The complexity of the human mind and its interaction with the environment is one of the main epistemological debates throughout history. Recent ideas, framed as the 4E perspective to cognition, highlight that human experience depends causally on both cerebral and extracranial processes, but also is embedded in a particular sociomaterial context and is a product of historical accumulation of trajectory changes throughout life. Accordingly, the human microbiome is one of the most intriguing actors modulating brain function and physiology. Here, we (...) present the 4E approach to the Human Microbiome for understanding mental processes from a broader perspective, encompassing one's body physiology and environment throughout their lifespan, interconnected by microbiome community structure and dynamics. We review evidence supporting the approach theoretically and motivates the study of the global set of microbial ecosystem networks encountered by a person across their lifetime (from skin to gut to natural and built environments). We furthermore trace future empirical implementation of the approach. We finally discuss novel research opportunities and clinical interventions aimed toward developing low‐cost/high‐benefit integrative and personalized bio‐psycho‐socio‐environmental treatments for mental health and including the brain‐gut‐microbiome axis. (shrink)

Numerosity perception is a key ability for human and non-human species, probably mediated by dedicated brain mechanisms. Electrophysiological studies revealed the existence of both early and mid-latency components of the Electrophysiological (EEG) signal sensitive to numerosity changes. However, it is still unknown whether these components respond to physical or perceived variation in numerical attributes. We here tackled this point by recording electrophysiological signal while participants performed a numerosity adaptation task, a robust psychophysical method yielding changes in perceived numerosity judgments despite (...) physical numerosity invariance. Behavioral measures confirmed that the test stimulus was consistently underestimated when presented after a high numerous adaptor while perceived as veridical when presented after a neutral adaptor. Congruently, EEG results revealed a potential at around 200 ms (P2p) which was reduced when the test stimulus was presented after the high numerous adaptor. This result was much prominent over the left posterior cluster of electrodes and correlated significantly with the amount of adaptation. No earlier modulations were retrievable when changes in numerosity were illusory while both early and mid-latency modulations occurred for physical changes. Taken together, our results reveal that mid-latency P2p mainly reflects perceived changes in numerical attributes, while earlier components are likely to be bounded to the physical characteristics of the stimuli. These results suggest that short-term plastic mechanisms induced by numerosity adaptation may involve a relatively late processing stage of the visual hierarchy likely engaging cortical areas beyond the primary visual cortex. Furthermore, these results also indicate mid-latency electrophysiological correlates as a signature of the internal representation of numerical information. (shrink)

Causal reductionism is the widespread assumption that there is no room for additional causes once we have accounted for all elementary mechanisms within a system. Due to its intuitive appeal, causal reductionism is prevalent in neuroscience: once all neurons have been caused to fire or not to fire, it seems that causally there is nothing left to be accounted for. Here, we argue that these reductionist intuitions are based on an implicit, unexamined notion of causation that conflates causation with prediction. (...) By means of a simple model organism, we demonstrate that causal reductionism cannot provide a complete and coherent account of ‘what caused what’. To that end, we outline an explicit, operational approach to analyzing causal structures. (shrink)

The problem of free will is deeply linked with the causal relevance of mental events. The causal exclusion argument claims that, in order to be causally relevant, mental events must be identical to physical events. However, Gibb has recently criticized it, suggesting that mental events are causally relevant as double preventers. For Gibb, mental events enable physical effects to take place by preventing other mental events from preventing a behaviour to take place. The role of mental double preventers is hence (...) similar to what Libet names free won’t, namely the ability to veto an action initiated unconsciously by the brain. In this paper I will propose an argument against Gibb’s account, the causal irrelevance argument, showing that Gibb’s proposal does not overcome the objection of systematic overdetermination of causal relevance, because mental double preventers systematically overdetermine physical double preventers, and therefore mental events are causally irrelevant. (shrink)

A la hora de acceder a los servicios sanitarios, las mujeres inmigrantes – especialmente, aquellas en situación administrativa irregular – se van a topar con una serie de obstáculos concretos, fruto de los diversos ejes de desigualdad que las atraviesan y dan forma a su ubicación en la trama social. Así, se pretende exponer la necesidad de incorporar un enfoque interseccional y de género en las políticas de integración, concretamente las relativas al ámbito sanitario, a través del análisis de la (...) legislación estatal y autonómica existente, que revelará los avances conseguidos y las deficiencias persistentes en la materia. (shrink)

The metaphysics of powers (Shoemaker, 1980; Mumford, 2004; Marmodoro, 2009; Heil, 2012 among many others) is a promising conceptual framework that has been successfully put to use in many philosophical and scientific domains, but surprisingly its potential applications in the contemporary philosophy of mind are still under-investigated. This thematic issue aims to show that power ontology has implications concerning major questions in the contemporary philosophy of mind, such as: what is the metaphysical relationship between consciousness and the physical? Are phenomenal (...) properties reducible to physical properties, fundamental, or emergent? How are we to explain notions such as belief, agency, and free will? (shrink)

A blatant contradiction seems to characterize the first part of DA II 12: 424a24-25 entails that possession of the power to ‘receive forms without the matter’ is sufficient for being a sense organ, while the ‘wax simile’ supposedly preceding it (424a19-23) attributes the same power to both senses and wax blocks. To solve the contradiction, I contend that Aristotle does not in fact endorse the described ‘wax simile’. He offers, instead, a ‘signature simile’ between the forms received by senses and (...) the analogously matterless signatures transmitted by signet rings. This reading is supported by the use of the clause ‘forms without matter’ in Aristotle’s Corpus, which consistently refers to causally powerless and metaphysically sterile abstractions. I accordingly contend that the reception of perceptible forms without matter only describes the mental dimension of perception, and that the idea has no implications whatsoever with regard to physiology. The resulting attempt at capturing the mental aspect of perception is original and philosophically interesting: no unanalysable opposition of the mental to the physical is postulated, and currently crucial notions like ‘consciousness’ or ‘intentionality’ are playing no role at all. (shrink)

In the face of the new and radically different type of public order that seems to be emerging on the contemporary scene, Catholics have sought to secure the legal and social space necessary for themselves and their institutions to live in accordance with their beliefs by appealing to America’s historic commitment to religious freedom. The difficulty we confront is that the vision of man and society animating this order, a vision that emerges from Enlightenment Liberalism issues in an impoverished understanding (...) of religious freedom that fails to secure this legal and social space. (shrink)

Reseña de la obra de Alegre Zahonero, Luis y Serrano García, Clara, Legitimidad. Los cimientos del Estado social, democrático y de derecho, Madrid, Akal, 2020.

The problem of animal consciousness has profound implications on our concept of nature and of our place in the natural world. In philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience the problem of animal consciousness raises two main questions (Velmans, 2007): the distribution question (“are there conscious animals beside humans?”) and the phenomenological question (“what is it like to be a non-human animal?”). In order to answer these questions, many approaches take into account similarities and dissimilarities in animal and human behavior, e.g. (...) the use of language or tools and mirror self-recognition (Allen and Bekoff, 2007), however behavioral arguments don’t seem to be conclusive (Baars, 2005). Cognitive neuroscience is providing comparative data on structural and functional similarities, respectively called “homologies” and “analogies”. Many experimental results suggest that the thalamocortical system is essential for consciousness (Edelman and Tononi, 2000; Tononi, 2008). The argument from homology states that the general structure of thalamocortical system remained the same in the last 100-200 million years, for it is neuroanatomically similar in all the present and past mammals and it didn’t change much during phylogeny (Allen and Bekoff, 2007). The argument from analogy states that the key functional processes correlated with consciousness in humans are still present in all other mammals and many other animals (Baars, 2005). These processes are information integration through effective cortical connectivity (Massimini et al., 2005; Rosanova et al., 2012) and elaboration of information at a global level (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011). On this basis, the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness states that all mammals, birds, and many other animals (such as octopuses) possess the neurological substrates of consciousness (Low et al., 2012). Conscious experience is private (Chalmers, 1995; Nagel, 1974) therefore the answer to the phenomenological question may be impossible. Nevertheless, cognitive neuroscience may provide an answer to the distribution question, showing that conscious experience is not limited to humans since it is a major biological adaptation going back millions of years. (shrink)

David Sedley entreprend dans cet ouvrage dense – et aussi original que son récent commentaire du Cratyle (voir supra) – d’apporter une lumière véritable­ment nouvelle sur un dialogue platonicien aussi complexe qu’amplement com­menté. Il ne prétend pas écarter le contenu de détail des analyses du Théétète produites dans les dernières décennies mais se fixe néanmoins un objectif ambitieux : dégager un aspect radicalement inaperçu de ce dialogue et, en parti­culier, les raisons véritables pour l...

The article is aimed at pointing out the correctness of the basic assumptions of Maurizio Ferraris’ documental theory of social reality, illustrating the results of a case study research. The theoretical analysis leads to an argument that shows that only the reference to the role of writing (and to a broad and diversified conception of Documentality) makes it possible to clarify the phenomenon of social and historical iteration of intellectual heritage. This latter represents an intangible heritage which is neither part (...) of the external perceivable world, nor of a conjectural platonic reality, since – though possessing abstract essence – it stems from a specific point in time. (shrink)

Beginning by praising Carson Holloway’s The Way of Life: John Paul II and the Challenge of Liberal Modernity for both contributing to our understanding of John Paul’s posture toward modernity and bringing his thought into conversation with the thought of some of the intellectual architects of liberal modernity, my essayproceeds to identify several subjects I wish Holloway had explored further, including the positive aspects of John Paul’s appraisal of liberal modernity and the engagement with modern thought that looms so large (...) in his pre-papal philosophical writings. It then explores John Paul’s account of the achievements issuing from the modern quest for freedom, and the connection between the crisis that has engulfed this quest and the understanding of human freedom that informs contemporary culture. Against this backdrop, it examines John Paul’s efforts to address this crisis by articulating an anthropology that will assimilate the legitimateinsights of modern philosophies of freedom and consciousness into the broader framework provided by the philosophy of being as that philosophy has been understood within the Christian metaphysical tradition; and how the understanding of freedom that emerges from this anthropology differs from that which dominates contemporary culture. Far from being an adversary of the modern quest for freedom, John Paul believes that this quest is ultimately rooted in the revolution in human self-understanding wrought by Christianity, and seeks to articulate the intellectual foundation necessary to bring it to a successful conclusion. (shrink)

Institutions are committed to a constant work aimed at classifying cultural heritages, in order to preserve selected objects from decay or disappearing. In this domain of policy, a significant role is played by architecture and by the preservation of the architectural heritage of cities. How is it possible, however, to determine the value in the field of architectural heritages? What are the criteria for evaluation and the degree of objectivity these classifications are based upon? Is architectural worth immanent to objects (...) or does it reside outside them? These are fundamental questions for the science of preservation and the legislation on cultural heritages. By closely examining a controversial case occurred in the European Union, e.g. England, the paper tackles analytically some of these issues, and it exploits also concepts borrowed from social ontology and ontology of art. (shrink)

This paper aims to identify several interpretive problems posed by the final part ofDAII.11 (423b27–424 a10), where Aristotle intertwines the thesis that a sense is like a ‘mean’ and an explanation for the existence of a ‘blind spot’ related to the sense of touch, adding the further contention that we are capable of discriminating because the mean ‘becomes the other opposite’ in relation to the perceptible property being perceived. To solve those problems, the paper explores a novel interpretation of Aristotle’s (...) claims, arguing that they describe a homeostatic physiological reaction by which the sensory apparatus responds to perceptible stimuli. According to the proposed interpretation, such homeostatic reaction constitutes a necessary condition for perceiving what Aristotle refers to as ‘proper’ perceptible features, which include properties like ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ as well as colors and sounds. (shrink)

There is a driving need computationally to interrogate large bodies of text for a range of non-denotative meaning (e.g., to plot chains of reasoning, detect sentiment, diagnose genre, and so forth)...

Integrated information theory attempts to account for both the quantitative and the phenomenal aspects of consciousness, and in taking consciousness as fundamental and widespread it bears similarities to panpsychist Russellian monism. In this paper I compare IIT's and RM's response to the conceivability argument, and their metaphysical account of conscious experience. I start by claiming that RM neutralizes the conceivability argument, but that by virtue of its commitment to categoricalism it doesn't exclude fickle qualia scenarios. I argue that IIT's core (...) notion of intrinsic cause-effect power makes it incompatible with categoricalist versions of RM and, to the contrary, is best understood as entailing pandispositionalism, the view for which all properties are powers. I show that, thus construed, IIT can cope with both the conceivability and with the fickle qualia arguments, offers a promising way to account for the content of experience, and hence is preferable to categoricalist RM. (shrink)

We present a high-level declarative programming language for representing argumentation schemes, where schemes represented in this language can be easily validated by domain experts, including deve...

Tailoring assistive systems for guiding and monitoring an individual in daily living activities is a complex task. This paper presents ALI, an assistive system combining a formal possibilistic argumentation system and an informal model of human activity: the Cultural-Historic Activity Theory, facilitating the delivery of tailored advices to a human actor. We follow an activity-centric approach, taking into consideration the human’s motives, goals and prioritized actions. ALI tracks a person in order to I) determine what activities were performed over a (...) period of time (activity recognition tracking), and II) send personalized notifications suggesting the most suitable activities to perform (decision-making monitoring). The ALI system was evaluated in a formative pilot study related to promote social activities and physical exercise. (shrink)

Climate change governance is extremely challenging because of both the intrinsic difficulty of the issues at stake and the plurality of values and world-views. For these reasons, the ethical concerns that characterise climate change should also be meaningfully addressed through a specific version of procedural justice. Accordingly, in this article we adopt an impure notion of procedural justice. On this theoretical basis, we define relevant fairness criteria and contextualise them for climate governance systems. Then, we empirically justify fairness criteria against (...) a critical and divisive element for the future governance of the Green Climate Fund, i.e., the no-objection procedure. The article concludes with some considerations prompted by the analysis. (shrink)

Premier volume d’une nouvelle collection (« Cambridge Studies in the Dia­logues of Plato », dirigée par Mary Margaret McCabe), Plato’s ‘Cratylus’ présente, d’un dialogue de Platon particulièrement complexe, une lecture radicalement nouvelle. L’ouvrage ouvre bien une voie originale par rapport aux travaux con­sacrés, depuis une douzaine d’années, à l’élucidation du sens et de la portée phi­losophiques du Cratyle (mentionnons notamment : T. M. S. Baxter, The Cratylus. Plato’s Critique of Naming...

The target article misrepresents the foundations of integrated information theory and ignores many essential publications. It, thus, falls to this lead commentary to outline the axioms and postulates of IIT and correct major misconceptions. The commentary also explains why IIT starts from phenomenology and why it predicts that only select physical substrates can support consciousness. Finally, it highlights that IIT's account of experience – a cause–effect structure quantified by integrated information – has nothing to do with “information transfer.”.

Platons Philosophie des Bildes est un ouvrage imposant et dense, qui propose une lecture générale du sens et de la fonction de l’image dans la philosophie de Platon. En dressant de ceux-ci un tableau synoptique à partir de la période « de maturité », il vise à faire apparaître une « unité remarquable » de la notion platonicienne d’image (« der platonische Bildbegriff »). Si Christoph Poetsch analyse les diverses formes de celle-ci, ainsi que les Gleichnisbilder (analogies et métaphores) les (...) p... (shrink)

I propose a revision of the received lexicography of μεσότης with regard to Plato’s and Aristotle’s use of the word. In their works, μεσότης never indicates something that merely ‘lies in the middle’, and rather hints at what establishes a reason-grounded, ἀναλογία-like relationship between two extremes. Particularly controversial occurrences of the word μεσότης are connected to the introduction of Aristotle’s ethical and perceptual doctrines of the mean, in Nicomachean Ethics II and De Anima II.12. In this regard, I shall briefly (...) mention some promising directions of inquiry that seem worthy of further investigation. (shrink)

John Paul II neither rejects modernity nor exalts the freedom it has engendered. Rather, he affirms the modem aspiration to achieve "the completeliberation of man," but does so in terms of "the complete truth about the human being" and "the truth and love revealed to men by Jesus Christ.".

Muhammad and the Empires of Faith: The Making of the Prophet of Islam. By Sean William Anthony. Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2020. Pp. xiv + 287. $32.95, £26.

The Making of the Medieval Middle East: Religion, Society, and Simple Believers. By Jack Tannous. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018. Pp. xiv + 647. $39.95, £34.

This article focuses on the conclusion in which the analyses of the previous papers converge, namely, the emergence of a new and radically different public order that is emerging in contemporary America. While Catholics could never feel completely comfortable in the older order that preceded it, the culture that informed this order had many features that were consistent with the Catholic vision of man, society, and the human good; and it secured for the Church a broad freedom to exercise her (...) ministry and for Catholics the freedom they needed to practice the faith. In sharp contrast, the new order installs at the heart of public life an ethic of human autonomy incompatible with the Catholic understanding, and jeopardizes the freedom of the Church and of Catholics to practice the faith. The emergence of this new order will require Catholics to rethink their relationship to American culture and the American state. (shrink)

Patrick Deneen’s Why Liberalism Failed offers a compelling critique of liberalism that casts considerable light on many of our current discontents. Nevertheless, its argument is vitiated by certain shortcomings, namely, a failure to recognize the role of other traditions in inspiring and shaping liberal democracy, and to do justice to the achievements, history, and complexities of the liberal intellectual tradition. Likewise, its account of liberalism fails to address that tradition’s defining philosophical commitments, commitments that determine the limits and possibilities of (...) its political theorizing and explain its historical trajectory toward an ever-deeper individualism. It will not be possible to escape the intellectual prison of Enlightenment Liberalism’s moral emotivism and hyper-individualism until we have transcended the impoverished metaphysics from which they issue. (shrink)

This monograph would like to present itself as a new transformative-emancipatory path. It knows how to reconcile the sphere of humanity, and particularly that of dignity, with the dimensions of conscience, vulnerability, and identity. These dimensions cross cultural boundaries and encompass various theoretical hypotheses. The current society shows ever-more traits of inequality, and the ethics should try to create constructivist bridges, which I will try to show by a "meta-ontological model", described in its "integral-centripetal" inclination. If we do not respect (...) ourselves, others, and the environment that hosts us, we will never be able to define ourselves as "human" beings, that is, beings endowed with "dignity". Any responsibility makes sense to the extent that this respect, which we could include in the category of "taking care", constitutes the epistemological background of ethical lives. (shrink)

: Autonomous driving systems promise important changes for future of transport, primarily through the reduction of road accidents. However, ethical concerns, in particular, two central issues, will be key to their successful development. First, situations of risk that involve inevitable harm to passengers and/or bystanders, in which some individuals must be sacrificed for the benefit of others. Secondly, and identification responsible parties and liabilities in the event of an accident. Our work addresses the first of these ethical problems. We are (...) interested in investigating how humans respond to critical situations and what reactions they consider to be morally right or at least preferable to others. Our experimental approach relies on the trolley dilemma and knowledge gained from previous research on this. More specifically, our main purpose was to test the difference between what human drivers actually decide to do in an emergency situations whilst driving a realistic simulator and the moral choices they make when they pause to consider what they would do in the same situation and to better understand why these choices may differs. Keywords: Self-driving Cars; Trolley Problem; Moral Choices; Moral Responsibility; Virtual Reality Dilemmi morali nelle automobili a guida autonoma Riassunto: I sistemi di guida autonomi promettono importanti cambiamenti per il futuro dei trasporti, principalmente attraverso la riduzione degli incidenti stradali. Tuttavia, vi sono preoccupazioni etiche, in particolare due questioni centrali, fondamentali per il loro sviluppo. In primo luogo, le situazioni di rischio che comportano inevitabili danni ai passeggeri e/o ai pedoni, ovvero situazioni in cui alcune persone devono essere sacrificate a beneficio di altri. In secondo luogo, l’identificazione delle parti responsabili in caso di incidente. Il nostro lavoro affronta il primo di questi problemi etici. Siamo interessati a studiare come gli umani rispondono a situazioni critiche e quali reazioni considerano moralmente giuste o almeno preferibili. Il nostro approccio sperimentale si basa sul trolley problem e sulle conoscenze acquisite da precedenti ricerche su questo ambito. Più specificamente, il nostro scopo principale è quello di testare la differenza tra ciò che i conducenti umani decidono effettivamente di fare in una situazione di emergenza, mentre guidano un simulatore realistico, e le scelte morali che compiono se posti nella stessa situazione e hanno la possibilità di decidere senza limiti di tempo. Lo scopo è inoltre comprendere come e perché queste scelte possono differire. Parole chiave: Automobili a guida autonoma; Trolley problem; Scelte morali; Responsabilità morale, Realtà virtuale. (shrink)

Two-thirds of global industrial greenhouse gas emissions over the past two centuries can be traced to the activities of a handful of companies (‘carbon majors'). Based on their direct contribution to climate change in terms of carbon emissions and on a number of morally relevant facts, this article proposes a normative framework to establish the responsibilities that carbon majors have in relation to climate change. Then, the analysis articulates these responsibilities in the form of two duties: a duty of decarbonisation (...) and a duty of reparation. The duty of decarbonisation entails a large-scale transformation that carbon majors ought to undergo in order to reduce and eventually eliminate carbon emissions from their entire business model. The duty of reparation implies rectification through disgorgement of funds for the wrongful actions of carbon majors, which resulted in negative climate impacts, starting from the most socially vulnerable groups affected by climate change. Finally, the article indicates possible practical implications of these duties. (shrink)

The single day conference “Ontology, Mind and Free Will. A Workshop in Memory of E.J. Lowe (1950-2014)” took place at the Department of Humanities of the University of Macerata on March, 3 rd 2014. It included as speakers Sophie Gibb (Durham University), Mario De Caro (Roma Tre University) and Michele Paolini Paoletti (University of Macerata). This event was thought by the organizers in order to honor the British philosopher Ethan Jonathan Lowe, who suddenly passed away last January with infinite regret (...) of the scientific community. The discussion of some of his major research topics, such as mental causation, free will and essence, was therefore meant as the right homage to one of the most influential philosophers who animated and deepened the debate of the last thirty years. Regarding the singular reviews of this report, Matteo Grasso took care of Sophie Gibb’s and Mario De Caro’s talks, while Mattia Sorgon reviewed Michele Paolini Paoletti’s. (shrink)

We live in a society we may often perceive as unfair and oppressive. When political and social oppression becomes suffocating, rebellion against such oppression emerges as the sole viable course of action. An oppressed social climate harbors feelings that could lead to revolutionary fervor. This work intends to deal with the topic of revolution, in line with predominantly theoretical-moral connotations, tending towards social ethics. Drawing on a phenomenological analysis of revolution, this work endeavors to delineate the form of justice that (...) should prevail amidst the fragile times we are living in. In effect, it proposes a path which crosses different ethical-moral matrices, which are linked to the epistemic context surrounding the concept of revolution, to finally arrive at proposing a new moral typology of justice. This theoretical scenario gives us the possibility of categorizing the revolutionary phenomenon within different dynamics, functions, and perspectives, opening up glimmers of criticism and reflection on our times. Furthermore, the research aims to demonstrate how the topic of revolution is not a theme of a “univocal” nature. It can be understood in various ways. From a first point of view, the revolution could be interpreted positively or negatively, depending on the meaning we attribute to the concepts of revolution and justice. Revolutionary justice, if oppressive and unequal, can indeed become a new form of injustice. Moreover, depending on how we interpret pre-revolutionary feelings, the concept of limit could vary in its ontological dimension. Within the branch of social and moral philosophy, this analysis will be conducted according to an analytical method. The method used concerns first of all the critical analysis, as the in-depth study of various concepts, such as e.g. the concepts of limit, shame, indignation, resilience, disobedience, vulnerability, temperance, consciousness, equality, difference, freedom, love, hope, honesty, trust, compassion, empathy, and care. The methodology also concerns the use of original expository plots, capable of crossing epistemic boundaries. (shrink)

Are colors features of objects “out there in the world” or are they features of our inner experience and only “in our head?” Color perception has been the focus of extensive philosophical and scientific debate. In this paper we discuss the limitations of the view that Chalmers’ (2006) has characterized as Primitivism, and we develop Marmodoro’s (2006) Constitutionalism further, to provide a metaphysical account of color perception in terms of causal powers. The result is Power-based Constitutionalism, the view that colors (...) are (multi-track and multi-stage) powers of objects, whose (full) manifestations depend on the mutual manifestation of relevant powers of perceivers and the perceived objects being co-realized in mutual interaction. After a presentation of the tenets of Power-based Constitutionalism, we evaluate its strengths in contrast to two other recent power-based accounts: John Heil’s (2003, 2012) powerful qualities view and Max Kistler’s (2017) multi-track view. (shrink)

This volume brings together eminent theologians, philosophers and political theorists to discuss such questions as how religious understandings have shaped the moral landscape of contemporary culture; the possible contributions of theology and theologically informed moral argument to contemporary public life; the problem of religious and moral discourse in a pluralistic society; and the proper relationship between religion and culture.

This article focuses on the conclusion in which the analyses of the previous papers converge, namely, the emergence of a new and radically different public order that is emerging in contemporary America. While Catholics could never feel completely comfortable in the older order that preceded it, the culture that informed this order had many features that were consistent with the Catholic vision of man, society, and the human good; and it secured for the Church a broad freedom to exercise her (...) ministry and for Catholics the freedom they needed to practice the faith. In sharp contrast, the new order installs at the heart of public life an ethic of human autonomy incompatible with the Catholic understanding, and jeopardizes the freedom of the Church and of Catholics to practice the faith. The emergence of this new order will require Catholics to rethink their relationship to American culture and the American state. (shrink)