Mark Platts is responsible for the first systematic presentation of truth-conditional semantics and for turning a generation of philosophers on to the Davidsonian program. He is also a pioneer in discussions of moral realism, and has made important contributions to bioethics, the philosophy of human rights and moral responsibility. This book is a tribute to Platts's pioneering work in these areas, featuring contributions from number of leading scholars of his work from the US, UK and Mexico. It features (...) replies to the individual essays from Platts, as well as a concluding chapter reflecting on his philosophical career from Oxford to Mexico City. Mind, Language and Morality will be of interest to philosophers across a wide range of areas, including ethics, moral psychology, philosophy of law, and philosophy of language. (shrink)

The papers in this collection discuss the central questions about the connections between language, reality and human understanding. The complex relations between accounts of meaning and facts about ordinary speakers’ understanding of their language are examined so as to illuminate the philosophical character of the connections between language and reality. The collection as a whole is a thematically unified treatment of some of the most central questions within contemporary philosophy of language.

Our purpose is not to define a particular philosophy of management but rather to demonstrate some of the ways in which philosophy — ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, logic and æsthetics — contributes to the practice of management. We identify a number of contemporary management questions, procedures or issues where the application of philosophical approaches is relevant and show how philosophical skills, an understanding of philosophical principles or exposure to philosophical discussion can contribute to improved management practice. In some ways the paper (...) is a report on progress in the quest begun by Nigel Laurie and Christopher Cherry in the first issue of Philosophy of Management, then entitled Reason in Practice (2001), when they asked why philosophers have interested themselves so little in the entire field of management. We include some examples where philosophers have written about management, some where managers have shown the direct impact of philosophy on management effectiveness and somewhere potential remains. In much, we see links to process philosophy and to the need for conversation and reflection by and between managers and philosophers. This does not of itself show how philosophy can contribute to management education. A brief final section discusses the way in which moral creativity skills can be developed through reflection and describes how this has been done in the Manufacturing Leaders’ Programme at the Institute for Manufacturing at Cambridge and in the International Management Ethics & Values course taught to undergraduate management students in Adelaide, Singapore and Hong Kong. This will be taken up in a subsequent paper. (shrink)

A large campaign has sought to destigmatize psychiatric disorders by disseminating the view that they are in fact brain disorders. But when psychiatric disorders are associated with neurobiological correlates, laypeople's attitudes toward patients are harsher, and the prognoses seem poorer. Here, we ask whether these misconceptions could result from the essentialist presumption that brain disorders are innate. To this end, we invited laypeople to reason about psychiatric disorders that are diagnosed by either a brain or a behavioral test that were (...) strictly matched for their informative value. Participants viewed disorders as more likely to be innate and immutable when the diagnosis was supported by a brain test as compared to a behavioral test. These results show for the first time that people spontaneously essentialize psychiatric conditions that are linked to the brain, even when the brain probe offers no additional diagnostic or genetic information. This bias suggests that people consider the biological essence of living things as materially embodied. (shrink)

Daphnis has taunted Aphrodite with Anchises; he goes on to Adonis as a still greater disgrace. ‘Fair is Adonis also,though he is only a shepherd, not even an oxherd.’ xs22EFπεxs22EF is common enough in this sense in latish writers, or we may supply an ellipse : ‘I mention Adonis, because—’ Then the reference to his hunting is also intended to vex her; Daphnis speaks ironically, as if he did not know that Adonis was killed while hunting.

Dr Platt begins by examining the reformist credentials of More that he shared with other humanists, particularly Colet and Erasmus. The humanist desire to draw from the fountain-source is explored and the need for Greek scholarship is identified as a key factor in scriptural interpretation. Finally, Dr. Platt investigates the dilemmas the humanists faced as the Protestant Reformation began to emerge in early 16th century Europe.

Joan of Arc was as a mere 13-year-old girl when she first heard voices and saw visions of the Archangel Michael, Saint Catherine of Alexandria, and Saint Margaret of Antioch in her fathers garden. Both of her female saints were popular in the Middle Ages when these hallucinations began and she would have been familiar with their images as displayed in the local church in Domremy. But it is difficult to understand how a young and inexperienced girl could produce, accept, (...) and follow through on the daunting charge to save France from English incursion during the Hundred Years War, notably in the Battle of Orleans. Was she divinely inspired, mentally ill, or an intuitive genius with paranormal powers of perception? This paper will discuss previous theories by literary figures, as well as by scientists, both past and present, to shed modern neuroscientific insights onto her powers of perception. (shrink)

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION This investigation seeks to make a modest contribution to the debate on the changes which took place in Reformed theology in the ...

This paper is the first of a two-part reexamination of causation in Descartes's physics. Some scholars ? including Gary Hatfield and Daniel Garber ? take Descartes to be a `partial' Occasionalist, who thinks that God alone is the cause of all natural motion. Contra this interpretation, I agree with literature that links Descartes to the Thomistic theory of divine concurrence. This paper surveys this literature, and argues that it has failed to provide an interpretation of Descartes's view that both distinguishes (...) his position from that of his later, Occasionalist followers and is consistent with his broader metaphysical commitments. I provide an analysis that tries to address these problems with earlier `Concurentist' readings of Descartes. On my analysis, Occasionalism entails that created substances do not have intrinsic active causal powers. As I read him, Descartes thinks that bodies have active causal powers that are partly grounded in their intrinsic natures. But I argue ? pace a recent account by Tad Schmaltz ? that Descartes also thinks that God immediately causes all motion in the created world. On the picture that emerges, Descartes's position is both continuous with, and a subtle departure from, the Thomisitic theory of divine concurrence. (shrink)

Understanding the components of clinical care that work best is a cornerstone of improving health care. And yet, the more we improve the quality of quality improvement and move to continuous learning about clinical care more broadly, the more we find ourselves in a regulatory environment that makes evaluation more difficult, expensive, and, in some situations, impossible. In their paper on the ethical underpinnings of the distinction between research and treatment, Ruth Faden and colleagues raise important implications for a wide (...) array of situations. These points give reason to rethink the definition of routine clinical operations to include evaluation of the processes and outcomes of care and dissemination of findings. We concur with the assertion by Faden and colleagues, and with previous work from The Hastings Center, that conducting continuous improvement activities such as these is an obligation of health systems and clinicians. We believe that rigorous, systematic evaluation should be considered part of normal, expected operations, rather than exceptional behavior that requires extraordinary regulatory control. (shrink)

In an attempt to control the 'ballooning' of (discourse about) human rights James Griffin proposes a theory of them grounded in their presumed aim of protecting what he calls 'normative agency'. This paper criticizes the resulting theory's restriction of those thereby deemed to possess human rights only to functioning human agents, and does so in part through special attention to cases of human beings trapped in non-functioning bodies. The need for a less stringent account of the conditions necessary for possession (...) of human rights is suggested, and is defended against the claim that adoption of such an account would continue to favour debasement of the language of human rights. (shrink)

It is plainly absurd to wish that Odysseus, who has been on Phrygian soil these ten years, should perish in the future before he even treads upon it. Paley gets some sense by supplying ‘as a conqueror or permanent settler,’ but obviously we have no right to supply all that: nor indeed would any Greek poet have ever said such a thing as έπí γâν îχνος βαλεîν ώς νικŵν or εìσαεí. See also Mr. Porter's note in C.Q. XI. 160. My (...) explanation may be hazardous, but such as it is it would be somewhat as follows: In the first place, it is notorious that in early Greek poetry the optative, present and aorist, is used in constructions which in strict Attic require imperfect or aorist indicative. I need say nothing of Ȅνθα ŵεν αѷт àπÓλοιτο and the like. But consider optatives after εì Not only does Homer use εì with present optative instead of indicative, e.g. B 780 ώς εȉ τε νέμοιτο, ۸ 467 ώς έȉ β ςιώατο X 411 ώς έί δμύχοιτο, ψ 274 εȉ νȗν άεθλεύοιµεν but he even does at least once so use aorist optative for indicative, a fact which I have not seen noticed, κ 416 ώς εί ίκοατο ‘as if they had come.‘ At N 343 ôς is substituted for εί in the sentence μάλα κε θρασυκρδιςεȉ ηôς ȍϚ τότε ηθήσειεƲ = ήν άν ός έγήθσεν. And the important point for my purpose is that this use of ει with present optative is occasionally found in Attic, as everybody knows. (shrink)

At the end of the twenty-eighth chapter of the eighth book of the Natural History Aristotle says: S0009838800018425_inline1, and goes on to narrate a strange story of the method employed to procure the hybrid. Though the details are entirely fabulous, it has not been doubted that the Indian dog was a real animal. In de Generatione Animalium 746a34 he says more cautiously S0009838800018425_inline2 What then was this creature ? Sundevall declines to commit himself. Aubert and Wimmer think perhaps a jackal, (...) for they hold that the θxs1F7Dς of Aristotle was no jackal. But apart from other considerations there is not the slightest reason for saying that θxs1F7Dς does not mean a jackal in Aristotle as much as in other authors; if some of his statements about it are not true, no more are most of his statements about the lion. Yet this absurd notion that the ‘Indian dog’ was perhaps a jackal is adopted in the Berlin Index 419a15. If we look to India for a dog really foreign to the Greeks we are of course at once confronted with the genus Cyon, familiar to all readers of the Jungle Books as the Red Dog; accordingly our problematical Indian has been identified also with this. One would not think that anybody who had ever seen a specimen of Cyon would dream of calling it a cross between a dog and a tiger. It is true, however, that Aristotle believed that the Laconian hound was descended from a cross between dog and fox , and that the ancients were very reckless in making guesses of this kind; so the Arabs say that the cheetah is a ‘breed between the lion and the pard’! (shrink)

This must be the right reading, not ζυγγxs22EFν for the next line begins with a vowel, and by Headlam's canon the final dactyl must be pure. Compare also 291: S0009838800019091_inline1.

That fat animals are bad breeders was well known to the ancients; Aristotle insists upon it several times. S0009838800017511_inline2 is, as Dr. Hunt observes, an epithet of the willow in Homer, but the explanations he quotes from Hesychius do not look very satisfactory; the willow was thought to ‘lose its fruit’ because it was supposed never to produce seed at all. Hence S0009838800017511_inline3 means ‘barren willows,’ and so Cercidas means ‘barren fat,’ i.e., fat which prevents a man from breeding.

Pioneers in psychology discovered, then repudiated, the traumatic origins of dissociation. Recent scientific research is showing how genetic predisposition plus trauma cause dissociation along with observable changes in the brain. EEG and PET scans have demonstrated that distinct neural networks lie at the base of dissociative states, with differences as striking as blindness vs. sight. Research is pointing as well to the role of the right hemisphere in developing a core sense of self through the mother-infant bond and dividing it (...) in response to childhood trauma and later stressors. Analysts from the nineteenth through the twenty-first century have witnessed frequent paranormal claims, such as telepathy, in mediums and dissociative patients, and wondered at the knowledge they displayed. This paper reports case studies of an empathic therapeutic matrix where unconscious transfers of information occurred with surprising revelations and imaginative constructs that both healed the patient and changed the therapist's own beliefs. (shrink)

The volume under review brings together new translations of the young Nietzsche's four published Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen and, from his contemporary literary leftovers, a portion commonly called "Wir Philologen," here translated, rightly enough, "We Classicists." The latter is an important gift to the English-speaking student of Nietzsche since it starts, as the only previous translation could not, with the leftovers as chronologically ordered by Georgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari; it is fully annotated, in some places beyond Colli/montinari; and it is introduced (...) by Arrowsmith so as to highlight Nietzsche's struggle with the classicists. (shrink)

How much of our ordinary moral thought can we make sense of using a model of practical reason in which value is seen as subjective? There are already problems with showing strength of will not to be irrational. If social obligations are conceived of instrumentally as in a tradition running from Hobbes through Hume to Mackie, and if we employ our strength of will to sacrifice our individual projects in favor of them, the problems become insuperable.

"The French philosopher Nicolas Malebranche popularized the doctrine of occasionalism in the late seventeenth century. Occasionalism is the thesis that God alone is the true cause of everything that happens in the world, and created substances are merely "occasional causes." This doctrine was originally developed in medieval Islamic theology, and was widely rejected in the works of Christian authors in medieval Europe. Yet despite its heterodoxy, occasionalism was revived starting in the 1660s by French and Dutch followers of the philosophy (...) of René Descartes. Since the 1970s, there has been a growing body of literature on Malebranche and occasionalism. There has also been new work on the Cartesian occasionalists before Malebranche - including Arnold Geulincx, Geraud de Cordemoy and Louis de la Forge. But to date there has not been a systematic, book-length study of the reasoning that led Cartesian thinkers to adopt occasionalism, and the relationship of their arguments to Descartes' own views. This book expands on recent scholarship, to provide the first comprehensive account of seventeenth century occasionalism. Part I contrasts occasionalism with a theory of divine providence developed by Thomas Aquinas, in response to medieval occasionalists; it shows that Descartes' philosophy is compatible with Aquinas' theory, on which God "concurs" in all the actions of created beings. Part 2 reconstructs the arguments of Cartesians - such as Cordemoy and a Forge - who used Cartesian physics to argue for occasionalism. Finally, it shows how Malebranche's case for occasionalism combines philosophical theology with Cartesian metaphysics and mechanistic science"--. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic spurred legal and policy attacks against foundational public health authorities. Act for Public Health — a partnership of public health law organizations — has tracked legislative activity since January 2021. This article describes that activity, highlighting 2023 bills primarily related to vaccine requirements and policy innovations undertaken in the wake of the pandemic. Finally, we preview a legal framework for more equitable and effective public health authority.

The purpose of this essay is to examine certain problems which arise from the use of human dignity as a normative principle, problems which too often seem to be ignored in discussions of the ethical significance of this concept. At the outset, such an enterprise obviously requires a statement regarding the sense in which the term “human dignity” is to be understood in this context. In what follows “human dignity” will be taken as an ethical construct in accordance with Abraham (...) Edel’s discussion of the concept. By using the term in this sense we will avoid the danger of becoming involved in debate on such issues as the metaphysical ground of human dignity. Instead we will be able to discuss the concept of human dignity, while making minimal claims about its ontological status. Men might well disagree as to whether human dignity does in fact exist in all human beings to the same extent, but there seems to be little ground for disagreement with the thesis that human dignity is a significant ethical construct. Current discussions of substantive issues frequently refer to this notion as an ideal which must be taken into account in the attempt to bring about the existence of ethically commendable situations. Thus at the very least we must admit that this notion functions as a norm by which men attempt to judge situations and behavior. (shrink)

David Platt believes that it may be religiously important to see God's existence as contingent. That there might have been nothing whatsoever, even though we find this conceptually impossible, points up God's contingency. The book discusses how the demands of religious adequacy may be met without recourse to divine necessity. The free gift of experience is rich with religious significance in a world without why. This probing and gentle book maintains that realization of the fragility of existence should also change (...) our domineering attitudes towards the environment. (shrink)

Executive dysfunctions, psychopathologies arising from problems in the control and regulation of behavior, can occur as a result of the faulty execution of formal information processing models or as a result of malfunctioning neural mechanisms. The models correspond to the formal descriptions of how signals in the environment must be transformed in order to behave adaptively, and the mechanisms correspond to the signal transformations that nervous systems implement in order to execute those cognitive functions. Mechanisms in the form of repeated (...) patterns of neural dynamics execute information processing models. Two distinct modes of malfunction can occur when neural dynamics execute models of information processing. The processing models describing behavior may fail to be executed correctly by neural mechanisms. Or, the neural mechanisms may malfunction, failing to implement the right computation. As an example of malfunctioning models in executive cognition, purported failures of rule following can be understood as failures to appropriately execute a suite of processing models. As an example of malfunctioning mechanisms of executive cognition, maladaptive behavior resulting from dysfunction in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) can be understood as failures in the signal transformations carried out therein. The purpose of these examples is to illustrate the potential benefits of considering models and mechanisms in the diagnosis and etiology of neuropsychological illness and dysfunction, especially disorders of executive cognition. (shrink)

Sandrine Roux's L'Empreinte cartésienne addresses what she describes as one of the "persistent problems" in philosophy, namely, the mind-body problem raised by Descartes's substance dualism. Her book carefully lays out the various puzzles, both real and perceived, raised by Descartes's theory of humans as a mind-body union. She distinguishes clearly between the way these problems are understood by Descartes, and the way they were seen by some of his seventeenth-century followers, especially the occasionalists, Louis de La Forge, Géraud de Cordemoy, (...) and Malebranche. And she tries to orient the Cartesian mind-body problem with respect to theories in contemporary philosophy of mind.The first two parts are... (shrink)

Mr. Richards is justified in saying that S0009838800006017_inline1 is here indefensible, but he does not much mend matters by reading S0009838800006017_inline2. Iocasta may have been a paragon of all the virtues, but what has that to do with it? No, the real correction is S0009838800006017_inline3. ‘ To whom should I tell even greater things than this rather than to thee ?’.

This second edition of the book contains a new chapter on the notions of natural-kind words and natural kinds.

84 B. ζῆν τε οῐεται οὕτω δεῖν … καὶ… ἀϕικομένη ἀπάλλαττεσθαι. Surprise has been expressed at this nominative after οἲεται δεῖν. Cf. Magna Moralia II. xi. 31, οὐκοἲ ονται δεῖν αὐτοι ϕιλεῖν ἀλλ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐνδεεστέρων οἲονται δεῖν αὐϒοῖ ϕιλεῖσθαι. Herodian Hist. I. X. 4, ῲήθη δεῖν μέϒα τι δράσας κατορθῶσαι. Isocrates ix. 30, οὐΧ ἠϒήσαϒο δεῖν χωρίον καταλαβὼν και τὸ σῶμα ἐν ἀσϕαλείᾀ καταστήσας περιιδειν.… Either such phrases were so common that οἲομαι δεῖν came to be thought of as (...) a single word, in which δεῖν did not count, or else this use comes from adding δεῖν superfluously to a primitive use of οἲομαι with an infinitive. It is of course common enough to say οἲομαι ϕιλεῖν in good Attic for ‘I think fit to love.’ I should prefer the latter hypothesis myself: οῐομαι is properly to ‘carry’ or ‘bear’ so οἲομαι ϕιλείν is ‘I propose to love,’ and then δεῖν was added, especially when οἲομαι had come to mean ‘I think.’ There is a good instance of the primitive use of οἲω in Odyss. xix. 312, ῶδʹἀνὰ θυμὸν οἲεται surely this is simply ‘it is borne in upon my mind,’ ‘je suis porté à croir’. Anyhow οἲομαι or ἡ ϒοῦμαι δειν may be followed by a nominativeand infinitive. (shrink)

Health care and public health programs increasingly rely on, and often even require, organizational action, which is facilitated, if not dependent on, trust. Case examples in this essay highlight trust, trustworthiness, and distrust in public and private organizations, providing insights into how trust in health‐related organizations can be betrayed, earned, and justified and into the consequences of organizational trust and trustworthiness for the health of individuals and communities. These examples demonstrate the need for holistic assessments of trust in clinicians and (...) trust in organizations and for organizations, public health, and the medical profession to address questions concerning their own trustworthiness. Normative and empirical assessments of trust and trustworthiness that capture the experiences of those treated within the walls of a health care organization, as well as the care of those outside, will contribute to more trustworthy systems of care. (shrink)

By coincidence, it seems, the critical vocabulary and concerns that came to be known as postcolonial theory and methodology rose to be a dominant school of inquiry in the Anglo-American academy in the same years that the Soviet Union collapsed (notwithstanding that key theoretical texts by Frantz Fanon and others predated this moment by decades). Yet, oddly, postcolonialist terms were seldom applied to postsocialist and post-Soviet cases until the 2000s, and they have become more broadly utilized in these territories only (...) in the past decade. Further, it must be admitted that few results of these applications of postcolonial tools to postsocialist cases have made much of a mark among broader circles of postcolonial scholars and thinkers. Djagalov's book may help to correct this situation. Rather than work in the mode of “application”—applying a postcolonial framework to yet one more case—Djagalov reconstructs the history of a century of socialist anti-imperialism, as it was expressed in global cultural institutions and networks, and in so doing discovers the ignored or forgotten genealogy that links contemporary postcolonial thought to writers, activists, and theoreticians of the socialist world.Djagalov's book toggles between, on the one hand, chapters of institutional history that chronicle the global cultural institutions (such as the Afro-Asian Writers Association, the Tashkent Film Festival, and the Lotus Prize) that connected the Soviet Union with decolonizing countries and, on the other hand, chapters of synthetic cultural criticism that articulate typological analyses of common narrative forms that circulated in the fiction and film of the socialist world—recurring varieties of “solidarity narratives,” as Djagalov calls them. His work reveals how central the state-socialist political imaginary was for writers and filmmakers ranging from Nâzım Hikmet to Ngūgī wa Thiong'o, and how prominent their itineraries through Soviet institutions and networks were in their biographies. Ngūgī, for instance, finished his 1977 novel Petals of Blood during a residency in the Soviet Writers House in Yalta.In recovering the lost continent of anti-imperial socialist globality that bridged the “second” and “third worlds,” Djagalov has demonstrated not how postcolonial terms can be applied to postsocialist cases but how postcolonial theory and method are themselves postsocialist phenomena. Djagalov does not attempt to rectify the state-socialist prehistory of postcolonial thought with a critique of Soviet imperial habits or of the postcolonial contexts of contemporary Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. At least, though, the challenges of thinking “postcolonial” and “postsocialist” together have now become clearer. From Internationalism to Postcolonialism leaves us with new research problems: what, for example, does it mean to be a postcolony of an anti-imperial empire? (shrink)

What is the relationship between art history and its objects? Responding to Jaś Elsner’s claim that art-historical writing is inevitably ekphrastic, this essay revisits a site of intense disciplinary anxiety—Johann Joachim Winckelmann’s 1759 description of the Belvedere Torso and its revised version in his 1764 History of Ancient Art. Description has been cast as the “scapegoat” (or pharmakos) of Winckelmann’s art history—that which must be excised yet is fundamental to the operations of the whole. But although it often serves as (...) a site of perceived excess and sublimation in his work, the ekphrastic elements of Winckelmann’s prose are nevertheless some of the most historicist aspects of his scholarship, shaped by a deep engagement with Greco-Roman ekphrastic literature. Description, in this sense, serves as a Platonic pharmakon—both affliction and cure for classical art history’s medial and ontological separation from its ruined and fragmented objects. In Winckelmann’s description of the torso, ekphrasis holds out the potential for the statue’s “completion” (Ergänzung). But understood according to eighteenth-century practices of visual restoration, this raises the question of whether such “whole-making” should be understood as proper or supplemental to the original image. What does it mean to “re-member” the Belvedere Torso through ekphrastic strategies drawn from antiquity itself? And what does this imply for our own textual (and pharmacological) mediations of the visual? (shrink)

While many have claimed that there is a conflict between science and religion, it is not often noted that they share a number of assumptions. Here, I work toward identifying and clarifying some of these shared assumptions. I focus on some of the common commitments to metaphysical, epistemological and moral priorities which are necessary for human life in a democratic society. While this will not eliminate all conflict between science and religion, it will remind the disputants of their common goals (...) and even common enemies. (shrink)

The Myrmidons going out to war are compared to a pack of wolves going to drink after they have devoured a deer; see the following lines; they are not like wolves which ‘are devouring’ it. Hence δπτουσιν looks wrong, and is probably a corruption of δΨουσιν, the old aorist subjunctive; this being taken for a future would infallibly be altered. In any case Ψ and πτ are not infrequently confused; thus in 161 λπτοντες is a variant for λΨοντες.

Heracles had gone to Arcadia to fetch the Erymanthian boar; when he had just returned he heard of the voyage of Argo, and, hastily depositing the boar at Mycenae, departed to join Jason without the knowledge of Eurystheus. λυρκήιον Αργος άμείψας is supposed to mean ‘having come to Lyrceian Argos’. But, first, άμείβω Αργος ought not to mean ‘I come to Argos’; άμείβω and άμείβομαι alike mean either change or pass or leave; enter they do not mean. The lexica quote (...) passages as meaning enter which do not mean any such thing; Θύρας or βαλόν άμείβω is ‘I pass’ the door or threshold, πόλιν έκπόλεως άμείβω or άμείβομαι is ‘I change one city for another,’ άμείβομαι έρκοςόδότων ‘I pass the hedge of the teeth,’ and so on. Until I see an instance of it I shall not believe that πόλιν άμείβω can mean merely I enter or come to a city. Nor can we take it to mean pass in this place, because the road from Arcadia to Mycenae does not pass Argos. Secondly, what is Lyrceian Argos ? Whether a river or a mountain be implied by Lyrceian, it is not a Greek expression; we do not speak of Hymettian Athens or Cephisian Athens, of Cithaeronian or Asopian Thebes or Boeotia. There is indeed found the expression Πηλιωτιν 'Ιωλκόν in Euripides, Medea 484, and the scholiast on iv. 131 says that Τιτνίδος Αίης means Aea of the river Titen, referring to Eratosthenes as his authority for the river, but no one else knows anything about it, and it is more than probable that Mr. Mooney is right in regarding it with suspicion. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 31.2 (2001) 3-8 [Access article in PDF] The Two Secrets of the Fetish Jean-Luc Nancy "Commodity fetishism": Marx's formula has been imprinted on the largest and most resistant of cultural memories. It has become almost anonymous, or rather synonymous with Marx's very name, as is the case with certain coined terms(cogito, categorical imperative...). This privilege could only be due to a very particular virtue. Such a virtue is (...) that which not only consists in characterizing, in the strict sense of the word (to typify a property or an essence), but even in characterizing in such a way that the character (the stamp, the seal) is somehow inscribed on the thing itself and can no longer be detached from it, or at least without some loss in the substance of the thing.In Kantian terms: the intuition presented under the word "fetishism" is printed or traced indelibly onto the concept of "commodity," giving rise to a schema "commodity," from which a new image, and thus a new idea, ensues. Not just the commodity as the fetish—as if this were one of its traits or one approach among others—but rather the essence of the commodity revealed as fetish, so that the fetish character would remain once the approach was shifted or the "secret" of its "mystical character" was revealed. (As we know, these are all Marx's own terms.)As is also known, the secret consists in that the commodity value (or exchange value) of the object (or product), which seems to be its intrinsic or immanent property (parallel in this way to its use value, which is extrinsic and completely relative to its utilization in a given sociotechnical context) only covers, masks or represses the origin of its pure or absolute value—this last value being nothing other than the living human labor of the producer, which the act of production incorporates into the product. But the commodity value deflects this incorporated creative life toward equivalence within an exchange, where the producer (the worker) finds himself surreptitiously stripped of the part of the value that the mercantile calculation does not exchange for the maintenance of its labor force, but rather sets to the account of capital. * * * Here we are not concerned with addressing the problems associated with the evaluation or the appreciation of living work as it is related to the intensification or the very creation of value ("the surplus-value"), nor with respect to the extortion suffered by the creator of value (the valuable and value-making man, the living man as maker, as giver of prices in an absolute fashion) to the benefit of the one who accumulates value in the form of general equivalence, creating mercantile prices through a common currency. Currency is the fetish, where fetishism is fixed: belief in the value of the market price itself. The critique of political economy—that is, the critique of the economy as politics—reveals the inanity of this belief, and if this critique cannot measure the hidden and mysticized or mystified value in monetary terms, the principle of this critique remains [End Page 3] no less, but even more so, the incommensurability of the value creator and the marketed product.Alienation is not measurable. It is at the same time the principle of the critique and its impasse from the moment that we would like to, and indeed that we should, oppose one measure to another: the critical measure of the fetish against the mercantile measure through the fetish.In contrast, what we would like to sketch out here would have the following hypothesis as a point of departure: does not the strength of Marx's formula derive from a power other than that of the only critique thus broached? Is there not another energy, and another enigma, slipped into the first, adding itself to the revelation of the secret, even exceeding this revelation and perhaps in this fashion displacing just a bit the secret itself (precisely because it is not measurable)?This other power would derive from "fetishism" itself. That is to say... (shrink)

This study offers a new account of the development of Cartesian Occasionalism. The doctrine of Occasionalism - most famously advocated by Nicolas Malebranche - states that God alone is the cause of every event, and created substances are merely "occasional causes." In the years following René Descartes' death in 1650, several of his followers -- including Arnold Geulincx, Gerauld de Cordemoy and Louis de la Forge - argued for some version of this thesis. My study builds on recent scholarship about (...) these first Cartesian Occasionalists, the motives that led them and Malebranche to adopt Occasionalism, and the connections between Occasionalism and the views of Descartes. I analyze the doctrine of Occasionalism, and examine its relationship to Descartes' philosophy. I argue that Descartes' views in physics and metaphysics are consistent with the claim that corporeal substances have intrinsic causal powers, and reply to arguments by Gary Hatfield, Janet Broughton and Daniel Garber that purport to show otherwise. I examine how Occasionalism relates to several proposed problems with Descartes' claim that the human mind causally interacts with the human body, and argue that Occasionalism is not the "natural" solution to these problems. I conclude by canvassing the arguments of the earliest Cartesian Occasionalists. I argue Cartesian Occasionalism was neither an ad hoc solution to the mindbody problem, nor a logical consequence of Descartes' own views, but rather an attempt to extend and better systematize Cartesian philosophy. (shrink)

Activators of RNA polymerase II transcription possess distinct and separable DNA‐binding and transcriptional activation domains. They are thought to function by binding to specific sites on DNA and interacting with proteins (transcription factors) binding near to the transcriptional start site of a gene. The ability of these proteins to activate transcription is a highly regulated process, with activation only occurring under specific conditions to ensure proper timing and levels of target gene expression. Such regulation modulates the ability of transcription factors (...) either to bind DNA or to interact with the transcriptional machinery. Here we discuss recent advances in our understanding of these mechanisms of transcriptional regulation in yeast. (shrink)

The contributors to The Moral of the Story, all preeminent political theorists, are unified by their concern with the instructive power of great literature. This thought-provoking combination of essays explores the polyvalent moral and political impact of classic world literatures on public ethics through the study of some of its major figures-including Shakespeare, Dante, Cervantes, Jane Austen, Henry James, Joseph Conrad, Robert Penn Warren, and Dostoevsky. Positing the uniqueness of literature's ability to promote dialogue on salient moral and intellectual virtues, (...) editor Henry T. Edmonson III has culled together a wide-ranging exploration of such fundamental concerns as the abuse of authority, the nature of good leadership, the significance of "middle class virtues" and the needs of adolescents. This collection reinvigorates the study of classic literature as an endeavor that is not only personally intellectually satisfying, but also an inimitable and unique way to enrich public discourse. (shrink)

"Cluster randomized trials," in which groups of patients are randomly assigned to different therapeutic interventions, provide a powerful way of evaluating drugs. CRTs have not been widely used, in good part because of concerns about whether patients must give informed consent to participate in them. A better understanding of how CRTs fit into clinical practice resolves the concerns.

Background: Humor, both producing and appreciating, underpins positive social interactions acting as a facilitator of communication. There are clear links to wellbeing that go along with this form of social engagement. However, humor appears to be a seldom studied, cross-disciplinary area of investigation when applied to people with an intellectual disability, this review collates the current state of knowledge regarding the role of humor behavior in the social interactions of people with intellectual disabilities and their carers. Method: A systematic review (...) utilizing the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines was completed which aimed to explore the current state of knowledge and quality of empirical evidence relating to humor in people with intellectual disabilities. Following this, articles were grouped thematically and summarized. A comprehensive search of four electronic databases (1954–2017) and additional search strategies yielded 32 articles which met the final inclusion criteria. Results: Humor played a significant positive and negative role in the social interactions of people with intellectual disabilities. Research had investigated humor in the classroom and humor expression in different groups including those with autism, Down syndrome, Angelman syndrome, Williams syndrome and Rett syndrome. Few investigations directly studied humor appreciation and comprehension hence themes did not focus solely on humor production/appreciation. Humor comprehension was reportedly supported by gestures. Some groups with intellectual disabilities found non-literal humor (e.g. sarcasm, irony) more difficult to understand which may affect social relationships. Various types of humor were found to be appreciated. The role of humor in relationship development, social facilitation, creativity and stigma had all received some limited attention. Humor also played a role for carer groups in coping with and enjoying the caring role. Research varied in quality with few experimental studies and mainly quasi-experimental and well-conducted qualitative studies. Conclusions: This review revealed the importance of humor behavior in many aspects of the social lives of people with intellectual disabilities. Limited disparate research exists pertaining to humor in this group, suggesting the need for further robust research in this area, including more high quality primary research in the areas of humor production, appreciation, comprehension and stigma. (shrink)