A translation of one of the single most important works of recent French philosophy, Badiou's magnum opus, and a must-have for his growing following and anyone interested in contemporary Continental thought.

been recently proposed (Morin, 2003; 2004). The model takes into account most known mechanisms and processes leading to self-awareness, and examines their multiple and complex interactions. Inner speech is postulated to play a key-role in this model, as it establishes important connections between many of its ele- ments. This paper first reviews past and current references to a link between self-awareness and inner speech. It then presents an analysis of the nature of the relation between these two concepts. It is (...) suggested that inner speech can inter- nally reproduce and expand social and physical (ecological) sources of self- awareness. Inner speech can also create a psychological distance between the self and mental events it experiences (thus facilitating self-observation) it can act as a problem-solving device where the self represents the problem and self-information the solution, and can label aspects of one’s inner life that would otherwise be difficult to objectively perceive. Empirical evidence supporting the role of inner speech in self-awareness is also presented. (shrink)

Quite a few recent models are rapidly introducing new concepts describing different levels of consciousness. This situ- ation is getting confusing because some theorists formulate their models without making reference to existing views, redun- dantly adding complexity to an already difficult problem. In this paper, I present and compare nine neurocognitive models to highlight points of convergence and divergence. Two aspects of consciousness seem especially important: perception of self in time and complexity of self-representations. To this I add frequency of (...) self-focus, amount of self-related informa- tion, and accuracy of self-knowledge. Overall, I conclude that many novel concepts (e.g., reflective, primary, core, extend- ed, recursive, and minimal consciousness) are useful in helping us distinguish between delicate variations in consciousness and in clarifying theoretical issues that have been intensely debated in the scientific literature—e.g., consciousness in rela- tion to mirror self-recognition and language. (shrink)

Little is known with regard to the precise cognitive tools the self uses in acquiring and processing information about itself. In this article, we underline the possibility that inner speech might just represent one such cognitive process. Duval and Wicklund’s theory of self-awareness and the selfconsciousness, and self-knowledge body of work that was inspired by it are reviewed, and the suggestion is put forward that inner speech parallels the state of self-awareness, is more frequently used among highly self-conscious persons, and (...) represents an effective, if not indispensable, tool involved in the formation of the self-concept. The possibility is also raised that the extent to which one uses inner speech could partially explain individual differences in self-consciousness and self-knowledge. A selective review of the private and inner speech literature is presented, and some possible ways of testing the hypothesis by using pre-existing techniques are proposed in the hope of stimulating empirical investigations. Some implications are outlined in conclusion. (shrink)

Overture -- Jacques Lacan -- Georges Canguilhem and Jean Cavaillès -- Jean-Paul Sartre -- Jean Hyppolite -- Louis Althusser -- Jean-François Lyotard -- Gilles Deleuze -- Michel Foucault -- Jacques Derrida -- Jean Borreil -- Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe -- Gilles Châtelet -- Françoise Proust -- A note on the texts.

This article raises the question of how we acquire self-information through self-talk, i.e., of how self-talk mediates self-awareness. It is first suggested that two social mechanisms leading to self-awareness could be reproduced by self-talk: engaging in dialogues with ourselves, in which we talk to fictive persons, would permit an internalization of others' perspectives; and addressing comments to ourselves about ourselves, as others do toward us, would allow an acquisition of self-information. Secondly, it is proposed that self-observation is possible only if (...) there exists a distance between the individual and any potentially observable self-aspect; self-talk, because it conveys self-information under a different form , would create a redundancy -- and with it, a wedge -- within the self. (shrink)

In the past, researchers have focused mainly on the effects and consequences of self-awareness; however, they have neglected a more basic issue pertaining to the specific mechanisms that initiate and sustain self-perception. The author presents a model of self-awareness that proposes the existence of 3 sources of self-information. First, the social milieu includes early face-to-face interactions, self-relevant feedback, a social comparison mechanism that leads to perspective taking, and audiences. Second, contacts with objects and structures in the physical environment foster self–world (...) differentiation in infants; this environment also contains self-focusing and reflecting stimuli, such as mirrors and video cameras. Third, the self can develop bodily awareness through proprioception and can reflect on itself using imagery and inner speech. Furthermore, self-awareness is mainly mediated by the prefrontal lobes. The author establishes various links among these different neurological, social, ecological, and cognitive elements of the model. (shrink)

There is little doubt that animals are ―conscious‖. Animals hunt prey, escape predators, explore new environments, eat, mate, learn, feel, and so forth. If one defines consciousness as being aware of external events and experiencing mental states such as sensations and emotions (Natsoulas, 1978), then gorillas, dogs, bears, horses, pigs, pheasants, cats, rabbits, snakes, magpies, wolves, elephants, and lions, to name a few creatures, clearly qualify. The contentious issue rather is: Do these animals know that they are perceiving an external (...) environment and experiencing internal events? Are animals self-conscious? Recent attempts at understanding animal consciousness (e.g., Edelman & Seth, 2009) agree that non-human animals most probably possess ―primary‖ (or ―minimal‖) consciousness. But these views also argue that unlike humans animals lack many (but not all) elements that make up higher-order consciousness—the capacity to self-reflect on the contents of primary consciousness. In this chapter I will aim at offering a more elaborate picture of this position. I will present detailed information on what is meant by ―higher-order consciousness‖—i.e., selfawareness. I will suggest that some dimensions of self-awareness (e.g., self-recognition, metacognition, mental time travel) may be observed in several animals, but that numerous additional aspects (e.g., self-rumination, emotion awareness) seem to be absent. Some other self-related processes, such as Theory-of Mind, have been identified in animals, but not as the full-fledged versions found in humans. I will postulate that these differences in levels of selfawareness between humans and animals may be attributable to one distinctive feature of human experience: the ability to engage in inner speech. (shrink)

Dans les Cours d'Esthétique, qu'il prononce à Berlin entre 1820 et 1829, Hegel propose une théorie de la musique et analyse le rapport de celle-ci avec les autres arts dans l'ensemble du système philosophique. Mais comment le philosophe, qui n'est pas connaisseur, peut-il penser la musique de son temps? Sur quelle base se construit la réflexion? Et comment la reconstituer scientifiquement à partir des différentes sources? Le présent ouvrage apporte une réponse à ces questions en replaçant le discours hégélien dans (...) l'arrière-plan socio-historique de la vie musicale contemporaine, et en reconstituant, pour la première fois, la théorie de Hegel à partir des manuscrits inédits des différents cours. La spéculation apparaît alors dans toute son originalité, comme le prolongement des multiples expériences faites au théâtre et au concert. La conception de la musique comme manifestation de l'esprit absolu se vérifie alors dans l'expérience la plus concrète. (shrink)

Merker’s definition of consciousness excludes self-reflective thought, making his proposal for decorticate consciousness not particularly groundbreaking. He suggests that brainstem sites are neglected in current theories of consciousness. This is so because broader definitions of consciousness are used. Split-brain data show that the cortex is important for full-blown consciousness; also, behaviors exhibited by hydranencephaly patients and decorticated rats do not seem to require reflective consciousness.

Since at least as far back as the seventeenth century, the “Quarrel Between the Ancients and the Moderns” has figured on the philosopher’s agenda, in aesthetics and in natural philosophy as well as in ethics and in politics. In this last field, one of the most important stakes of the quarrel turns on the distinction which Benjamin Constant drew in 1819, between two different conceptions of liberty: that of the Ancients and that of the Moderns. The problem of freedom lies (...) at the very heart of all philosophical reflection: in metaphysics and in theology, as well as in ethics and in social and political philosophy. Being founded on a very strong affirmation of the preeminent value of individual freedom, liberalism has, for at least two centuries, been at the centre of the discussion both in modern political philosophy and in economics. Not only were its first rivals, namely anarchism, socialism and a reactionary mode of thought together with its nostalgia for a hierarchical society, defined against the background of liberalism; but the internal discussions within liberalism itself have not been any the less intense, as is realized when comparing its “solidarist” with its “proprietarist” or “libertarian” versions. Some liberals claim descent from Burke, others from Condorcet, some from Humboldt and others from the early Fichte. Liberalism can indeed be spelt out in different ways. One can anyway perceive in present-day objections to liberalism the reappearance of a good many classical philosophical theses. Thus the communitarian criticism of abstract universalism and of state neutrality reminds one of the Hegelian and romantic criticism of the Enlightenment; while some arguments advanced by “leftist” communitarians recall the Marxist criticisms aimed at the formal idealism inherent in the Declaration of the Rights of Man. (shrink)

Free will typically refers to any form of significant control over one’s actions. This definition is remarkably similar to that of self-regulation—the control of one’s behavior, emotions, and thoughts in pursuit of long-term goals. Indeed, several scholars have proposed that the latter constitutes the psychological equivalent of the former. A large body of empirical work demonstrates that both covert (inner) and overt (private) forms of self-directed speech are causally associated with self-regulatory outcomes such as action planning, problem-solving, emotion regulation, attention, (...) cognitive flexibility, working memory, and self-reflection. It thus seems logical to propose that free will too recruits self-directed speech. This argument is explored by reviewing the relevant literature pertaining to free will, self-regulation, and inner/private speech. More specifically, free will is defined and contrasted with self-regulation, whose definition ends up being remarkably similar. Examples of typical research on private and inner speech are presented and show a key involvement of self-directed speech in self-regulation. The notion that free will depends on inner speech is further explored based on Wiley’s work (2009). One outstanding implication is that individual differences in self-directed speech use could be linked to different levels of free will. That is, people using inner/private speech more efficiently could exhibit freer will, and vice-versa. (shrink)

Summary.— Recent empirical work in social cognition suggests that in building a self-concept people make inferences about themselves based on overt behavior or private thoughts and feelings. This article addresses the question of how, exactly, people make these inferences about themselves and raises the possibility that they do so through self-talk. It is proposed that the more on talks to oneself to construct a selfimage, the more this image will gain coherence and sophistication. A correlational study was conducted to explore (...) the relation between richness of the self-concept (using the W-A-Y) and natural disposition to talk to oneself (using a pilot questionnaire). A moderate but positive correlation of .30 is obtained. The article concludes with clinical implications. (shrink)

In order to address to the relation between philosophy and mathematics it is first necessary to distinguish the grand style and the little style. The little style painstakingly constructs mathematics as the object for philosophical scrutiny. It is called the little style for a precise reason, because it assigns mathematics to the subservient role of that which supports the definition and perpetuation of a philosophical specialisation. This specialisation is called the ‘philosophy of mathematics’, where the ‘of’ is objective. The philosophy (...) of mathematics can in turn be inscribed under the area of specialisation that supports the name ‘epistemology and history of science’, an area to which corresponds a specialised bureaucracy in the academic authorities and committees whose role it is to manage the personnel of researchers and teachers. But in philosophy, specialisation is invariably the means by which the little style insinuates itself. In Lacan terms, this occurs through the collapse of the discourse of the Master, which is rooted in the signifier of the same name, the S1 that gives rise to a signifying chain, onto the discourse of the University, that perpetual commentary which adequately represents the second moment of all speech, that is, the S2 which only exists by making the Master disappear under the commentary which exhausts it. The little style of the philosophy of mathematics, and of its epistemology, strives for such a disappearance of the ontological sovereignty of mathematics, its instituting aristocratism, its unrivalled mastery, by confining its dramatic and almost incomprehensible existence to a generally dusty compartment of academic specialisation. (shrink)

Imagine that scientists have been successful at designing a drug that “freezes” brain areas producing our internal monologue. After taking the drug you can’t talk to yourself anymore. Every other mental activity is fine, but it’s now total silence in your head. Not a word. What would happen? What would it be like?

La tradition sociologique a habituellement considéré la mobilité, qu’elle soit sociale ou spatiale, comme le déplacement entre des positions établies, l’essentiel étant d’analyser le système formé par ces positions. On trouve cependant, dans la sociologie même, les moyens pour élargir cette perspective. Des travaux sur la mobilité sociale, on tire une interrogation sur l’accès aux ressources qui prend en compte diverses formes de mobilité. Simmel développe l’analyse du rôle de la proximité et de la distance dans la construction du social. (...) Des travaux contemporains qui portent sur les déplacements ou sur la télématique s’inscrivent dans la même perspective. Tocqueville introduit la notion d’une mobilité individuelle, notamment spatiale, consommatoire, et qui n’a d’autre objectif qu’elle-même. Ces trois orientations permettent à la sociologie de contribuer à une théorie de la mobilité généralisée, qui croise l’interrogation sur la modernité.Sociological tradition used to consider mobility – whether social or spatial – as a movement from an established position to another, but it put more emphasis on the positions system than on the movement itself. Yet sociology itself provides the means to widen the scope. Studies on social mobility have eventually resulted in the larger problématique of resource acquisition involving various forms of mobility. Simmel developed an in-depth analysis of the influence of presence vs absence in the set up of social relationships, interrelated with current studies dealing with movements and telematics. Earlier Tocqueville had introduced the concept of individual mobility, notably spatial, consumption-focussed, and with a life of its own ; which eventually resulted in the philosophy of self-reference. These three orientations enable sociology to contribute to a theory of generalized mobility intersecting with the questioning on modernity. (shrink)

A double ambiguity has been charged against Rawls’s difference principle (DP). Is it Maximin, Leximin, or something else? Usually, following A. Sen, scholars identify DP with the so-called Leximin. One argues here that one has to distinguish 1° the Leximin, 2° the Maximin (as rule of justice formally analogous to the maximin rule of decision), represented by the figure in L of the perfectly substitutable goods, and 3° the genuine DP. When the augmentation of inequality benefits the worse off, only (...) Pareto-strong improvements are permitted. Leximin would also permit Pareto-weak improvements too (after the first maximum D), where only the richest improves: from (2, 3) to (2, 5), say. This is forbidden by DP. With two classes, unlike Maximin, DP has no curve of indifference and is always decisive, as Leximin is. For undecisive Rules of Justice, which admit indifferent curves, I propose to add a lexically secondary rule, to break ties. That move is able to clarify the links and the differences between on the one hand Maximin alone, with its typical indifference curves in L, and on the other hand, the DP properly understood and the Leximin, which both have no indifferent curves. With two classes of persons (best off/worse off), DP appears more egalitarian than Leximin, because it's secondary rule is MinIn (Minimization of Inequality). But the intuition behind the distinction is that it cannot possible “fair” that only the best off improves in a productive social cooperation. (shrink)

Un milliard d'ètres humains vivant avec moins d'un dollar par jour. 270 millions de morts, entre 1990 et 2005, sous l'effet de l'extrème pauvreté. Plus que toutes les pertes des guerres du XXe siècle. 18 millions de victimes, un tiers des décès mondiaux par an dus à la misère. Ces données correspondent pour l'essentiel à la profondeur des inégalités entre les pays du Nord et ceux du Sud. Faut-il que les États riches s'emploient à remédier à la situation des États (...) pauvres, et si oui, selon quelles modalités et à quelles conditions? Cette question, qu'on désigne aujourd'hui comme celle de la « justice globale », est venue s'ajouter, depuis la fin des années 1970, à la question classique des inégalités. Quel peut ètre, au plan global ou mondial, l'analogue de ce que sont les politiques sociales au sein d'une société donnée? S'agit-il, si l'on accorde que les États riches ont à contribuer au développement des pays pauvres, de procéder, là aussi, par des transferts de ressources? Ou faut-il oeuvrer pour que les pauvres du monde accèdent à des « pouvoir-faire » les rendant capables de prendre en charge leur destin? Discutant ces options, envisageant d'autres perspectives encore, ce livre entreprend pour la première fois, en combinant approche politique et approche éthique, de construire une théorie systématique de la justice globale. (shrink)

First conversation -- The situation of the left today and the necessity of an alternative -- The democratic discourse -- Communism as modern politics? -- Second conversation -- The new imperialism -- Politics of identity -- The principle of the common good, or, Beyond the economy.

Comme première étape pour parler de la philosophie française, je pars d'un paradoxe : ce qui est la ¾philosophie¾ la plus universelle est aussi, en même temps, la plus particulière. C'est ce que Hegel appelle l'universel concret, la synthèse de ce qui est absolument universel, qui est pour tous, et qui à la fois a une place et un moment particuliers. Absolument universel, il a des particularités nationales et culturelles. Il y a ce que j'appellerais des moments de philosophie, dans (...) l'espace et dans le temps. Ainsi, je voudrais soutenir une thèse historique et nationale : il y a eu ou il y a, selon les cas, un moment philosophique français qui a duré pendant la seconde moitié du XXe siècle et je voudrais essayer de présenter le lien entre tous ces philosophes et la littérature dans cette séquence. Et je parlerais aussi de la discussion constante, tout au long de cette période, entre la philosophie et la psychanalyse. Question d'origine, question d'opérations, question de style et de littérature, question de psychanalyse, tels seront mes moyens pour tenter d'identifier cette philosophie française contemporaine. (shrink)

El filósofo francés Alain Guy (La Rochelle, 1918 - Narbonne, 1998) dedicó por entero su vida al estudio de la filosofía española e hispanoamericana, dándola a conocer no sólo en el extranjero sino también en nuestro país.

Depuis plus de vingt ans, le développement de la vidéoprotection fait l'objet de nombreux débats, parfois passionnés, tant en ce qui concerne son utilité en vue de lutter contre la délinquance que pour ses éventuelles conséquences en matière d'atteintes aux libertés individuelles. En France, l'installation de systèmes de vidéoprotection sur la voie publique est encadrée par les dispositions de la loi du 21janvier 1995. La vidéoprotection n'est qu'un outil parmi d'autres au service de la prévention et de la lutte contre (...) la criminalité. Elle peut être efficace lorsque sa mise en oeuvre répond à des objectifs clairement définis. En revanche, certains problèmes demeurent lorsqu'elle est mal utilisée. L'usage des nouvelles technologies par l'État ne doit pas être systématiquement abordé sous l'angle symbolique ou du militantisme. La problématique n'est pas dans leur essor, car il est incontestable que les progrès technologiques contribuent à une meilleure sécurité des citoyens, tant à charge pour les criminels, qu'à décharge pour les personnes injustement poursuivies, mais dans les moyens et les procédures de contrôle de ces outils. Là est l'enjeu.The development of video-monitoring has been a subject of considerable and often heated debate for over twenty years, both as regards its effectiveness against crime and its potential for infringing civil liberties. In France, the installation of video-monitoring systems in public places is regulated by the Act of January 21st, 1995. Video-monitoring is one of a range of tools used in preventing and fighting crime. When implemented with clearly defined objectives, it can be effective. However, the misuse of video-monitoring raises a number of problems. The use of new technologies by the State should not be systematically viewed in symbolic terms or from the angle of political activism. The problem at issue is not the boom in video-monitoring in itself, as it cannot be denied that technological progress is contributing to better security for citizens, both against criminals and in the defence of persons unjustly charged, but rather the means and procedures for controlling its use. (shrink)