The title of this Festschrift to Stephen Brown points to the understanding of medieval philosophy and theology in the longue durée of their traditions and discourses.

Based on the relevant logic R, the system R# was proposed as a relevant Peano arithmetic. R# has many nice properties: the most conspicuous theorems of classical Peano arithmetic PA are readily provable therein; it is readily and effectively shown to be nontrivial; it incorporates both intuitionist and classical proof methods. But it is shown here that R# is properly weaker than PA, in the sense that there is a strictly positive theorem QRF of PA which is unprovable in R#. (...) The reason is interesting: if PA is slightly weakened to a subtheory P+, it admits the complex ring C as a model; thus QRF is chosen to be a theorem of PA but false in C. Inasmuch as all strictly positive theorems of R# are already theorems of P+, this nonconservativity result shows that QRF is also a nontheorem of R#. As a consequence, Ackermann's rule γ is inadmissible in R#. Accordingly, an extension of R# which retains its good features is desired. The system R##, got by adding an omega-rule, is such an extension. Central question: is there an effectively axiomatizable system intermediate between R# and R##, which does formalize arithmetic on relevant principles, but also admits γ in a natural way? (shrink)

The authors present a critical edition of the Quaestio de formalitatibus of John Duns Scotus. In the introduction to their edition, they examine the evidence of the manuscripts and the external and internal evidence to determine the authorship, place and date of the question. They conclude that the Quaestio was disputed by John Duns Scotus at Paris in the Franciscan studium sometime between 1305 and 1307. Chronologically, Scotus’ Quaestio, disputed at Paris, would seem to be his final, magisterial word on (...) the subject of the formal distinction. Finally, the authors examine the transmission of the text in each of the manuscripts in order to establish a stemma codicum and the principles that govern their edition. (shrink)

A basic problem of daily life is determining who owns what. One way that people may solve this problem is by relying on a ‘first possession’ heuristic, according to which the first person who possesses an object is its owner, even if others subsequently possess the object. We investigated preschoolers’ use of this heuristic in five experiments. In Experiments 1 and 2, 3- and 4-year-olds inferred that an object was owned by the character who possessed it first, even though another (...) character subsequently possessed it. Two-year-olds also showed this bias, but only when the object was placed between the characters when children were asked about ownership. Experiment 3 ruled out the possibility that children’s bias to select the first possessor results from a tendency to select the character first associated with the object. Experiment 4 showed that 3- and 4-year-olds have difficulty disregarding the first possession heuristic, even when provided with evidence that the character who first possessed an object is not its owner. But Experiment 5 found that children can disregard the heuristic in at least some situations. These five experiments suggest that the first possession heuristic guides children’s ownership inferences. The findings provide the first evidence that preschoolers can infer who owns what, when not explicitly told, and when not reasoning about objects with which they are personally acquainted. (shrink)

Understanding the neuroanatomical correlates of individual differences in executive function (EF) is integral to a complete characterization of the neural systems supporting cognition. While studies have investigated EF-neuroanatomy relationships in adults, these studies often include samples with wide variation in age, which may mask relationships between neuroanatomy and EF specific to certain neurodevelopmental time points, and such studies often use unreliable single task measures of EF. Here we address both issues. First, we focused on a specific age at which the (...) majority of neurodevelopmental changes are complete but at which age-related atrophy is not likely ( N = 251; mean age of 28.71 years, SD = 0.57). Second, we assessed EF through multiple tasks, deriving three factors scores guided by the unity/diversity model of EF, which posits a common EF factor that influences all EF tasks, as well as an updating-specific and shifting-specific factor. We found that better common EF was associated with greater volume and surface area of regions in right middle frontal gyrus/frontal pole, right inferior temporal gyrus, as well as fractional anisotropy in portions of the right superior longitudinal fasciculus (rSLF) and the left anterior thalamic radiation. Better updating-specific ability was associated with greater cortical thickness of a cluster in left cuneus/precuneus, and reduced cortical thickness in regions of right superior frontal gyrus and right middle/superior temporal gyrus, but no aspects of white matter diffusion. In contrast, better shifting-specific ability was not associated with gray matter characteristics, but rather was associated with increased mean diffusivity and reduced radial diffusivity throughout much of the brain and reduced axial diffusivity in distinct clusters of the left superior longitudinal fasciculus, the corpus callosum, and the right optic radiation. These results demonstrate that associations between individual differences in EF ability and regional neuroanatomical properties occur not only within classic brain networks thought to support EF, but also in a variety of other regions and white matter tracts. These relationships appear to differ from observations made in emerging adults ( Smolker et al., 2015 ), which might indicate that the brain systems associated with EF continue to experience behaviorally relevant maturational process beyond the early 20s. (shrink)

This volume collects essays which are thematically connected through the work of Kent Emery Jr., to whom the volume is dedicated. A main focus lies on the attempts to bridge the gap between mysticism and a systematic approach to medieval philosophical thought.

Recruiting adolescents into smoking cessation studies is challenging, particularly given institutional review board (IRB) requirements for research conducted with adolescents. This article provides a brief review of the federal regulations that apply to research conducted with adolescents, and describes researchers' experiences of seeking IRB approval for youth cessation research. Twenty-one researchers provided information. The most frequently reported difficulty involved obtaining parental consent. Solutions to commonly reported problems with obtaining IRB approval are also identified. Waivers of parental consent can facilitate recruitment (...) of youths into studies; however, researchers must ensure that their protocols comply with federal regulations when requesting a waiver. (shrink)

Let k be a positive integer. There is a longest finite sequence x1,...,xn in k letters in which no consecutive block xi,...,x2i is a subsequence of any other consecutive block xj,...,x2j. Let n(k) be this longest length. We prove that n(1) = 3, n(2) = 11, and n(3) is incomprehensibly large. We give a lower bound for n(3) in terms of the familiar Ackerman hierarchy. We also give asymptotic upper and lower bounds for n(k). We view n(3) as a particularly (...) elemental description of an incomprehensibly large integer. Related problems involving binary sequences (two letters) are also addressed. We also report on some recent computer explorations of R. Dougherty which we use to raise the lower bound for n(3). (shrink)

This paper considers the relevance of the Duhem-Quine thesis in economics. In the introductory discussion which follows, the meaning of the thesis and a brief history of its development are detailed. The purpose of the paper is to discuss the effects of the thesis in four specific and diverse theories in economics, and to illustrate the dependence of testing the theories on a set of auxiliary hypotheses. A general taxonomy of auxiliary hypotheses is provided to demonstrate the confounding of auxiliary (...) hypotheses with the testing of economic theory. (shrink)

At the University of Newcastle, health law and ethics is taught and assessed in each year of the five-year curriculum. However, the critical question for assessment remains: 'Does teaching ethics have a measurable effect on the clinical activity of medical students who have had such courses?' Those responsible for teaching confront this question each year they sit down to construct their assessment tools. Should they assess what the student knows? Should they assess the student's moral reasoning, that is, what decisions (...) the student makes, and, how these decisions are justified, or should they assess what the student actually does when dealing with patients in the clinical setting, and how he or she does it? From 1982 to 1991, assessment at Newcastle was primarily aimed at determining the quality of the students' ethics knowledge base. This paper describes the strengths and limitations of a purely knowledge-based method of evaluation and why in 1992, we are now attempting to redefine and assess, what we call 'clinical ethical competence' in terms of how students actually apply this knowledge base in a controlled clinical context. (shrink)

Quentin Skinner's The Foundations of Modern Political Thought is primarily of interest to philosophers not for its excellent account of European thought about the state but for the self–conscious philosophy which has gone into it. It is a rare historian who pauses to get his philosophy in order before he embarks on a major enterprise, though such a policy is possibly less unusual in intellectual history than in other fields. In Skinner's case, however, this order of doing things has been (...) pushed so far that he counts as a philosopher in his own right, rather than as merely someone who is unusually careful to think about what he is doing. The publication of this major work thus provides a convenient opportunity to make a few remarks about the relation between historical theory and practice. (shrink)

I first met Parmenides – together with Xenophanes, Heraclitus, and the other great Presocratics – in a German translation by Wilhelm Nestle, famous as the editor of the later editions of Zeller's magnum opus. I was 15 or 16 years old, and I was overwhelmed by the meeting. The verses that I liked best were Parmenides' story of Selene's love for radiant Helios . But I did not like it that the translation made the moon male and the sun female (...) , and it occurred to me to give the couplet in German a title like ‘Moongoddess and Sungod’, or perhaps ‘Selene and Helios’, in order to rectify the genders. So I began fiddling about with the translations. The volume, which I still possess, shows many traces of this. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “A Computational Constructivist Model as an Anticipatory Learning Mechanism for Coupled Agent–Environment Systems” by Filipo Studzinski Perotto. Upshot: Mainstream AI research largely addresses cognitive features as separate and unconnected. Instead of addressing cognitive growth in this same way – modeling it simply as one more such isolated feature and continuing to uphold a wrong-headed divide-and-conquer tradition – a constructivist approach should help unify many key phenomena such as anticipation, self-modeling, life-long learning, and recursive self-improvement. (...) Since this is likely to result in complex systems with unanticipated properties, all cognitive architecture researchers should aim to implement their ideas in full as running systems to be verified by experiment. Perotto’s paper falls short on both these points. (shrink)

Measurement is a special type of evaluation that is more exact than either opinion or estimation. In the social sciences, in particular, most evaluations are not measures, but rather mixtures of opinion and estimation. Over-measurement represents anchoring to evaluations which are not measures. For an over-measured characteristic, single measures are used when instead a portfolio of possible measures should be used. There are three implications. First, measurements of characteristics which depend on the over-measured characteristic are biased. Secondly, decisions which depend (...) on the over-measured characteristic are biased. Thirdly, over-measurement biases the measurement of uncertainty. (shrink)

Recognition that the Principle of Respect for Autonomy fails to work in family-centric societies such as Singapore has recently led to the promotion of relational autonomy as a suitable framework within which to place healthcare decision making. However, empirical data, relating to patient and family opinions and the practices of healthcare professionals in Confucian-inspired Singapore, demonstrate clear limitations on the ability of a relational autonomy framework to provide the anticipated compromise between prevailing family decision-making norms and adopted Western led atomistic (...) concepts of autonomy. Evidence suggests that despite a growing infusion of Western influence, there is still little to indicate any major shift to individual decision making, particularly in light of the way society and healthcare are structured. Similarly, the lack of employing a shared decision-making model and data that discredit the notion that the complex psychosocial and cultural factors that affect the decision making may be considered “content neutral” not only prevents the application of relational autonomy but questions the viability of the values behind the Principle of Respect for Autonomy. Taking into account local data and drawing upon a wider concept of personhood that extends beyond prevailing family-centric ideals along with the complex interests that are focused upon the preservation of the unique nature of personhood that arises from the Ring Theory of Personhood, we propose and “operationalize” the employing of an authoritative welfare-based approach, within the confines of best interest decision making, to better meet the current care needs within Singapore. (shrink)

This is the first comprehensive study of Schrödinger's scientific and philosophical writings. The task requires a person trained thoroughly in physical science and yet capable of appreciating the sometimes puzzling philosophical ideas Schrödinger put forward. Professor Scott, a physicist, is remarkably successful at communicating both the physical and the philosophical ideas. After a brief summary of Schrödinger's diverse writings, he divides the writings into four groups which are treated in separate chapters. The first group, including very early papers, deals with (...) Schrödinger's work on Statistical Mechanics, and statistical theories in general. The second covers the crucial development of Wave Mechanics. The third concerns Schrödinger's interpretation of quantum mechanics and the important departures from the prevailing views of the Copenhagen school. Finally the fourth group contains Schrödinger's views on life and the self. The author shows that Schrödinger was led to his doctrine of identity by reflecting on the paradox of freedom and determinism. His study "What is Life?" convinced him that living systems are governed by the law of causality but he also believed that men were free. The doctrine of identity was his solution to the paradox. Scott is critical of this solution and a number of other doctrines of Schrödinger. The book is clearly written throughout and is a good introduction to Schrödinger's thought.--R. H. K. (shrink)

As the author states, this book could be read as an introductory text on scientific explanation and related topics or as a monograph which introduces some new ideas and takes a stand on these topics. Part I is strictly a textbook treatment of explanations and laws. It is clearly written and is particularly good in the classification of sorts of explanations. Part II is less successful as introductory material, but it contains some novel ideas. The author develops an approach to (...) explanation, prediction, and retrodiction by considering discrete state systems. He shows that for any number of simple systems of this kind, deterministic and probabilistic explanation, prediction, and retrodiction may not work. The discussion is abstract and the results are not related to actual physical systems. But the possibility of such systems is surely important for any complete theory of explanation as the author suggests. Discussions are also included of teleological systems and of confirming evidence. Part III discusses philosophical issues about the nature of laws, causality, indeterminism, and the limits of explanation. Two appendices discuss problems of scientific explanation in history and the social sciences. There is a long and very useful bibliography.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Intended for students of Thomistic metaphysics, this is a companion to Smith's earlier work on Natural Theology. From the basic question of being, stated in terms of the one and the many, a consistent metaphysics is developed. Stress is put upon the questions of our knowledge and the cause of being, and the relations of metaphysics, epistemology, and theology in Thomistic philosophy. The treatments of analogy, possibility, abstraction, and the transcendentals are especially informative.--R. H. K.

All those interested in the field of education will find this book fascinating, instructive, and thought-provoking. Gill presents a comprehensive reflection on learning. Prior to discussing the quality of education in America, or considering issues of pedagogy and curriculum, Gill seeks to develop a philosophy of education that is critically based in an investigation of the nature of human knowing. The first part of the book works to identify a more adequate philosophy of education, one based on a "postcritical" examination (...) of the nature of human knowing. The second part of the book searches out a theory of learning that should inform any philosophy or system of education. The third part renders a model of learning that can suggest appropriate programs, pedagogies, and curriculum. (shrink)

Harris presents Spinoza’s philosophy as an attempt to ground a total and coherent system of the universe that preserves the integrity and freedom of finite beings as modes of God the all inclusive Substance. Traditionally, Spinoza has perhaps been too often caricatured been as a sterile rationalist clinging adamantly to the priority of mathematical knowledge and its method of strict deduction. Harris rectifies this view by clarifying and reinterpreting his theory of knowledge, the metaphysical foundations of the concept of Substance, (...) the discrepancies in the mind-body relationship, and he evaluates Spinoza’s ethical and political theories in light of his total enterprise. (shrink)

Those who read this book may be more impressed with its author than the man about whom he is writing. Loren Eiseley is an anthropologist, naturalist and humanist, but more than this he is a man who has a talent for poetic expression. His ardent admiration of Bacon, the heralder [[sic]] of the scientific age, permeates the work and motivates him to speak of the philosopher as "the greatest Elizabethan voyager of all time—a man who sounded the cavernous surges of (...) the darkest sea against which men will ever contend: the sea of time itself." For Eiseley, Bacon is the forerunner of modern times with its awareness of the viability of science in the affairs of man. Bacon recognized the import of the history of philosophy and science and was consumed with the idea that nature is an infinite plenum of hidden potentiality beckoning man to unfold its mysteries and truths. He thought a new frontier could be forged grounded on a "new organ," an inductive method born of the marriage between reason and imagination. He was anxious to achieve triumph of the experimental method and harshly criticized Aristotle’s inductive method. One familiar with Aristotle, however, is cognizant of the fact that he was not, as Bacon contended, caught up with "simple enumeration" but maintained that scientific knowledge as a knowledge of the four causes did not preclude any serious attempts to discover real causal connections. (shrink)

At 2.00 am on the morning of May 24, 1995 the Northern Territory Legislative Assembly Australia passed the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act by the narrow margin of 15 votes to 10. The act permits a terminally ill patient of sound mind and over the age of 18 years, and who is either in pain or suffering, or distress, to request a medical practitioner to assist the patient to terminate his or her life. Thus, Australia can lay claim to (...) being the first country in the world to legalise voluntary active euthanasia. The Northern Territory's act has prompted Australia-wide community reaction, particularly in South Australia, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory where proposals to legalise euthanasia have already been defeated on the floor of parliament. In New South Wales (NSW) the AIDS Council of NSW has prepared draft euthanasia legislation to be introduced into the Upper House as a Private Member's Bill some time in 1996. In this paper, we focus on a brief description of events as they occurred and on the arguments for and against the legalisation of euthanasia which have appeared in the media. (shrink)

Walton offers a sustained and thorough study of Malebranche’s science of ethics. Much has been written about his Search for Truth but little has been said about his Treatise on Ethics which presents another perspective to Malebranche as a philosopher and extricates him from that sphere of philosophical thinking impoverished by sterility and abstraction, a criticism often unjustly leveled at the so-called Rationalists. Walton starts out by presenting an analysis of Malebranche’s theocentric ontology, an understanding of which is essential to (...) his moral thinking. Malebranche attempts in his Treatise to discover a common denominator in man which can serve as the foundation for a science of ethics. He finds reason to be the controlling factor which not only unites men to each other but unites man to God who Himself is Reason and Wisdom. (shrink)

This paper describes the exploratory study which was carried out in Zimbabwe with an elementary Grade 7 class and with the firstand third- year student teachers, at a Teacher Training College, "doing philosophy", using Lipman's PIXIE and HARRY novels, respectively, and the proposed critical inquiry methodology.Secondly the perceptions of the participants, about their experiences during these exploratory sessions, which were derived from the researcher's self-evaluation and the students' informal evaluations, are presented in the paper.

A translation of an early work by Aron which has become- almost a classic. First published in 1938, it is one of the best discussions of the limitations of objective historical knowledge. Analyzing man as both the subject and object of historical knowledge, Aron argues against the reduction of human history to natural history. There are also some brilliant chapters on the epistemological and sociological problems of historical knowledge.--K. R. D.

This is the first work on Campanella's philosophy to appear in English. In it the author presents a detailed analysis of Campanella's theory of knowledge, metaphysics, treatise on God, and moral and political doctrines, and evaluates each position in relation to medieval and renaissance thought. The study opens with a survey of Italian renaissance philosophy and a report on Campanella's life and historical position and concludes with an assessment of Campanella's system and an exceptionally thorough bibliography. A chief concern of (...) Professor Bonansea in the preparation of his work has been to support each statement with Campanella's own words or references to one or more primary sources. This exacting method has the double advantages of assuring the reader of a faithful rendering of Campanella's thought and of acquainting him with original material not easily available. In certain areas the inquiry has led to conclusions that conflict with those of various earlier writers who were unable to use all the primary sources now accessible or were too hasty in their judgments. Thus a more thorough study reveals that while Campanella, especially in his earlier writings, subscribed in some degree to naturalistic doctrines then current, he never rejected any of the basic truths of the Christian faith. However it would be wrong, Professor Bonansea points out, to call Campanella a genuine representative of traditional scholastic philosophy. He does not conform to the Thomistic school, which he blames on many counts for betraying Aquinas' thought and for its close adherence to the philosophy of Aristotle. Nor does he belong, properly speaking, to the Augustinian school, although this latter greatly contributed to the shaping of his thought. Campanella's doctrine is truly syncretic. In it elements of different schools of philosophy are fused to produce a unique and original synthesis, with principles drawn mainly from Augustinian, Thomistic, and naturalistic streams of thought. Bonansea's volume is the product of many years of research and shows itself to be a clear, solid, and comprehensive study of Campanella's many-sided thought. Its combination of fresh and independent judgment and thorough documentation make this a work of unique authority and value.--J. K. R. (shrink)

Lönning suggests that theology has long been faced with the problem of bringing Christian revelation and human culture and reason into relation without distortion of the Christian gospel. At the present time, Lönning sees this dilemma arising out of the confrontation of traditional Christian claims with those of existentialism and demythologized interpretations of Scripture, especially in regard to the issues of the nature of God's revelation in Christ and man's sinfulness and salvation. Lönning is critical of a demythologized and existentialized (...) Christian faith, claiming that faith must be more historically grounded than Bultmann allows, and that existential self-estrangement must be traced back to a fundamental distortion of man's relation to God. These remarks about contemporary theology are couched in an historical setting that includes essays on Luther, Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche—J. K. R. (shrink)

A useful edition of some political and strategic writings, together with all the significant philosophical essays of Mao Tse-tung, who is described as the "most influential" contemporary Marxist philosopher. Except for the 1957 "Hundred Flowers" speech, all the translations and footnotes are from International Publishers' four volume Selected Works. Miss Fremantle's forty-one page introduction is largely a paraphrased abridgment of Edgar Snow's well known biography, Red Star over China. For the general reader, this Mentor paperback probably provides the best low (...) priced introduction to the thought of Mao Tse-tung.--K. R. D. (shrink)

This is a systematic and critical account of Berkeley’s philosophy of science. Brook’s intention is to evaluate Berkeley’s analysis of significant scientific concepts, his general theories in optics, physics, and mathematics, and finally Berkeley’s own interpretation and criticism of Newton’s principles. That Berkeley’s writings are pervaded with ambiguities, inconsistencies, and misinterpretations of Newton seems to be the conclusion that Brook reaches, although he does distinguish in the writings the areas in which he feels Berkeley is on target. Berkeley conceived the (...) purpose of science to be the practical mastery of nature, and his philosophy is indicative of a phase in the evolution of a "new" science that had its roots as far back as Galileo who envisioned a universe that could be read off in terms of mathematical relationships. This view entailed the overthrow of traditional physics and its concern with substantial forms and qualitative changes. As Brook points out, the object of physics for Berkeley is a phenomenal order that can at best display only uniformities, efficient causality belongs to the realm of metaphysics. Brook does not go into the metaphysical or historical foundations of Berkeley’s philosophy of science, but his first chapter on the theory of signification presents sufficient background for the more detailed and complex chapters that deal with his theory of vision, philosophy of physics and mathematics. This is not an easy book to read, and the chapter on Berkeley’s mathematics may prove to be especially difficult to those who lack an orientation to this field. Yet Brooks could hardly do better than he does considering the obscurities and obfuscatory trappings that are to be found in the primary sources from which he is working. A good bibliography is included that should serve to facilitate a reading of this book. Brook’s study is the only work to date that takes into account Berkeley’s scientific works as a whole and not just some aspects.—K.R.M. (shrink)

The third volume in a projected library of contemporary Soviet thought called 'Sovietica' is of particular interest because it makes available to non-Russian readers a condensed German translation of the most recent Summa of Soviet thought, Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii. The text, organised under two main headings, Dialectical and Historical Materialism, is a catechism of Soviet dogmata which ranges from questions of space, time and perception to those of scientific socialism, class war and social consciousness. One of the aims of the (...) editor, as stated in the preface, is to demonstrate that the current Soviet version of 'Marxism' fails to express young Marx's overriding concern for the human being, and the phenomenon of estrangement.--K. R. D. (shrink)

The fourth volume of the 'Sovietica' series is chiefly composed of a collection in German translation of four papers read at a Moscow conference in 1958. The theme of the conference was 'The Question of Dialectical Contradiction in the Light of Contemporary Science and Practice.' Included are a brief excerpt from the official Soviet textbook, Osnovy marksistkoj filosofii and a noteworthy paper by A. I. Kolman.--K. R. D.

A new journal issued in connection with the Hegel-Kommission der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft, which is preparing a new critical-historical collection of Hegel's works. The first volume contains critical editions of certain Hegel fragments, essays on Hegel, and reviews of Hegel literature.--K. R. D.

This is a fresh and stimulating analysis of the esthetic experience in terms of the import it gives to the role of "affective hazard" in the constitution of the esthetic form. The author, who comes with a background in English literature, proposes that all esthetic experiences have one common feature, their form as felt unity which endows the object with a value that distinguishes it from other objects. The experiencer as one of the terms of the relationship is confronted with (...) a manifold of elements one of which stands out in a hazardous way as an impediment to the union of the terms. Its very hazardousness, however, impregnates the whole structure, and in spite of an apparent obstruction to the order it actually bestows a balance and symmetry that would otherwise be lacking. There is a bending, but no breaking; the fragility itself is a necessary precondition for the form that constitutes the esthetic experience marking the object as a potentiality for some form yet unactualized but implicitly determined. The scholastic notion of being is evident in Slattery’s analysis of form as the principle of "unity," "intelligibility," and "determination." Rather than emphasize the static quality of things she chooses to focus on the object as both open and closed; open to receive many forms but closed in that it is only actualized as one form by a mind who at will chooses it from a manifold of other possible forms which it rejects. Unlike the Aristotelian form which inheres in the thing independent of the experiencer the form in the esthetic object is constituted by an experiencer who is an active participant in the relationship. This active term also confers upon the object its value which defines it as an object of esthetic quality. Interspersed throughout the book are descriptive analyses of various esthetic forms that illustrate what Slattery means by the decisive role of "affective hazard," and it is here that she is at her best. So well does she capture the essence of the dynamic richness peculiar to the esthetic object that she evokes in the reader an affective excitement and an awareness of a felt unity. This in itself verifies her thesis, and we could only have wished that she furnished us with more of the heightening experiences.—K. R. M. (shrink)

This small volume successfully captures the essential in Kant’s philosophy, his insight and understanding of the a priori as the universal and necessary condition in epistemology and ethics. Knowledge and morality, if they are to qualify as knowledge and morality, must be subjected to principles of universalizability, and it is Kant’s contribution to philosophy that he argues for the non-empirical conditions that make these possible. The author approaches Kant’s theory of knowledge from an untraditional perspective. Rather than start his inquiry (...) with a study of the Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic, Hartnack focuses in on the Transcendental Dialectic giving Kant’s arguments for the first two antinomies and presenting a cursory account of the paralogisms and Transcendental Idea. Hartnack defends his procedure by calling our attention to the fact that it was not primarily Hume’s attack on the necessary connexion of cause and effect that influenced Kant to undertake his transcendental criticism as many scholars believe. By Kant’s own admission which he makes clear in a letter to Christian Garve in 1798 it was the antinomy of pure reason that "first aroused me from my dogmatic slumber and drew me to the Critique of Pure Reason itself in order to resolve the scandal of ostensible contradiction of reason with itself." It was the illegitimate use of reason that prompted Kant to search out the bounds and limits to which reason could legitimately make claim to. Bearing this in mind the present study centers on the dialectical illusion of reason which necessarily implies that it has another side to it, the legitimate and regulative use of reason. Hartnack strongly emphasizes the relationship between the Transcendental Analytic and Transcendental Dialectic and the relationship of the Critique as a whole to the Critique of Practical Reason where the a priori finds its expression in the categorical imperative. The Transcendental Dialectic are as two sides of the same coin. Reason on the one side legitimately applies its categories to the empirical, conditioned, phenomenal object of sense experience. But by nature reason seeks the unempirical, unconditioned, noumenal object which by definition cannot be given, and reason by applying the categories falls prey to the antinomies, paralogisms, and transcendental Idea. Hartnack’s critical account reveals the intimate and dynamic unity within the first Critique and its unity with the Critique of Practical Reason, a synthesis of Kant’s theory of knowledge and theory of morality. Much of what is obscure and obfuscatory in the primary sources is clarified and simplified for us in this work and yet the author has sacrificed none of the depth and dimension that characterize Kant’s writings. Rather in a few pages he has managed to target in on a significant aspect that sheds light and puts into proper perspective Kant’s project as a whole. Here is a case where less is better than more.—K.R.M. (shrink)

This compact book provides a much needed study of Leibniz’ moral philosophy which, unfortunately, has not been given the attention that his metaphysics and logic have received. It is Hostler’s contention that this neglect is an indication that the moral system of Leibniz has been incorrectly viewed as tangential to his other systems which are supposed to be Leibniz’ primary concerns. On the contrary, as Hostler points out, Leibniz’ moral philosophy was largely completed before his metaphysical works which were intended (...) to provide the principles for his ethical system. As Leibniz himself says in the New Essays, "you are more in the tradition of metaphysical thought, whereas I am more interested in ethics." Hostler embarks on his task by orienting us to Leibniz’s general metaphysics and proceeds throughout the study to show the interconnection between his morals and metaphysics. Leibniz’ ethics is traditionally grounded in that he acknowledges the essential relationship between the will, reason, and desire. At the same time he breaks with tradition by introducing two apparently contradictory motives for voluntary action. On one hand he proposes an egoism which aims at one’s own welfare, and on the other hand he proposes an altruism that demands that one should seek the welfare of the other. Hostler’s analysis of the concepts of the good, pleasure, happiness, and perfection shows that the contradiction is only apparent, and that egoism and altruism are reconcilable in Leibniz’ system. The good that I seek for myself is achieved when I do good for others, because in doing good to others I realize a perfection to some degree, and my awareness of that perfection is a source of pleasure which identifies itself as the consciousness of an increase in perfection. Hostler discusses the substantive part of Leibniz’ ethics wherein we find that love tempered by prudence produces justice, the demands of which are binding on all beings possessing reason and free will. Consequently, even God is subject to the moral imperative. As the ens perfectissimum God displays both perfect benevolence and wisdom in all his activities, hence he must create the best of all possible worlds, an act that Leibniz describes as "universal justice." Ultimately it can be seen that the reconciliation between egoism and altruism is explained through the principle of pre-established harmony for what affects one affects the others and every act has infinite consequences. It is only our finite intellect that prevents us from seeing the perfection in every object and thereby choosing it. The choice of the lesser good is a manifestation of that radical finitude. Hostler has presented us with a well organized study of Leibniz’ moral philosophy and has managed to situate it in terms of his philosophy as a whole. The brevity of the volume does not diminish its worth as a fine treatment of the subject.—K.R.M. (shrink)

A significant advance toward a more objective understanding of western philosophy in Soviet philosophical circles. Unlike the off-hand condemnations of western philosophers which so often fill the pages of Voprosy Filosofii, this Georgian philosopher presents a well documented historical development of twentieth century analytic philosophy from Russell's atomism, through Wittgenstein's Tractatus, logical positivism, and recent trends in English analysis. The "moral" of the story is that western thinkers are gradually coming to see the poverty of their philosophical perspective; linguistic analysis (...) must give way to the "precise vision of historical materialism."--K. R. D. (shrink)

A selection of articles originally written in English for the New York Tribune and here edited with an eye to proving the tantalizing thesis "that for Karl Marx antagonism between capital and labor took second place to the eternal duel between East and West, in which his sympathies... lay unequivocally with the West." Although these articles, dealing mainly with the Crimean War, merit greater attention than they have thus far received, this edition is misleading in two critical aspects: 1) Many (...) of the articles signed by Marx in the New York Tribune, especially those dealing with military affairs, were actually written by Engels. The crucial document for distinguishing them, a notebook kept by Marx's wife, is acknowledged to be in Moscow, but the editor makes no mention of this. 2) The editor also gives no hint of Marx's many other statements on Russia, especially in his preface to the second edition of Capital and in his correspondence with Vera Zasulich.--K. R. D. (shrink)

If there is an age in which philosophy seemed to experience a demise it is the nineteenth century, and yet this was not due to a lack of philosophy nor to the fact that there prevailed an attitude of estrangement from philosophy. Rather, what appeared to be a de-emphasis was merely a replacement of writings by "philosophers" with those by the natural scientist and the humanist. Tatarkiewicz divides his period into three phases distinguishing the era with their peculiar disciplines: 1830-60 (...) marked by positivism, empiricism, naturalism, and dialectical materialism; 1860-80 in which the minimalistic philosophy of positivism reached full bloom; 1880-1900 dominated by minimalism, positivism, scientism and in addition the appearance of opposing doctrines. Although such familiar names as Comte, Mill, Marx, Engels, Spencer, Brentano and Nietzsche find their way into Tatarkiewicz’ book, of greater significance is the manifold of less familiar figures who play a determining role in this period of philosophy. Yet it is not the author’s intent to expound individual doctrines in reference to anything but philosophical currents of the day. Tatarkiewicz focuses on times not men. A very good summary is presented at the end of the book mapping out the social, economic, political, geographic, and religious climate prevalent in the nineteenth century, thus concluding a helpful survey of a period that has been somewhat neglected in the history of philosophy.—K.R.M. (shrink)

Many of the papers in this volume originated in a colloquium at the University of Western Ontario in 1967. These include a paper on the logic of norms by G. H. Von Wright, a paper on the logic of questions by L. Åqvist, a paper on the logic of belief by W. Sellars, and a paper on inductive logic by R. Ackermann. The commentaries by Anderson and Sosa have been revised for the volume and a further commentary to Ackermann's paper (...) by Wesley Salmon has been added. In addition to the colloquium papers a number of further papers are published here for the first time: J. Hintikka on the semantics of propositional attitudes, R. Hilpinen on relativized modalities, C. Harrison on the unanticipated examiner and H. Smokler and M. Rohr on confirmation and translation. The volume is completed by two papers published in Synthese and a well-known paper in modal logic by Lemmon, Meredith, Meredith, Prior, and Thomas published complete with a new postscript by Prior. Although the collection is somewhat haphazard and seems to have no unifying theme, philosophers interested in these topics in philosophical logic will be thankful for the availability of the papers, both old and new.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The first book of a projected two-volume set which construes the diverse tendencies of contemporary political thought within the tradition of classical political philosophy. In two very closely argued sections, Brecht examines the degree to which modern logic and scientific method may be said to necessitate "scientific value relativism," and the actual rise of relativism among Europeans and Americans of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The final section, "At the Borderline of Metaphysics,"- is an eloquent argument designed to demonstrate (...) the relevance of belief in God to the question of universal values. Brecht's challenging thesis is developed with unusual care and vast scholarship.--K. R. D. (shrink)

The author divides present ideological tendencies into three groups: Christian, Communist, and agnostic. Subsequent chapters attempt to outline a "small-1 liberal" theology designed to provide a "reason for living" through "the present chaos."--K. R. D.

In this book, a Woodbridge Lecture, Professor Dennes assesses the formulations of naturalism given by such philosophers as John Dewey and J. E. Woodbridge, and finds them open to certain fundamental circularities of argument. The critique centers its attention on the questions of meaning and morals, and in each area seeks to lay bare the 'restriction metaphysics' to which naturalistic explanation is inevitably tied down.--K. R. D.

This provocative book provides a stimulating study of the self that is somewhat reminiscent of Husserl’s transcendental ego. But for Earle the ego is absolute and infinite, yet so unique and singular that it precludes any descriptive analysis in terms of a universal structure. As the primary and absolute source of objectification the ego is opposed to these "others" to which something "happens" as the necessary is opposed to the contingent. The realm of happening is the realm of existence, and (...) the ego as the constitutive agent of objects and their meanings transcends this world, and in this sense is non-existent. Yet it is, and its mode of being is "eternity." Paradoxically, the self is both absolute and independent, but so relatively dependent on others for its fulfillment that it can only realize itself as a person on the level of intersubjectivity and most significantly in transcendental love. Earle remains insistent on the incommunicability and singularity of the I and maintains that if there is no common nature in which the I partakes neither is there any universal or abstract moral ought. Value is transcendentally grounded and is what I choose it to be and what I decide ought to be. There are some valuable critical accounts found in this work on Husserl, Sartre, and a very fine in depth refutation of James’ theory of memory. For Earle memory is the one essential way for the transcendental ego to preserve itself "amid the distraction and chaos of its chosen existence." The last two chapters are devoted to a phenomenology of horror and death, and although it is somewhat unrelated to the main topic it does make interesting reading. The book is replete with rich material for critical thinking and offers a challenge to investigate the self from a new and what may appear to some a radical approach. An index facilitates the reading.—K. R. M. (shrink)

Kierkegaard's leap of faith is one of the most thoroughly explored topics in modern philosophy. What can yet another inquiry into this notion hope to achieve? A number of significant things, I think, of both historical and systematic value. The main contention of this paper is that the leap of faith, often associated with the emergence of existentialism, is Kierkegaard's response to a problem which is essentially Kantian in origin and structure. Kierkegaard wants to accomodate both the Kantian interpretation of (...) morality as rational command and Kant's insistence on morality as the sole point of access to religion, while rejecting the Kantian moralization of religion and rationalization of faith. The leap of faith is not, as existentialism would have it, an absolute beginning in philosophy or in individual reflection but a transition from morality to religion within an essentially Kantian context. (shrink)

This is a fine work that purports to serve as an introduction to philosophic problems surveyed from the historical perspective. Hartnack chooses to focus on a single work or theme of those philosophers who have significantly contributed to the development of philosophy starting with Heraclitus and ending with Wittgenstein. He renders concise and uncomplicated accounts that capture the nucleus of the problems. What makes this book stand out among so many other similar endeavors is that the expositions are not only (...) true to the problem but, refreshingly, they say neither too little nor too much. Rather they afford the reader a taste of the author’s wares whetting the appetite to further sample the original sources in hopes of finding the solutions to the problematics offered. For the freshman with little or no previous encounter with philosophy this can be an immeasurable bonus since too often he is victimized by arid and tedious readings. Hartnack makes good use of cross referencing providing the work with a thread of continuity, and it is only in his chapter on Kant’s epistemology that we note a deficiency in this area. Had he spelled out the influence of Hume’s skepticism on Kant’s Critique he might have approached the chapter in terms of the question which seems to be most central to Kant’s project, i.e., "Is metaphysics as a science possible?" rather than start out with an analysis of the antinomies that only indirectly point to this problem. However, if there is a deficiency in this chapter, it is offset by an excellent account of Kant’s moral philosophy. Notwithstanding this negative criticism plus the fact that there are several typographical errors, this is a scholarly accomplishment and deserves to be on the bookshelf of not only the beginning philosophy student who wishes to have a viable resource but also for those who have passed beyond this stage and wish to possess a valuable reference tool. Included at the end is a short but worthwhile bibliography.—K.R.M. (shrink)