William Osler's description of the ideal physician remains the dominant character-ideal for modern physicians. He believed that the personality traits that resulted from a belief in ascetic Protestantism, what has been called the Puritan temper, were essential in the practice of medicine. However, this idealism has been weakened by modern psychological theories which view idealism as an illness. In a culture oriented to health, rather than virtue, as an ultimate ideal, physicians can help develop a science of limits.

Life history theory is a fruitful source of testable hypotheses about human individual differences. However, this field of study is beset by unresolved debates about basic concepts and methods. One of these controversies concerns the usefulness of instruments that purport to tap a unidimensional life history factor based on a set of self-reported personality, social, and attitudinal variables. Here, we take a novel approach to analyzing the psychometrics of two variants of the Arizona Life History Battery: the Mini-K and the (...) K-SF-42. Psychological network analysis generates models in which psychological variables comprise the nodes of a network, while partial correlation coefficients between these variables comprise the edges of the network. Centrality indices operationalize each node’s importance based on the pattern of the connections in which that node plays a role. Because childhood environments are hypothesized to influence adult LH, we tested the hypothesis that among the Mini-K items, and the K-SF-42 scales, those that tap relationships with parents are central to the networks constructed from these instruments. In an MTurk sample and an undergraduate sample that completed the Mini-K, and an MTurk sample that completed the K-SF-42, this hypothesis was falsified. Indeed, the “relationships with parents” items were among the most peripheral in all three networks. We propose that network analysis, as an alternative to latent variable modeling, offers considerable potential to test hypotheses about the input-output mappings of specific evolved psychological mechanisms. (shrink)

Adam Smith sought to explain the persistence of slavery as an institution in Wealth of Nations and Lectures on Jurispridence. In order to accomplish this he also drew on arguments he had developed in the Theory of Moral Sentiments. The result was a sophisticated explanation which bridged economic, psychological, and moral considerations. After presenting Smith’s explanation I will consider a discussion of the moral wrong of slavery in Ottobah Cugoano, the author of the incisive criticism of the slave trade Thoughts (...) and Sentiments on the Evil of Slavery (1787). I will suggest that Cugoano’s account of what is morally wrong in slavery shows an important lacuna in Smith‘s views. (shrink)

I reconstruct J. H. Lambert’s views on how practical grounds relate to epistemic features, such as certainty. I argue, first, that Lambert’s account of moral certainty does not involve any distinctively practical influence on theoretical belief. However, it does present an interesting form of fallibilism about justification as well as a denial of a tight link between knowledge and action. Second, I argue that for Lambert, the persistence principle that underwrites induction is supported by practical reasons to believe; this indicates (...) that Lambert is a moderate pragmatist about reasons for theoretical belief. (shrink)

In part one, I identify the core logical structure of the precautionary principle and distinguish it from the various key concepts that appear in the many different formulations of the principle. I survey these concepts and suggest a program of further conceptual analysis. In part two, I examine a particular version of the precautionary principle dubbed “the catastrophe principle” and criticize it in light of its similarities to the principle at work in Pascal’s Wager. I conclude with some suggestions for (...) advocates of the precautionary principle who wish their formulation to avoid the pitfalls confronting the catastrophe principle. (shrink)

Recent discoveries in physics, cosmology and biochemistry have captured the public imagination and made the Design Argument - the theory that God created the world according to a specific plan - the object of renewed scientific and philosophical interest. This accessible but serious introduction to the design problem brings together new perspectives from prominent scientists and philosophers including Paul Davies, Richard Swinburne, Sir Martin Rees, Michael Behe, Elliot Sober and Peter van Inwagen.

_Analytic Philosophy: An Interpretive History_ explores the ways interpretation (of key figures, factions, texts, etc.) has shaped the analytic tradition, from Frege to Dummet. It offers 17 chapters, written especially for this volume by an international cast of leading scholars. Some chapters are devoted to large, thematic issues like the relationship between analytic philosophy and other philosophical traditions such as British Idealism and phenomenology, while other chapters are tied to more fine-grained topics or to individual philosophers, like Moore and Russell (...) on philosophical method or the history of interpretations of Wittgenstein’s _Tractatus_. Throughout, the focus is on interpretations that are crucial to the origin, development, and persistence of the analytic tradition. (shrink)

In recent years there has been wide-ranging discussion of epistemic virtues. Given the value and importance of acquiring knowledge this discussion has tended to focus upon those traits that are relevant to the acquisition of knowledge. This acquisitionist focus ignores or downplays the importance of epistemic restraint: refraining from seeking knowledge. In contrast, in many periods of history, curiosity was viewed as a vice. By drawing upon critiques of curiositas in Middle Platonism and Early Christian philosophy, we gain useful insights (...) into the value and importance of epistemic restraint. The historical discussion paves the way for a clarification of epistemic restraint, one that distinguishes the morally relevant features of epistemic process, content, purpose, and context. Epistemic restraint is identified as an important virtue where our epistemic pursuits pose risks and burdens, where such pursuits have opportunity costs, where they are pursued for vicious purposes. But it is in the social realm where epistemic restraint has most purchase, epistemic restraint is important both because privacy is important and because being trusted are important. Finally, some suggestions are offered as to why epistemic restraint has not received the contemporary attention that it deserves. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Uriah Kriegel has attempted to describe the varieties of consciousness, that is, the primitive elements that constitute the phenomenal realm. Perceptual, imaginative, algedonic, cognitive, entertai...

This essay intends to create a path forward for philosophical work in higher education that is sensitive to the discursive, organizational, economic, epistemic, and political cultures of the institution. This essay will therefore not provide a grand theory of higher education that might be overlaid onto university practice. Instead, as we will argue, any viable philosophy of higher education must not only recognize but also be prepared to account for and harness the heterogeneity of theoretical, organizational, economic, epistemic, and professional (...) perspectives that are the ground of institutions of higher learning. (shrink)

The concept of difference has a long and important research tradition. We identify and explicate a heretofore overlooked distinction in the meaning and measurement of two different meanings of 'difference': 'diversity' and 'heterogeneity'. We argue that ‘diversity’ can describe a population well enough but does not describe a collective well. In contrast, ‘heterogeneity’ describes a collective better than a population and therefore ought to describe a collective. We argue that ignoring these distinctions can lead to a surprising and disturbing conflict (...) between diversity and heterogeneity. In particular, focusing on the 'diversity' of human communities can be self-defeating for those who truly care about the importance of diversity, inclusion, and belonging. (shrink)

The idea of individual responsibility for action is central to our conception of what it is to be a person. Behavioural genetic research may seem to call into question the idea of individual responsibility with possible implications for the criminal justice system. These implications will depend on the understandings of the various agencies and professional groups involved in responding to violent and anti-social behaviour, and, the result of negotiations between them over resulting practice. The paper considers two kinds of approaches (...) to the question of responsibility and ‘criminal genes’ arising from a sociological and philosophical perspective respectively. One is to consider the social context and possible practical implications of research into ‘criminal genes’ which will later be examined through interviews and discussions with a range of experts including lawyers and social workers. A second and different kind of approach is to ask whether the findings of behavioural genetics ought to have implications for attributions of responsibility. Issues of genetic influence are central to both approaches. (shrink)

Svirsky, Howard, and Berman address the U.S. Food and Drug Administration ’s oversight of tobacco products, the newest major area of regulation Congress assigned to the FDA. They discus...

If we are to understand why psychoanalysis extends ordinary psychology in the precise ways that it does, we must take account of the existence of, and the interplay between, two distinct kinds of explanatory concern: functional and idiographic. The form and content of psychoanalytic explanation and its unusual methodology can, at least in part, be viewed as emerging out of Freud's attempt to reconcile these two types of explanatory concern. We must also acknowledge the role of the background theoretical context (...) that shapes Freud's functional thinking about the mind. A neglect of the role of the background theory in shaping the extension of ordinary psychology leaves us with puzzles about the nature and direction of the psychoanalytic extension and gives rise to an unbelievable history of psychoanalysis. (shrink)

The US has found it hard to establish competition in the market for biologics, which are therapeutics derived from living cells. In the case of small-molecule drugs, the emergence of direct competition from generic drugs at the end of the exclusivity period has provided the impetus for price competition, leading to lower spending. In 2010, to spur competition in the biologics market, Congress created a simplified pathway for the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to approve comparable versions of biologic (...) drugs called biosimilars. Biosimilar competition in the US has nonetheless remained weaker than in European peer countries. For example, as of August 2020, there were 52 biosimilars available in Germany, and only 15 in the US.1 An important contributor to this “biosimilar gap” has been the fact that biosimilars to biologic blockbusters such as adalimumab (Humira) and etanercept (Enbrel) were only (or will only become) commercially available in the US several years after receiving FDA approval, while they were available in Europe years earlier.2 Through the end of 2021, it took biosimilars a median of 301 days between receiving FDA approval and becoming available for use.3 In one recent study, the median length of time between when a biologic drug was approved and when its first biosimilar was made available to US patients was 21.5 years.4 This paucity of competition has contributed to high US spending on biologics. According to the Department of Health and Human Services, in 2022 41% of US drug expenditures was spent on biologics, which represented 16% of US prescriptions.5. (shrink)

There is empirical evidence that many patients want information about treatment options even though they do not want to take a full part in decision-making about treatment. Such evidence may have considerable ethical implications but is methodologically problematic. It is argued here that, in fact, it is not at all surprising that patients' informational interests should be separable from their interests in decision-making. A number of different reasons for wanting information are offered, some to do with the content of information; (...) some with the process, others with the fact or occasion of informing. This philosophical clarification leads to some suggestions for further empirical study. (shrink)

A great deal has been learned in the past fifteen years from the study of pain mechanisms. More recently, the relief of pain has begun to receive much needed attention as well. Although most, if not all, acute and cancer pain can be relieved, recent evidence shows that inadequate treatment of pain is still common among the general population—even for pain due to cancer. Inadequate treatment of cancer pain is even more likely if the patient is a member of an (...) ethnic minority, female, elderly, or a child. Evidence also suggests that substance abusers are at risk for poor pain treatment.A number of barriers which involve problems of knowledge, attitudes, and laws and regulations affect health care professionals, patients, and the health care system; collectively, they contribute to the inadequate treatment of pain. (shrink)

The design argument for the existence of God is often criticized for resting on anthropocentrism. Some critics maintain that anthropocentrism explains the origin of the design argument. Such critics commit the genetic fallacy. Others say anthropocentrism explains the appeal of the belief that human beings are ends especially worthy of creation. They fail to appreciate that the design argument need not be framed in terms of the fitness of the universe for humanity. Lastly, some say the design argument requires a (...) picture of value according to which it was true, prior to the coming-into-being of the universe, that our sort of universe is worthy of creation. Such a picture, they say, is mistaken, though our attraction to it can be explained in terms of anthropocentrism. This is a serious criticism. To respond to it, proponents of the design argument must either defend an objectivist conception of value or, if not, provide some independent reason for thinking an intelligent designer is likely to create our sort of universe. (shrink)

Consider someone whom you know to be an expert about some issue. She knows at least as much as you do and reasons impeccably. The issue is a straightforward case of statistical inference that raises no deep problems of epistemology. You happen to know the expert’s opinion on this issue. Should you defer to her by adopting her opinion as your own? An affirmative answer may appear mandatory. But this paper argues that a crucial factor in answering this question is (...) the description under which you identify the expert. Experts may be identified under various descriptions (e.g., “the expert appearing on Channel 7 at 5 pm”). Section 2 provides cases that illustrate how deference to a known expert may be appropriate under some descriptions, but not others. Section 3 proposes that, in these cases, the differentiating factor is self-identification: deference to an expert under a given description is appropriate when the expert self-identifies under that description. Section 4 presents a formal framework that demonstrates the sufficiency of self-identification for appropriate deference within a significant class of cases. Section 5 notes a way in which this phenomenon allows for a form of “agreeing to disagree” in Robert Aumann’s sense. Section 6 illustrates the practical application of these results to the case of testimonials. (shrink)

Peter Singer argues that when some fail to do their part in alleviating suffering, the rest of us must take up their slack. In response, L. J. Cohen, Liam Murphy, and David Miller argue that such a requirement would be unfair. No one, they contend, should be required to contribute more than she would be required to under full compliance. I argue against Cohen, Murphy, and Miller that we are obligated to take up slack left by noncontributors, but agree that (...) we are thereby treated unfairly. Drawing on the literatures on group causation and moral responsibility, I argue that noncontributors wrong those they fail to help and those who take up their slack. I refer to the latter kind of wrong as “burden dumping.” Furthermore, I argue that my account applies whether we conceive of rescue duties as discretionary or nondiscretionary. One might think that if my duties to rescue do not require me to contribute to any particular rescue effort, I do not dump burdens on anyone when I do nothing. In reply, I argue that when I have a nondiscretionary duty to contribute to a particular rescue effort, I unfairly dump burdens on those contributing to that effort when I fail to do my part. Similarly, when my duty to rescue is discretionary and I do nothing, I unfairly dump burdens on everyone whose rescue efforts I might have contributed to. Using this apparatus, we can account for the force of arguments such as Singer’s as well as the idea that those who dump burdens are blameworthy for treating other rescuers unfairly. (shrink)

The Standard Picture holds that the contribution to the law made by an authoritative legal pronouncement is directly explained by the linguistic content of that pronouncement. This essay defends the Standard Picture from Mark Greenberg’s purported counterexamples drawn from patterns of statutory interpretation in U.S. criminal law. Once relevant features of the U.S. rule of recognition are admitted into the analysis—namely, that it arranges sources of law hierarchically, and that judicial decisions are sources of valid law—Greenberg’s counterexamples are revealed as (...) only apparent, not genuine. The legal norms that result from the patterns of interpretation he identifies can be directly explained in terms of the linguistic contents of authoritative pronouncements: judicial decisions. Furthermore, those norms can be understood as modifications of the valid norms contained in their originating statutes because judicial decisions are permitted ‘explanatory intermediaries’ of statutes by the rule of recognition. (shrink)

Does the very existence of money depend in any sense on our “recognition” of it? According to certain functionalist views, no such attitudes are necessary. This paper argues to the contrary for recognition dependence, of a minimal sort. What’s needed in a population is (1) the functional know-how of money use, (2) an ideational structure founded upon people’s thinking about what others are thinking, and (3) wide enough acceptance of a payment or settlement obligation (as expressed, e.g., when someone asks (...) a vendor “So what do I owe ya?”). (shrink)

The aim of this volume is to consider connections among issues in metaphilosophy, historiographical method, and the formation of philosophical canons. Here I consider an ancient metaphilosophical position very different from anything accepted in mainstream academic philosophy today, but which, I believe, merits revival in a form appropriate to our era. I call this position “metaphilosophical eudaimonism” because it takes human flourishing to be the ultimate goal of philosophy. I first explain the position before considering its implications for philosophy’s relationship (...) to its history, for the historiography of philosophy, and for the role of canons in philosophy. Along the way, I develop a perspective on the possibility of trans-historical knowledge grounded in a Husserlian analysis of the act of consciousness. (shrink)

I argue that our present crisis of meaning is grounded in what Dallas Willard called "the disappearance of moral knowledge," and in institutional changes related to this disappearance. Following Frankl, I argue that meaning requires self-transcendence via commitment to "higher" values, but the disappearance of moral knowledge has obscured the reality of such values, and hence has obscured the path to meaningful self-transcendence.

Accompanying an exhibition organized by the Whitney Museum of American Art, New York, this book is the most comprehensive catalogue on the work of this internationally recognized architectural firm.

Ayn Rand and the Russian Intelligentsia, by Derek Off ord, deals with both the origins and the influence of Rand’s thought. On the former, Off ord places Rand squarely and persuasively within the Russian intelligentsia tradition. On the latter, and less convincingly, the author discusses Rand as an “icon” of an American “Right” that remains largely undefined.

Over-the-counter drugs are ubiquitous in the US. Policymakers have long debated how to modernize the system for making determinations of safety and effectiveness and addressing safety issues with OTC drugs.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Philosophers, especially in recent years, have engaged in reflection upon the nature of experience. Such reflections have led them to draw a distinction between conscious and unconscious mentality in terms of whether or not it is like something to have a mental state. Reflection upon the history of psychology and upon contemporary cognitive science, however, identifies the distinction between conscious and unconscious mental states to be primarily one which is drawn in epistemic terms. Consciousness is an epistemic notion marking the (...) special kind of first-person knowledge we have of our own mental states. Psychologists have found it expedient, for explanatory reasons, to ignore or reject the assumption that we have exhaustive first-person knowledge of our mental states and, in doing so, use the term ‘unconscious’ to indicate the peculiar epistemic status of certain mental states.It is argued that epistemic consciousness is distinct from the subjective-experiential notion of consciousness, from ‘access-consciousness’ and from higher-order thought conceptions of mental state consciousness, and that epistemic consciousness has an important role to play in philosophy of mind and in the history of psychology.Author Keywords: Consciousness; Unconscious mental states; Self-knowledge; History of psychology; Freud; Chomsky. (shrink)

The modern vat-brain debate is an epistemological one, and it focuses on the point of view of a putatively deceived subject. Semantic externalists argue that we cannot coherently wonder whether we are brains in vats. This paper examines a new experimental paradigm for cognitive neuroscience—the neurally-controlled animat (NCA) paradigm—that seems to have a great deal in common with the vat-brain scenario. Neural cells are provided with a simulated body within an artificial world in order to study the brain both in (...) vitro and in vivo. Given the similarity between the NCA scenario and the vat-brain scenario, semantic externalism seems to undermine the utility of the NCA methodology. Three initial responses to the externalist challenge are offered. A fourth response clarifies the distinctive theoretical background to the NCA in ‘artificial life’ and, in doing so, we uncover an anti-representationalist conception of the NCA. This distances the NCA paradigm from externalist objections and casts cognitive neuroscience, and the vat-brain debate, in a new light. # 2004 Published by Elsevier Ltd. (shrink)