The Molyneux question asks: would a blind person, who knows spheres and cubes only from touch, be able to recognize these shapes visually immediately upon becoming sighted, without touching them? Molyneux himself answered no. Locke accepted Molyneux’s negative answer. But Locke’s answer appears inconsistent with the doctrine of common sensibles, according to which some ideas are given in more than one sense modality. Motivated by alleviating this tension, philosophers have put forth several interpretations of Locke’s views on shape perception. Here (...) I motivate a novel interpretation of Locke that can better resolve the tension. (shrink)

We defend a ‘tight borders’ view of mind and cognition. Our key move comes from Berkeley.

The goal of this thesis is to provide an account of phenomenal unity, the togetherness felt between our conscious experiences. I begin in the first chapter by spelling out the target phenomenon in more detail. I organize the discussion around the analysis question—what does phenomenal unity consist in or reduce to?—and clarify the desiderata we want an answer to the analysis question to meet. In the second and third chapter, I look at answers to the analysis question, organized under two (...) broad headings. In the second chapter, I examine a slate of monistic theories, which argue that phenomenal unity consists in a single relation which holds between phenomenal experiences. In the third chapter, I examine pluralistic theories, which argue that phenomenal unity consists in a plurality of relations between phenomenal experiences. My overall aim is twofold: 1) argue for a pluralistic approach to the analysis question, and 2) argue for a specific pluralistic account, the many relations account. Once I have argued for my specific pluralistic account, I apply it to other questions surrounding phenomenal unity in chapter 4. (shrink)