In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Answer to Catherine König-Pralong, Eun-Jeung Lee, and Jyoti MohanSelusi Ambrogio (bio)I want to start my reply by expressing my deep gratitude to the three reviewers who devoted their energy and time to reading and commenting on my book. Their wise comments and criticisms helped in shaping my upcoming research plans, as well as in refining my understanding of this historiographical topic. The eventual readers of this research will (...) certainly benefit from their arguments. I will reply to each review separately, one after the other. Also I could never thank the editors of Philosophy East and West enough for the honor they bestowed on me in hosting this debate.Mapping the ExclusionCatherine König-Pralong provides an extremely knowledgeable and refined review of the book in three sections. The first section is a theoretical evaluation and discussion of the outputs of the monograph through the lens of Reinhard Koselleck's theory of the "temporalization of history" (Verzeitlichung [End Page 230] der Geschichte)1 and her unequalled expertise on the imaginary maps of civilizations. I completely agree with her statement that "from the doxography of the seventeenth century to Brucker's eclecticism, philosophical historiography seemed to be much less attached to historical accuracy than to delimiting regions and identifying peoples and their minds—in a word, to territorializing." The territorialization of philosophy into maps that presented first the lost seeds of divine wisdom (perennialism) and afterwards the exclusive regions of rationality (eclecticism) shows more the Western necessity for a self-definition rather than an effective understanding of the thought of other civilizations. As Metha perfectly expresses it, "Long ago 'Asia' and the 'Orient' became almost existential categories in the European mind."2 It is in this context of 'spatialization of identities' that philosophy became one of the leading characteristics—when not the leading one—of European identity. As the reviewer lucidly remarks, this happened at the expense of philosophy itself. Practical philosophy was put under the superior control of theoretical and logical faculties. It is true that this process was achieved in German pragmatism and Kantian historiography, but this was already evident in Heumann and Brucker's historiographical productions.In her dense analysis, König-Pralong provides bibliographical suggestions that could be integrated within the monograph. I have to admit that, unluckily, I've never come across the two outstanding essays by Wimmer and Rüdiger on Chinese philosophy as a problem of historiography in the eighteenth century, both published in 2017.3 On the contrary, I eagerly read the reviewer's book La colonie philosophique, which was published in March 2019. However, at that time, my monograph was already in the hands of the editor, undergoing the process of double-blind peer review and editing, and hence my argumentation could not benefit from her discussion on temporalization versus historicization and the mapping of civilizations. To quote a sentence from her brilliant book: "L'histoire de la philosophie des Lumières programme en effet une rationalisation de l'histoire et une temporalisation de la philosophie."4 This sentence is a perfect explanation of the "de-territorialization" of India and China from the land of historicity and rationality, namely philosophy. For Brucker, India and China did not possess reliable historical sources, showed childish theoretical capacities, and presented oppressive norms that were not based on moral principles and reasoning.The reviewer agrees with the fact that, at the time of Brucker, we can already find reasons for the exclusion of Asian philosophies, but she contests the thesis that the character of this exclusion was already completely displayed. She suggests that Brucker's Historia critica is mostly a destructive history, showing human mistakes, and that the real targets were Neoplatonism and mystical syncretism, not Asian thought. She writes that "Brucker excluded non-European thoughts from philosophy, but not from the history of philosophy." In my view, Brucker did not insert "barbarian" [End Page 231] and "exotic" civilizations in the history of philosophy, but rather in a critical history—that is, historia critica—of human mistakes. He clearly states that nothing philosophical could be detected in these lands and that his own use of the term "philosophy" about them is... (shrink)

An investigation into the reasons for the inclusion and exclusion of Chinese and Indian philosophical thought in 17th-and-18th-century Europe.

It is usually acknowledged that the core contribution of the Enlightenment is primarily twofold: the first being the introduction of reason and science as judgmental principles, and the second being the belief in the future progress of humankind as a shared destiny for humanity. This ‘modern’ reason—an exclusively human prerogative among creatures—could be applied to create a better society from the political, civil, educational, scientific, and religious points of view. What is usually less known is that for most of the (...) Enlightenment thinkers, this philosophical and cultural step was the prerogative of European or Western-educated thinkers, which implied a gradual exclusion of extra-European civilizations from human progress as a natural phenomenon. Thus, with the exception of a few French libertines, the creation of a better society was due to reason and critical thinking absent in other civilizations, who could, at most, inherit this ‘rational power’ from Western education. This exclusion, which is usually attributed to the violence of the colonialist period, is already implied in the arguments of several Enlightenment thinkers. Our investigation will follow three steps: an exposition of the three Western historical paradigms in which Eastern civilizations were inserted between the 17th and 18th century; a comparison between the attitude toward China and Buddhism of two very distant philosophers of the Enlightenment—i.e. Pierre Bayle (1647–1706) and Johann Jacob Brucker (1696–1770)—and a brief reflection on the Enlightenment from an ‘external/exotic’ point of view that will suggest the necessity of a ‘new skeptical Enlightenment’ for inducing actual intercultural dialogue. (shrink)

Nul n'est plus fuyant que le mauvais goût. Qu'il soit relatif, ancré dans son temps, frontière sociale ou revendiqué tel une profession de foi artistique. Dans ce Dictionnaire amoureux intime et partial, Nicolas d'Estienne d'Orves vous invite dans son grenier braillard et cocasse. 'Le mauvais goût échappe à toute définition, famille ou clan. Tout comme le bon goût, il est relatif, circonstanciel, ancré dans son temps. Il peut également être une frontière sociale, un racisme de classe. En ce cas, (...) le mauvais goût c'est celui de l'autre, celui qu'on n'a pas et qu'on se défend d'avoir au risque de trahir les siens. Enfin il y a le mauvais goût patenté, revendiqué, qui n'est pas une attitude, une mode, mais une profession de foi artistique, un manifeste esthétique. C'est -sans doute- ce qu'on pourrait appeler le kitsch. C'est-à-dire un style en soi, des formes volontaires, pensées, destinées à déranger la norme. Ce livre sera donc, par essence, partial. Avec le mauvais goût, j'entre dans une zone marécageuse. Est-il possible de faire un livre plus intime, plus narcissique, puisqu'il explore la part d'ombre de ma propre sensibilité? Petit enfant sous Giscard, adolescent sous Mitterrand, j'ai pris racine dans des époques aux esthétiques très contrastées qui seront forcément présentes dans ces pages. Souvenirs intimes, émissions de télévision, films, livres, plats, commerces, personnages imaginaires ou pas, attitudes de tous poils, mon mauvais goût est une auberge qui n'a rien d'espagnole mais tout d'un grenier. Un grenier braillard et cocasse, que j'ai moi-même tenté de ranger pour les besoins de la cause. Le mauvais goût ne se partage pas, en ce qu'il est une exploration de nos propres frontières esthétiques, la ligne de crête entre ce que l'on goûte et ce que l'on recrache. Bienvenue dans mon train fantôme!'"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This volume contains five articles by prominent scholars of French literature and political philosophy that examine the relation between Montaigne's Essays, one ...

For centuries, scholars have not doubted that Macrobio Ambrogio Teodosio was pagan. Recently, prof. Alan Cameron in his The Last Pagans of Rome clamied that the late antique writer was actually a Christian. This essay seeks to refute this assumption. --Translated from back cover.

The disappearance of the technical notion ofspeciesin Montaignes’sEssaysis characteristic of the transformation that took place around the beginning of the trial of knowledge. The theory of the species is then replaced by a doctrine of the appearance as “fantasy”. The problem, which is epistemological, takes its source in the debate opposing Stoics, Neo-academicians and Pyrrhonists on the topic of the truth value of representation. The conclusive passages in theApologyenable us to grasp the neo-pyrrhonian problematic in all its complexity. In it, (...) Montaigne focuses on the difference between appearance and reality, or appearance and essence, by opposing — as Sextus did — the “nature”, in itself inaccessible, to the quality as we perceive it through our senses. The role of the senses in this process is described either as a qualification or alteration of the object, or as a “falsification” of it, which entails the classical sceptical problem of the difficulty to choose between one representation or another — and to discriminate between the qualities that are “normal” and those that are not. A comparison with Henri Estienne’s commentary to thePyrrhonianae Hypotyposesfinally sheds some light on Montaigne’s dependence toward Greek sources and Renaissance philology. (shrink)