The Northern Irish footballer James McClean chooses not to take part in the practice of wearing a plastic red poppy to commemorate those who have died fighting for the British Armed Forces. Each year he faces abuse, including occasional death threats, for his choice. This forms part of a wider trend towards ‘poppy enforcement’, the pressuring of people, particularly public figures, to wear the poppy. This enforcement seems wrong in part because, at least in some cases, it involves abuse. But (...) is there anything else wrong with it? We will consider the various ways the existing literature on the ethics of commemoration might help us understand what is wrong with poppy enforcement. We will argue that this cannot provide a complete account of what is wrong with poppy enforcement. We then argue that such pressure can constitute two distinct forms of affective injustice, which are wrongs done to people specifically in their capacity as affective beings. In McClean’s case, we argue first that poppy enforcement is a violation of affective rights and second that he faces a particular type of affective injustice that we call emotional imperialism. (shrink)

Stories about the divine are meant to help our imagination cope with what is ultimately not fully imaginable. In the process we make use of metaphors that rely on quantitative relationships to express the qualitative difference between the reality accessible to us and the transcendent reality of God. For example, because we have no notion of what it would mean to “be outside of time,” eternity tends to be explained in terms of infinite temporality. With the increasingly bizarre and unimaginable (...) worldview of contemporary physics, it is perhaps no longer clear what the difference is between the unknown and the unknowable, or even whether it is possible to articulate a meaningful difference. Science appears to have outrun theology in creating stories that engage our imagination. How to overcome the difficulties this raises, particularly with respect to a widening gulf between academic analysis and popular belief, is at present not clear. A “flight from metaphor” into formalized theory, although apparently valid in science, leads to a dead end in theology. A re‐thinking of many traditional concepts, such as immanence and transcendence, seems to be indicated. (shrink)

A paradox is constructed employing four languages L1-L4, such that L1 is a metalanguage for L3, L3 for L2, and L2 for L1; L4 functions as the semantic meta-metalanguage for each of L1-L3. The paradox purports to show that no omniscient being can exist, given that there is a set of true sentences (each true within its respective language) from L1, L2, and L3 that no omniscient being can believe.The remainder of the paper consists in an examination of some attempts (...) at challenging the paradox on syntactic, semantic and pragmatic grounds. Just which of these attempts are the most promising for the religious person is a question which is left open. (shrink)

Globalization is a part of modern life. Sharing a common set of professional nursing values is critical in this global environment. The purpose of this research was to examine the professional values of nursing students from two distinct cultural perspectives. Nurse educators in Taiwan partnered with nurse educators in the United States to compare professional values of their respective graduating nursing students. The American Nurses Association Code of Ethics served as the philosophical framework for this examination. The convenience sample comprised (...) 94 Taiwanese students and 168 US students. Both groups reported high scores on an overall measure of values. They did differ substantially on the relative importance of individual items related to advocacy, competence, education, self-evaluation, professional advancement, and professional associations. Global implications for the collaborative practice of nurses from different cultures working together can be improved by first recognizing and then attending to these differences in value priorities. (shrink)

Bildung sollte ein individuell begründetes Selbst- und Weltverhältnis ermöglichen. Dieses neuhumanistische Versprechen beinhaltete immer schon eine Distanz zu den sozial akzeptierten Wissensbeständen und Fähigkeitsprofilen. Deren Aneignung war nicht das Kriterium einer gelingenden Selbstbildung. Ein solches Verständnis von Bildung scheint nur sinnvoll, wenn soziale Ordnungsvorstellungen nicht als selbstverständlich geltende verstanden werden. Dass deren Begründung nicht nur aus der Sicht des sich bildenden Individuums, aber auch im Hinblick auf den Streit um das Richtige und Gültige problematisiert werden kann, verweist auf eine Verbindung (...) von Bildungs- und Demokratietheorie. Aktuelle Demokratie-theorien thematisieren die letztliche Unmöglichkeit der Begründung sozialer Ordnung und den daraus resultierenden Streit um Begründungsansprüche. Von hier aus erscheint die Frage sinnvoll, ob das Bildungsversprechen nicht zugleich einen politisch-demokratischen Einsatz enthält und wie man sich diesem (theoretisch und empirisch) nähern kann. (shrink)

What sort of existence does the Sum have? Whether we affirm it to be the conceptual being of thought or the concrete existence of an individual, we will be forced to draw conclusions inimical to the Cartesian philosophy, for the alternative interpretations give rise to a serious dilemma. Jules Lequier states the dilemma in this way: "I think, therefore I am. Now in saying: 'I am,' after having said: 'I think,' either I say less, or I say more. If I (...) say less, I am proceeding with certainty, but backwards; if I say more, I advance indeed, but by what right? What perplexity!...Such are the two aspects of this proposition which is alternately evident and sterile, pregnant and obscure for the mind that examines it. But to the extent it is evident, it is sterile; to the extent that it is fruitful, it is obscure.". (shrink)

This is a major work by one of the best-known philosophical writers, representing the culmination of some twenty-five years’ work on the possibility of giving a rational defence of the claims of the religious man, and specifically the theist, in the face of modern criticisms. Dr Ewing’s object has been to fulfil what seem to him the two most important tasks for the philosopher in at least the present age, namely, to see if it is still possible to give a (...) rational defence of a genuinely religious point of view, and to do the same thing for an objective ethics, a task he has attempted in other works, and continues here. The conclusions are that while there can be no question of strict, logical proof, an ethical theism can be defended rationally as an explanatory, metaphysical hypothesis and there are no grounds to reject as illusory the most fundamental intuitive convictions of religion. The book, originally published in 1973, included a new theory of the ultimate criterion of truth for hypotheses, a restatement of the case for a substantial self and for indeterminism, a fresh treatment of the moral and certain other arguments for God, some points in the discussion of the problem of evil and some speculations on time. (shrink)

In this paper I will explore certain key features of Francisco Suarez's account of God's action in the world, with an eye toward explaining his view of the precise way in which God concurs with--that is, makes an immediate causal contribution to--free action in general and sinful action in particular. Suarez agrees with his mainly Thomistic opponents that God is an immediate cause of every effect produced by creatures--including every free act and, a fortiori , every sinful act elicited by (...) creatures with a rational or 'free' nature. But he differs markedly from them in his account of how it can be plausibly maintained that God permits sin without causing sin or, to put it somewhat differently, how it can be plausibly maintained that the moral defectiveness of a sin is not traceable to God as a source. (shrink)