An ontology of Leibnizian relationalism, consisting in distance relations among sparse matter points and their change only, is well recognized as a serious option in the context of classical mechanics. In this paper, we investigate how this ontology fares when it comes to general relativistic physics. Using a Humean strategy, we regard the gravitational field as a means to represent the overall change in the distance relations among point particles in a way that achieves the best combination of being simple (...) and being informative. (shrink)

Este artículo presenta una alternativa a la dicotomía entre razones motivacionales y razones normativas. En Practical Reality, Dancy mantiene que ambas razones se identifican con estados externos al agente--"tesis de la identidad" --. Hay dos argumentos en PR a favor de la TI: El primero se basa en una interpretación externista del significado de "tener una razón". El segundo presenta una vía indirecta, defendiendo que las adscripciones de razones según estados psicológicos internos no son casos centrales en las explicaciones normativas. (...) Estas dos críticas ignorarían una fuerte intuición normativa: el "acceso epistémico". Si ésta es persuasiva, los estados internos no pueden ser eliminables. /// This paper presents an alternative account to the dichotomy between normative and motivating reasons. In Practical Reality, Dancy argues that both types of reasons should be identified with external states of the agent--"identity thesis". There are two arguments in PR for the IT: one is based on an externalist interpretation of expressions like "A has a reason to x". The other is an indirect argument that claims that the ascription of reasons grounded on internal states cannot be central instances in normative explanations. Both arguments ignore a strong intuition: the "epistemic access". If this is a persuasive intuition, internal psychological states cannot be eliminated. (shrink)

Ethical dilemmas raised by the use of nanotechnology in medical practice can be viewed from several perspectives: religious spiritualist perspective, the perspective of human dignity (nanotechnologies can be thought of as an affront to human dignity), the issue of controversial choice. The article aims to expose some bioethical dilemmas in using synthetic biology and nanotechnologies. Nowadays is often brought into discussion the fact it is possible to appear in the future new human species resulted not via natural selection and evolution, (...) but through the demiurgic effect of technology development in areas such as: synthetic biology, genetics, neurobiology and neurosciences, prosthesis technology and not least of artificial intelligence research. We will also refer into this paper at the possible raised challenges to ethicists who are oriented towards an ethics of species. Those challenges are raised right from the dawn of a consciousness of species, a social construction generated by changes of the meaning of belonging to humanity. During our article we argue that medical technology, especially genetics, medical assisted human reproduction and not least synthetic biology, require a rethinking ethical meanings of applying those technologies in everyday practices. (shrink)

Perché quella faccia triste, lettore? Non sapere ti rende infelice. Non sai nulla di quello che ti circonda: non sai come fa a volare l'aereo che ti porterà a Londra, non sai quante zampe ha una Pseudoiulia cambriensis, come funziona il wi-fi, quanta acqua c'è nell'Oceano Atlantico. Sai cosa vuol dire entelechìa? Quanti capelli abbiamo in testa? Hai mai provato a contare tutte le stelle? No, ma l'ha già fatto l'astronomo Ipparco, e le notizie non sono buone: non potremo saperlo (...) mai. Più cerchi di trovare risposte più si formulano ulteriori domande. Ogni informazione è superata nel momento in cui la ricevi, ogni novità è storia vecchia. Grazie a Internet puoi sapere dove sono i tuoi amici in questo momento, con chi sono, cosa fanno. Ma ti interessa davvero? Se digiti parole a caso su Google (“kefYDl9”) qualche risultato verrà fuori di sicuro. Ma saperlo potrà farti vivere meglio? Hai uno sguardo sconsolato, lettore. Non sai che potresti vivere anche senza tutte queste conoscenze. Tu sei Prometeo, prigioniero del fuoco. Sei il fratello spirituale di Friedrich Nietzsche. Se fossi un personaggio di Game of Thrones saresti il Guardiano della Notte Jon Snow, il paladino che lotta trafitto dal dolore di non conoscere né il suo passato né il suo destino. Non lo conosci, ma forse non hai mai voluto saperlo. Anche sapere ti rende infelice: sai benissimo che più cose riuscirai a conoscere più diventerai ignorante. È il paradosso dell'ignoranza: non sapremo mai cosa esattamente sappiamo, e sappiamo solamente ciò che pensiamo di sapere. (shrink)

v. 1. Dal primo periodo padovano al periodo presalernitano.

In this paper, we present a formal interpretive account of Jean Piaget’s theory of the morality that regulates social exchanges, which we call interactional morality. First, we place Piaget’s conception in the context of his epistemological and sociological works. Then, we review the core of that conception: the two types of interactional moralities that Piaget identified to be usual in social exchanges, and the role that the notion of respect-for-the-other plays in their definition. Next, we analyze the main features of (...) social exchanges that are subject to each of those two types of interactional moralities. Following, we formalize Piaget’s account of how the two types of interactional moralities can be put to regulate social exchanges in which values, norms, beliefs, and goals are exchanged, so that interactional commitments can be established among the participants. Then, we sketch a moral reasoning system able to support formal reasonings about interactional moralities. Finally, we illustrate the usefulness of the overall formal model of interactional moralities that resulted from our study by applying it to the explication of some of the conclusions achieved by Piaget in his moral studies about children games. (shrink)

Beyond the terms used by the various pre-Socratic thinkers (thymós, kardia, eros, etc.) and beyond also the different settings adopted in their discussion,it is possible to find the reference to a reality which is susceptiblebut to be described in the three essential characteristics of desire:1) The change of a previous situation, which is almost always understood as an exit from one reality to another.2) The push, placed at the origin of this exit, which appears as opposition or attraction about another (...) reality. 3) Finally the achievement of a new situation, equal or very similar to the previous situation. (shrink)