What does the idea of taking 'the point of view of the universe' tell us about ethics? Lazari-Radek and Singer defend objectivism in ethics, and hedonistic utilitarianism, following Henry Sidgwick's lead. They explore how to justify an ethical theory; conflicts of self-interest and universal benevolence; and whether we should discount the future.

Tests the views and metaphor of 19th-century utilitarian philosopher Henry Sidgwick against a variety of contemporary views on ethics, determining that they are defensible and thus providing a defense of objectivism in ethics and of hedonistic utilitarianism.

Utilitarianism may well be the most influential secular ethical theory in the world today. It is also one of the most controversial. It clashes, or is widely thought to clash, with many conventional moral views, and with human rights when they are seen as inviolable. Would it, for example, be right to torture a suspected terrorist in order to prevent an attack that could kill and injure a large number of innocent people? In this Very Short Introduction Peter Singer and (...) Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek provide an authoritative account of the nature of utilitarianism, from its nineteenth-century origins, to its justification and its varieties. Considering how utilitarians can respond to objections that are often regarded as devastating, they explore the utilitarian answer to the question of whether torture can ever be justified. They also discuss what it is that utilitarians should seek to maximize, paying special attention to the classical utilitarian view that only pleasure or happiness is of intrinsic value. Singer and de Lazari-Radek conclude by analysing the continuing importance of utilitarianism in the world, indicating how it is a force for new thinking on contemporary moral challenges like global poverty, the treatment of animals, climate change, reducing the risk of human extinction, end-of-life decisions for terminally-ill patients, and the shift towards assessing the success of government policies in terms of their impact on happiness. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable. (shrink)

Evolutionary accounts of the origins of human morality may lead us to doubt the truth of our moral judgments. Sidgwick tried to vindicate ethics from this kind of external attack. However, he ended The Methods in despair over another problem—an apparent conflict between rational egoism and universal benevolence, which he called the “dualism of practical reason.” Drawing on Sidgwick, we show that one way of defending objectivity in ethics against Sharon Street’s recent evolutionary critique also puts us in a position (...) to support a bold claim: the dualism of practical reason can be resolved in favor of impartiality. (shrink)

Searching for a rational method of moral reasoning, Henry Sidgwick concludes that practical reason is inconsistent and sometimes directs us to actions that are contradictory. Our ultimate duty is in fact to achieve both our own, particular happiness and the happiness at all. We have duties both of a selfish and of a utilitarian nature. In a situation of conflict, when for the public good we must sacrifice our own interests, reason is not able to indicate to us what course (...) of action should be followed. Finally, we must admit that we cannot entirely rationalize our moral choices. The so-called problem of the dualism of practical reason has been and is discussed by many eminent philosophers, including Roger Crisp, John Skorupskiego and Derek Parfit. This paper is an attempt to highlight the considerations of Sidgwick's dualism of practical reason, the sources of dualism and the contemporary reception of this extremely serious problem for ethics. (shrink)

Moralists and philosophers of law often demand that the axiological systems be in conformity with “human nature”, or with “nature”. Among conceptions which look for footing in human nature two main trends may be distinguished.

Sidgwick's defence of esoteric morality has been heavily criticized, for example in Bernard Williams's condemnation of it as 'Government House utilitarianism.' It is also at odds with the idea of morality defended by Kant, Rawls, Bernard Gert, Brad Hooker, and T.M. Scanlon. Yet it does seem to be an implication of consequentialism that it is sometimes right to do in secret what it would not be right to do openly, or to advocate publicly. We defend Sidgwick on this issue, and (...) show that accepting the possibility of esoteric morality makes it possible to explain why we should accept consequentialism, even while we may feel disapproval towards some of its implications. (shrink)

The author draws a distinction between active and passive resistance. The latter is defined as a mental protest against some events in public life that is not followed by additional action. The former, or active resistance, is further divided by the author into resistance with the use of violence and resistance which renounced violence. She concentrates on the concept of violence and puts the question if, and in what circumstances, a recourse to violence is justified. She quotes various opinions on (...) that matter. The problem of using violence is the problem of the admissibility of various modes of action, or means of action, she says. As every method of protest in every society can be adopted in defence of either good or bad ends, the author focuses on the question, what criteria of evaluation of the objectives defended by resistance can be relied upon. She ends her paper by pointing out that resistance is the most important form of non-violent resistance. (shrink)

W artykule przedstawiono postać Henry Sidgwicka oraz główne założenia i recepcję jego najważniejszego dzieła The Methods of Ethics. Myśl Sidgwicka, w Polsce znana marginalnie, wpłynęła na współczesną dyskusję filozoficzną w większym stopniu niż teorie Benthama czy Milla i to nie tylko w obrębie utylitaryzmu i konsekwencjalizmu, ale również teorii umowy społecznej czy etyki cnoty. Kwestie moralne, które Sidgwick omawiał w The Methods, w dużym stopniu wynikły z obecnego w historycznych i społecznych realiach wiktoriańskich kryzysu powstałego na tle konfliktu wiary i (...) rozumu. Myśl Sidgwicka zrodziła się z dwu bodaj najbardziej charakterystycznych symptomów owego okresu: zainteresowania nauką i wiary w postęp oraz sceptycyzmu w stosunku do religii. Zarówno w swym wielkim dziele jak i w życiu osobistym Sidgwick dowiódł, iż rzeczą podstawowej wagi było dla niego poszukiwanie prawdy. Świadectwem jego oddania prawdzie było to, że po racjonalnym dojściu do konkluzji sprzecznych z jego utylitarystycznymi „preferencjami”, uznał, iż istnieją dwie ostateczne, nie dające się ze sobą pogodzić zasady moralne — utylitarystyczna zasada życzliwości oraz egoistyczna zasada roztropności. (shrink)

The experience of pleasure, alongside pain, is a primary element of human life. It rules our instincts and desires for food, sex and for the avoidance of various forms of harm. Crucial to psychological and social well-being, it has preoccupied philosophers from Aristotle to John Stuart Mill and plays a fundamental role in moral and ethical theory, especially utilitarianism. More recently, it has become a central subject for psychologists, biologists and neuroscientists. Yet it remains an elusive and deceptively difficult concept. (...) What is pleasure? How does it differ from happiness? Should we value pleasure? Which theories of pleasure are most plausible? In this rigorous and comprehensive introduction to the topic, Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek unpacks and assesses these questions and many more, including: The history of pleasure from ancient Greece to modern times Pleasure, sensation and consciousness What scientific research reveals about the nature of pleasure. Can pleasure be measured scientifically? 'Higher' and 'lower' pleasures The relation between happiness and pleasure Pleasure and pain Pleasure and animals Pleasure as an ultimate good and the relation between pleasure and rationality. Philosophy of Pleasure: An Introduction is essential reading for students of ethics and political philosophy, and also suitable for those studying related disciplines such as psychology, politics and sociology. (shrink)

Utylitarysta hedonista twierdzi, że jego moralnym obowiązkiem jest bezstronne maksymalizowanie przyjemności dla możliwie jak największej liczby istot zdolnych do jej odczuwania. Czym jednak jest owa przyjemność? Henry Sidgwick, filozoficznie najbardziej skrupulatny z hedonistów, definiuje przyjemność jako „pożą dany stan świadomości”. W pierwszej częś ci artykułu przyjrzę się szczegółowo temu, co Sidgwick miał do powiedzenia w kwestii przyjemności. W części drugiej przedstawię niektóre najnowsze wnioski badań empirycznych i zastanowię się, jaki wpływ mogą one mieć na definiowanie przyjemności przez Sidgwicka. Czy pragnienie (...) zawsze towarzyszyć musi przyjemności? Czy świadomość jest koniecznym warunkiem do jej zaistnienia? Czy można porównywać ze sobą przyjemności i cierpienia? Wnioski skłonią mnie do postawienia pytania wyjściowego do kolejnych rozważań o możliwość użycia badań naukowych w dyskusjach filozoficznych. (shrink)

By professional ethics I mean written standards which answer the question.

A common expectation of moralists is that man will develop some positive characteristics in himself. However, they disagree as regards the solution of two problems.

In this article we argue that it is reasonable to believe that normal vertebrate animals can feel pleasure, and that there is sufficient evidence for a capacity for pleasure in some invertebrates. It follows that the pleasures of animals are morally significant. We argue for that in a few steps. First, we explain why philosophers used to concentrate more on pain rather than pleasure in regard to animals. Second, we define the notion of pleasure and show how it implies to (...) non-human animals. Third we discuss whether animals are conscious beings and how they may feel pleasure. It is true that we do not know exactly how pain and pleasure feel to nonhumans, but this is also true for other humans. Even though we can give a detailed verbal description of what we feel, pains and pleasures are subjective and we do not have any certain insight into what another human is feeling. This limitation should not stop us from behaving in a way that takes into account the fact that both we and many nonhuman animals are beings who can suffer and enjoy. (shrink)

Das Wort "Kulturrelativismus" wird in Bezug auf mehrere, methodologisch recht unterschieliech Überzeugungen angewandt, von denen ich drei hervorhebe: 1. den deskriptiven, 2. den methodolgischen, 3. den axiologischen Relativismus. Die Aufgabe des Referates beschränkt sich auf Erörterungen, 1. worin die Meinungsdifferenzen in Bezug auf den deskriptiven Relativismus beruhen, 2. ob der deskriptive und methodologische Relativismus den axiologischen zur Folge hat, 3. ob es gegenwärtig Ansätze von einem überkulturell anerkannten Maß des Guten gibt.

Pojęcie godności używane bywa przede wszystkim w dwóch znaczeniach. W znaczeniu egalitarnym godność jest walorem przysługującym wszystkim ludziom jako takim, walorem niestopniowalnym i niezbywalnym. W znaczeniu selektywnym człowiek wykazuje się godnością lub nie wykazuje, a także wykazuje się w mniejszym lub większym stopniu, zależnie od swoich indywidualnych cech i od swojego indywidualnego sposobu postępowania. Artykuł poświęcony jest problemom godności w sensie egalitarnуm. Autorka szuka w nim odpowiedzi na trzy pytania: Jakie postulaty moralne kojarzone są współcześnie z godnością człowieka? W jaki (...) sposób argumentuje się na rzecz ludzkiej godności? Jakimi motywami kierują się ludzie, szanując godność człowieka? (shrink)

The first part of the article presents Petrażycki’s theory of moral and legal phenomena, which he called collectively ethical phenomena. The second part is devoted to normative issues. Petrażycki appreciated a specific moral ideal of personality; he wished that men should refute blameworthy acts instinctively and impulsively. Moral rules, according to him, are to be observed not because of the possible consequences of the acts but because of a positive or negative emotional attitude towards the acts as such. He believed (...) that moral rules are always obligatory, independently of the circumstances. (shrink)