The history of modern logic is usually written as the history of mathematical or, more general, symbolic logic. As such it was created by mathematicians. Not regarding its anticipations in Scholastic logic and in the rationalistic era, its continuous development began with George Boole's The Mathematical Analysis of Logic of 1847, and it became a mathematical subdiscipline in the early 20th century. This style of presentation cuts off one eminent line of development, the philosophical development of logic, although logic (...) is evidently one of the basic disciplines of philosophy. One needs only to recall some of the standard 19th century definitions of logic as, e.g., the art and science of reasoning (Whateley) or as giving the normative rules of correct reasoning (Herbart). In the paper the relationship between the philosophical and the mathematical development of logic will be discussed. Answers to the following questions will be provided: 1. What were the reasons for the philosophers' lack of interest in formal logic? 2. What were the reasons for the mathematicians' interest in logic? 3. What did "logic reform" mean in the 19th century? Were the systems of mathematical logic initially regarded as contributions to a reform of logic? 4. Was mathematical logic regarded as art, as science or as both? (shrink)

The Polish philosophy of mathematics in the 19th century had its origins in the Romantic period under the influence of the then-predominant idealist philosophies. The decline of Romantic philosophy precipitated changes in general philosophy, but what is less well known is how it triggered changes in the philosophy of mathematics. In this paper, we discuss how the Polish philosophy of mathematics evolved from the metaphysical approach that had been formed during the Romantic era to the (...) more modern positivistic paradigm. These evolutionary changes are attributed to the philosophers Henryk Struve, Antoni Molicki and Julian Ochorowicz, and mathematicians Karol Hertz and Samuel Dickstein. We also show how implicit ideas (i.e., those not declared openly) from the area between the philosophy of science and general philosophy played a crucial role in the paradigm shift in the Polish philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

Cet article étudie l’édition des œuvres de mathématiciens au xixe siècle Je me concentre sur une étude de cas : l’édition des œuvres du mathématicien allemand B. Riemann, par R. Dedekind et H. Weber, publiées pour la première fois en 1876, puis republiées en 1892 et en 1902, par Teubner, et partiellement traduites en français en 1898 chez Gauthier-Villars. Pour l’édition des textes de mathématiciens au xixe siècle, les éditeurs ne sont plus historiens ou philologues, mais eux-mêmes des mathématiciens de (...) premier plan. Le mathématicien éditeur devient celui qui à la fois lit et fabrique le texte à publier. Le cas des œuvres de Riemann est particulièrement intéressant, car une large majorité du travail éditorial s’est effectué par lettres. Ces lettres, ainsi que les Nachlässe de Riemann et Dedekind fournissent une documentation exceptionnellement riche. Il est possible d’obtenir une vision détaillée du processus d’édition. Après avoir replacé l’édition des œuvres de Riemann et ses rééditions dans leur contexte, j’étudierai certains choix faits par les éditeurs dans la sélection des textes à publier. Enfin, je considérerai la question des modifications et adaptations des textes de Riemann par les éditeurs. (shrink)

Aborder l’histoire des mathématiques et son enseignement à travers les institutions scientifiques est une démarche dorénavant courante et souvent pertinente. De nombreux travaux l’ont montré en particulier dans le cadre des grandes institutions scientifiques militaires comme l’École polytechnique [Belhoste 1994], [Bret 2002]. L’histoire de l’enseignement et de la diffusion des sciences, en particulier des mathématiques, a été renouvelée depuis une vingtaine d’années tant en France que dans d’...

Max Ungar (1850-1930) was born in Boskovice, Moravia, and pursued an academic career in mathematics at Vienna University [Franz Brentano was one of his examiners]. His memoirs describe his escape from Orthodox Judaism into a century of high liberalism and the turning to science and knowledge and his failure to achieve the humanism that he was devoted to as a result of anti-Semitism. Although he wrote his memoirs chronologically, there is a recognisable leitmotif: on the one hand his (...) escape from Orthodox Judaism into a century of high liberalism and the turning to science and knowledge; while on the other hand it charts his failure as a devotee of the humanism he was dedicated to as result of his pursuit of science and knowledge. In this respect Max Ungar’s reminiscences written in 1928 but covering the period 1855 – 1892/1928 are particularly significant for their overlapping topics: for its Jewish history during the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in the 19th century and for the portrayal of identity in the modern period. He concentrates on important events in his life, passing the matura/school exam. Helping in his father's business. Falling in love, keeping the engagement a secret, while at university. His time at university and his love of mathematics. Also the academic intrigues and pettiness - not much has changed. Then leaving academic life and working in the business. Trying to get back into academia 5 years later, but without success. His home life, travels with family, visiting friends, information about his wider family: who married whom, how they met, who died, etc. Stories from the business. The difficult relationship with his father. His critical stance towards Judaism. He also relates incidents of anti-semitism in business but also at university. This is the first translation of Ungar’s memoir into English (originally written in German) - translated by Miroslav Imbrisevic. The book is free to download. (shrink)

Cet article vise à montrer comment l’École polytechnique et l’École d’application de l’artillerie et du génie de Metz ont influencé l’Académie d’ingénieurs militaires de Madrid en tant que modèles inspirant des plans d’études et manuels mathématiques tout au long du xixe siècle. Concernant les manuels, les premières traductions espagnoles des œuvres de Monge et de Lacroix ont marqué une tendance qui a entraîné d’autres traductions, appropriations et œuvres originales sur la base d’une sélection rigoureuse de différentes sources françaises. Quant aux (...) plans d’études, l’intérêt d’élever le niveau mathématique des ingénieurs militaires apparaît clairement en 1816 et se développe entre 1839 et 1870, lorsque l’estime des ingénieurs militaires espagnols envers les écoles françaises susmentionnées en tant que modèles à suivre est documentée. (shrink)

79. This study of the interaction between mechanics and differential geometry does not pretend to be exhaustive. In particular, there is probably more to be said about the mathematical side of the history from Darboux to Ricci and Levi Civita and beyond. Statistical mechanics may also be of interest and there is definitely more to be said about Hertz (I plan to continue in this direction) and about Poincaré's geometric and topological reasonings for example about the three body problem [Poincaré (...) 1890] (cf. also [Poincaré 1993], [Andersson 1994] and [Barrow-Green 1994]). Moreover, it would be interesting to find out how the 19th century ideas discussed here influenced the developments in the 20th century. Einstein himself is a hotly debated case. Yet, despite these shortcommings, I hope that this paper has shown that the interactions between mechanics and differential geometry is not a 20th century invention. Klein's view (see my Introduction) that Riemannian geometry grew out of mechanics, more specifically the principle of least action, cannot be maintained. On the other hand, when Riemannian geometry became known around 1870 it was immediately used in mechanics by Lipschitz. He began a continued tradition in this field, which had several elements in common with the new view of mechanics conceived by the physicists and explicitly carried out by Hertz. Before 1870 we found only scattered interactions between differential geometry and mechanics and only direct ones for systems of two or three degrees of freedom. For more degrees of freedom the geometrical ideas were in some interesting cases taken over by analogy, but these analogies did not lead to formal introduction of geometries of more than three dimensions. (shrink)

It has been stated, „history is the master of life ". Is this a statement reserved exclusively for historians or is it applicable to those with quantitative interests in the fields of mathematics, physics, astronomy, and philosophy and for matters of purpose, for all humanity? The latter have certainly learned much from their ancestors in their respective fields of concentrated research and study. Knowledge and discovery in the present has been predicated upon what has been inherited and handed down (...) by our generation ancestors who were experts in their respective fields of knowledge. The question is presented, „Can anything be learned and discovered today from our educated colleagues who lived during the period covered between the 16th and 19th centuries?" For whatever purpose this text may be used, the response by the reader would emphatically be one in the affirmative, yes. (shrink)

This paper is the first in a two-part series in which we discuss several notions of completeness for systems of mathematical axioms, with special focus on their interrelations and historical origins in the development of the axiomatic method. We argue that, both from historical and logical points of view, higher-order logic is an appropriate framework for considering such notions, and we consider some open questions in higher-order axiomatics. In addition, we indicate how one can fruitfully extend the usual set-theoretic semantics (...) so as to shed new light on the relevant strengths and limits of higher-order logic. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the complex conditions for the emergence of 19th-century symbolic logic. The main scope will be on the mathematical motives leading to the interest in logic; the philosophical context will be dealt with only in passing. The main object of study will be the algebra of logic in its British and German versions. Special emphasis will be laid on the systems of George Boole and above all of his German follower Ernst Schröder.

The canonical history of mathematics suggests that the late 19th-century “arithmetization” of calculus marked a shift away from spatial-dynamic intuitions, grounding concepts in static, rigorous definitions. Instead, we argue that mathematicians, both historically and currently, rely on dynamic conceptualizations of mathematical concepts like continuity, limits, and functions. In this article, we present two studies of the role of dynamic conceptual systems in expert proof. The first is an analysis of co-speech gesture produced by mathematics graduate students (...) while proving a theorem, which reveals a reliance on dynamic conceptual resources. The second is a cognitive-historical case study of an incident in 19th-century mathematics that suggests a functional role for such dynamism in the reasoning of the renowned mathematician Augustin Cauchy. Taken together, these two studies indicate that essential concepts in calculus that have been defined entirely in abstract, static terms are nevertheless conceptualized dynamically, in both contemporary and historical practice. (shrink)

Frank Quinn of Jaffe-Quinn fame worked out the basics of his own account of how mathematical practice should be described and analyzed, partly by historical comparisons with 19th century mathematics, partly by an analysis of contemporary mathematics and its pedagogy. Despite his claim that for this task, "professional philosophers seem as irrelevant as Aristotle is to modern physics," this philosophy talk will provide a critical summary of his main observations and arguments. The goal is to inject (...) some of Quinns remarks to the current conversation on mathematical practice. [1] Jaffe, Arthur, Quinn, Frank. "Theoretical Mathematics: Towards a synthesis of mathematics and theoretical physics," Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society NS 29:1, 113. [2] Quinn, Frank. Contributions to a Science of Mathematics, manuscript, 98pp. [3] Quinn, Frank. "A revolution in mathematics? What really happened a century ago and why it matters today," Notices American Mathematical Society 59:1 31-37. (shrink)

We review different studies of the Periodic Law and the set of chemical elements from a mathematical point of view. This discussion covers the first attempts made in the 19th century up to the present day. Mathematics employed to study the periodic system includes number theory, information theory, order theory, set theory and topology. Each theory used shows that it is possible to provide the Periodic Law with a mathematical structure. We also show that it is possible (...) to study the chemical elements taking advantage of their phenomenological properties, and that it is not always necessary to reduce the concept of chemical elements to the quantum atomic concept to be able to find interpretations for the Periodic Law. Finally, a connection is noted between the lengths of the periods of the Periodic Law and the philosophical Pythagorean doctrine. (shrink)

Le rôle des mathématiques dans la formation des officiers de l’armée néerlandaise, a profondément changé pendant le premier xixe siècle avec la fondation de l’Académie militaire en 1828. Les mathématiques étaient au centre de la formation. L’Académie était un des lieux les plus importants de diffusion des connaissances mathématiques aux Pays-Bas pendant la première moitié du xixe siècle, mais elle a perdu ce rôle pendant les années 1860-1870. Dans cet article, je me propose d’examiner à la fois les programmes de (...) l’Académie et le rôle central des enseignants de mathématiques de l’Académie dans la Société Mathématique néerlandaise et dans l’Académie royale des Sciences. Par ailleurs, l’évolution des mathématiques, visible dans ces deux institutions dans les années 1850, n’a pas entraîné une adaptation des programmes au sein de l’Académie. Ainsi, à partir de 1870, l’Académie a presque complètement disparu de la vie mathématique des Pays-Bas. The role of mathematics in the education of Dutch army officers changed dramatically in the early 19th century. This shift became visible with the founding of the Dutch Royal Military Academy in 1828, which shows the role of mathematics in military education shifting toward a purely pedagogical function. This change in approach, which primarily occurred in 1860’s, affected the standing and perception of an academy once highly respected in the field of mathematics. In the present work, I examine both the curricula at the Academy and the crucial role of the Academy’s mathematics instructors in the Dutch Mathematical Society and the Royal Academy of Sciences. Importantly, these two institutions managed to successfully adapt to the changing character of mathematical sciences that occurred around 185 Mathematicians at the Royal Military Academy, however, appeared to cling to an outdated view of mathematics. Failing to update their approach ultimately caused the Academy to lose its once prominent place in the Dutch mathematical community. (shrink)

Review of Benjamin Wardhaugh (ed.), The history of the history of mathematics: Case studies for the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. Oxford: Peter Lang, 2012, vi + 187 pp. (ISBN 978-3034307086).

In this paper we discuss visualizations in mathematics from a historical and didactical perspective. We consider historical debates from the 17th and 19th centuries regarding the role of intuition and visualizations in mathematics. We also consider the problem of what a visualization in mathematical learning can achieve. In an empirical study we investigate what mathematical conclusions university students made on the basis of a visualization. We emphasize that a visualization in mathematics should always be considered in (...) its proper context. (shrink)

The most prominent “schools” or programs for the foundations of mathematics that took shape in the first third of the 20th century emerged directly from, or in response to, developments in mathematics and logic in the latter part of the 19th century. The first of these programs, so-called logicism, had as its aim the reduction of mathematics to purely logical principles. In order to understand properly its achievements and resulting problems, it is necessary to (...) review the background from that previous period. (shrink)

The present book is an introduction to the philosophy of mathematics. It asks philosophical questions concerning fundamental concepts, constructions and methods - this is done from the standpoint of mathematical research and teaching. It looks for answers both in mathematics and in the philosophy of mathematics from their beginnings till today. The reference point of the considerations is the introducing of the reals in the 19th century that marked an epochal turn in the foundations of (...) mathematics. In the book problems connected with the concept of a number, with the infinity, the continuum and the infinitely small, with the applicability of mathematics as well as with sets, logic, provability and truth and with the axiomatic approach to mathematics are considered. In Chapter 6 the meaning of infinitesimals to mathematics and to the elements of analysis is presented. The authors of the present book are mathematicians. Their aim is to introduce mathematicians and teachers of mathematics as well as students into the philosophy of mathematics. The book is suitable also for professional philosophers as well as for students of philosophy, just because it approaches philosophy from the side of mathematics. The knowledge of mathematics needed to understand the text is elementary. Reports on historical conceptions. Thinking about today‘s mathematical doing and thinking. Recent developments. Based on the third, revised German edition. For mathematicians - students, teachers, researchers and lecturers - and readersinterested in mathematics and philosophy. Contents On the way to the reals On the history of the philosophy of mathematics On fundamental questions of the philosophy of mathematics Sets and set theories Axiomatic approach and logic Thinking and calculating infinitesimally – First nonstandard steps Retrospection. (shrink)

The second half of the 19th Century saw a revolution in both European politics and philosophy. Philosophical fervour reflected political fervour. Five great critics dominated the European intellectual scene: Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx, Soren Kierkegaard, Fyodor Dostoevsky, and Friedrich Nietzsche. "Nineteenth-Century Philosophy" assesses the response of each of these leading figures to Hegelian philosophy - the dominant paradigm of the time - to the shifting political landscape of Europe and the United States, and also to the emerging (...) critique of modernity itself. Both individually and collectively, these thinkers succeeded in revolutionizing theology, philosophy, psychology, and politics. The period also saw the emergence of new schools of thought and new disciplinary thinking. The volume covers the birth of sociology and the social sciences, the development of French spiritualism, the beginning of American pragmatism, the rise of science and mathematics, and the maturation of hermeneutics and phenomenology. (shrink)

The Polish philosophy of mathematics in the 19th century is not a well-researched topic. For this period, only five philosophers are usually mentioned, namely Jan Śniadecki, Józef Maria Hoene-Wroński, Henryk Struve, Samuel Dickstein, and Edward Stamm. This limited and incomplete perspective does not allow us to develop a well-balanced picture of the Polish philosophy of mathematics and gauge its influence on 19th- and 20th-century Polish philosophy in general. To somewhat complete our picture of the (...) history of the Polish philosophy of mathematics in those times, we here present the profiles of some lesser-known Polish Romantic philosophers of the 19th century, namely Karol Libelt, Bronisław Trentowski, and Józef Kremer. We discuss their contributions to the philosophy of mathematics and their metaphysical perspectives, and we also show how their metaphysical ideas have found some continuity in the studies of some Catholic philosophers. (shrink)

Our visual experience seems to suggest that no continuous curve can cover every point of the unit square, yet in the late 19th century Giuseppe Peano proved that such a curve exists. Examples like this, particularly in analysis received much attention in the 19th century. They helped to instigate what Hans Hahn called a ‘crisis of intuition’, wherein visual reasoning in mathematics came to be thought to be epistemically problematic. Hahn described this ‘crisis’ as follows (...) : " Mathematicians had for a long time made use of supposedly geometric evidence as a means of proof in much too naive and much too uncritical a way, till the unclarities and mistakes that arose as a result forced a turnabout. Geometrical intuition was now declared to be inadmissible as a means of proof … "Avoiding geometrical evidence, Hahn continued, mathematicians aware of this crisis pursued what he called ‘logicization’, ‘when the discipline requires nothing but purely logical fundamental concepts and propositions for its development’. On this view, an epistemically ideal mathematics would minimize, or avoid altogether, appeals …. (shrink)

The book is a collection of the author’s selected works in the philosophy and history of logic and mathematics. Papers in Part I include both general surveys of contemporary philosophy of mathematics as well as studies devoted to specialized topics, like Cantor's philosophy of set theory, the Church thesis and its epistemological status, the history of the philosophical background of the concept of number, the structuralist epistemology of mathematics and the phenomenological philosophy of mathematics. Part II (...) contains essays in the history of logic and mathematics. They address such issues as the philosophical background of the development of symbolism in mathematical logic, Giuseppe Peano and his role in the creation of contemporary logical symbolism, Emil L. Post's works in mathematical logic and recursion theory, the formalist school in the foundations of mathematics and the algebra of logic in England in the 19th century. The history of mathematics and logic in Poland is also considered.This volume is of interest to historians and philosophers of science and mathematics as well as to logicians and mathematicians interested in the philosophy and history of their fields. (shrink)

In this article, modern standards of early years mathematics education are criticized and a proposal for change is presented. Today's early years mathematics education standards rest on a view of mathematics that became obsolete already at the end of the 19th century while the spirit of children's mathematics is precisely the spirit of modern mathematics. The proposal for change is not a return to the “new mathematics” movement, but something different.

In this article, we study the prehistory of type theory up to 1910 and its development between Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica ([71], 1910-1912) and Church's simply typed λ-calculus of 1940. We first argue that the concept of types has always been present in mathematics, though nobody was incorporating them explicitly as such, before the end of the 19th century. Then we proceed by describing how the logical paradoxes entered the formal systems of Frege, Cantor and Peano (...) concentrating on Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik for which Russell applied his famous paradox and this led him to introduce the first theory of types, the Ramified Type Theory (RTT). We present RTT formally using the modern notation for type theory and we discuss how Ramsey, Hilbert and Ackermann removed the orders from RTT leading to the simple theory of types STT. We present STT and Church's own simply typed λ-calculus (λ → C) and we finish by comparing RTT, STT and λ → C. (shrink)

The paper contends that neoclassical ideology stems, to a great extent, from mathematical analysis. It is suggested that mainstream economic thought can be comprehensively revisited if both histories of mathematical and economic thought are to be taken collaboratively into account. Ideology is understood as a 'social construction of reality' that prevents us from evaluating our own standpoint, and impedes us from realising our value judgments as well as our theories of society and nature. However, the mid-19th century's intellectual (...) controversies about the validity of mathematical thought, truth and knowledge can procure new interesting insights concerning the ideological stance of the first marginalists. In this respect, the methodological categories of analysis and synthesis serve as the basis for the crucial distinction between old geometry and mathematical analysis, indicating that the discipline of mathematics has its own history of fundamentally unresolved disputes. Lastly, this may also shed some light on Alfred Marshall's peculiarly reluctant attitude towards the use of mathematical analysis in his work. (shrink)

It is commonly the case that a problem concerning a mathematical or physical system can be solved in two quite different ways--by an internal or an external approach. For example, the area of a triangle can be found by integration or by showing it to be half that of a certain rectangle. In general, the first approach is, to analyse the given system into component parts, and the second approach is to deal with the system as a whole. It seems (...) that even in cases where solutions to physical problems obtained according to these two approaches are equally valid, and are equally good as explanations, scientists prefer the solution obtained by the internal approach. The reasons for this preference are examined. And it is suggested that whatever the reasons, this preference may have been partly responsible for the 19th century preference for the Kinetic Theory rather than Thermodynamics. (shrink)

The second half of the 19th Century saw a revolution in both European politics and philosophy. Philosophical fervour reflected political fervour. Five great critics dominated the European intellectual scene: Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx, Soren Kierkegaard, Fyodor Dostoevsky, and Friedrich Nietzsche. "Nineteenth-Century Philosophy" assesses the response of each of these leading figures to Hegelian philosophy - the dominant paradigm of the time - to the shifting political landscape of Europe and the United States, and also to the emerging (...) critique of modernity itself. Both individually and collectively, these thinkers succeeded in revolutionizing theology, philosophy, psychology, and politics. The period also saw the emergence of new schools of thought and new disciplinary thinking. The volume covers the birth of sociology and the social sciences, the development of French spiritualism, the beginning of American pragmatism, the rise of science and mathematics, and the maturation of hermeneutics and phenomenology. (shrink)

The essence of number was regarded by the ancient Greeks as the root cause of the existence of the universe, but it was only towards the end of the 19th century that mathematicians initiated an in-depth study of the nature of numbers. The resulting unavoidable actuality of infinities in the number system led mathematicians to rigorously investigate the foundations of mathematics. The formalist approach to establish mathematical proof was found to be inconclusive: Gödel showed that there existed (...) true propositions that could not be proved to be true within the natural number universe. This result weighed heavily on proposals in the mid-20th century for digital models of the universe, inspired by the emergence of the programmable digital computer, giving rise to the branch of philosophy recognised as digital philosophy. In this article, the models of the universe presented by physicists, mathematicians and theoretical computer scientists are reviewed and their relation to the natural numbers is investigated. A quantum theory view that at the deepest level time and space may be discrete suggests a profound relation between natural numbers and reality of the cosmos. The conclusion is that our perception of reality may ultimately be traced to the ontology and epistemology of the natural numbers. (shrink)

From the end of the 19th century until his death, one of history's most brilliant mathematicians languished in an asylum. The Mystery of the Aleph tells the story of Georg Cantor (1845-1918), a Russian-born German who created set theory, the concept of infinite numbers, and the "continuum hypothesis," which challenged the very foundations of mathematics. His ideas brought expected denunciation from established corners - he was called a "corruptor of youth" not only for his work in (...) class='Hi'>mathematics, but for his larger attempts to meld spirituality and science. (shrink)

The human attempts to access, measure and organize physical phenomena have led to a manifold construction of mathematical and physical spaces. We will survey the evolution of geometries from Euclid to the Algebraic Geometry of the 20th century. The role of Persian/Arabic Algebra in this transition and its Western symbolic development is emphasized. In this relation, we will also discuss changes in the ontological attitudes toward mathematics and its applications. Historically, the encounter of geometric and algebraic perspectives enriched (...) the mathematical practices and their foundations. Yet, the collapse of Euclidean certitudes, of over 2300 years, and the crisis in the mathematical analysis of the 19th century, led to the exclusion of “geometric judgments” from the foundations of Mathematics. After the success and the limits of the logico-formal analysis, it is necessary to broaden our foundational tools and re-examine the interactions with natural sciences. In particular, the way the geometric and algebraic approaches organize knowledge is analyzed as a cross-disciplinary and cross-cultural issue and will be examined in Mathematical Physics and Biology. We finally discuss how the current notions of mathematical (phase) “space” should be revisited for the purposes of life sciences. (shrink)

When science of the 20th century is spoken of in opposition to that of the 19th century, a particularly characteristic attribute is often cited: namely, that since the time of Galileo and Newton the task of science has been to explain everything mechanistically. By analogy the world was to be conceived as a great machine. But the theories of the 20th century, above all the relativity and quantum theories, caused a revolution in science. It is seen (...) today that nature can be described and understood not ‘mechanistically’ but only through abstract mathematical formulas. The world is no longer a machine but a mathematical formula. (shrink)

Using a contextual method the specific development of logic between c. 1830 and 1930 is explained. A characteristic mark of this period is the decomposition of the complex traditional philosophical omnibus discipline logic into new philosophical subdisciplines and separate disciplines such as psychology, epistemology, philosophy of science, and formal logic. In the 19th century a growing foundational need in mathematics provoked the emergence of a structural view on mathematics and the reformulation of logic for mathematical means. (...) As a result formallogic was taken over by mathematics in the beginning of the 20th century as is shown by sketching the German example. (shrink)

Thomas Urquhart (1611–1660), celebrated for his English translation of Rabelais’ Gargantua et Pantagruel, has earned some notoriety for his eccentric, putatively incomprehensible early book on trigonometry The Trissotetras (1645). The Trissotetras was too impractical to succeed in its own day as a textbook, since it lacked both trigonometric tables and sample calculations. But its current bad reputation is based on literary authors’ amplifications of the verdict prefaced to its 19th century reprinting by one mathematician, William Wallace, who lacked (...) the background to appreciate the book’s historical context. Considering that context (including seventeenth century ‘copious’ prose, and medieval logic and ‘art of memory’), the bad reputation is undeserved: the book is mathematically clear, clever (e.g. in superimposing 16 problems into one diagram), and complete. The Trissotetras may thus be viewed as simply one more of Urquhart’s polymathic projects and involvements – which included education, rise of the middle class, religious and class conflicts, development of science and mathematics, search for patronage, universal language construction, and development of English prose – which serve to make him a lively and instructive intellectual Everyman for his time. (shrink)

Wynn examines the confluence of science, mathematics, and rhetoric in the development of theories of evolution and heredity in the 19th century. He shows how mathematical warrants become accepted sources for argument in the biological sciences and explores the importance of rhetorical strategies in persuading biologists to accept mathematical arguments.

These arguments are fairly well known today. It is interesting to note that v. Kries already knew them, and that they have been ignored by Reichenbach and v. Mises in their original account of probability.2This observation leads to the interesting question why the frequency theory of probability has been adopted by many people in our century in spite of severe counterarguments. One may think of a change in scientific attitude, of a scientific revolution put forward by Feyerabendarian propaganda- and (...) who would deny that Reichenbach was an excellent propagandist!My suggested explanation is the following:J. v. Kries is still a mentalist in the tradition of Descartes and Locke. This can be shown very well from his logic, which he wrote even much later (1916). A mentalist does not pose semantical questions in a proper sense: he rather asks which ideas in the human mind make up a concept. And studying probability in this way, he will find in any case that what is in the human mind is first of all an expectation. Therefore, his analysis of the concept of probability will be centered around the concept of expectation.People tended to approach the problem in quite a different way after the scientific revolution which led from mentalism to lingualism. They tended in many cases to use operationalism and to ask how probabilities are determined in science, if they wanted to clear up the meaning of probability. This new aspect of probability, which was caused by looking at it from a new position or standpoint, suggested it to be the limit of relative frequencies in the first instance. This suggestion was so strong that all objections were ignored, and all counterarguments encountered deaf ears.Of course I have used here an oversimplification. Neither was J. v. Kries untouched by Poincaré's conventionalism, which is essentially a movement leading to the breakdown of mentalism; nor was Reichenbach, when he wrote his thesis in 1915, already a lingualist in any respect.Nevertheless, I think that the lingualist revolution, which took place particularly in mathematics and physics, has also changed the attitude towards probability. It would be interesting to corroborate this thesis by extensive study of the history of science in the late 19th century.Besides this historical aspect of v. Kries' theory, there is a systematic one which should be noticed. Though his theory still has a mentalist outlook, many of v. Kries' statements can be translated into the present lingualist idiom and then become most interesting contributions to the present discussion. We shall then state that for v. Kries probabilities appear first of all in probabilistic hypotheses which may or may not be confirmed by empirical data. Therefore, they have a role similar to theoretical concepts.3But that is not the only predominant feature of v. Kries' theory. He is approaching objective probability in a way which is quite unfamiliar to present day philosophers or mathematicians. Objective probabilities are connected with other concepts in three different ways. First of all, probabilistic hypotheses are confirmed by empirically found relative frequencies in a finite series of events. Secondly, they serve as an aid for decisions. And finally, there is a third relationship. Probabilities have to be explained by theories which are in many cases not formulated in probabilistic terms themselves. We can try to understand probability in one of the first two ways via their connection to other concepts. That is what is usually done by interpretations in terms of frequencies or decisions. A third approach, however, is to understand the nature of probability by the way probabilities are explained, and that is what v. Kries does. Such an approach does not seem unusual at all. In many cases the nature of a kind of objects is characterized by giving an explanation. If somebody asks what an eclipse of the moon is, we shall answer - as Aristotle already proposed - by giving an explanation of it. Thus it is quite natural to answer a question as to the nature of probability by describing the general type of explanation of probability distributions in natural or social science. The answer given by v. Kries is - as we know today — of limited validity. Quantum mechanical probabilities are not explainable by Spielräume. V. Kries solution, however, is remarkable in one important respect. It accounts for the time direction of objective probabilities, which are always predictive or forward probabilities, while retrodictive or backward probabilities are always subjective. The relation of objective probabilities to time direction is surely of utmost importance for natural philosophy. I do not know of any other philosophical foundation of probability which takes into account this deep-rooted relation. Therefore, v. Kries' interpretation may help us to understand one of the most intricate puzzles of philosophy. It may be nearly one hundred years old, but is by no means out of date. (shrink)

This article aims first at showing that Russell's general doctrine according to which all mathematics is deducible ‘by logical principles from logical principles’ does not require a preliminary reduction of all mathematics to arithmetic. In the Principles, mechanics (part VII), geometry (part VI), analysis (part IV–V) and magnitude theory (part III) are to be all directly derived from the theory of relations, without being first reduced to arithmetic (part II). The epistemological importance of this point cannot be overestimated: (...) Russell's logicism does not only contain the claim that mathematics is no more than logic, it also contains the claim that the differences between the various mathematical sciences can be logically justified—and thus, that, contrary to the arithmetization stance, analysis, geometry and mechanics are not merely outgrowths of arithmetic. The second aim of this article is to set out the neglected Russellian theory of quantity. The topic is obviously linked with the first, since the mere existence of a doctrine of magnitude, in a work dated from 1903, is a sign of a distrust vis-à-vis the arithmetization programme. After having shown that, despite the works of Cantor, Dedekind and Weierstrass, many mathematicians at the end of the 19th Century elaborated various axiomatic theories of the magnitude, I will try to define the peculiarity of the Russellian approach. I will lay stress on the continuity of the logicist's thought on this point: Whitehead, in the Principia, deepens and generalizes the first Russellian 1903 theory. (shrink)

The attempts of theoretically solving the famous puzzle-dictum of physicist Eugene Wigner regarding the “unreasonable” effectiveness of mathematics as a problem of analytical philosophy, started at the end of the 19th century, are yet far from coming out with an acceptable theoretical solution. The theories developed for explaining the empirical “miracle” of applied mathematics vary in nature, foundation and solution, from denying the existence of a genuine problem to structural theories with an advanced level of mathematical (...) formalism. Despite this variation, methodologically fundamental questions like “Which is the adequate theoretical framework for solving Wigner’s conjecture?” and “Can the logico-mathematical formalism solve it and is it entitled to do it?” did not receive answers yet. The problem of the applicability of mathematics in the physical reality has been treated unitarily in some sense, with respect to the semantic-conceptual use of the constitutive terms, within both the structural and non-structural theories. This unity (of consistency) applied to both the referred objects and concepts per se and the aims of the investigations. For being able to make an objective study of the possible alternatives of the existent theories, a foundational approach of them is needed, including through semantic-conceptual distinctions which to weaken the unity of consistency. (shrink)

Mathematics plays an inordinate role in the work of many of famous Western philosophers, from the time of Plato, through Husserl and Wittgenstein, and even to the present. Why? This paper points to the experience of learning or making mathematics, with an emphasis on proof. It distinguishes two sources of the perennial impact of mathematics on philosophy. They are classified as Ancient and Enlightenment. Plato is emblematic of the former, and Kant of the latter. The Ancient fascination (...) arises from the sense that mathematics explores something ‘out there’. This is illustrated by recent discussions by distinguished contemporary mathematicians. The Enlightenment strand often uses Kant's argot: ‘absolute necessity’, ‘apodictic certainty’ and ‘a priori’ judgement or knowledge. The experience of being compelled by proof, the sense that something must be true, that a result is certain, generates the philosophy. It also creates the illusion that mathematics is certain. Kant's leading question, ‘How is pure mathematics possible?’, is easily misunderstood because the modern distinction between pure and applied is an artefact of the 19th century. As Russell put it, the issue is to explain ‘the apparent power of anticipating facts about things of which we have no experience’. More generally the question is, how is it that pure mathematics is so rich in applications? Some six types of application are distinguished, each of which engenders its own philosophical problems which are descendants of the Enlightenment, and which differ from those descended from the Ancient strand. (shrink)

Three-dimensional material models of molecules were used throughout the 19th century, either functioning as a mere representation or opening new epistemic horizons. In this paper, two case studies are examined: the 1875 models of van ‘t Hoff and the 1890 models of Sachse. What is unique in these two case studies is that both models were not only folded, but were also conceptualized mathematically. When viewed in light of the chemical research of that period not only were both (...) of these aspects, considered in their singularity, exceptional, but also taken together may be thought of as a subversion of the way molecules were chemically investigated in the 19th century. Concentrating on this unique shared characteristic in the models of van ‘t Hoff and the models of Sachse, this paper deals with the shifts and displacements between their operational methods and existence: between their technical and epistemological aspects and the fact that they were folded, which was forgotten or simply ignored in the subsequent development of chemistry. (shrink)

Francis Ysidro Edgeworth’s unduly neglected monograph New and Old Methods of Ethics (1877) advances a highly sophisticated and mathematized account of social well-being in the utilitarian tradition of his 19th-century contemporaries. This article illustrates how his usage of the ‘calculus of variations’ was combined with findings from empirical psychology and economic theory to construct a consequentialist axiological framework. A conclusion is drawn that Edgeworth is a methodological predecessor to several important methods, ideas, and issues that continue to be (...) discussed in contemporary social well-being studies. (shrink)

The manuscripts of Harriot discussed in this paper are essentially rough notes marginal to his systematic treatment of algebra, of which a small part was published posthumously. The central theme is the sign-rule for multiplication; but the incidentals open up an aspect of symbolism in mathematics entirely new for the time. A more restricted aspect of the same theme was touched on by Commandino in his Euclid, quoted by Harriot as rightly blaming ‘those that thinke that minus per minus (...) shal produce plus’; Commandino's authority was Cardano, in a similarly marginal departure from his great Ars magna, the de Aliza, which Harriot also cites in the same reference. The ostensible motivation, to preserve intact the Euclidean tradition in geometry, plays a very minor role in Harriot's notes. The basic aim, to elude the fatal link with imaginaries, they do touch on. More dimly underlying the arguments are the crucial logical facets of the problem, which Harriot faced with a greater conceptual clarity, formulating in words, however, only his own conclusion: the choice of sign-rule is the user's—a fact not fully recognised by mathematicians generally until the 19th century. (shrink)