In order to approach the phenomena of responsibility, which is primarily liability and accountability, the author suggests a phenomenological clarification of the question: What is the precondition that makes a responsible life possible? This question should enable to give an answer to another one which is from high anthropological and even political relevance, namely: Is there a spot beyond or "outside" of any responsibility, i.e. can a human being live as "irresponsible" in the radical meaning of the word? The main (...) thesis of the author is that there is a situation in which a human being has no means to act by making any "own" choices and thus everything in his life is imposed to him from the outside. This situation is the nativity and, more concretely, the time-space of the pre-natal human life. The aim of this paper is to analyze this situation by means of Husserl's phenomenological reduction as well as of the "counter reduction" of Michel Henry, and consequently to propose a new understanding of the responsibility problematics. (shrink)

Experience does not have boundaries; it is a boundary. Transgression, as envisaged by Bataille, consists in the realisation of this circumstance. Boundary experiences are experiences of the limit. The experience itself communicates the boundary; communication takes place at the boundary of two experiences. Following Bataille, Jean-Luc Nancy further developed this thought, arguing that in this impossible inner experience, a community of beings is communicated, or indicated, but cannot be translated into any specific (organisational) form of community, or concrete politics. Such (...) an ‘inoperative’ or ‘unrepresentable’ community is to be found in birth, love, and death. This paper will try to apply Derrida’s famous judgement of ascribing Bataille a Hegelianism without reserve, by reading Nancy’s thought mutatis mutandis as a Batailleanism with reserve. This coincides with a transition from a restricted natology – which presupposes an equivalence, or exchangeability, of birth and death – to a general natology. This represents a shift in Western philosophy’s thanatological tradition, which over the course of the twentieth century has gradually come to refuse such an easy equation in the wake of its discovery of birth as a philosophical phenomenon in its own right – independent of death. (shrink)

‘We are before Dante’: In this interview, held via email in March 2020 amid the massive outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, Jean-Luc Nancy leads us on a brief but far-reaching foray through his thought. He succeeds in providing an overview of the subjects that he has raised since the beginning of his career as a philosopher, while maintaining a focus on their pertinence for what we are currently facing in the world today. He supplements his insight that ‘we are before (...) Dante’ with the equally remarkable conclusion: ‘Desire is what is born par excellence’. In between these two propositions, and in between the lines and words documented here – touching upon topics as diverse as the moai statues of Easter Island, the music of Schumann, Wagner, and techno, as well as the writing of Artaud, Proust, and Verlaine – we find an exciting, up-to-date treatment of the question of how to ‘deal with the world intellectually’ (Musil) without, in doing so, participating in the modern claim to ‘master’ it. Instead, Nancy suggests, we ought to be attentive to what escapes us by its very principle, with philosophy, literature, and art serving as witnesses of what has always been absent from our mind, that is, the sensibility of meaning, in order to become aware that, since we are always already before and after birth, ‘we come from nowhere and everywhere’. This realization enables us to understand the political consequences that it has for our understanding of a world in metamorphosis, including for highly controversial issues such as colonialism, anti-Semitism, the far right, neo-liberalism, and other totalitarian forms that supposedly manifest a return of the myth, as well as its consequences for the insurmountability of Marx(ism). (shrink)

The other Hölderlin, an unheroic, unprophetic, un-German, in a word: a poor Hölderlin, might have played an essential role in the development of Eugen Fink’s experienceable ontology as an/other form of idealism. Understood cosmologically as a “quarrel” or “game” between heaven and earth, it is designed to realize Husserl’s term “Weltbewusstseinsleben” as illustrated by Fink’s remark: “Coexistence in cognition is at the same time a testimony to the heavenly spirit.” Thus, a twofold question arises: If, in cognition, coexistence is at (...) the same time a testimony to the heavenly spirit, what is it outside of cognition, if anything? And how does it come to cognition? Reading Fink and Hölderlin together, I suggest the following answers: 1. In cognition, coexistence is at the same time a testimony to the “heavenly”, that is to say: higher, i.e. communal spirit, precisely because 2. it is nothing outside of cognition–nothing but the cosmological laceration of man, the openness of human beings to the world, about which 3. nothing more can be said than that it has always already been there for us to know, for it is being brought to our cognition time and again: through poetry. (shrink)

In this article, we use the theory of Information Ethics to argue that deceased people have a prima facie moral right to privacy in the context of health data research, and that this should be reflected in regulation and guidelines. After death, people are no longer biological subjects but continue to exist as informational entities which can still be harmed/damaged. We find that while the instrumental value of recognising post-mortem privacy lies in the preservation of the social contract for health (...) research, its intrinsic value is grounded in respect for the dignity of the post-mortem informational entity. However, existing guidance on post-mortem data protection is available only in the context of genetic studies. In comparing the characteristics of genetic data and other health-related data, we identify two features of DNA often given as arguments for this genetic exceptionalism: relationality and embodiment. We use these concepts to show that at the appropriate Level of Abstraction, there is no morally relevant distinction between posthumous genetic and other health data. Thus, genetic data should not automatically receive special moral status after death. Instead we make a plea for ‘contextual exceptionalism’. Our analysis concludes by reflecting on a real-world case and providing suggestions for contextual factors that researchers and oversight bodies should take into account when designing and evaluating research projects with health data from deceased subjects. (shrink)

We present a derivation of the homogeneous Lorentz transformations that arrives immediately at the general form without the usual specialization in thex direction.

Thucydides, II. 28, records an eclipse of the sun in the summer of the first year of the Peloponnesian war. It can be no other than the annular eclipse of the 3rd of August, 431 B.C. He describes the phenomenon so accurately and with so many details that we can hardly doubt that he observed it himself — Tο δ' αủτο θέρονς γονμηνι κατά σελήγηγ, σπερ και μόγογ δοκει ειναι γιγνεσθαι δνγατόγ, ό λιος έξέλιπε μετά μεσημβριαγ και πάλιγ άγ επληρθη, (...) γενόμενος μηνοειδής και άστέρν τινν έκΦανέντων. (shrink)

This chapter examines ethnic differences in responses to alcohol. Specifically, it discusses the subjective effects of alcohol on Asians, Native Americans, and Jews. Recent studies have shown that genetic variations in the enzymes that metabolize alcohol lead to individual differences in the subjective effects of alcohol, typically in the form of increased sensitivity to its effects. It is also recognized that these gene variations are associated with lower rates of alcohol consumption and alcohol use disorders, and possibly other substance use (...) and substance use disorders. Causes of decreased intensity or more pleasurable effects associated with alcohol or other drug use in ethnic groups, whether such variations exist, and to what extent they are genetically and environmentally influenced, remain currently unanswered questions. (shrink)

In the ontology of music the Aristotelian theory of musical works is the view that musical works are immanent universals. The Aristotelian theory (hereafter Musical Aristotelianism) is an attractive and serviceable hypothesis. However, it is overlooked as a genuine competitor to the more well-known theories of Musical Platonism and nominalism. Worse still, there is no detailed account in the literature of the nature of the universals that the Aristotelian identifies musical works with. In this paper, I argue that the best (...) version of Musical Aristotelianism identifies musical works with structural universals. I first motivate the view by outlining its explanatory benefits. I then argue that Musical Aristotelianism is preferable to Musical Platonism and present a novel account of musical works as structural universals by developing D. M. Armstrong’s theory of structural universals. I discuss the consequences of Musical Aristotelianism with respect to on-going issues in debates about musical works and defend the view against an influential objection, concluding that Musical Aristotelianism is a genuine competitor in debates about the nature of musical works. (shrink)

Bourbaki suggest that their definition of the number 1 runs to some tens of thousands of symbols. We show that that is a considerable under-estimate, the true number of symbols being that in the title, not counting 1 179 618 517 981 links between symbols that are needed to disambiguate the whole expression.