W artykule tym przedstawiam skróconą historię „intelektualnych kontaktów” Józefa Innocentego Marii Bocheńskiego i Leszka Kołakowskiego. Koncentruję się na zdecydowanej polemice, która pozwala dostrzec różnice filozoficznych stanowisk i „stylów filozofowania”. Zaczyna się ona sporem o znaczenie Erazma z Rotterdamu na konferencji w Rapperswillu w roku 1986; jej kontynuacją była krytyczna ocena książki Bocheńskiego Sto zabobonów. Jerzy Giedroyc w liście do Kołakowskiego zauważył: „Rzeczywiście trudno z większą elegancją zniszczyć autora. Wyobrażam sobie jaka będzie reakcja Bocheńskiego”. Zaiste reakcja Bocheńskiego była gwałtowna, opublikował (...) w roku następnym dwa artykuły, które były – przeważnie „nie wprost” – zdecydowaną polemiką z Kołakowskim i próbą precyzyjnego przedstawienia własnego stanowiska. Spór ten można potraktować jako ilustrację słynnego rozróżnienia Kołakowskiego na dwa typy aktywności w kulturze: kapłana i błazna. (shrink)

Jerzy Perzanowski s ideas were based on an original blend of logic and ontology in what he called onto/logic, where the slash is meant to suggest a quotient of ontology by logic. Perzanowski began as a logician, his early works being on modal logic, then gradually shifted his interest to logical philosophy, meaning not so much philosophy of logic as philosophy informed by logic. Perzanowski was a rare breed of analytical philosopher who thought that a philosophical theory of everything (...) was worthwhile. In this systematic spirit, he began with method. He presented his method of total analysis and synthesis quite simply: reduce the object of research to its simplest possible constituents, and then combine them in some way. Better still, combine them in every possible way, thereby producing a space of possibilities analogous to (and in certain cases identical with) the logical space. Thus, analysis and synthesis differ from a trivial disassembly and reassembly.". (shrink)

Chciałem Go pożegnać. Kilkakrotnie próbowałem napisać choć parę słów. O Nim samym. Okazało się, że nie potrafię. Udało mi się tylko przedstawić Jego poglądy na reizm Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego, ale uczyniłem to gdzie indziej. Muszę tu poprzestać na ofiarowaniu Mu tego, co napisałem na Jego dziewięćdziesiąte urodziny, w osiemdziesięciolecie naszej przyjaźni.

W publikacji autor analizuje powszechność wdrażania określonych kategorii innowacji w przedsiębiorstwach funkcjonujących w krajach Unii Europejskiej. Analizy dokonano w dwóch przekrojach: 1) państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej, 2) przynależności sektorowej przedsiębiorstw. Podstawą dla tej analizy są wyniki badań kwestionariuszowych przeprowadzonych w kwietniu 2009 r. przez the Gallup Organization wśród 5034 przedsiębiorstw. Respondentami byli przedstawiciele zarządów tych przedsiębiorstw. Celem publikacji jest dokonanie statystycznej analizy odpowiedzi respondentów na temat powszechności wdrażania innowacji.

The paper analyzes the philosophical consequences of the recent discovery of direct violations of the time–reversal symmetry of weak interactions. It shows that although we have here an important case of the time asymmetry of one of the fundamental physical forces which could have had a great impact on the form of our world with an excess of matter over antimatter, this asymmetry cannot be treated as the asymmetry of time itself but rather as an asymmetry of some specific physical (...) process in time. The paper also analyzes the consequences of the new discovery for the general problem of the possible connections between direction of time and time-asymmetric laws of nature. These problems are analyzed in the context of Horwich’s Asymmetries in time: problems in the philosophy of science argumentation, trying to show that existence of a time–asymmetric law of nature is a sufficient condition for time to be anisotropic. Instead of Horwich’s sufficient condition for anisotropy of time, it is stressed that for a theory of asymmetry of time to be acceptable it should explain all fundamental time asymmetries: the asymmetry of traces, the asymmetry of causation, and the asymmetry between the fixed past and open future. It is so because the problem of the direction of time has originated from our attempts to understand these asymmetries and every plausible theory of the direction of time should explain them. (shrink)

The idea of rejection of some sentences on the basis of others comes from Aristotle, as Jan Łukasiewicz states in his studies on Aristotle's syllogistic [1939, 1951], concerning rejection of the false syllogistic form and those on certain calculus of propositions. Short historical remarks on the origin and development of the notion of a rejected sentence, introduced into logic by Jan Łukasiewicz, are contained in the Introduction of this paper. This paper is to a considerable extent a summary of papers (...) which are not easily available, even to the Polish reader: (1) J. Słupecki, Funkcja Łukasiewicza (Łukasiewicz’s function), Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Seria B, nr 3 (1959), 33-40; (2) U. Wybraniec-Skardowska, Teoria zdań odrzuconych (Theory of Rejected Sentences), (doctoral dissertation under the supervision of Jerzy Słupecki, published as a monograph), Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Opolu, Studia i Monografie, Nr 22 (1969), 5-131; (3) G. Bryll, Kilka uzupełnień teorii zdań odrzuconych (Some supplements to the theory of rejcted sentences), Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Opolu, Studia i Mnografie, Nr 22 (1969), 153-154. The paper also contains a good number of results which have not been published yet. Chapter I contains results presented in the papers (1)-(3). It provides an extension of Alfred Tarski’s theory of deductive systems presented by him in the papers [1930]: Fundamentale Begriffe der Methodologie der deduktiven Wssenschaften, I and Über einige fundamentale Begriffe der Metamathematik. The enriched theory is marked with T. The most essential new concept in T is the function Cn-1, whose definition was given by Słupecki in (1) on the basis of the so-called Tarski’s general theory of deductive systems. It has the form: y e Cn-1X iff Ex e X (x e Cn {y}), where Cn is Tarski’s consequence operation. In accordance with the definition: A sentence y is rejected on the basis of the sentences of the set X iff at least one of sentences of X is a consequence of y (is deducible from y). The intuitive meaning of the rejection function Cn-1: on the basis of false sentences we can reject false sentences only (while by means of the consequence operation Cn on the basis of true sentences we can deduce true sentences only). The function Cn-1 is a generalization of the notion of rejected sentences which was introduced into logic by Łukasiewicz. The essential property of the rejection function Cn-1 is that it satisfies the axioms of general Tarski’s consequence Cn, so it is a consequence operation, called the rejection consequence. In addition, it is an additive and normal operation. In Chapter I, there are given notions analogous to those of the theory of deductive systems, but they are written down by means of the symbol ‘Cn-1’ and not ‘Cn’. There are established the properties of introduced notions and differences and analogies taking place between them and properties of respective notions of the theory T. There are also given generalizations of the notions of ‘decidable system’ and ‘consistent system’ used by Łukasiewicz. The short Chapter II contains axioms of the system T’ which is equivalent to the system T. The only difference between sets of primitive notions of these systems consists in the appearance of the function Cn-1 in the system T’ instead of the function Cn. This chapter reproduces the results given in (2), but they are partially simplified. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics (QM) predicts probabilities on the fundamental level which are, via Born probability law, connected to the formal randomness of infinite sequences of QM outcomes. Recently it has been shown that QM is algorithmic 1-random in the sense of Martin–Löf. We extend this result and demonstrate that QM is algorithmic $$\omega$$ -random and generic, precisely as described by the ’miniaturisation’ of the Solovay forcing to arithmetic. This is extended further to the result that QM becomes Zermelo–Fraenkel Solovay random on (...) infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. Moreover, it is more likely that there exists a standard transitive ZFC model M, where QM is expressed in reality, than in the universe V of sets. Then every generic quantum measurement adds to M the infinite sequence, i.e. random real $$r\in 2^{\omega }$$, and the model undergoes random forcing extensions M[r]. The entire process of forcing becomes the structural ingredient of QM and parallels similar constructions applied to spacetime in the quantum limit, therefore showing the structural resemblance of both in this limit. We discuss several questions regarding measurability and possible practical applications of the extended Solovay randomness of QM. The method applied is the formalization based on models of ZFC; however, this is particularly well-suited technique to recognising randomness questions of QM. When one works in a constant model of ZFC or in axiomatic ZFC itself, the issues considered here remain hidden to a great extent. (shrink)

Contents: INTRODUCTION. Kazimierz TWARDOWSKI: The Majesty of the University. I. Zygmunt ZIEMBI??N??SKI: What Can Be Saved of the Idea of the University? Leszek KO??l??AKOWSKI: What Are Universities for? Leon GUMA??N??SKI: The Ideal University and Reality. Zygmunt BAUMAN: The Present Crisis of the Universities. II. Kazimierz AJDUKIEWICZ: On Freedom of Science. Henryk SAMSONOWICZ: Universities and Democracy. Jerzy TOPOLSKI: The Commonwealth of Scholars and New Conceptions of Truth. Klemens SZANIAWSKI: Plus ratio quam vis. III. Leon KOJ: Science, Teaching and Values. Klemens (...) SZANIAWSKI: The Ethics of Scientific Criticism. Jerzy BRZEZI??N??SKI: Ethical Problems of Research Work of Psychologists. IV. Janusz GO??L??KOWSKI: Tradition in Science. Jerzy KMITA: Is a "Creative Man of Knowledge" Needed in University Teaching? Leszek NOWAK: The Personality of Researchers and the Necessity of Schools in Science. RECAPITULATION. Jerzy BRZEZI??N??SKI: Reflections on the University. (shrink)

Science and Convention: Essays on Henri Poincare's Philosophy of Science and The Conventionalist Tradition contains essays concerned with Henri Poincare's philosophy of science, physics in particular, and with the conventionalist tradition in philosophy that he revived and reshaped, simultaneously with, but independently of, Pierre Duhem. Separating five essays as chapters, the book discusses the main ideas of the philosophy (Essays 1 and 5), traces at least some of its historical background (Essays 1, 2, and 3), and provides some of its (...) developments (Essays 2 and 4). (shrink)

Author: Sawicki Jerzy Title: THELEOGICAL PRINCIPLE IN KANT’S METHODOLOGY (Zasada teleologiczna w metodologii Kanta) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2005, vol:.5, number: 2005/1, pages: 281-292 Keywords: KANT, THELEOGICAL PRINCIPLE, FINALISM, MECHANICISM Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The work contains a concise of I. Kant’s views on the problem of the laws of nature and the theleological principle presented in this context, which Kant proposes in the character of a regulative methodological postulate. (...) The analysis of fundamental philosophical notions (the law of nature, necessity, causality, purpose) carried out from the position of an extreme aprioristic rationalism leads Kant to the conclusion about the basic impossibility of educing the conception of purpose (in relation to nature) from aprioristic transcendental laws, ie. such laws which the theoretical reason imposes to the nature by necessity. However, the fact of a total functioning of an organism does not fit, according to Kant, into the frames of a mechanically understood causality. Kant tries to solve this problem choosing the way of conclusion by analogy and finally he suggests to introduce into the living nature a specific causal relation in which the purposes constitute a particular kind of causes and results at the same time. That conception oscillates between mechanicism and theological finalism, and the fitting of a science system into the frames of aprioristic categories does not permit a finally decide about the supremacy of one or the other way of seeing the world. However, nevertheless, the perceiving and stressing of the peculiarity of organic symptoms, the formulation of the postulate about their unreductability to the law of a mechanical type constitute unquestionable and great merit of the author of the Criticism of the Judgment Authority. The idea of the totality of organism, though involved in subjective idealistic non consequences of Kant’s conceptions has in the given historical period all features of a deep and progressive thought, outpacing and inspiring several later research ideas, both in philosophy and in natural science. (shrink)

The paper defends a dynamic view of reality which is founded on the assumption of the existence of the flow of time. This vindication makes use of a metaphysical theory of the flow of time developed by the author which is based on the notion of dynamic existence. It is shown that such a conception allows one to explain the fundamental phenomena connected with the flow of time, namely the continuous changing of the present, the endurance of things, and the (...) asymmetry of time. It is also argued that the proposed approach may be of some virtue for the empirical sciences because it explains the ubiquitous interest of scientists in the evolution of dynamic systems of different kinds, and provides us with an arrow of time which is lacking in theories describing fundamental physical interactions. The argument is advanced which aims to show that physics is unable to provide us with a theory of the flow of time and that we should look for such a theory in metaphysics. Thus, an approach to the relation between metaphysics and physics is vindicated that may help to overcome the difficulties blocking our understanding of reality as a dynamic one. (shrink)

Прототетика Ст. Лесневского является обобщением двузначного исчисления предложений. Выступают в ней рядом с терминами этого исчисления функторы (как постоянные так и переменные) всех тех семантических категорий какие могут быть определены, когда точкой исхода является категсрия предложений.В этом труде представлены три системы прототетики. Основным термином двух из них является импликация, ссновным термином третьей системы эквивалентность. Системы с основным термином импликации разнятся гравилами вывода. В одной из них действует так наз. правило проверки, в другой прабило зкстенсиональности. Первое из этих правил является обобщением (...) следующего правила вывода исчисления предложений, обогащенного тєрминами 0 и 1:Вь'ражение ϕ является тезисом системы, когда тезисами системы являются оба выражения возникнувшие из ϕ через подстановку некоторой его переменной символов 0 и 1.На основании правила экстенсиональности тезисами системы являются правила экстенсиональности сформулированные для функторов любых семантических категсрий свойственных грототетике.В этом труде даются доказательства эквивалентности трех систем протстетики и доказательство их полноты.Значительная часть результатов из опытов Лесневского, представленных в этом труде, не была до сих пор опубликована. Обрабатывая эти результаты я пользовался записками составленными по лекциях Лесневского, его учениками. Оригинальные записки Лесневского подвєрглись уничтожению во еремя варшавского восстания. (shrink)

The paper, which is a continuation if my earlier paper devoted to the problem whether there is the flow of time in science, analyses the possibility of the reunion of the idea of passage of time and the theory of relativity.

This article is drafted on the basis of three complementary essays by Professor Jerzy Janik. The author takes a look at selected issues in the field of quantum mechanics – especially the problem of quantum superposition and supersymmetry – from perspective of great philosophical systems. The author draws attention to the fact that some of these issues reflect old philosophical problems, and – in some cases – philosophical perspective may save interpretations of quantum mechanics from paradoxes.

The aim of this paper is to make presentism a dynamic view of reality by basing it on a notion of dynamic existence, that is, on a notion of existence which has a dynamic character. The paper shows that both of the notions of existence which are used in metaphysical theories of time have a static character and, while such a notion is useful for eternalists, it is useless for presentists if they want to make their view able to remain (...) in agreement with our everyday experience and self-consistent. It is demonstrated that both empirical and theoretical arguments indicate that the presentist should replace the notion of this static existence with the notion of a dynamic existence and that this maneuver allows the presentist to treat his/her existential thesis as equivalent to the thesis that time flows. Not only does this strategy allow us to express presentism in a simple, homogenous way which remains in agreement with our experience, but also permits us to solve some of the difficult problems which presentism faces, such as, for example, the objection of triviality and the question about the rate of time passage. Moreover, such an approach to presentism allows us to solve fundamental metaphysical problems concerning time such as the problem of the openness of the future and the fixity of the past, direction of causation, and relations between presentism and persistence through time by endurance. (shrink)

This paper is a continuation of Part I under the same title. Its Chapter III contains results given in the following publications: U. Wybraniec-Skardowska, Teoria zdań odrzuconych (Theory of Rejected Sentences), (doctoral dissertation under the supervision of Jerzy Słupecki, published as a monograph), Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Opolu, Studia i Monografie, Nr 22 (1969), 5-131. G. Bryll, Związki logiczne pomiędzy zdaniami nauk empirycznych (Logical relations between sentences of empirical sciences). Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Opolu, Studia (...) i Monografie, Nr 22 (1969), 155-216. This chapter contains an attempt to formalize some questions of methodology of empirical sciences. The theory T is enriched here not only by new definitions but also by a new primitive term and new axioms. The most important notion defined in this chapter is the set IndX of all inductive conclusions obtained on the basis of sentences of the set X. The function CnI defined by the equality: CnI X = X u IndX, satisfies the axioms of the general theory of deductive systems. The set CnI X can be understood as a system of empirical sciences in a narrower sense. This paper is a development of the considerations of G. Bryll, included in the above-listed article by this author. (shrink)

The so-called ‘type method’ widely employed in biological taxonomy is often seen as conforming to the causal-historical theory of reference. In this paper, I argue for an alternative account of reference for biological nomenclature in which taxon names are understood as descriptive names. A descriptive name, as the concept came to be known from the work of Gareth Evans, is a referring expression introduced by a definite description. There are three main differences between the DN and the causal account. First, (...) according to the DN account, rather than fixing a name to a referent, the assignment of a type specimen to serve as the name-bearer for a taxon should be seen as performatively establishing a synonymy between a name and a definite description of the form “the taxon whose type is t”. Each taxon name is therefore associated with a criterion of application, a semantic rule that establishes the connection between the name and the descriptive content. This is the second major difference from the causal account: taxon names do have some descriptive content associated with them. The final locus of dissent concerns the strength of the modality resulting from the usage of taxon names. In order to address this point, I use the DN account to focus on the debate between Matt Haber and Joeri Witteveen concerning misidentification of type specimens, misapplication of names, and the truth conditions of Joseph LaPorte’s de dicto necessary sentence “Necessarily, any species with a type specimen contains its type specimen”. Using a pragmatic variant of the distinction between attributive and referential uses of descriptions, I argue that a metalinguistic version of the de dicto sentence is in fact falsified, as previously argued by Haber. (shrink)

Jerzy Franczak comprehensively presents Jacques Rancière's thought by emphasizing the relations between politics and literature. The detailed analysis considers the context of modern aesthetics and political philosophy, which is why the book introduces further protagonists, such as Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, or Jean-François Lyotard. Franczak first reconstructs Rancière's original philosophy of literature so as to then immediately apply it in readings of select world literature masterpieces by Gustav Flaubert, Max Jacob, Bertold Brecht, Vladimir Nabokov, and Philip Roth.

In [8] Jakowski defined by means of an appropriate interpretation a paraconsistent calculusD 2 . In [9] J. Kotas showed thatD 2 is equivalent to the calculusM(S5) whose theses are exactly all formulasa such thatMa is a thesis ofS5. The papers [11], [7], [3], and [4] showed that interesting paraconsistent calculi could be obtained using modal systems other thanS5 and modalities other thanM. This paper generalises the above work. LetA be an arbitrary modality (i.e. string ofM''s,L''s and negation signs). Then (...) theA-extension of a set of formulasX is {¦A X}}. Various properties ofA-extensions of normal modal systems are examined, including a problem of their axiomatizability. (shrink)