"When John Dewey died in 1952, he was memorialized as America's most famous philosopher, revered by liberal educators and deplored by conservatives, but universally acknowledged as his country's intellectual voice. Many things conspired to give Dewey an extraordinary intellectual eminence: He was immensely long-lived and immensely prolific; he died in his ninety-third year, and his intellectual productivity hardly slackened until his eighties." "Professor Alan Ryan offers new insights into Dewey's many achievements, his character, and the era in which his scholarship (...) had a remarkable impact. He investigates the question of what an American audience wanted from a public philosopher - from an intellectual figure whose credentials came from his academic standing as a philosopher, but whose audience was much wider than an academic one." "Ryan argues that Dewey's "religious" outlook illuminates his politics much more vividly than it does the politics of religion as ordinarily conceived. He examines how Dewey fit into the American radical tradition, how he was and was not like his transatlantic contemporaries, why he could for so long practice a form of philosophical inquiry that became unfashionable in England after 1914 at the latest."--BOOK JACKET. (shrink)

Applies a philosophical analysis of the natural sciences to the social sciences.

The aim of the SI is to bring to the fore the places in which cross-sector partnerships (CSPs) are formed; how place shapes the dynamics of CSPs, and how CSPs shape the specific settings in which they develop. The papers demonstrate that partnerships and place are intrinsically reciprocal: the morality and materiality inherent in places repeatedly reset the reference points for partners, trigger epiphanies, shift identities, and redistribute capacities to act. Place thus becomes generative of partnerships in the most profound (...) sense: by developing an awareness of their emplacement, CSPs commit to place, and through their place-based commitments produce three intertwined modalities of place-specific ethics that bind CSPs and place: ethic of recognition, an ethic of care, and an ethic of resilience. Our authors have found vivid examples of how emplaced CSPs embody these ethics, signaling hope for the sustainability of our (always hyper-local) life-worlds. (shrink)

Introduction 1 Part 1: Conceptual and Practical 19 1. Liberalism 21 2. Freedom 45 3. Culture and Anxiety 63 4. The Liberal Community 91 5. Liberal Imperialism 107 6. State and Private, Red and White 123 7. The Right to Kill in Cold Blood: Does the Death Penalty Violate Human Rights? 139 Part 2: Liberty and Security 157 8. Hobbes’s Political Philosophy 159 9. Hobbes and Individualism 186 10. Hobbes, Toleration, and the Inner Life 204 11. The Nature of Human (...) Nature in Hobbes and Rousseau 220 12. Locke on Freedom: Some Second Thoughts 233 Part 3: Liberty and Progress, Mill to Popper 255 13. Mill’s Essay On Liberty 257 14. Sense and Sensibility in Mill’s Political Thought 279 15. Mill in a Liberal Landscape 292 16. Utilitarianism and Bureaucracy: The Views of J. S. Mill 326 17. Mill and Rousseau: Utility and Rights 346 18. Bureaucracy, Democracy, Liberty: Some Unanswered Questions in Mill’s Politics 364 19. Bertrand Russell’s Politics: 1688 or 1968? 381 20. Isaiah Berlin: Political Theory and Liberal Culture 395 21. Popper and Liberalism 413 Part 4: Liberalism in America 427 22. Alexis de Tocqueville 429 23. Staunchly Modern, Nonbourgeois Liberalism 456 24. Pragmatism, Social Identity, Patriotism, and Self-Criticism 473 25. Deweyan Pragmatism and American Education 489 26. John Rawls 505 Part 5: Work, Ownership, Freedom, and Self-Realization 521 27. Locke and the Dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie 523 28. Hegel on Work, Ownership, and Citizenship 538 29. Utility and Ownership 556 30. Maximizing, Moralizing, and Dramatizing 573 31. The Romantic Theory of Ownership 586 32. Justice, Exploitation, and the End of Morality 600 33. Liberty and Socialism 617 Notes 631. (shrink)

Explores Russell's activities as a polemicist, agitator, educator, and popularizer and discusses the evolution of his moral philosophy and its application, including his final battle against American intervention in Vietnam.

Writers of very different persuasions have relied on arguments about self-ownership; in recent years, it is libertarians who have rested their political theory on self-ownership, but Grotian authoritarianism rested on similar foundations, and, even though it matters a good deal that Hegel did not adopt a full-blown theory of self-ownership, so did Hegel's liberal-conservatism. Whether the high tide of the idea has passed it is hard to say. One testimony to its popularity was the fact that G. A. Cohen for (...) a time thought that the doctrine of self-ownership was so powerful that an egalitarian like himself had to come to terms with it; but he has since changed his mind. I have tackled the topic of self-ownership glancingly elsewhere, but have not hitherto tried to pull together the observations I have made in passing on those occasions. The view I have taken for granted and here defend is that self-ownership is not an illuminating notion—except in contexts that are unattractive to anyone of libertarian tastes. (shrink)

John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) was born in London, son of the Scottish historian of India and philosopher, James Mill, by whom he was educated in, among other things, the principles of British empiricism and Benthamite utilitarianism. Like his father, he worked for the East India Company, being in charge of the Company's relations with the native states 1836–1856, and head of the examiner's office from 1856 until the powers of the Company were transferred in 1858. The book which established Mill (...) as a philosopher was his System of Logic (1843), described in its full title as ‘a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of scientific investigation’. Book 6 of the System of Logic was ‘On the logic of the moral sciences’, and at the end of it Mill declared, without trying to justify it, his opinion that there is a ‘general principle to which all rules of practice ought to conform’; namely that of ‘conduciveness to the happiness of mankind, or rather, of all sentient beings’. For example, we should keep our promises not because we can see intuitively the truth of the precept, but because it passes the utilitarian test. Mill's justification for this opinion was in his Utilitarianism (1863). Mill's version of utilitarianism differed from Bentham's in that he recognized not only quantitative but also qualitative differences between pleasures. (shrink)

The paper puts forward a pluralistic account of fairness within which concepts of equality of sacrifice and outcome, desert, and randomized outcomes within a fair framework all have their place. The distinction between efficiency and fairness is set out early on, and it is later argued that only efficient social arrangements can withstand the questioning about the fairness of the way they distribute their benefits to their beneficiaries and impose demands on those whose taxes pay for them that the modern (...) welfare state increasingly has to face. (shrink)

This is the first in a series of occasional volumes of original papers on predefined themes. The Mind Association will nominate an editor or editors for each collection, and may join with other organizations in the promotion of conferences or other scholarly activities in connection with each volume. This collection, published to coincide with the 400th anniversary of Thomas Hobbes's birth, focuses on central themes in his life and work. Including essays by David Gauthier, Noel Malcolm, Arrigo Pacchi, David Raphael, (...) Tom Sorrell, Francois Tricaud, and Richard Tuck, the book testifies to Hobbes's enduring importance as a major philosopher and helps to unravel those aspects of his intellectual biography that are relevant to a proper appreciation of his philosophy. (shrink)

Friends since childhood, Anais Darnby and Lindsay Markham have long harbored a secret passion for one another. When they finally confess their love, their future together seems assured, sealed with their searing embrace. But when a debauched Lindsay is seduced by a scheming socialite, a devastated Anais seeks refuge in another man's bed while Lindsay retreats to the exotic East. There, he is seduced again--this time by the alluring red smoke and sinister beauty of opium. Back home, Lindsay's addiction is (...) fed by the vogue for all things Oriental--especially its sensual pleasures--in fashionable London society. In his lucid moments, Lindsay still lusts after Anais, who can neither allow him near nor forget his smoldering touch. Tortured by two obsessions--opium and Anais--Lindsay must ultimately decide which is the one he truly cannot live without. (shrink)

Excerpt: …I here tackle three topics: first, the lowly place of happiness among the goals of political action in the great tradition of political thought; second, the novelty of the idea of happiness is the proper aim or public policy; and last, the importance of the distinction between what was aptly described by T.H. Green as "hindering hindrances to the good life" and the promotion of happiness by political action. As that might suggest, I shall say some unkind things about (...) the paternalism implicit in some recent emphasis on happiness as an object of state action. (shrink)

This paper begins with some brief reflections on the 19th century apprehensions of Tocqueville and Mill and their relevance to ourselves, and goes on to ask for what and for whom universities exist. There is no incontrovertible answer, but one can distinguish two ideal types of a modern university, as I do. I praise one of them, without being dismissive of the others, and pose some problems about their institutionalization, and raise some old questions about the rights of citizens and (...) the privileges of guilds. I finally discuss the threats to free inquiry posed by well-intentioned governments in a British - rather than an American or European - context, recurring to themes from Tocqueville and Mill. (shrink)

This is a simple essay. It raises a familiar question about equality, adduces a very small amount of empirical evidence about the social consequences of equality as distinct from prosperity, and broods on the difficulty of providing a really persuasive answer to the question raised. I begin with the view that there simply cannot be anything intrinsically wrong with inequality, move on to the view that there are extrinsic reasons for anxiety, dividing these into conceptual and empirical reasons, though without (...) any great commitment to the clarity of that distinction in this context, and end with some reflections on recent social and political theory. The essay thus begins with what I hope are clear and (what I am sure are) very simple thoughts, before muddying the water pretty thoroughly thereafter. (shrink)

Anyone trying to give a brief account of liberalism is immediately faced with an embarrassing question: are we dealing with liberalism or with liberalisms? It is easy to list famous liberals; it is harder to say what they have in common. John Locke, Adam Smith, Montesquieu, Thomas Jefferson, John Stuart Mill, Lord Acton, T. H. Green, John Dewey and contemporaries such as Isaiah Berlin and John Rawls are certainly liberals – but they do not agree about the boundaries of toleration, (...) the legitimacy of the welfare state, and the virtues of democracy, to take three rather central political issues. They do not even agree on the nature of the liberty they think liberals ought to seek. (shrink)

John Stuart Mill is—surprisingly—a difficult writer. He writes clearly, non-technically, and in a very plain prose which Bertrand Russell once described as a model for philosophers. It is never hard to see what the general drift of the argument is, and never hard to see which side he is on. He is, none the less, a difficult writer because his clarity hides complicated arguments and assumptions which often take a good deal of unpicking. And when we have done that unpicking, (...) the task of analysing the merits and deficiencies of the arguments is still only half completed. This is true of all his work and particularly true of Liberty. It is an essay whose clarity and energy have made it the most popular of all Mill's work. Yet it conceals philosophical, sociological and historical assumptions of a very debatable kind. In his introduction, Mill saysthe object of this essay is to defend one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion (Liberty, 68). (shrink)

First published in 1974. As logician, economist, political theorist, practical politician and active champion of social freedom, John Stuart Mill is a figure of continuing importance. In this book the author does full justice to the range of Mill's achievements, providing an introductory guide to his most important and best known writings including Autobiography,A System of Logic,Utilitarianism,Liberty, and The Subjugation of Women. In their treatment of his works, the author seeks to emphasise Mill's approach to those issues -- education, the (...) conflict between social order and individual freedom, the unresolved state of the social sciences, rights and duties of citizens in a democratic state -- which remain most alive to us today. At the same time Mill is seen as part of his own age, responding to the anxieties that beset his contemporaries. This book will be of interest to students of politics and philosophy. (shrink)

This collection of essays by philosophers, political theorists, and social critics ranges over two millennia--from the ideas of Plato and Aristotle to those of contemporary thinkers such as John Rawls and Robert Nozick. It examines the nature of justice, its importance in human life, and its place among the other virtues. The scope of the collection gives a clear picture of the differences and continuities that have marked the debate: Plato's emphasis on the ideal of "sticking to one's task" contrasts (...) with the modern emphasis on individual rights, while the account of justice as part of the law of nature offered by Aristotle and Cicero contrasts with Hume's analysis of justice as an artificial virtue. Alan Ryan's introductory essay emphasizes the stringency of justice--showing how its demands can conflict with considerations of the general welfare. The book concludes with a discussion of Marx's view that justice is perhaps merely a concession to a world of scarcity and selfishness created by capitalist necessities. An excellent guide to interpretations of one of the central values of political life and thought, this book will interest students and scholars of political theory and philosophy. (shrink)

This paper is a small contribution to two large subjects. The first large subject is that of exploitation—what it is for somebody to be exploited, in what ways people can be and are exploited, whether exploitation necessarily involves coercion, what Marx's understanding of exploitation was and whether it was adequate: all these are issues on which I merely touch, at best. My particular concern here is to answer the two questions, whether Marx thought capitalist exploitationunjustand how the answer to that (...) question illuminates Marx's conception of morality in general. The second large subject is that of the nature of morality—whether there are specificallymoralvalues and specifically moral forms of evaluation and criticism, how these relate to our explanatory interests in the same phenomena, what it would be like to abandon the ‘moral point of view’, whether the growth of a scientific understanding of society and ourselves inevitably undermines our confidence in the existence of moral ‘truths’. These again are issues on which I only touch if I mention them at all, but the questions I try to answer are, what does Marx propose to put in the place of moral judgment, and what kind of assessment of the horrors of capitalism does he provide if not a moral assessment? (shrink)