The performance and the success of a group working as a team on a common goal depends on the individuals’ skills and the collective coordination of their abilities. On a perceptual level, individual gaze behavior is reasonably well investigated. However, the coordination of visual skills in a team has been investigated only in laboratory studies and the practical examination and knowledge transfer to field studies or the applicability in real-life situations have so far been neglected. This is mainly due to (...) the fact that a methodological approach along with a suitable evaluation procedure to analyze the gaze coordination within a team in highly dynamic events outside the lab, is still missing. Thus, this study was conducted to develop a tool to investigate the coordinated gaze behavior within a team of three human beings acting with a common goal in a dynamic real-world scenario. This team was a basketball referee team adjudicating a game. Using mobile eye-tracking devices and an indigenously designed software tool for the simultaneous analysis of the gaze data of three participants, allowed, for the first time, the simultaneous investigation of the coordinated gaze behavior of three people in a highly dynamic setting. Overall, the study provides a new and innovative method to investigate the coordinated gaze behavior of a three-person team in specific tasks. This method is also applicable to investigate research questions about teams in dynamic real-world scenarios and get a deeper look at interactions and behavior patterns of human beings in group settings. (shrink)

Experiences of absence are common in everyday life, but have received little philosophical attention until recently, when two positions regarding the nature of such experiences surfaced in the literature. According to the Perceptual View, experiences of absence are perceptual in nature. This is denied by the Surprise-Based View, according to which experiences of absence belong together with cases of surprise. In this paper, I show that there is a kind of experience of absence—which I call frustrating absences—that has been overlooked (...) by the Perceptual View and by the Surprise Based-View and that cannot be adequately explained by them. I offer an alternative account to deal with frustrating absences, one according to which experiencing frustrating absences is a matter of subjects having desires for something to be present frustrated by the world. Finally, I argue that there may well be different kinds of experiences of absence. (shrink)

The survival of some masterpieces of literature across the ages is still an unexplained mystery. Deeply rooted in their time, they reflect the preoccupations of a given historical period and have an impact, by means of their testimony, on future generations. They bring into play images, drives and phantoms which have remained unchanged from prehistoric time to our day. The perfection of their form has remained unequaled; their examples incite us to meditation and creativity.

Burge famously argued that one can have thoughts involving a concept C even if one’s understanding of C is incomplete. Even though this view has been extremely influential, it has also been taken by critics as less than clear. The aim of this paper is to show that the cases imagined by Burge as being ones in which incomplete understanding of concepts is involved can be made clearer given an account of direct concept ascriptions—such as “Peter has the concept of (...) arthritis”—according to which these ascriptions are to be analysed in terms of ascriptions of the knowledge of what something is. The upshot is that the cases imagined by Burge can be explained is terms of the idea of subjects knowing in part what something is. (shrink)

Burns proposes an intriguing hypothesis by suggesting that the “schizophrenia genes” might not be regulatory genes themselves, but rather closely associated with regulatory genes directly involved in the proper growth of the social brain. We point out that this account would benefit from incorporating the effects of localized lesions and aberrant hemispheric asymmetry on cortical connectivity underlying the social brain. In addition, we argue that the evolutionary framework is superfluous.

We argue that the pivotal role assigned by Northoff to the principle of top-down modulation in catatonia might successfully be applied to other symptoms of schizophrenia, for example, hallucinations. Second, we propose that Northoff's account would benefit from a more comprehensive analysis of the cognitive level of explanation. Finally, contrary to Northoff, we hypothesize that “top-down modulation” might play as important a role as “horizontal modulation” in affective-behavioral alterations.

Government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations (quangos) comprise a powerful organizational sector that has been criticized for its lack of accountability to governments and their citizens. These organizations are established to serve the public as a whole by targeting the needs of particular groups or fulfilling specific functions. Often they use practices adopted from the business sector, and sometimes they enter the marketplace as profitmaking enterprises. In light of the contribution of GSE Fannie Mae to the 2008 world economic (...) crisis, the impact of this sector on effective democratic government bears further examination. In this article, I present a systems model that suggests how researchers might comprehensively assess the accountability of organizations in this sector, here termed the "gray sector," with respect to their government missions. I focus on four systems dimensions: mission, organizational design, organizational outcomes, and the information feedback process. Organizational design and the nature of the sector population are cited as emerging issues of particular importance. (shrink)

Voici un ouvrage fort bien traduit dont la lecture attentive récompensera aussi bien ceux que l’éthique des Grecs passionne, ceux que le sort de la modernité inquiète et ceux que l’œuvre de Bernard Williams intéresse. Le philosophe britannique présente ici une série de conférences Sather prononcées à Berkeley en 1989 et traitant des conceptions éthiques des Grecs anciens à travers l’œuvre des poètes épiques et tragiques. L’auteur reprend dans cet ouvrage nombre de thèmes déjà présents dans ses travaux antérieurs; il (...) radicalise à certains égards ses conceptions concernant les Grecs, la modernité et leur relation, et appuie ses interprétations sur une analyse minutieuse des textes classiques. L’érudition n’est cependant pas ici une fin en soi, car Williams n’entend pas faire œuvre de spécialiste des humanités grecquesmais plutôt défendre une thèse générale fréquente depuis Nietzsche, à savoir que, «par certains aspects, les idées éthiques fondamentales des Grecs étaient différentes des nôtres, mais [elles] étaient plus valables. Par d’autres côtés [...] nous nous référons aux mêmes conceptions, mais nous ignorons jusqu’à quel point nous le faisons». Si nos conceptions éthiques modernes sont ainsi plus proches de celles des Grecs que nous le soupçonnons, en revanche nous ne partageons plus nombre de leurs croyances, en particulier les conceptions surnaturelles apparaissant par exemple dans les tragédies. «Toutes ces propositions peuvent-elles être vraies ensemble?» : voilà le problème que se pose Williams et qu’il s’efforcera ici de résoudre. Cet ouvrage présente ainsi autre chose qu’une histoire des idées de honte et de nécessité; il ne constitue pas non plus un plaidoyer nostalgique pour un retour aux Grecs: la tension entre «les Grecs et nous» est constamment maintenue et exploitée pour proposer une interprétation éclairante des Grecs et une critique décapante de la modernité. Voyons tout d’abord cette interprétation, avant que de présenter quelques critiques. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est une réédition numérique d’un livre paru au XXe siècle, désormais indisponible dans son format d’origine.

Epistemic justification has been widely accepted as both a gradational and relational notion. Given those properties, a natural thought is to take degrees of epistemic justification to be probabilities. In this paper, we present a simple Bayesian framework for justification. In the first part, after putting the model in an evidentialist form, we distinguish different senses of “being evidence for” and “confirming”. Next, we argue that this conception should accommodate the two relevant kinds of qualitative confirmation or evidential support. In (...) the second part of the paper, we discuss the claim that this view is unable to satisfy the modified version of the conjunction closure for beliefs in probabilistically independent propositions. We defend that the underlying assumption on which this objection depends leads to an improper reading of the concept of epistemic probability. After providing a better interpretation of it, we put forward a rationale, which is based on the notion of conditional uncertainty, in support of a more plausible and restricted version of the closure of justification under conjunction. (shrink)

Die Ausgabe der Oeuvres Complètes von A. A. Cournot erlaubt es, den Umfang und den genauen Stellenwert, die der Lektüre von Leibniz und dem Nachdenken über seine Gedanken in der Entwicklung des Autors zukommen, zu bestimmen. Eine vollständige Untersuchung würde ein Buch füllen. 1. Zunächst möchten wir hervorheben, daß Cournot Leibniz in beachtlichem Maße verpflichtet ist. Die Leibniz-Bezüge durchziehen die Werke von Cournot nicht nur, sondern sie verleihen ihnen ein fundamentales Gerüst. Er beruft sich auf die Ausgaben der Primärliteratur, die (...) um die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts zur Verfügung standen: Des Maizeaux, Raspe, Dutens, den Briefwechsel mit Arnauld und mit Clarke, das Specimen dynamicum, das Système nouveau, die Nouveaux Essais, die Théodicée usw. Zwei Kapitel sind Leibniz gewidmet: eins bei der Untersuchung der Systeme in §§ 381-392 des Essai, ein anderes handelt über Newton, Leibniz und Locke. Diese Präsenz ist nicht nur historischer, sondern philosophischer, wissenschaftlicher und kritischer Natur. Leibniz' Lehren befruchten Cournots Denken. 2. Umgekehrt können wir sagen, daß Leibniz Cournot wenigstens im gleichen Maße verpflichtet ist. Indem Cournot Leibniz' Gedanken unter vielfältigen Aspekten angeht, trägt er zur Präzisierung ihrer Interpretation bei. Aber es sind nicht nur gelehrte Kommentare, was die Aufmerksamkeit auf sich zieht, Leibniz' Thesen sind vielmehr weitergeführt und zu neuem Leben erweckt, sie sind konfrontiert mit dem Wissen und der Kultur des 19. Jahrhunderts, sie treten ein in das intellektuelle Kapital der Zeit Cournots. Cournot hat ebensoviel für Leibniz getan wie Leibniz für Cournot; denn er hat die wissenschaftlichen Thesen von Leibniz über die Algebra, die Geometrie und die Wahrscheinlichkeit weitergeführt, er hat die Lehren über die Substanz, die Kraft und den zureichenden Grund erneuert und -was noch wichtiger ist — er hat von einigen Gedanken Leibnizens aus die Grundlagen der ökometrie erarbeitet. 3. Jetzt, im November 1980, verfügen wir über die Gesamtheit der Bände der Oeuvres Complètes, die der Philosophie und der Ökonomie gewidmet sind. Wir begrenzen daher diesen ersten Aufsatz auf Fragen, die dort herausgearbeitet sind. Für einen zweiten Aufsatz, welcher sich auf die in Arbeit befindlichen Bände der Mathematik stützen wird, lassen wir die im engeren Sinne wissenschaftlichen Gesichtspunkte des Werkes von Cournot in ihren Beziehungen zu denen von Leibniz zurück 1. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est une réédition numérique d’un livre paru au XXe siècle, désormais indisponible dans son format d’origine.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Was Hume An Atheist? Shane Andre Hume's philosophy of religion, as expressed in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, the Natural History of Religion, and sections 10 and 11 ofthe Enquiry ConcerningHuman Understanding,1 invites a number of diverse interpretations. At one extreme are those who see Hume as an "atheist"2 or "anti-theist."3 At the other extreme are those who see Hume as some kind of theist, though not a classical (...) or orthodox one.4 In between are others for whom Hume is an "agnostic* or "ironic skeptic."6 Still a fourth interpretation can be found, according to which Hume "seems to vacillate hopelessly" in his view ofreligion;7 in other words, no coherent philosophy ofreligion can be found in his work and so it is futile to look for one. Ofthe four alternatives, it seems to me that the fourth, being less interesting philosophically and less to Hume's credit as a major philosopher, should be rejected unless by default no coherent case can be made for one of the other three. Since I believe that Hume's views about the nature and existence of God are complex, somewhat unconventional, but still coherent, I will concentrate on the title question. Before tackling that question directly, however, we need to clarify the meaning of the term "atheist" and its cognates. While an atheist is popularly defined as one who does not believe in God, this definition is inadequate for two reasons. First, while the absence of belief is sometimes treated as a synonym for disbelief, it is clear that the two are not the same. An infant does not believe in God, but that does not make him an atheist,8 for, as yet, he does not have the linguistic competence to reflect on the question, Does God exist? Neither is the agnostic an atheist, for, though he has reflected on the question, he has not found reason to answer it affirmatively, Uke the theist, or negatively, like the atheist. For this reason, the atheist must be characterized more strongly, as one who disbelieves that God exists. But even this stronger characterization is insufficient, for, as is well-known but perhaps less widely takeninto account, there are many different conceptions ofGod, ranging from monotheism to polytheism, from beUef in a perfect being to belief in a being who shares some human limitations, from deism to pantheism, and so on. Accordingly, it has become commonplace in philosophy to recognize at least two senses ofthe term "God": a narrow sense, signifying "a supremely good being, creator of but separate from and independent of the world, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal and self-existent";9 and a wide sense, Volume XLX Number 1 141 SHANE ANDRE signifying one or more divine beings, personal or otherwise, manifesting extraordinarybut perhaps not superlative properties. For short, we could call the narrow sense the standard concept ofGod, and beliefin the existence ofsuch a being standard theism.10 And we could call the broad sense, applicable to any concept of the divine, the extended concept of God, and belief in the existence of such a being(s) extendedtheism. On this account, standard theists will alsobe extended theists, but of course someone could be an extended theist without being a standard theist. Let us call such a person (for example, Epicurus, who denied, not that the Gods exist, but that they intervene in human affairs) a limited theist. It is important to note that the limited theist rejects standard theism but is not an atheist simpliciter. How does recognition of these different forms oftheism affect our understanding of atheism? There seem to be two major possibilities. One is to characterize atheism in the narrow sense as disbeUef in standard theism; the other is to characterize it in the broad sense as disbeliefin any form of theism, including limited theism. While either option is open, it seems to me that the latter is preferable. For ifwe say that anyone who rejects standard theism is an atheist, we will end up with the paradoxical result that many distinguished theists will turn out to be atheists. For example, while Charles Hartshorne is not a standard theist, insofar as he rejects the... (shrink)

O tema da substituição é o coração da filosofia levinasiana. O desejo do infinito, a questão que move o pensamento, expressa-se na fórmula: tero-outro-em-sua-pele. Segundo Levinas é isso o que explica o fato de sermos tão numerosos no mundo. A substituição é a sustentação do mundo. Mas não significa isso uma idéia de fundamento. A metafísica levinasiana aborda o ser como questão que excede o princípio de uma fundamentação filosófica ou condição de possibilidade. O ser em questão é anterior ao (...) princípio como o outro-em-sua-pele não é uma condição subjetiva, mas a incondição do pensamento, o desde sempre da responsabilidade: anarquia imemorial do tempo e do mundo. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Ética. Substituição. Subjetividade. Anarquia imemorial. Desejo do infinito. (shrink)