"What can we expect from the study of Chinese philosophy? « In the philosophical systems of the Hindoos and the Chinese there are still hidden treasures, in which the anticipation of scientific discoveries, the results of thousands of years of occidental research, is most striking. Such are the words of Edward von Hartmann, the most famous living German philosopher1. Much labour has been spent in Europe on the Indian Vedanta philosophy, which had such a marked influence on Arthur Schopenhauer. « (...) The Upanishads, says the author of the Parerga and Paralipomena, are the outcome of the highest human wisdom.... They afford the most remunerative and sublime reading possible in this world, which has been the consolation of my life, as it will be that of my death 2. I do not see why the many germs scattered over the vast field of Chinese philosophy should not have a similar fertilizing influence on some philosophical European mind also. The deep impression caused by the Tao-tê-king will support my view. But much work remains to be done before Chinese philosophy will take its proper place in the history of philosophy. The burden of this task lies with us who are living in China and studying her language and literature, for, while great care is bestowed on all her sister languages in Europe and America, Chinese, the oldest of all, but the youngest in the curriculum of our high-schools, is treated as a step-child by public opinion. This paper is meant as a move in the direction just indicated.". (shrink)

First published in Great Britain in 1948, this book examines the definition of goodness as being distinct from the question of What things are good? Although less immediately and obviously practical, Dr. Ewing argues that the former question is more fundamental since it raises the issue of whether ethics is explicable wholly in terms of something else, for example, human psychology. Ewing states in his preface that the definition of goodness needs to be confirmed before one decides on the place (...) value is to occupy in our conception of reality or on the ultimate characteristics which make one action right and another wrong. This book discusses these issues. (shrink)

The Northern Irish footballer James McClean chooses not to take part in the practice of wearing a plastic red poppy to commemorate those who have died fighting for the British Armed Forces. Each year he faces abuse, including occasional death threats, for his choice. This forms part of a wider trend towards ‘poppy enforcement’, the pressuring of people, particularly public figures, to wear the poppy. This enforcement seems wrong in part because, at least in some cases, it involves abuse. But (...) is there anything else wrong with it? We will consider the various ways the existing literature on the ethics of commemoration might help us understand what is wrong with poppy enforcement. We will argue that this cannot provide a complete account of what is wrong with poppy enforcement. We then argue that such pressure can constitute two distinct forms of affective injustice, which are wrongs done to people specifically in their capacity as affective beings. In McClean’s case, we argue first that poppy enforcement is a violation of affective rights and second that he faces a particular type of affective injustice that we call emotional imperialism. (shrink)

First published in 1959, this volume follows on from Dr. A. C. Ewing’s earlier work, _The Definition of Good_. The book does not apologize or undermine Ewing’s previous publication but after further consideration on the topic, it explores the issues that were arguably overlooked in the original book. For example, it looks at the possibility of intermediate positions which have been developed since the philosophers Moore and Ross did their main work. Ewing also responds to the criticisms that originated from (...) _The Definition of Good_ and suggests that _Secondary Thoughts in Moral Philosophy_ makes his reading on the topic more balanced. (shrink)

According to the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, the Son of God is truly but only contingently a human being. But is it also the case that Christ’s individual human nature is only contingently united to a divine person? The affirmative answer to this question, explicitly espoused by Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, turns out to be philosophically untenable, while the negative answer, which is arguably implicit in St. Thomas Aquinas, explication of the Incarnation, has some surprising and significant (...) metaphysical consequences. (shrink)

Cells isolated from this freshwater polyp can aggregate and form a complete new animal. Experiments with the system lend support to a physico-chemical scheme for the creation of biological pattern.

Globalization is a part of modern life. Sharing a common set of professional nursing values is critical in this global environment. The purpose of this research was to examine the professional values of nursing students from two distinct cultural perspectives. Nurse educators in Taiwan partnered with nurse educators in the United States to compare professional values of their respective graduating nursing students. The American Nurses Association Code of Ethics served as the philosophical framework for this examination. The convenience sample comprised (...) 94 Taiwanese students and 168 US students. Both groups reported high scores on an overall measure of values. They did differ substantially on the relative importance of individual items related to advocacy, competence, education, self-evaluation, professional advancement, and professional associations. Global implications for the collaborative practice of nurses from different cultures working together can be improved by first recognizing and then attending to these differences in value priorities. (shrink)

Bildung sollte ein individuell begründetes Selbst- und Weltverhältnis ermöglichen. Dieses neuhumanistische Versprechen beinhaltete immer schon eine Distanz zu den sozial akzeptierten Wissensbeständen und Fähigkeitsprofilen. Deren Aneignung war nicht das Kriterium einer gelingenden Selbstbildung. Ein solches Verständnis von Bildung scheint nur sinnvoll, wenn soziale Ordnungsvorstellungen nicht als selbstverständlich geltende verstanden werden. Dass deren Begründung nicht nur aus der Sicht des sich bildenden Individuums, aber auch im Hinblick auf den Streit um das Richtige und Gültige problematisiert werden kann, verweist auf eine Verbindung (...) von Bildungs- und Demokratietheorie. Aktuelle Demokratie-theorien thematisieren die letztliche Unmöglichkeit der Begründung sozialer Ordnung und den daraus resultierenden Streit um Begründungsansprüche. Von hier aus erscheint die Frage sinnvoll, ob das Bildungsversprechen nicht zugleich einen politisch-demokratischen Einsatz enthält und wie man sich diesem (theoretisch und empirisch) nähern kann. (shrink)