In this paper I shift the center of utopian debates away from questions of ideology towards the question of power. As a new point of departure, I analyze Foucault's notion of biopower as well as Hardt and Negri's theory of biopolitics. Arguing for a new hermeneutic of biopolitics in education, I then apply this lens to evaluate the educational philosophy of John Dewey. In conclusion, the paper suggests that while Hardt and Negri are missing an educational theory, John Dewey is (...) missing a concept of democracy adequate to the biopolitical struggles of the multitude. Thus, I call for a synthesis of Dewey and Hardt and Negri in order to generate a biopedagogical practice beyond both traditional models of education as well as current standardization. (shrink)

A number of different types of arguments have been advanced against the use of Utopian speculation in Political Philosophy. In this essay I examine what I call "political arguments against utopianism." I limit my discussion to those arguments made by liberals. These arguments hold that there is some essential incompatibility between liberalism and utopianism. I argue that this is not the case. After examining these arguments in detail, I attempt to define "utopianism." This leads me to argue (...) that there is a type of utopianism, which I call "political utopianism," which escapes the political arguments advanced by liberals. I end by urging that liberals should spend more time developing Utopian conceptions of liberal society. (shrink)

Bishop John Wilkins’s “universal philosophical language", set out in his Essay Towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language (1668), has often been described - and indeed dismissed - as a “utopian” project. However, despite the charge of utopianism being applied to Wilkins’s work by theorists as eminent as Foucault, Lacan, and Umberto Eco, no effort has yet been made to read the Essay as a legitimately utopian text: a text that may be positioned alongside the rich utopian (...) literary-critical tradition to mutually illuminating effect. This article argues that the Essay displays a tendency that the author terms “info-utopianism,” and that this tendency can be located in a number of other Early Modern utopian works. The article then discusses the contextual influences behind the emergence of Early Modern info-utopianism, as well as its implications for contemporary utopian theory. (shrink)

Utopien beschreiben andere Verhältnisse, um reale Gesellschaften zu kritisieren oder Alternativen zu ihnen zu entwerfen. Sie können ernst sein oder spielerisch. Alle Formen und Realitätsbezüge des Utopischen haben ihren Ort. Aber wir möchten für eine bestimmte Spielart plädieren: Angewandten Utopismus.

The papers published in this issue of the EJPT discuss facets of the work of Isaiah Berlin from different perspectives and making use of varying intellectual approaches. At the same time, they focus attention on a few, central themes of Berlin's work: his complex relationship to liberalism and nationalism, his theories of liberty and value pluralism, and his perception and uses of the history of ideas. Consideration of the differences and overlap between these articles presents an occasion to take stock (...) of Berlin's work as a whole; and a critical response to the interpretations and criticisms of Berlin presented here afford an opportunity to re-evaluate, criticize and defend central aspects of Berlin's intellectual position. This article goes beyond summary to present a critical, interpretive adjudication between the claims of Berlin's work, and the interpretations of that work presented in the other articles in this issue. Drawing on each of these, I present an interpretation of Berlin's contributions to thinking about the Enlightenment, nationalism and cultural pluralism, utopianism and political ethics, liberty, and value pluralism; I also consider the difficulties of interpreting Berlin's work, and applying his ideas today. (shrink)

Hegel has long been considered a major thinker of progress. This paper extends Hegel’s philosophy of progress into an outline of a philosophy of technology. It does this not by directly reading the little Hegel wrote on the subject, but by introducing six central Hegelian ideas that bear on the technological thought. It argues that, for Hegel, (1) mankind is destined to change its destiny; (2) that true change involved qualitative change; (3) that true change is conceptual, and not material, (...) change; (4) that history progresses immanently according to its own laws; (5) that history progresses towards ever greater artificiality; and that (6) artificiality is closely linked to freedom. These ideas cohere into a Hegelian metaphysics of technology, which is supportive of the technological enterprise. This paper is meant both to sketch a metaphysical understanding of the technological enterprise, and to trace the intellectual roots of contemporary technological utopianism. (shrink)

This book tries to argue for both of two theses that some have thought are incompatible, one negative, the other positive. To start with the negative thesis, the book opposes the 'normative turn' in political philosophy: the idea that the right approach to politics is to start from thinking abstractly about our own normative views and apply them to judging political structures, decisions, and events. Rather, the book argues, the study of politics should be focused on the historically and sociologically (...) contextualized sphere of real politics. The second, and positive thesis, is that opposition to the 'normative turn' need not mean the end of utopianism, although that utopianism needs to be re-understood. The utopian impulse is not an attempt to describe a perfect society, but an impulse to think the impossible in politics. That is, it is an attempt to articulate deep-seated desires that cannot be realized under current conditions and to imagine how structures and forms of action that now seem invariant can be changed."--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

A Kantian Utopia in Russia: Erikh Solov'ëv. The article deals with Erikh Solov'ëv, a historian of philosophy who is one of the best Soviet and post-Soviet exponents of Kant. In several of his works and articles, published in the 1990s, Solov'ëv has attempted to apply the ideas of Kant's social philosophy to post-Soviet realities. Kant is important above all as a theoretician of a free subjectivity, human rights, and a critic of paternalism in social life. Several Kantian motives came to (...) the fore during the perestrojka when the Marxist "class approach" was abandoned and "all-human" values entered into the discussion. Later, Solov'ëv attempted to develop Kantian guidelines for a post-Soviet society, including moral norms for businessmen in the new Russia, but these attempts bore the distinct hallmark of social utopianism. (shrink)

Sibley was a prolific writer and speaker on pacifism, civil disobedience, and utopianism. His many publications include articles and books on these topics. My favorite is his highly respected The Quiet Battle: Writings on the Theory and Practice of Nonviolent Resistance, an anthology of major-–as well as less well-known—sources on pacifism and nonviolence, meticulously edited, with rich and insightful introductions and concluding reflections by Sibley. There are many tales to be told of Sibley’s adventures as a pacifist in the (...) academy from the early 1940s to the late 1980s. One particularly telling episode --revived by Tim Brady in the Winter 2016 edition of the Minnesota Alumni Magazine--is sufficient to describe the character of this man. (shrink)

The normative criterion of attainability, or non-utopianism, is often referred to in discussions of goal-setting rationality. Goals should be realistic, it is argued, since it is unreasonable to adopt goals that cannot be achieved and that are of no use in the selection of means toward their realization. However, despite the proposed requirement of attainability, utopian or semi-utopian goals are often adopted in political contexts, the Swedish Vision Zero for trafflc safety being one example. This paper develops and analyzes (...) four objections that can be raised against the use of utopian goals and to support the normative criterion of attainability: that utopian goals are (1) too imprecise and (2) too far-reaching to guide action effectively, (3) counterproductive, and (4) morally objectionable. A tentative defense of utopian goal-setting is built on the counter-arguments that can be put forward to weaken each of the four objections. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Neo-Idealist Reception of Kant in the Moscow Psychological SocietyRandall A. Poole*The Moscow Psychological Society, founded in 1885 at Moscow University, was the philosophical center of the revolt against positivism in the Russian Silver Age. By the end of its activity in 1922 it had played the major role in the growth of professional philosophy in Russia. 1 The Society owes its name to its founder, M. M. Troitsky (...) (1835–99), an empiricist psychologist. Although it sponsored significant psychological research, its greater importance in the history of Russian philosophy began to emerge already in 1888, when Nikolai Ia. Grot (1852–99) took over as director. Grot’s principal colleagues in the affairs of the Society included the major Russian idealist philosophers Vladimir S. Solov’ev (1853–1900), Sergei N. Trubetskoi (1862–1905), and Lev M. Lopatin (1855–1920). In 1889 the Psychological Society began publication of Russia’s first regular, specialized journal in philosophy, Questions of Philosophy and Psychology (Voprosy Filosofii i Psikhologii). Grot characterized the journal’s prevailing direction as idealist or, “in respect to method, metaphysical.” 2While the cultural revival of the Silver Age mounted a broad-based revolt against positivism, neo-idealist philosophy in the Psychological Society was distinctive in the theoretical depth of its critique. Positivism was remarkably pervasive [End Page 319] in Russia from the middle of the nineteenth century. The main characteristics of this positivist Weltanschauung were reductionism, which dismissed as a meaningless proposition (neither analytic nor empirical) the possibility of being beyond the positively-given data of sense experience, i.e., phenomena in space and time; scientism, the claim, consistent with the positivist reduction of being to natural phenomena, that the methodology of the natural sciences covered eve-rything; and utopianism, the hope that the application of natural scientific methods to man and society would make human existence as regular and well-ordered as nature. 3 The defining trait was reductionism or, in other words, naturalism or atheism: the reduction of being to nature. In ethics, epistemology, ontology, and social philosophy neo-idealism emerged as a response to these characteristics. Its development by philosophers in the Psychological Society, apart from comprising a basic chapter in the history of Russian thought, informs the European-wide revolt against positivism characteristic of fin-de-siècle culture.According to scientistic positivism, philosophy had no distinctive methodology and thus no legitimate right to exist as its own type of scientific (nauchnyi or wissenschaftlich) discipline. Empirical sciences were the only sciences; philosophy could at best serve as a field that systematized empirical research. Against these claims Russian neo-idealists sought to advance the autonomy of philosophy by showing that the positivist measure of reality was far from exhaustive and that what it did not exhaust comprised the domain of philosophy. This domain was human consciousness itself, to the extent it could be shown to be irreducible to empirical experience (the positivist sphere). Neo-idealism thus took shape as a type of philosophy of consciousness. In the inaugural issue of Questions of Philosophy and Psychology S. N. Trubetskoi published the first installment of a large essay bearing the title, “On the Nature of Human Consciousness.” “The question of the nature of consciousness is the principal question of philosophy, not only of psychology,” Trubetskoi wrote, “for in consciousness we know everything that we know.” 4 Trubetskoi and his colleagues in the Psychological Society were convinced that philosophy had to develop through specification of its own internal standards and through autonomization from the spurious criteria positivism applied externally to it. Their goal was to match, in theoretical rigor, the professionalism associated with the natural sciences by making philosophy “scientific,” but on idealist, not empirical grounds. [End Page 320]The Kantian Critique of PositivismIn their defense of the self against positivist reductionism and naturalism, neo-idealists of the Psychological Society were deeply indebted to Kant, in both epistemology and moral philosophy. This claim revises the traditional view that Russian philosophy developed without significant assistance from Kant. 5In two ways Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason defends the minimal idealist claim that not everything intellectual can be reduced to the natural (sensible or psychological), that consciousness cannot... (shrink)

Statistics in public life .................................................................................................... .....5 Things and numbers............................................................................................. ...................8 Representative samples............................................................................................. ..........8 Averages: meaning and relevance .....................................................................................9 Correlations........................................................................................ ................................10 Applied statistics .................................................................................................... ................13 Relative risks .................................................................................................... ..................14 Relative risk versus absolute risk.....................................................................................16 Problems of classification and confounding factors....................................................17 Epidemiological research............................................................................................ ..........19 Publication bias................................................................................................ ..................20 Statistical significance versus scientific relevance................................................................24 Relative risk again............................................................................................... ...............24 P-values............................................................................................ ...................................25 Confidence intervals .................................................................................................... .....26 Correlation is not causation .............................................................................................26 An infamous episode .................................................................................................... ....27 Terror, utopianism and power .............................................................................................29 Faith and science .................................................................................................... ...........29 Fear and power: the precautionary principle.................................................................30 Utopian salvation........................................................................................... ....................32....

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 27.1 (2003) 241-254 [Access article in PDF] Darwin and Political Theory Denis Dutton [Erratum]IN THE 1970s, during the oil crisis, B. F. Skinner suggested a way that the United States's energy shortage could be alleviated. People should be rewarded, he argued, for coming together to eat in large communal dining halls, rather than cooking and eating at home with their families. His reasoning was irresistible: large (...) cooking pots have a lower ratio of surface area to volume. There would be therefore a considerable saving in energy in massive public kitchens, compared with numberless small individual pots cooking in private kitchen stoves across the nation.Of course, Skinner must have known his idea would have to overcome objections based on ingrained middle-class prejudices. Some parents would feel aggrieved: placing children before big communal pots would rob mothers of the pleasures of preparing foods and feeding their own offspring. Others might object that the only foods adequate to a big, round energy-efficient vessels are stews or soups; they might complain about endless boiled fare. Families of one ethnic background or another might dislike the relatively uniform diet, despite the hearty, nutritious goodness of stew. I can imagine Skinner's frustration: Why are people so stubborn? Why can't they look beyond minor details and see the sheer reasonableness of the proposal?The story is cited by Steven Pinker in The Blank Slate as yet another dream of a better-engineered world shattered by the ornery persistence of human nature. Based on his work with rats and pigeons, Skinner was sure that the proper conditioning applied to human beings could eliminate aggression, overpopulation, pollution, and inequality. In Skinner's utopia, Pinker wisecracks, "The noble savage became the noble pigeon." [End Page 241]B. F. Skinner was just another daft step on a long utopian road that stretches back through Marx, Rousseau, Hobbes, and St. Thomas to Plato. These political philosophers, as well as those who, like Aristotle, are skeptical of utopianism, base their visions on some understanding, argued or merely implied, of human nature. All political systems—free or totalitarian, monarchist or republican—tend to posit some notion of the natural human being. In recent generations many thinkers have been inclined to regard competing conceptions of human nature as stuck in eternal conflict, embodying basic commitments about the human condition that are independent of evidence, originating instead in the religion, culture, or individual temperament of the political philosopher.Evolutionary psychology gives hope against this pessimism. Political philosophers are right to posit a natural background that underlies construction of political systems, evolutionary psychologists say, but it required Darwin finally to explain that background to us. A lucid attempt to spell out the implications evolution for politics has now been published by Paul H. Rubin, a professor of economics and law at Emory University, in the form of Darwinian Politics: The Evolutionary Origin of Freedom (Rutgers University Press, $25.00, paperback). Some of his conclusions are what anyone familiar with evolutionary psychology might suppose even without picking up the book. Others come as a surprise, and were unexpected even by Rubin himself. The book is both fascinating and unpredictable.The scene of evolution is the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness, the EEA, essentially the Pleistocene, the whole, long period lasting from 1.6 million years ago up until the shift to the Holocene with the invention of agriculture and large settlements 10,000 years ago. Our present intellectual constitution was achieved by about 50,000 years ago, or 40,000 before the Holocene. Keep in mind the immensity of this time scale: calculating at twenty years for a generation, there were 800,000 generations of humans and proto-humans in the Pleistocene, while there have been a mere 500 generations since agriculture and the first cities. It was in the earlier, much longer period that selective pressures created genetically modern humans. These pressures might have pushed only very slightly in one direction over another. But a slight pressure over hundreds of thousands of generations—toward a taste for sweet, say, or a wariness of snakes—... (shrink)

Deep ecology has been criticized for being anti-anthropocentric, ignorant of feminism, and utopian. Most of the arguments against deep ecology, however, are based on uncritical use of these terms. Deep ecology places anthropocentrism, feminism, and utopianism into a proper perspective--deep anthropology-which pennits understanding of the human relationships with other beings in nature, in a total-fieldmodel, without accepting unhealthy extremes. The principles of deep ecology are concerned with creating good places, rather than the “no places” of modem industrial cultures.

In this essay, I take as a starting point Foucault’s rejection of two different ways of thinking about the future, prophecy and utopianism, and use this rejection as a basis for the elaboration of a more detailed rejection of them, invoking complexity-based epistemic limitations in relation to thinking about the future of political society. I follow Foucault in advocating immanent political struggle, which does not seek to build a determinate vision of the future but rather focuses on negating aspects (...) of the current conjuncture. I extend this argument into an ethical register, arguing that the same arguments apply mutatis mutandis to our personal lives. I conclude by engaging with Jacques Lacan’s account of subjectivity, and the interpretation of its political import furnished by Yannis Stavrakakis, drawing from these additional supports for my position, in particular the rejection of utopianism as an attempt to avoid limitation by the real. (shrink)

Introduction. The article is focused on analyzing the utopian direction of Russian cosmism and its influence on the Soviet cosmonautics and the development of society in the USSR. This philosophical theory was created in the period that made it possible to incorporate the applied aspects of utopia into scientific and technological progress and thereby embody a number of steps towards the outer space exploration. The authors have developed criteria and parameters for assessing the utopian component of the Russian cosmism (...) theories, which made it possible to bring this construct to a higher level of abstraction and thereby create a working model for conducting such studies in the context of other utopias of models. The purpose of the article is to show the influence of the Russian cosmism utopia on the cosmonautics development in the USSR, develop empirical criteria for evaluating the phenomenon. Achieving the goal required solving the following tasks: 1) considering and analyzing the subject matter of the cosmism utopia; 2) developing parameters for assessing the impact of utopia on the development of the social system; 3) applying the developed parameters to assess the impact of utopian ideas on the development of the Soviet cosmonautics system. Methods. Developing the theoretical model for assessing social utopias, as well as considering and analyzing the cosmism utopia, required the use of structural-functional and systems analysis. The research was conducted within the framework of a synergistic paradigm. Scientific novelty of the research. The article conceptualizes the concept of utopia. It is shown that most of the definitions of utopia as a socio-political ideal focus on the limitations of its existence: utopia cannot be embodied, often has an unscientific character, does not correlate with the real state of the system, i.e. definitions of utopia are often reduced to the negative format. The authors believe that the influence of utopia on society, as a rule, is positive. It is noted that, along with limitations, utopianism has certain unique essential features that qualitatively affect the social projects implementation. Utopia in the systemic understanding acts as a complex of ideas influencing the development of the system, being both internal (since it is created artificially and consciously by the very elements of the system) and an external factor of influence. Unlike Plato’s eidos, the projection of which is reality, utopia is created inductively, but after its creation it again “descends” to the level of reality, since it begins to influence the social model in which it was created. Results. The article discusses the prognostic and modeling functions of the social utopias of Russian cosmists. It has been proved that one of the essential functions of the Russian cosmism utopias is the formation of an ideal type, towards which, in a historical perspective, the real social system begins to strive. It is convincingly demonstrated that utopia acts as a cognitive support and inevitably forms the canvas along which society begins to move, defining the utopian model as an attractor, although such a goal is not always formulated when creating a utopia. This relationship makes it possible to assess the degree of influence of utopian ideas on the formation of reality in each specific case, which, in turn, provides an opportunity to answer the question of how and to what extent the utopian ideal type participates in determining the characteristics and parameters of a real social system. Conclusions. It was found that the social utopia of cosmists as a cognitive concept is an important effective factor influencing the development of the space industry in the USSR. The parameters adopted in the study allow us to describe the measure of its influence as both an internal and an external factor on the development of the society in which it is implemented. The validity of perceiving the utopia of cosmists as a construct with a certain life cycle, the main part of which is the period of functioning, is stated. During this time period, utopian theory can have a significant impact on the actual development of society from various angles. (shrink)

This article consists of an original translation of Ernst Bloch’s 1923 review of Lukács History and Class Consciousness, preceded by a translator’s introduction contextualising Bloch’s review and interpreting what it tells us about the intellectual and personal relationship between Bloch and Lukács. I argue that Bloch’s review highlights some of the key differences and points of intersection between their thinking. Written when their personal relationship had already soured for both political and intellectual reasons, Bloch’s review makes clear his ongoing commitment (...) to a form of utopianism Lukács had long abandoned. Unlike Lukács, who in History and Class Consciousness argued that the dialectical method could only be applied to the social realm, Bloch followed Engels in developing a dialectics of nature. However, even if Bloch was less willing to become involved in party politics than his erstwhile friend, as the review reveals, both men ultimately emphasised the present moment as the privileged locus of urgent political action. (shrink)

This essay honors Lyman Tower Sargent's cumulative work on utopian genres by offering a brief provocation about genre in general. Beneath the evolving faces of utopianism, it proposes that we focus on a different aspect of genre: the indeterminate number n of embodied labors at particular sites and times where people applied the conceptual and material tools at hand to the work of interacting with particular aspects of lived experience. It argues that much of the work of genre—the (...) work of genre deploying, genre undoing, genre becoming, or genre aspiring to become—happens at unique sites of labor, past, present, and future. Following McKenzie Wark, it refers to this as a labor point of view toward genre. (shrink)

: The debate between proponents of ideal and non-ideal approaches to political philosophy has thus far been framed as a meta-level debate about normative theory. The argument of this essay will be that the ideal/non-ideal debate can be helpfully reframed as a ground-level debate within normative theory. Specifically, it can be understood as a debate within the applied normative field of professional ethics, with the profession being examined that of political philosophy itself. If the community of academic political theorists (...) and philosophers cannot help us navigate the problems we face in actual political life, they have not lived up to the moral demands of their vocation. A moderate form of what David Estlund decries as “utopophobia” is therefore an integral element of a proper professional ethic for political philosophers. The moderate utopophobe maintains that while devoting scarce time and resources to constructing utopias may sometimes be justifiable, it is never self-justifying. Utopianism is defensible only insofar as it can reasonably be expected to help inform or improve nonutopian political thinking. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:WisCon 46Laurie Fuller, Jenna N. Hanchey, and E. OrnelasExistence as Resistance, WisCon 46, May 26–29, 2023, Madison, Wisconsin, United StatesIn a world that seems structured to kill most of its occupants, there is a utopian impulse in the act of existence itself. WisCon 46 represented a prefigurative utopian impulse through centering continued marginalized existence as resistance.1 Leah Lakshmi Piepzna-Samarasinha calls “prefigurative politics” the “fancy term for the idea (...) of imagining and building the world we want to see now,” particularly in terms of access needs.2 The structure as well as the content of the convention itself created a space in which to set the groundwork for utopia: the ways that we live and act to resist structures of oppression in order to prefigure a better world.Since WisCon’s founding in 1977, its intended audience has been fans, authors, and academics interested in the intersection between feminism and “science fiction, fantasy, and speculative literature of all sorts.”3 While neither feminism nor speculative fiction could be solely defined as utopian, both do explore utopian impulses that inspire change for the better. Therein lies the hope of Alessa Johns’s proposal that “the utopian imagination has been crucial for feminists.”4 Lisa Yaszek agrees: “for nearly 200 years writers have used speculative fiction consciously and collectively to dramatize the political issues most central to women living in a technocultural world and to create a sense of wonder about the interrelated possibilities of social and scientific change.”5 Envisioning a liberatory world is a feminist imperative, and speculative fiction offers a unique venue to do so. This imperative informed WisCon this year, as participants collectively worked to imagine and enact a better future for marginalized folks, in and beyond the space of the conference. [End Page 618]Enabling Existence through Con StructuresWisCon is unique in attuning its organizational structure to the creation of liberatory futures in the here and now. WisCon is strongly attentive to disability access of all kinds, COVID safety, antiracist/anti-oppression principles, and safety and anti-abuse support for all these areas. In the contemporary US context—where COVID-19 remains a major barrier to disabled people wishing to participate in conventions, where racist violence continues to threaten BIPOC (Black, Indigenous, and People of Color) life, where queer and trans folks are under exacerbated legal attacks—creating a convention space that protects and enables marginalized participation becomes a means of prefiguring utopian potential through embodied praxis. As mask, capacity, and vaccination mandates disappear (despite these ongoing pandemic times), and as bigotry of all forms continues relatively unabated, WisCon 46 remains steadfast in its commitment to safety. In short, the conference itself aims to become a utopian space.WisCon organizers are also keenly aware of the challenges that many different bodyminds might encounter in large group settings.6 Trained monitors oversee in-person and online programming in an effort to discourage harmful words and actions as well as ensure the fullest participation for those most impacted. Hence, disability justice lies at the center of the Con’s policies and practices. The event is made as accessible as possible through careful attention to venue selection, including the availability of gender-neutral bathrooms, scent-free spaces, and quiet rooms, as well as the use of color communication badges.This year’s event followed strict masking and testing protocols: individually packaged rapid COVID-19 tests were available without cost at registration, as were KN95 masks. The Con kept an anonymized record of self-reported positive COVID-19 tests, in case of possible exposure. This mutual responsibility reflects the kind of utopianism inherent to disability politics; that is, disability “allows for reformulation of in/dependence and community,” a way of rethinking how we share space and produce knowledge together.7The conference’s decidedly feminist approach “to creating a space for feminism and its consideration within the science fiction community” is applied at every level. The Con’s general organization and procedures are structured as nonhierarchically as possible. There is a board of directors as well as co-chairs, but these are rotating positions. This “commitment to feminism” is [End Page 619] reflected... (shrink)

The present work is developed within the frame of so-called critical neuroscience. The aim of this article is to explain the transition from a kind of neuroscience understood as a strict scientific discipline, possessing a methodology and a specific praxis, to a kind of neuroscience that has been transformed into a meta-narrative with totalizing claims. In particular, we identify and examine eleven catalysts for such a transition: 1) a lack of communication between scientists and journalists; 2) the abuse of information (...) by the sensational press; 3) the acceptance of specific philosophical approaches by a wide range of scientists; 4) the widespread transmission of two conceptual mistakes: a) an identification between methodological and ontological reductionism and b) the mereological fallacy; 5) the influence of post-Cartesian philosophical thinking in the scientific community; 6) an overwhelming scientific hyper-specialization; 7) the illegitimate transfer of authority from humanities to the sciences; 8) an inbuilt human preference for visual data; 9) economic interests; 10) scientific utopianism; and 11) the new self-help movements and their alliance with neuro-enhancement. Finally, our essay seeks to draw attention to the most damaging consequences for both science and human ways of living. (shrink)

The author brings to the study of the two concepts of "religious" and "secular" the same intellectual honesty and analytical rigor that we met in his early work Pacifism: An Historical and Sociological Study. This is a "book of demolition" which attempts to eliminate the term "secularization" from the vocabulary of sociology due to the simple-minded fashion in which the word has been applied to describe the decline of religious faith in the present day. He tries to show that (...) the term is not monolithic and cannot be used legitimately merely to support some ideological perspective. It is rooted in various ideologies of utopianism and betrays many elements which were derived from Christianity. Certain identities of structure which he calls "an ontological privileged strata" are present--Israel as the Chosen People, Intelligentsia, Proletariat-who think of themselves as "seers" who bear the truth on behalf of the world. He mentions such examples as scientific messianism and Marxist messianism which have tried to translate the monism of nature into the monism of society so as to collapse certain dialectical opposites in Judaism and Christianity--e.g., God and Man, Heaven and Earth, Church and State--and to convert certain undefensible metaphysical views into technical issues which can be subjected to the strategies spun out by rational planning. Having pointed out the complementary relationship between the "religious" and the "secular," Martin proceeds to examine so-called secularization in music, theology, and sociology. In conclusion, Martin indicates that the application of these two concepts can be made only if the institutional setting and historical background is kept firmly in view, and he shows convincingly that it is not "a simple convergent process consequent on industrialism and the scientific and technological revolution."--J. B. L. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Funding Utopia: Utopian Studies and the Discourse of Academic ExcellenceAdam Stock (bio)As an academic field, there is in some important ways nothing special about utopian studies. Granted, our object of inquiry may look beyond the present toward what Ruth Levitas terms the Imaginary Reconstruction of Society, but we are still workers in what Darren Webb calls the “corporate-imperial” university.1 Webb argues that within the university we can at best (...) protect “bolt holes, breathing spaces, and places of refuge” that can function as “fleeting, transitory, small-scale experiences of utopian possibility.” As academics, our greater value to utopian politics therefore involves using our “knowledge and resources... in the service of a collaborative process of memory- and story-making, pulling together disparate inchoate dreams and yearnings in order to generate a utopian vision that can help inform, guide, and mobilize long-term collective action for systemic change.”2 Such work uses resources and the products of labor within the academy in the service of ends beyond and at times against it. In other words, utopianism within the academy is necessarily complicit in the academy’s constitutive material relations, but it can also be oppositional in intellectual and—more importantly—activist senses to the academy’s ideological form. In other words, whether or not a given [End Page 517] project in the field of utopian studies is politically utopian does not depend on its material basis (i.e., how it is funded) so much as its content, in the senses of both the work that it does and the ways in which it captures and mobilizes available resources. Hence it is possible to imagine both regressive and emancipatory research projects in our field that capture or co-opt additional resources, including both internal and external funding. It is, however, a mark of emancipatory projects that they will use these resources to the ends Webb describes.Implicit in Webb’s argument is an acceptance that politically useful utopian work should be socially engaged beyond the confines of the university campus. However, engaging in utopian politics from within inegalitarian university structures (via what is institutionally termed “outreach” and “engagement” work) should be pursued with caution. Even researchers and educators acting in good faith can easily end up exploiting or causing damage to social movements, support groups and activists. Good allyship and effective support cannot be reduced to institutional mechanisms like ethics committee compliance or equality, diversity and inclusivity (EDI) initiatives, even when these go beyond “lip service” to become meaningful acts.3 For projects involving external collaborators with a connection to the sort of “long-term, collective action” Webb describes, research design must walk a tightrope between being supportive of utopian politics beyond the university and responding to instrumental pressures within it.Here I suggest as an academic field utopian studies is at least a little special as it mediates dialectically between theory and practice at one level while developing a conceptual framework of the dialectic between theory and practice at another. Within what Richter et al term “the paradox of universities as colonizing and liberatory spaces for community engagement and activism” the utopian method is well placed to ask questions about how we engage with the given conditions of the academy, including competitive research funding grants.4 I begin below with a discussion of the relationship of theory and academic work to the social with reference to utopian theory and then apply this to questions about our wider complicity within a discursive regime I term “academic excellence.” I argue this regime is central to the “prestige economy” upon which some of the structural inequalities of our sector are based. I conclude by suggesting that working within the constraints of the given while remaining orientated toward utopian politics in an ethical manner requires close attention to how we navigate the relationship between utopian theory and political practice. [End Page 518]Theory, Praxis, PracticeIn the final chapter of his recent monograph Becoming Utopian, Tom Moylan forms a cogent argument about the praxis of utopian-oriented politics with reference to Saul Alinsky’s community organizing and Paulo Freire’s pedagogy of the oppressed.5 The writings of both figures are grounded in... (shrink)

This article addresses the question of utopia through some reflections on the work of the Russian writer Andrei Platonov (1899-1951). Platonov's work represents an inspirational series of investigations into the circumstances of utopia: not so much utopia as fantasy, nor utopia as actualized in failure, nor even dystopia, but what is here termed `actually existing utopia'. As such his work captures aspects of utopianism that may have been largely opaque to the investigations of either literary versions of the utopian (...) imagination or utopian versions of social science. Platonov shows us an `anthropological' dimension inherent within the utopian impulse: that we are, so to speak, `utopological' beings. And to this dimension of ourselves he applies a critical style that is not straightforwardly anti-utopian or dystopian but what is called here `counter-utopian'. (shrink)

Hopefully, critical rationalism will improve. The best way to improve is to be open to criticism and respond to it with no defensiveness. Future criticism is unpredictable, but one can seek weak spots that invite criticism. It is not easy to view Popper’s institutionalism as minimal; it should be minimal in different ways, relative to diverse ends, theoretical and practical, just as critical rationalism is minimalist and as the minimum is relative to ends. Popper’s third world is a meta-institution of (...) sorts, and efforts to apply it to diverse problems are welcome in a minimal manner. Finally, Popper declared optimism obligatory; this is open to interpretation the way Jarvie viewed utopianism as useful for diverse ends, thus criticizing Popper’s anti-utopianism. (shrink)

This paper considers the reputation of William Morris's News From Nowhere and its evaluation as a utopia. It argues that there is a discrepancy between scholarly estimations of the book's importance and its treatment as a utopia relevant to socialism. Whilst scholars have for many years almost unanimously praised News From Nowhere as Morris's crowning achievement, most have also attempted to argue that Morris did not intend his work to be used as a serious model for socialism. After reviewing some (...) of the secondary literature and distinguishing between a variety of different interpretations of Morris's work, I suggest that the relevance of News From Nowhere might be assessed by the standards which Morris applied to Thomas More's Utopia. Considering Morris's work in this framework of utopianism, I argue that the relevance of Morris's utopia lies in what Norman Geras has called its ?maximum? vision. (shrink)

Vol. 24 of Boston Studies In The Philosophy Of Science, this study includes a few essays previously published. It presents a philosophy of technology as a relatively new specialization and is offered in a Heideggerian and phenomenological mode. Contemporary philosophy has presented modern man with a great deal of philosophy of science but little specifically on technology, and Ihde finds Heidegger one of the most insightful sources for such reflection. The book includes specific sections devoted to Heidegger, Jonas, and Ricoeur. (...) Ihde’s interpretation of technology, with its Heideggerian roots, presents an anti-Platonic theory with an emphasis upon the primacy of praxis. Furthermore, he argues for the ontological primacy and priority of technology over science, for science is really the tool of technology. The alternative and more usual scheme presenting science as primary and technology as offering but applied science is fundamentally Platonic, assuming the primacy of theory over practice and mind over matter. Consequently, concern with the primacy of practice necessitates a philosophy of action which itself is primary to a theory of cognition. A science so grounded in and secondary to praxis and technology suggests thereby that science is by no means value free. Any such historical science is both an assertion of certain values and a denial of others. Neither is technology as the ground of science value free, for it is a decision as to how to live the world. Science itself is embodied in its instruments which themselves provide the conditions for its cognition. We may choose to live the world with machines, and consequently serious consideration of the relations of humans and machines is at stake in such inquiry. We can, for example, experience the world through the machine, or the machine itself may become the object in experience. We have only begun to explore the world of instruments and the implications of that world, for an instrumental world raises its own formulation of the problem of determinism, concerning whether the instruments themselves determine the course of the inquiry, although Ihde denies that this is the necessary conclusion. All of the above is to emphasize that the elaboration of technology transforms experience, for the technologies themselves offer an analogy to nature by offering self-extension, by becoming the other, and by providing their own immediate world. The instruments have both a magnifying and reductive office, thus evidencing their lack of neutrality. In these various modes they express a telos of human desire attempting to bring close what otherwise remains hidden. In this process of bringing close there is retained the ever present reflexive temptation to turn back upon the interpretation of the subject its world of instruments. Thus technology offers a manner of transformation both of the world and of the self. There is no presuppositionless vision, for vision has its setting within a set of beliefs as to what is taken as vision, an obvious transformation of the Husserlian phenomenological program of a presuppositionless looking. In technical science there is no "just looking" as the Greeks had thought, and this transformation inevitably has its significant effects upon the very essence of man. In fact, perhaps technology is a most serious expression of the ambiguity of man’s nature so that he has become a threat to himself. Ihde’s exploration of a philosophy of technology is at the same time an exploration of the lebenswelt of modern man. There remains to be explored study of the essence of man who remains potentially so self-destructive via technology, but this is hardly the theme of a philosophy of technology. It is, however, the theme to which the philosophy of technology points. The book is very useful and one might wish that it would receive not only the attention of philosophers but find its way into the serious considerations of the technologists and masters of technology themselves. If it is inevitable that such a hope remains pure utopianism, then we shall all reap the whirlwind.—H.A.D. (shrink)

Does it count against a normative theory in political philosophy that it is in some important sense infeasible, that its prescriptions are unlikely to be complied with? Though a positive answer seems plausible, it has proved hard to defend against the claim that this is not how normative theories work - noncompliance shows a problem with the noncomplying agents, not with the normative theory. I think that this line of thought - this defense of Utopianism - wins the battle (...) but loses the war. It’s right about what does and what does not refute a normative theory. It’s wrong in misidentifying the problem. The right way to think about the feasibility worry is as essentially involving multiple agents, and how expected noncompliance by one agent may refute a normative claim addressed at another. Thus understood, feasibility problems may very well refute a theory in political philosophy. In this paper I develop this understanding of the feasibility worry, tie it to more general discussions in normative ethics, and in political philosophy. (shrink)

L.A. Paul argues that interesting issues for rational choice theory are raised by epistemically transformative experiences: experiences which provide access to knowledge that could not be known without the experience. Consideration of the epistemic effects of pregnancy has important implications for our understanding of epistemically transformative experiences and for debate about the ethics of abortion and applied ethics more generally. Pregnancy is epistemically transformative both in Paul’s narrow sense and in a wider sense: those who have not been pregnant (...) face significant barriers to acquiring the knowledge made accessible through pregnancy. This knowledge is crucial for engaging with the ethics of abortion. The epistemically transformativeWIDE nature of pregnancy may require us to use new methods to try to partially grasp what pregnancy is like such as for example, significant engagement with narrative literature. Because pregnancy is also epistemically transformative in a narrow sense, we need to work out how to engage in ethical reasoning when relevant knowledge is not fully accessible to all. This argument has implications beyond the debate about abortion. Philosophers in many areas of applied ethics will need to work out how to respond appropriately to epistemically transformative experiences. (shrink)

This article seeks to critically question the internal logic and coherence of ‘anti-doping’ through the case study of advantage-seeking practices in the sport of Brazilian Jui-Jitsu (BJJ). We provide an analysis of the recent controversy between high-profile fighters Gordon Ryan and Nicky Rod involving the relative morality of image and performance enhancing drug (IPED) use compared with ‘greasing’, whereby BJJ athletes apply substances, such as oil or lubricants, to the body to make it harder for opponents to establish a grip (...) or maintain control during grappling exchanges. We employ this case study to highlight the impasse between the World Anti-Doping Agency’s (WADA) ethical foundation of the ‘spirit of sport’ and the anti-doping industry’s ‘anti-policy’ stance. We then query why a host of non-chemical advantage-seeking practices are normalised and overlooked within the rigid and constrictive systems. Ultimately, we characterise WADA as a myopic compliance system that stifles moral debate around advantage-seeking in sport and is hamstrung by an ethical discord between anti-policy and the neo-Aristotelian ideal of the spirit of sport. We close with a call for a holistic ethical understanding of advantage-seeking in sport and the need to encourage stakeholders to ‘think institutionally’ in order to establish a malleable and reactive response to doping. (shrink)

What is it like to be a bat? What is it like to be sick? These two questions are much closer to one another than has hitherto been acknowledged. Indeed, both raise a number of related, albeit very complex, philosophical problems. In recent years, the phenomenology of health and disease has become a major topic in bioethics and the philosophy of medicine, owing much to the work of Havi Carel (2007, 2011, 2018). Surprisingly little attention, however, has been given to (...) the phenomenology of animal health and suffering. This omission shall be remedied here, laying the groundwork for the phenomenological evaluation of animal health and suffering. (shrink)

Moral character is explored in all its dimensions: virtues, vices, attitudes, emotions, commitments, and personal relationships, in addition to right and wrong conduct. The aim is to stimulate personal reflection and group dialogue, rather than to offer solutions. It seeks to sharpen ideas which we use as tools in coping responsibly with our daily lives.

This paper has both theoretical and practical ambitions. The theoretical ambitions are to explore what would constitute both effective and ethical treatment of Autism Spectrum Disorder.1 However, the practical ambition is perhaps more important: we argue that a dominant form of Applied Behavior Analysis, which is widely taken to be far-and-away the best “treatment”2 for ASD, manifests systematic violations of the fundamental tenets of bioethics. Moreover, the supposed benefits of the treatment not only fail to mitigate these violations, but (...) they often exacerbate them. Warnings of the perils of ABA are not original to us—autism advocates have been ringing this... (shrink)

The question of whether a proper phenomenological investigation and analysis requires one to perform the epoché and the reduction has not only been discussed within phenomenological philosophy. It is also very much a question that has been hotly debated within qualitative research. Amedeo Giorgi, in particular, has insisted that no scientific research can claim phenomenological status unless it is supported by some use of the epoché and reduction. Giorgi partially bases this claim on ideas found in Husserl’s writings on phenomenological (...) psychology. In the present paper, I discuss Husserl’s ideas and argue that while the epoché and the reduction are crucial for transcendental phenomenology, it is much more questionable whether they are also relevant for a non-philosophical application of phenomenology. (shrink)

Enhancing the competency of double-qualified teachers can significantly improve educational quality, adapt to industry demands, drive educational reform, and support teachers' personal career development and students' overall growth. This study aims to investigate and identify the components of double-qualified teachers' competency in local applied universities by distributing expert confirmation forms to experts in the field of educational management. Additionally, a survey will be conducted among 228 double-qualified teachers from Baise University to explore the current and desired states of their (...) competencies. The PNI modified method will then be used to assess the key priority needs index of double-qualified teachers' competencies in local applied universities. Based on the survey feedback, a training program will be proposed to enhance the competency of double-qualified teachers. The results revealed that: Part 1 of the components of enhancing double-qualified teachers' competency include: i) Proper Ethics, ii) Practical ability, iii) Teaching ability, iv) Reflection and improvement, v) Teacher-student relationship. The suitability of these components was highly rated by experts. Part 2 in the study of the current, desired states, and priority needs of double-qualified teachers' competencies in local applied universities, the current state was generally at a medium level. In the desired state, the competencies of double-qualified teachers were at a very high level. Among the PNI rankings, "Proper ethics" was identified as having the highest priority need. Part 3 is to enhance the competency of double-qualified teachers in local applied universities, the project will use the 70:20:10 learning model. The program consists of 5 components: i) Principles, ii) Objectives, iii) Contents, iv) Development Processes, and v) Measurement and Evaluation. The suitability and feasibility of the program were evaluated by 5 experts. The results indicated that both the suitability and feasibility of the program were at the highest level. This study is significant for enhancing the competency of double-qualified teachers in local applied universities, as it can provide a reference framework for the training of double-qualified teachers' competencies. (shrink)

One of the more debated topics in the recent realist literature concerns the compatibility of realism and utopianism. Perhaps the greatest challenge to utopian political thought comes from Bernard Williams' realism, which argues, among other things, that political values should be subject to what he calls the ‘realism constraint’, which rules out utopian arguments based on values which cannot be offered by the state as unrealistic and therefore inadmissible. This article challenges that conclusion in two ways. First, it argues (...) that the rationale for accepting Williams' original argument for the ‘realism constraint’ fails. Secondly, it argues that there is at least one genuinely political value of liberty available which is both compatible with realism and something that cannot be offered by the state, namely that of the political anarchist. This opens the way for far more ambitious and utopian forms of realist political thought and implies that the arguments of what we call political anarchists must be met by political argumentation, not simply ruled out by methodological stipulation. (shrink)

Virtually every empirical inquiry of issues relevant to applied business ethics involves the asking of questions that are sensitive, embarrassing, threatening, stigmatizing, or incriminating. Accordingly, questions of this sort are likely to result in unsatisfactory outcomes: 1) many individuals will not respond; and/or, 2) many individuals will not respond candidly. An obvious objective, then, is to use a method to collect information which increases participation, provides absolute anonymity, and does not jeopardize subjects' privacy. The randomized response technique (RRT) is (...) a method designed to realize this promise. We provide here an overview of RRT approaches and applications 'which may be effectively used in empirical examinations of potentially sensitive issues in business ethics. (shrink)

The abstract found at the beginning of most journal articles has increasingly become an essential part of the article. It tends to be the first part of the article to be read and, to some extent, it `sells' the article. Acquiring the skills of writing an abstract is therefore important to novice writers to enter the discourse community of their discipline. Based on 30 abstracts from three journals, the present study aims at exploring not only the rhetorical moves of abstracts (...) in the fields of applied linguistics and educational technology, but also the linguistic realizations of moves and authorial stance in different abstract moves. The results show that there are three obligatory moves in abstracts in these two disciplines — Presenting the research, Describing the methodology, and Summarizing the results. The results also indicate that a combination of certain linguistic features such as grammatical subjects, verb tense and voice can help distinguish moves in the abstract. The findings of the study have some pedagogical implications for academic writing courses for graduate students, especially students from non-English backgrounds. (shrink)

In this work, quantum theories are considered which consist in essence of a map from state preparation proceduresw to states and a map from decision proceduresQ to probability operator measures. Two definitions of validity, similar to that given elsewhere, are given and compared for these theories. One definition is given in terms of one carrying out of somew followed by someQ, denoted by(Q, w). The other is given in terms of infinite repetitions(Q, w) ofw followed byQ. Both definitions are discussed (...) in terms of the comparison of limit empirical means with theoretical expectation values. Particular attention is given to the use of outcome sequences of(Q, w) and of(Q, w) to determine properties of the probability measures the physical theory assigns to each(Q, w) in its domain. (shrink)

This dissertation is informed by the general project of applying ethics to intellectual property, and focuses on a matter of particular concern within the field of applied bioethics, in conjunction with business ethics. Ensuring access to life-saving medical treatments for those in need of them is of crucial contemporary relevance. This line of enquiry led me to a specific question, which provides a conceptual framework for this work. That question is the following: should patents on pharmaceuticals be prohibited or (...) restricted in order to achieve that objective? ;To address that question, I use a very old and familiar example of a thought experiment, namely the Heinz dilemma, to make the case for paying attention to intellectual property issues. The Heinz dilemma is the focus of Chapter One. In Chapter Two, I endorse the application of mid-level principles in applied ethics. I elaborate on the mid-level principle of "economic efficiency" in Chapter Three, and then examine the "social responsibility of business" principle in Chapter Four. ;I recommend a relatively anti-theoretical approach to applying ethics to intellectual property issues. It is easier, I suggest, to appreciate the merits of such approaches if one first acquires an appreciation for the wonders and perplexities of intellectual property jurisprudence. To that end, Chapter Five contains background material on the particulars of intellectual property jurisprudence, especially patent law. In it, I contrast patents with trade secrecy protection, and briefly discuss compulsory licensing, stockpiling provisions, infringement exemptions. In Chapter Six, I survey the economic literature on patents and the debates over increased innovation as a desirable social goal. I propose several concepts---namely, technique, proportional property rights and the enhancement effect---which can contribute to a clearer understanding of what is at stake in the debates. ;The next three chapters, Seven to Nine, each deal with a different objection to patent protection in the context of biotechnology. Chapter Seven addresses the objections to bioprospecting. Chapter Eight deals with the objections to the increasing commercialization of medical research. Then Chapter Nine explicitly tackles the objections to unreasonable pricing practices, the ones so frequently charged against pharmaceutical patents, in particular. Lastly, I explore a range of policy options, alternatives to altering the scope or availability of patent protection, which may more effectively address the specific problem of ensuring access to innovative medical treatments. (shrink)

This book deals with a major problem in the study of language: the problem of reference. The ease with which we refer to things in conversation is deceptive. Upon closer scrutiny, it turns out that we hardly ever tell each other explicitly what object we mean, although we expect our interlocutor to discern it. Amichai Kronfeld provides an answer to two questions associated with this: how do we successfully refer, and how can a computer be programmed to achieve this? Beginning (...) with the major theories of reference, Dr Kronfeld provides a consistent philosophical view which is a synthesis of Frege's and Russell's semantic insights with Grice's and Searle's pragmatic theories. This leads to a set of guiding principles, which are then applied to a computational model of referring. The discussion is made accessible to readers from a number of backgrounds: in particular, students and researchers in the areas of computational linguistics, artificial intelligence and the philosophy of language will want to read this book. (shrink)