Ampliamente conocidos son los señalamientos realizados en Ser y tiempo por Martin Heidegger en torno al contraste entre la corporalidad pensada modernamente con base en una mezcla de cuerpo-alma, de raigambre cartesiana, y la corporalidad existenciaria a partir del Ser-en-el-mundo del Dasein. Después de ello y con pocas alusiones en algunas de sus lecciones, la tematización mayor en torno al cuerpo se remonta a los Seminarios de Zollikon. El presente artículo busca nuevas vías de tematización a partir de lo que (...) Heidegger piensa como ambigüedad de la verdad en las diversas versiones de la conferencia “De la esencia de la verdad. La verdad del cuerpo dejaría ver al cuerpo en su errar como Körper y, por otro lado, en tanto misterio como Leib. Tal perspectiva permite una comprensión no unilateral del cuerpo y a la vez abre las posibilidades para pensarlo desde el Ser-en-el-mundo, tal como Heidegger había anunciado en diversos momentos de su obra. (shrink)

En el siguiente escrito buscamos poner de manifiesto las necesidades expresivas, en razón de las cuales, el joven Heidegger emprende el camino en búsqueda de los indicadores formales. Nuestra línea argumentativa toma como punto de partida la crítica que Eugen Fink construye alrededor de los conceptos de la fenomenología husserliana, pero se enfoca exclusivamente en la transformación hermenéutica de sus contenidos. Con ello pretendemos aclarar la transición de qué al cómo que caracteriza la propuesta fenomenológico-hermenéutica de Martin Heidegger, desde el (...) punto de vista de su conceptualidad específica. (shrink)

For three decades Franco Volpi’s thesis concerning the Aristotelianism of Heidegger has been grounds for investigation. Nevertheless, it has remained pending until now the task of delving deeply into the motives for which Heidegger would measure his strength against the great philosopher Aristotle. This paper is a contribution to this line of investigation into the preoccupations of the young Heidegger in his first lessons in Freiburg, especially in the post-war semester of 1919, as well as the discussions he sustained with (...) the radical philosophies of Dilthey, Rickert, and Husserl. This will allow us to understand better why Heidegger was required to rehabilitate the practical philosophy of Aristotle. (shrink)

lntentional ontology. Heidegger and the transformation of Husserlian phenomenology. The article will look inside in what Heidegger said in his first course in Marburgo about the issue of intentionality as the basis for a “fundamental ontological investigation.” Through the first Heidegger’s lessons, especially Freiburg, aspects of the Husserl’s idea of intentionality who suffered a hermeneutic appropriation by Heidegger, will be deployed. The text will focus on the relationship between Husserl’s intentionality and categorial intuition in order to interpret them through the (...) light of hermeneutic and understanding intuition that Heidegger speaks in his 1919’s Kriegsnotsemester. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false ES-CO X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 The article aims at discussing some aspects about how Hegel and Heidegger use the term “phenomenology”. The author examines as a first step Heidegger´s reading of Hegel´s texts, and then as a second step indentifies the differences. Therefore it becomes necessary to give a brief introduction about Hegel´s use of “phenomenology”, in order to put it in contrast with Heidegger´s idea of phenomenology, especially starting from his first lectures in Freiburg. (...) In this way we will reveal some elements in order to distinguish the dialectic meaning and the hermeneutic meaning which the term “phenomenology” may bear. (shrink)

Resumen Este artículo se enfoca en la revisión de la Retórica de Aristóteles que Martin Heidegger ofreció durante el semestre de verano de 1924. Mi objetivo es destacar algunos aspectos de esa revisión que, a pesar de no haber repercutido mucho en el horizonte de la pregunta por el ser, contribuyen al redescubrimiento y revalorización del papel de la retórica no sólo para el planteamiento heideggeriano, sino en el ámbito filosófico contemporáneo en general. En concreto, se trata de la caracterización (...) de la retórica como hermenéutica, como posibilidad, como escucha y, sobre todo, como la primera investigación acerca del entendido λόγος como lenguaje. El artículo busca destacar aspectos que no enfatizan otras interpretaciones en torno a las contribuciones de Heidegger respecto del llamado “giro retórico”.This article focuses on the revision of Aristotle’s Rhetoric by Martin Heidegger during the summer semester of 1924. My objective is to highlight some aspects of this revision which, despite not having had a great repercussion on the horizon of the question of being, contribute to the rediscovery and revaluation of the role that rhetoric has played not only within the Heideggerian approach, but also in contemporary philosophy in general. Specifically, I comment on the characterization of rhetoric as hermeneutics, as possibility, as listening and, above all, as the first research on λόγος understood as language. I seek to highlight aspects not emphasized in other interpretations of Heidegger’s specific contributions to so-called “rhetorical turn”. (shrink)

Resumen En este escrito se expone la critica heideggeriana a la lógica, que en su primera etapa comienza como una revisión histórica del concepto lógos, pero se irá radicalizando conforme el lenguaje se presenta como un impedimento para el desarrollo del proyecto ontológico, hasta desembocar en lo que él mismo denominó la necesidad de una conmoción estructural de la lógica. Con la finalidad de dar seguimiento al desarrollo paulatino de esta problemática, este texto ha sido dividido de la siguiente manera: (...) en primer lugar, exponemos el desmantelamiento del lógos propio de la lógica que Heidegger lleva a cabo en sus primeras lecciones; en segundo lugar, nos concentraremos en la crítica a la lógica que se lleva a cabo en el horizonte filosófico abierto por la pregunta acerca de la nada alrededor de los años 30, para así, finalmente, aclarar el sentido particular que caracteriza el proyecto de la Erschütterung der Logik en el contexto filosófico de 1934.The following text presents the Heideggerian critique to the logic, which, at the beginning is realized as an historical revision of the concept of lógos, but that will be more radical as language becomes a structural obstacle for the development of the ontological project. The culmination of the mentioned critique will be announced by Heidegger as the necessity to shake the logic in a structural way. Our purpose consists in following up the gradual development of this project, based on three different stages: so, firstly we expose the dismantling of the lógos proper of the logic that Heidegger carries out in his first lessons; secondly, we focus on the approach to logic that is opened up by the question of nothingness around the 1930's. Finally we clarify the particular meaning that characterizes the propousal of the Erschütterung der Logik in the philosophical context of 1934. (shrink)

Tras el inicio de la publicación de los llamados Cuadernos negros de Martin Heidegger, a partir de 2014, se pueden constatar, con mayor claridad, algunos aspectos autocríticos frente a lo expuesto en Ser y tiempo, de 1927. A partir de un análisis de los documentos hasta ahora conocidos es posible reconstruir a detalle cuáles fueron los motivos por los que Heidegger, entre 1931-1932, planteó una crítica al proyecto de la ontología fundamental y abandonó el plan de redacción de la segunda (...) parte de Ser y tiempo, en favor de un camino que lo llevaría a la senda del pensar ontohistórico. Con base en los nuevos materiales aportados por los Cuadernos negros es posible cuestionar una serie de interpretaciones apresuradas que rápidamente hablaron de un “fracaso” en el proyecto de Ser y tiempo. (shrink)

El presente artículo busca exponer la relación implícita que guarda para Martin Heidegger filosofía y estilo a partir de la idea de camino. En primer lugar, se destacará el carácter disposicional afectivo del Dasein como el primer impulso radicalmente diferente de repensar la idea de ser humano hasta ese momento primado por la historia de la metafísica. En segundo lugar, se ahondará en la afirmación del autor «Mis lecciones son caminos de bosque» como el hilo conductor de su idea de (...) filosofía y la manera en la que su pensamiento tomará un rumbo y un estilo propio. En tercer lugar, se desarrollará la correlación entre el pensamiento filosófico y el estilo, como la única posibilidad en la que el lenguaje poético puede nombrar lo inefable de la filosofía. (shrink)

A pesar de la inabarcable bibliografía en torno a Heidegger y Aristóteles, la publicación de documentos y cartas permite rastrear elementos centrales para la filosofía posterior heideggeriana. Uno de ellos es la interpretación de la metafísica como onto-teología. En múltiples textos Heidegger despliega diversos elementos que fortalecen su interpretación histórica de la tradición filosófica. Sin embargo, en una conferencia de 1957 (“La constitución onto-teo-lógica de la metafísica”) plantea la pregunta sobre la procedencia de esta cuestión. El presente artículo asume tal (...) pregunta y la interpreta en el sentido de hallar el origen de la discusión onto-teológica en Heidegger a partir de sus primeros ejercicios sobre Aristóteles (en el verano de 1921) sobre De anima. Ello permitirá actualizar, en la línea que ya había anticipado Franco Volpi, la importancia de las primeras lecturas de Aristóteles para la totalidad de la obra heideggeriana. (shrink)

La publicación del libro de Anthony Steinbock en 1995 sobre generatividad (Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl) abrió líneas de investigación que en su momento no contaban con una amplia base documental. La aparición de gran parte de la obra tanto de Edmund Husserl (en Husserliana) como de Martin Heidegger (en la Gesamtausgabe) en las últimas décadas han confirmado y ampliado lo anticipado por Steinbock, especialmente en lo referente al lugar que ocupa la tematización del “mundo de la vida” (...) (Lebenswelt). El presente artículo despliega algunas de las confluencias entre ambos fenomenólogos, especialmente en la década de los años 30 a partir de la meditación histórica. Con ello se busca comprender, por otras vías, no solo la idea de fenomenología generativa, sino a su vez confirmar el hecho de que la empresa fenomenológica efectivamente puede ser aprehendida como un trabajo generacional concreto. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo se analiza la relación entre la ética y la religión a la luz del pensamiento de Hermann Cohen. Para ello se exponen las relaciones y diferencias que éste guarda con Kant, haciendo hincapié en la interpretación teleológica de la ética kantiana que Cohen propone. Luego se establecen los límites de la ética filosófica y la peculiaridad de la religión de la razón, para, finalmente, describir el camino que conduce desde el ' c o n g é (...) n e r e' pasando por el 'prójimo' y el individuo pecador hasta el yo que redime. (shrink)

En este ensayo planteo una dificultad que encuentro en la última propuesta de Quine sobre las oraciones observacionales. Argumento que esta dificultad impide que tales oraciones cumplan el rol que él les asigna en su filosofía y socavan su empirismo ilustrado. Luego exploro tentativamente un resquicio que encuentro en la propia filosofía quineana que eventualmente podría evitar los problemas derivados de dicha dificultad. El precio de seguir el camino apuntado por ese resquicio es, sin embargo, una cierta reinterpretación del espíritu (...) empirista de la filosofía de Quine. In this paper I set out a problem I find in Quine's last proposal on observation sentences. I argue that this problem prevents those sentences to play the role he ascribes to them in his philosophy and undermines his enlightened empiricism. Then I tentatively explore an option I find in Quine's own philosophy which can eventually avoid the issues raised by that problem. The price to pay in following this option, though, is a certain reinterpretation of the empiricist spirit of Quine's philosophy. Apresenta-se uma dificuldade na última proposta de Quine sobre as orações observacionais. Argumenta-se que essa dificuldade impede que essas orações cumpram o papel que ele concede a elas em sua filosofia e debilitam seu empirismo ilustrado. Explora-se tentativamente um resquício na própria filosofia quineana que eventualmente poderia evitar os problemas derivados dessa dificuldade. O preço de seguir o caminho indicado por esse resquício é, contudo, certa interpretação do espírito empirista da filosofia de Quine. (shrink)

IntroductionRheumatologists are the primary healthcare professionals responsible for patients with rheumatic diseases and should acquire medical ethical competencies, such as the informed consent process (ICP). The objective clinical structured examination is a valuable tool for assessing clinical competencies. We report the performance of 90 rheumatologist trainees participating in a station designed to evaluate the ICP during the 2018 and 2019 national accreditations.MethodsThe station was validated and represented a medical encounter in which the rheumatologist informed a patient with systemic lupus erythematosus (...) with clinically active nephritis about renal biopsy. A trained patient–actor and an evaluator were instructed to assess ICP skills (with a focus on kidney biopsy benefits, how the biopsy is done and potential complications) in obtaining formal informed consent, delivering bad news and overall communication with patients. The evaluator used a tailored checklist and form.ResultsCandidate performance varied with ICP content and was superior for potential benefit information (achieved by 98.9% of the candidates) but significantly reduced for potential complications (37.8%) and biopsy description (42.2%). Only 17.8% of the candidates mentioned the legal perspective of ICP. Death (as a potential complication) was omitted by the majority of the candidates (93.3%); after the patient–actor challenged candidates, only 57.1% of them gave a clear and positive answer. Evaluators frequently rated candidate communications skills as superior (≥80%), but ≥1 negative aspect was identified in 69% of the candidates.ConclusionsEthical competencies are mandatory for professional rheumatologists. It seems necessary to include an ethics competency framework in the curriculum throughout the rheumatology residency. (shrink)

This volume contains new and original papers on Martin Heidegger's complex relation to Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy. The authors not only critically discuss the many aspects of Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche, they also interpret Heidegger's thought from a Nietzschean perspective. Here is presented for the first time an overview of not only Heidegger's and Nietzsche's philosophy but also an overview of what is alive - and dead - in their thinking. Many authors through a reading of Heidegger and Nietzsche deal with (...) current issues such as technology, ecology, and politics. This volume is of interest for everyone interested in Heidegger's and Nietzsche's thought. Contributors include: Babette Babich, Charles Bambach, Robert Bernasconi, Virgilio Cesarone, Stuart Elden, Michael Eldred, Markus Enders, Charles Feitosa, Véronique Fóti, Luanne T. Frank, Jeffery Kinlaw, Theodore Kisiel, William D. Melaney, Eric Sean Nelson, Abraham Olivier, Friederike Rese, Karlheinz Ruhstorfer, Harald Seubert, Robert Sinnerbrink, Robert Switzer, Jorge Uscatescu Barrón, Nancy A. Weston, Dale Wilkerson, Angel Xolocotzi, Jens Zimmermann. (shrink)

Thinking is a kind of dialogue ─ according to Plato thinking is a silent and inner conversation of the soul with itself. Understanding presupposes thinking. Therefore, understanding presupposes a kind of dialogue. From this conclusion arises not only the question of what dialogue and understanding are in essence, but also the question of the connection between dialogue and understanding. This volume explores these two question complexes in both a philosophical-historical and a systematic manner and presents possible answers from a classical (...) as well as a modern perspective. Contributors to this volume are Gregor Damschen (Oldenburg), Lourdes Flamarique (Navarra), Vittorio Hösle (Notre Dame), Hans Lenk (KIT), Dmitri Nikulin (The New School for Social Research), Jorge Afredo Roetti (CONICET), Jochen Sauer (Bielefeld), Alejandro G. Vigo (Navarra), Mirko Wischke (Halle), and Ángel Xolocotzi (Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla). (shrink)

Los trabajos que componen este libro se adentran en eso que ha llegado a verse como un campo de estudio asegurado, pero que más bien parece un arco en problemática tensión: el que se forma al pretender conjuntar la fenomenología “y” la hermenéutica. La particularidad de Heidegger consiste tanto en haber tensado ese arco como en haber abandonado después su propio intento, tan fructífero para otros. Por ello, Heidegger es −junto a Gadamer− el interlocutor principal de estos escritos. El libro (...) tiene como objetivo homenajear a Franco Volpi por todo lo que nos dio como pensador y persona. Da a conocer uno de los últimos trabajos del propio Volpi, así como ensayos de Jean Grondin, Arturo Leyte, Ramón Rodríguez, Alejandro Vigo y Ángel Xolocotzi, entre otros. (shrink)

Desde la tradicional linealidad temporal hasta la temporalización estética y premeditadamente elaborada, se estudian aquí los diferentes enfoques de la temporalidad en la novela mexicana desde Al filo del agua de Agustín Yáñez hasta La ley del amor de Laura Esquivel, pasando por Pedro Páramo de Juan Rulfo, La muerte de Artemio Cruz de Carlos Fuentes, Palinuro de México de Fernando del Paso y Arráncame la vida de Ángeles Mastretta.

Explores intellectual and philosophical evolution of German philosopher Martin Heidegger, focusing on period after World War II. Analyzes how Heidegger s ideas, particularly his notion of being, influenced and were influenced by postwar context, including confrontation with Nazism and emergence of new philosophical currents. Argues that Heidegger s work offers relevant insights for contemporary philosophical debates and calls for a critical dialogue with his legacy. Discusses Heidegger s philosophy in the context of French and German philosophical schools, highlighting relevance of (...) his ideas and impact they had on contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

Informational theories of semantic content have been recently gaining prominence in the debate on the notion of mental representation. In this paper we examine new-wave informational theories which have a special focus on cognitive science. In particular, we argue that these theories face four important difficulties: they do not fully solve the problem of error, fall prey to the wrong distality attribution problem, have serious difficulties accounting for ambiguous and redundant representations and fail to deliver a metasemantic theory of representation. (...) Furthermore, we argue that these difficulties derive from their exclusive reliance on the notion of information, so we suggest that pure informational accounts should be complemented with functional approaches. (shrink)

In having an experience one is aware of having it. Having an experience requires some form of access to one's own state, which distinguishes phenomenally conscious mental states from other kinds of mental states. Until very recently, Higher-Order (HO) theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a full-fledged account of this form of awareness within the analytical tradition. Independently of any objections that HO theories face, First/Same-Order (F/SO) theorists need to offer an account of such access to (...) become a plausible alternative. My aim in this paper is twofold. In the first place, I wish to widen the logical space of the discussion among theories of consciousness by offering a distinction, orthogonal to that between F/SO and HO theories, between what I will call 'Self-Involving' (SI) and 'Mental-State-Involving' (MSI) theories and argue in favor of the former one. In the second place, I will present the basics of a characterization of such a Self-Involving theory in Same-Order terms. (shrink)

It is often claimed that a minimal form of self-awareness is constitutive of our conscious experience. Some have considered that such a claim is plausible for our ordinary experiences but false when considered unrestrictedly on the basis of the empirical evidence from altered states. In this paper I want to reject such a reasoning. This requires, first, a proper understanding of a minimal form of self-awareness – one that makes it plausible that minimal self-awareness is part of our ordinary experiences. (...) I will argue that it should be understood as Perspectival First-Person Awareness : a non-conceptual identification-free self-attribution that defines the first-person perspective for our conscious experience. I will offer a detailed characterization of PFP-Awareness in semantic and epistemological terms. With this tool in hand, I will review the empirical literature on altered states. I will focus on psychedelics, meditation and dreams, as they have been claimed to present the clearest cases in favor of a radical disruption of self-awareness. I will show that the rejection of the idea that minimal self-awareness is constitutive of our experience on the basis of this evidence is unfounded, for two main reasons. First, although there are good grounds to think that some forms of self-awareness that typically accompany our ordinary experiences are compromised, they do not support the claim that PFP-Awareness is absent. Secondly, the reports that could make us think of a radical disruption of self-awareness are most probably due to a confirmation bias – and hence we should mistrust them – derived from the expectations and metaphysical views of their subjects. (shrink)

In developing a theory of consciousness, one of the main problems has to do with determining what distinguishes conscious states from non-conscious ones—the delimitation problem. This paper explores the possibility of solving this problem in terms of self-awareness. That self-awareness is essential to understanding the nature of our conscious experience is perhaps the most widely discussed hypothesis in the study of consciousness throughout the history of philosophy. Its plausibility hinges on how the notion of self-awareness is unpacked. The idea that (...) consciousness involves self-awareness has been understood in two different ways: either as awareness of oneself—the subject of experience—or as awareness of the conscious episode itself. In this paper I argue (i) that every experience concerns the subject in a very specific way, involving what I will call ‘perspectival de se representation’, and (ii) that there is no need to appeal to the experience itself in order to characterize the awareness within that experience. The view I articulate explains the subjective nature of experience without over-intellectualizing it, accommodates the phenomenology of experience, and dispels any doubt about the need to find the self in introspection. (shrink)

This is a collection of new investigations and discoveries on the history of a great tradition, the Lvov-Warsaw School of logic , philosophy and mathematics, by the best specialists from all over the world. The papers range from historical considerations to new philosophical, logical and mathematical developments of this impressive School, including applications to Computer Science, Mathematics, Metalogic, Scientific and Analytic Philosophy, Theory of Models and Linguistics.

In this paper I investigate which of the main conditions proposed in the moral responsibility literature are the ones that spell trouble for the idea that Artificial Intelligence Systems could ever be full-fledged responsible agents. After arguing that the standard construals of the control and epistemic conditions don’t impose any in-principle barrier to AISs being responsible agents, I identify the requirement that responsible agents must be aware of their own actions as the main locus of resistance to attribute that kind (...) of agency to AISs. This is because this type of awareness is thought to involve first-person or de se representations, which, in turn, are usually assumed to involve some form of consciousness. I clarify what this widespread assumption involves and conclude that the possibility of AISs’ moral responsibility hinges on what the correct theory of de se representations ultimately turns out to be. (shrink)

Higher-order thought theories of consciousness attempt to explain what it takes for a mental state to be conscious, rather than unconscious, by means of a HOT that represents oneself as being in the state in question. Rosenthal Consciousness and the self: new essays, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) stresses that the way we are aware of our own conscious states requires essentially indexical self-reference. The challenge for defenders of HOT theories is to show that there is a way to explain (...) the required reference-fixing mechanisms that is compatible with the theory. According to Rosenthal, the reference to oneself as such is grounded in the disposition to identify the individual the HOT refers to as the individual who has that HOT. I argue that this leads to a vicious infinite regress on the more than plausible assumption that our cognitive capacities are limited. This leaves such theories without a foundation, since self-reference is thought essential to consciousness. (shrink)