 19th century, the modern development of relation algebras started with the work of Tarski and his colleagues [21, 22]. They showed that relation algebras can capture strong first‐order theories like ZFC, and so their equational theory is undecidable. The less expressive class WA of weakly associative relation algebras was introduced by Maddux [7]. Németi [16] showed that WA's have a decidable universal theory. There has been extensive research (...) on increasing the expressive power of WA by adding new operations [1, 4, 11, 13, 20]. Extensions of this kind usually also have decidable universal theories. Here we give an example – extending WA's with set‐theoretic projection elements – where this is not the case. These “logical” connectives are set‐theoretic counterparts of the axiomatic quasi‐projections that have been investigated in the representation theory of relation algebras [22, 6, 19]. We prove that the quasi‐equational theory of the extended class PWA is not recursively enumerable. By adding the difference operator D one can turn WA and PWA to discriminator classes where each universal formula is equivalent to some equation. Hence our result implies that the projections turn the decidable equational theory of “WA + D ” to non‐recursively enumerable (© 2009 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim). (shrink)

In many natural languages, there are clear syntactic and/or intonational differences between declarative sentences, which are primarily used to provide information, and interrogative sentences, which are primarily used to request information. Most logical frameworks restrict their attention to the former. Those that are concerned with both usually assume a logical language that makes a clear syntactic distinction between declaratives and interrogatives, and usually assign different types of semantic values to these two types of sentences. A different approach has been taken (...) in recent work on inquisitive semantics. This approach does not take the basic syntactic distinction between declaratives and interrogatives as its starting point, but rather a new notion of meaning that captures both informative and inquisitive content in an integrated way. The standard way to treat the logical connectives in this approach is to associate them with the basic algebraic operations on these new types of meanings. For instance, conjunction and disjunction are treated as meet and join operators, just as in classical logic. This gives rise to a hybrid system, where sentences can be both informative and inquisitive at the same time, and there is no clearcut division between declaratives and interrogatives. It may seem that these two general approaches in the existing literature are quite incompatible. The main aim of this paper is to show that this is not the case. We develop an inquisitive semantics for a logical language that has a clearcut division between declaratives and interrogatives. We show that this language coincides in expressive power with the hybrid language that is standardly assumed in inquisitive semantics, we establish a sound and complete axiomatization for the associated logic, and we consider a natural enrichment of the system with presuppositional interrogatives. (shrink)

We introduce a logic for a class of probabilistic Kripke structures that we call type structures, as they are inspired by Harsanyi type spaces. The latter structures are used in theoretical economics and game theory. A strong completeness theorem for an associated infinitary propositional logic with probabilistic operators was proved by Meier. By simplifying Meier’s proof, we prove that our logic is strongly complete with respect to the class of type structures. In order to do that, we define a canonical (...) model (in the sense of modal logics), which turns out to be a terminal object in a suitable category. Furthermore, we extend some standard model-theoretic constructions to type structures and we prove analogues of first-order results for those constructions. (shrink)

This paper establishes a connection between structure sensitive categorial inference and classical modal logic. The embedding theorems for non-associative Lambek Calculus and the whole class of its weak Sahlqvist extensions demonstrate that various resource sensitive regimes can be modelled within the framework of unimodal temporal logic. On the semantic side, this requires decomposition of the ternary accessibility relation to provide its correlation with standard binary Kripke frames and models.

We study a generalization of the standard syntax and game-theoretic semantics of logic, which is based on a duality between two players, to a multiplayer setting. We define propositional and modal languages of multiplayer formulas, and provide them with a semantics involving a multiplayer game. Our focus is on the notion of equivalence between two formulas, which is defined by saying that two formulas are equivalent if under each valuation, the set of players with a winning strategy is the (...) same in the two respective associated games. We provide a derivation system which enumerates the pairs of equivalent formulas, both in the propositional case and in the modal case. Our approach is algebraic: We introduce multiplayer algebras as the analogue of Boolean algebras, and show, as the corresponding analog to Stone’s theorem, that these abstract multiplayer algebras can be represented as concrete ones which capture the game-theoretic semantics. For the modal case we prove a similar result. We also address the computational complexity of the problem whether two given multiplayer formulas are equivalent. In the propositional case, we show that this problem is co-NP-complete, whereas in the modal case, it is PSPACE-hard. (shrink)

The focus of this article is on the Business Council of Australia, an association of the CEOs of the 100 or so largest companies operating in Australia. Since its inception the BCA has been an influential supporter of largely successful efforts to neoliberalize and internationalize the Australian economy. Running in parallel with these developments, however, the BCA has moved from being a “somewhat strong” to a relatively weak policy organization. This article argues these two trends are causally related. Neoliberal-inspired (...) economic restructuring and economic internationalization have weakened the “logic of membership” and the “logic of influence” of the BCA, leading to a process of organizational involution. Furthermore, potential offsets to what I describe as the organizational predations of neoliberalism and internationalization—especially via a willingness or capacity to forge supportive or mutualistic relations with the state—have not been realized. (shrink)

Linear logic is a new logic which was recently developed by Girard in order to provide a logical basis for the study of parallelism. It is described and investigated in Gi]. Girard's presentation of his logic is not so standard. In this paper we shall provide more standard proof systems and semantics. We shall also extend part of Girard's results by investigating the consequence relations associated with Linear Logic and by proving corresponding str ong completeness theorems. Finally, we (...) shall investigate the relation between Linear Logic and previously known systems, especially Relevance logics. (shrink)

In this paper we introduced various classes of weakly associative relation algebras with polyadic composition operations. Among them is the class RWA of representable weakly associative relation algebras with polyadic composition operations. Algebras of this class are relativized representable relation algebras augmented with an infinite set of operations of increasing arity which are generalizations of the binary relative composition. We show that RWA is a canonical variety whose equational theory is decidable.

Abstract.ΠMTL is a schematic extension of the monoidal t-norm based logic (MTL) by the characteristic axioms of product logic. In this paper we prove that ΠMTL satisfies the standard completeness theorem. From the algebraic point of view, we show that the class of ΠMTL-algebras (bounded commutative cancellative residuated l-monoids) in the real unit interval [0,1] generates the variety of all ΠMTL-algebras.

Gravitation is interpreted to be an “ontomathematical” force or interaction rather than an only physical one. That approach restores Newton’s original design of universal gravitation in the framework of “The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy”, which allows for Einstein’s special and general relativity to be also reinterpreted ontomathematically. The entanglement theory of quantum gravitation is inherently involved also ontomathematically by virtue of the consideration of the qubit Hilbert space after entanglement as the Fourier counterpart of pseudo-Riemannian space. Gravitation can be (...) also interpreted as purely mathematical or logical “force” or “interaction” as a corollary from its ontomathematical (rather than physical) realization. The ontomathematical approach to gravitation is implicit in general relativity equating it to operators in pseudo-Riemannian space obeying the Einstein field equation and also well-known by the “geometrization of physics”. Quantum mechanics shares the same by the separable complex Hilbert space and defining “physical quantity” by the Hermitian operators on it. One can interpret special Minkowski space involved by special relativity and the qubit Hilbert space of quantum information as Fourier counterparts immediately noticing that general relativity means gravitation as the Fourier counterpart of non-Hermitian operators implying non-unitarity and the violation of energy conservation and thus destroying Pauli’s particle paradigm. Since the Standard model obeys it, this explains the impossibility of “quantum gravitation” in any framework conservatively generalizing the Standard model so that it would include gravitation along with electromagnetic, weak, and strong interactions. Einstein’s geometrization of gravitation can be continued into a purely mathematical theory of it following Euclid’s realization for geometry to be exhaustively built in a deductive and axiomatic way as well as Riemann’s parametrization of all the class of Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries by “space curvature”, then being generalized to Minkowski space as the operators on pseudo-Riemannian space as the Einstein field equation means gravitation. The transition from mathematical gravitation to logical one can rely on the historical lesson of the pair of Lobachevski’s and Riemann’s approaches now “reversely”, i.e., from the latter to the former. Logical gravitation is linkable to Hegel’s dialectical logic and ontological dialectics abandoning their interpretations as a new zero logic substituting classical propionyl logic. The approach of ontomathematics generalizing that of ontology, traceable even to Aristotle’s reformation of Plato’s doctrine, needs Hegel’s doctrine to be formalized as a first-order logic naturally containing Boolean algebra, isomorphic to both classical propositional logic and set theory being the class of all first-order logics, as a sub-logic along with Peano arithmetic as another sub-logic. The first-order logic at issue is called Hilbert arithmetic and elaborated in detail in other papers. It allows for both self-foundation of mathematics to be internally proved as complete and furthermore, quantum mechanics reinterpreted as quantum information to be included by the qubit Hilbert space interpretable in turn as a dual and physical counterpart of Hilbert arithmetic in a narrow sense, that is, both counterparts constitute Hilbert arithmetic in a wide sense, being mathematical and physical simultaneously and thus overcoming the Cartesian dualism of “body” gapped from “mind” by an abyss. Then, the proper philosophical interpretation of gravitation to be the fundamental ontomathematical force or interaction overcomes the ridiculous belief of the Big Bang wrongly alleged to be a scientific theory. Ontomathematical gravitation suggests an omnipresent and omnitemporal medium of “God’s” creation “ex nihilo” following only the natural necessity of quantum-information conservation particularly and locally manifested as energy conservation. (shrink)

Substructural logics extending the full Lambek calculus FL have largely benefited from a systematical algebraic approach based on the study of their algebraic counterparts: residuated lattices. Recently, a nonassociative generalization of FL has been studied by Galatos and Ono as the logic of lattice-ordered residuated unital groupoids. This paper is based on an alternative Hilbert-style presentation for SL which is almost MP -based. This presentation is then used to obtain, in a uniform way applicable to most substructural logics, a form (...) of local deduction theorem, description of filter generation, and proper forms of generalized disjunctions. A special stress is put on semilinear substructural logics. Axiomatizations of the weakest semilinear logic over SL and other prominent substructural logics are provided and their completeness with respect to chains defined over the real unit interval is proved. (shrink)

We present a procedure which allows us to recover classical and nonclassical logical structures as concrete logics associated with physical theories expressed by means of classical languages. This procedure consists in choosing, for a given theory ${{\mathcal{T}}}$ and classical language ${{\fancyscript{L}}}$ expressing ${{\mathcal{T}}, }$ an observative sublanguage L of ${{\fancyscript{L}}}$ with a notion of truth as correspondence, introducing in L a derived and theory-dependent notion of C-truth (true with certainty), defining a physical preorder $\prec$ induced by C-truth, and finally selecting (...) a set of sentences ϕ V that are verifiable (or testable) according to ${{\mathcal{T}}, }$ on which a weak complementation ⊥ is induced by ${{\mathcal{T}}. }$ The triple $(\phi_{V},\prec,^{\perp})$ is then the desired concrete logic. By applying this procedure we recover a classical logic and a standard quantum logic as concrete logics associated with classical and quantum mechanics, respectively. The latter result is obtained in a purely formal way, but it can be provided with a physical meaning by adopting a recent interpretation of quantum mechanics that reinterprets quantum probabilities as conditional on detection rather than absolute. Hence quantum logic can be considered as a mathematical structure formalizing the properties of the notion of verification in quantum physics. This conclusion supports the general idea that some nonclassical logics can coexist without conflicting with classical logic (global pluralism) because they formalize metalinguistic notions that do not coincide with the notion of truth as correspondence but are not alternative to it either. (shrink)

Bilattices, introduced by Ginsberg as a uniform framework for inference in artificial intelligence, are algebraic structures that proved useful in many fields. In recent years, Arieli and Avron developed a logical system based on a class of bilattice-based matrices, called logical bilattices, and provided a Gentzen-style calculus for it. This logic is essentially an expansion of the well-known Belnap–Dunn four-valued logic to the standard language of bilattices. Our aim is to study Arieli and Avron’s logic from the perspective of (...) abstract algebraic logic . We introduce a Hilbert-style axiomatization in order to investigate the properties of the algebraic models of this logic, proving that every formula can be reduced to an equivalent normal form and that our axiomatization is complete w.r.t. Arieli and Avron’s semantics. In this way, we are able to classify this logic according to the criteria of AAL. We show, for instance, that it is non-protoalgebraic and non-self-extensional. We also characterize its Tarski congruence and the class of algebraic reducts of its reduced generalized models, which in the general theory of AAL is usually taken to be the algebraic counterpart of a sentential logic. This class turns out to be the variety generated by the smallest non-trivial bilattice, which is strictly contained in the class of algebraic reducts of logical bilattices. On the other hand, we prove that the class of algebraic reducts of reduced models of our logic is strictly included in the class of algebraic reducts of its reduced generalized models. Another interesting result obtained is that, as happens with some implicationless fragments of well-known logics, we can associate with our logic a Gentzen calculus which is algebraizable in the sense of Rebagliato and Verdú . We also prove some purely algebraic results concerning bilattices, for instance that the variety of distributive bilattices is generated by the smallest non-trivial bilattice. This result is based on an improvement of a theorem by Avron stating that every bounded interlaced bilattice is isomorphic to a certain product of two bounded lattices. We generalize it to the case of unbounded interlaced bilattices. (shrink)

Intermediary metabolism molecules are orchestrated into logical pathways stemming from history (L-amino acids, D-sugars) and dynamic constraints (hydrolysis of pyrophosphate or amide groups is the driving force of anabolism). Beside essential metabolites, numerous variants derive from programmed or accidental changes. Broken down, variants enter standard pathways, producing further variants. Macromolecule modification alters enzyme reactions specificity. Metabolism conform thermodynamic laws, precluding strict accuracy. Hence, for each regular pathway, a wealth of variants inputs and produces metabolites that are similar to but (...) not the exact replicas of core metabolites. As corollary, a shadow, paralogous metabolism, is associated to standard metabolism. We focus on a logic of paralogous metabolism based on diversion of the core metabolic mimics into pathways where they are modified to minimize their input in the core pathways where they create havoc. We propose that a significant proportion of paralogues of well-characterized enzymes have evolved as the natural way to cope with paralogous metabolites. A second type of denouement uses a process where protecting/deprotecting unwanted metabolites - conceptually similar to the procedure used in the laboratory of an organic chemist - is used to enter a completely new catabolic pathway. (shrink)

In a standard sense, consistency and paraconsistency are understood as the absence of any contradiction and as the absence of the ECQ (‘E contradictione quodlibet’) rule, respectively. The concepts of weak consistency (in two different senses) as well as that of F -consistency have been defined by the authors. The aim of this paper is (a) to define alternative (to the standard one) concepts of paraconsistency in respect of the aforementioned notions of weak consistency and F (...) -consistency; (b) to define the concept of strong paraconsistency; (c) to build up a series of strongly paraconsistent logics; (d) to define the basic constructive logic adequate to a rather weak sense of consistency. All logics treated in this paper are strongly paraconsistent. All of them are sound and complete in respect a modification of Routley and Meyer’s ternary relational semantics for relevant logics (no logic in this paper is relevant). (shrink)

Natural deduction systems were motivated by the desire to define the meaning of each connective by specifying how it is introduced and eliminated from inference. In one sense, this attempt fails, for it is well known that propositional logic rules underdetermine the classical truth tables. Natural deduction rules are too weak to enforce the intended readings of the connectives; they allow non-standard models. Two reactions to this phenomenon appear in the literature. One is to try to restore the (...) standard readings, for example by adopting sequent rules with multiple conclusions. Another is to explore what readings the natural deduction rules do enforce. When the notion of a model of a rule is generalized, it is found that natural deduction rules express “intuitionistic” readings of their connectives. A third approach is presented here. The intuitionistic readings emerge when models of rules are defined globally, but the notion of a local model of a rule is also natural. Using this benchmark, natural deduction rules enforce exactly the classical readings of the connectives, while this is not true of axiomatic systems. This vindicates the historical motivation for natural deduction rules. One odd consequence of using the local model benchmark is that some systems of propositional logic are not complete for the semantics that their rules express. Parallels are drawn with incompleteness results in modal logic to help make sense of this. (shrink)

Among the quantificational notions neglected by classical logic are "many," "few," and "nearly all." Despite the apparent vagueness associated with these terms in ordinary discourse, in specific contexts we can and do draw strict inferences from statements in which they occur. In this pioneering work, Altham has attempted to uncover something of the formal logic that justifies such inferences. He begins by showing the mutual interdefinability of the three terms. If negation and any one of them are taken as primitive, (...) the other two are definable in terms of these. Selecting as his basic semantic notion the idea of a manifold or many-membered-set, he shows it is only necessary to fix upon a number n, greater than one, to represent the least number of elements to constitute a specific manifold and then one can construct a natural deductive system which uses the standard predicate logic. He develops at great length a weak system that yields principles of inference which are valid in every non-empty domain and in which the classical predicate logic appears as a limiting case. One point that emerges is that the three plurality operators may all be exhibited as involving a double quantification not characteristic of "some," "none," or "all." Next, two stronger systems are developed more briefly which are valid only in many-membered domains. The strongest can represent the largest set of informal arguments and seems to be the most natural of the three. Nevertheless, since these three systems admittedly do not give an exhaustive account of the use of these quantifiers in informal discourse, Altham explains three further systems which correspond more closely to the natural language use of these terms. Finally an appendix indicates what modifications would be required for an intuitionistic logic like Heyting's or the minimal logic of Kolmogorov-Johansson. The text is clearly written and requires no greater logical sophistication to understand than would be needed to follow Lemmon's Beginning Logic or Mates' Elementary Logic.--A. B. W. (shrink)