Mula sa iisang lahi ang Pilipinas at Malaysia sang-ayon sa pag-aaral na may kinalaman sa paksaing Austronesyo. May mahabang kasaysayan ng ugnayan ang dalawang bansang ito, di lámang sa ekonomikong aspekto, kundi lalo’t higit sa kultural na batayan, at isa na rito ang paggamit ng mga simbolo sa pagbabatik/pagtatatu na nakaugat pa sa relihiyon ng pag-aanito sa mundong Austronesyo. Bagamat naging parehong kolonya ang dalawang bansa ng mga Kanluranin na nagpalawak di lámang ng kapangyarihan kundi maging ng merkado, hindi tuluyang (...) naalis/nakalimutan ang kalinangang nakaugat sa mga bansang ito. Sa kasalukuyan, nagpapatúloy pa rin ang iláng tradisyonal na pang-araw-araw na búhay ng ilang bahagi ng mga bansang ito gaya ng pagbabatik. Nariyan pa rin ang pagpupukpok o tapping process sa pagbabatik na sa kasalukuyan ay dinarayo pa sa kabundukan ng Cordillera ng mga tagasiyudad upang makapagpatatu kay Whang Od. Gayundin, mayroon pa ring kahalintulad na ganitong paraan ng pagbabatik sa Malaysia, sa kaso halimbawa ng mga Iban, Kayan at Dayak. Hindi kataka-taka sa kasalukuyan na kahit nariyan pa rin ang tradisyonal na paraan ng pagbabatik, naghahalinhinan ang tradisyonal at modernong pagbabatik sa mga bansang ito na ang pinakanag-uugnay ay ang mga simbolismong nakaugat sa kanilang malalim na kasaysayan. (shrink)

The Institute on Religion in the Age of Science (IRAS) asked Ted Peters, an eminent theologian and bioethicist who was at the forefront of the cloning and stem cell debates in the past few decades, and myself, a molecular biologist, to invite scholars from various fields to brainstorm the religious and ethical implications of the CRISPR revolution. We invited keynote speakers, whose talks will be covered here, as well as other speakers and poster presentations. The conference also hosted question and (...) answer sessions, chaplain sessions, and discussions throughout the week at the beautiful Star Island in the summer of 2019. The purpose of this paper is to highlight and sample the discussions and presentations from that conference. I will organize them into three broad topics: CRISPR in science, ethics, and religion. For readers unfamiliar with CRISPR technology, this overview can also serve as an introduction to the field, and a stepping stone for future ideas for CRISPR discussions. (shrink)

To assist in the evaluation process when determining architectures for new robots and intelligent systems equipped with artificial emotions, it is beneficial to understand the systems that have been built previously. Other surveys have classified these systems on the basis of their technological features. In this survey paper, we present a classification system based on a model similar to that used in psychology and philosophy for theories of emotion. This makes possible a connection to thousands of years of discourse on (...) the topic of emotion. Five theories of emotion are described based on an emotion theory model proposed by Power and Dalgleish. The paper provides classifications using a model of 10 new questions, for 14 major research projects that describe implementations or designs for systems that use artificial emotions for either robotics or general artificial intelligence. We also analyze the trends in the usage of various theories and complexity changes over time. (shrink)

In this paper, a novel efficient algorithm is presented for locating and tracking object parts in low resolution videos using Lowe's SIFT keypoints with a nearest neighbor object detection approach. Our interest lies in using this information as one step in the process of automatically programming service, household, or personal robots to perform the skills that are being taught in easily obtainable instructional videos. In the reported experiments, the system looked for 14 parts of inanimate and animate objects in 40 (...) natural outdoor scenes. The scenes were frames from a low-resolution instructional video on cleaning golf clubs containing 2,405 frames of 180 by 240 pixels. The system was trained using 39 frames that were half-way between the test frames. Despite the low resolution quality of the instructional video and occluded training samples, the system achieved a recall of 49% with a precision of 71% and an F1 of 0.58, which is better than that achieved by less demanding applications. In order to verify that the reported results were not dependent on the specific video, the proposed technique was applied to another video and the results are reported. (shrink)

Human skin detection is an essential phase in face detection and face recognition when using color images. Skin detection is very challenging because of the differences in illumination, differences in photos taken using an assortment of cameras with their own characteristics, range of skin colors due to different ethnicities, and other variations. Numerous methods have been used for human skin color detection, including the Gaussian model, rule-based methods, and artificial neural networks. In this article, we introduce a novel technique of (...) using the neural network to enhance the capabilities of skin detection. Several different entities were used as inputs of a neural network, and the pros and cons of different color spaces are discussed. Also, a vector was used as the input to the neural network that contains information from three different color spaces. The comparison of the proposed technique with existing methods in this domain illustrates the effectiveness and accuracy of the proposed approach. Tests were done on two databases, and the results show that the neural network has better precision and accuracy rate, as well as comparable recall and specificity, compared with other methods. (shrink)

In a distributed multi-agent system, an idle agent may be available to assist other agents in the system. An agent architecture called intent recognition is proposed in this article to accomplish this with minimal communication. To assist other agents in the system, an agent performing recognition observes the tasks other agents are performing. Unlike the much-studied field of plan recognition, the overall intent of an agent is recognized instead of a specific plan. The observing agent may use capabilities that it (...) has not observed. In this study, the key research question is: What are intent-recognition systems and how can these be used to have agents autonomously assist each other effectively and efficiently? A conceptual framework is proposed to address this question. An implementation of the conceptual framework is tested and evaluated. A set of metrics, including task time and number of communications, is used to compare the performance of plan recognition and intent recognition. This research shows that under certain conditions, an intent-recognition system is more efficient than a plan recognition system. (shrink)

Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR) has been the buzzword for genome editing in the past few years, especially with the birth of Lulu and Nana, twin girls who were genetically edited using the CRISPR/Cas system. To discuss this, a group of scientists, theologians, and ethicists gathered at the 2019 Institute on Religion in the Age of Science (IRAS) conference to discuss the implications of CRISPR gene editing. It became quickly apparent through our discussions that this CRISPR revolution will (...) impact not only human medicine, but any application that involves DNA in every organism from bacteria to plants and animals. Moreover, there are multiple stakeholders in this technology—not only the scientific community, but also the business, legal, and religious communities, to name a few. As a scientist myself, I am providing a brief overview of the scientific hopes and concerns about this powerful technology. (shrink)

In this book, the contributors examine how various religious traditions engage with transhumanism and its vision for the future.

Against the traditional view, Alvin Goldman argues that logic, probability theory, and linguistic analysis cannot by themselves delineate principles of rationality or justified belief. The mind's operations must be taken into account.

Knowledge in a Social World offers a philosophy for the information age. Alvin Goldman explores new frontiers by creating a thoroughgoing social epistemology, moving beyond the traditional focus on solitary knowers. Against the tides of postmodernism and social constructionism Goldman defends the integrity of truth and shows how to promote it by well-designed forms of social interaction. From science to education, from law to democracy, he shows why and how public institutions should seek knowledge-enhancing practices. The result is (...) a bold, timely, and systematic treatment of the philosophical foundations of an information society. (shrink)

People are minded creatures; we have thoughts, feelings and emotions. More intriguingly, we grasp our own mental states, and conduct the business of ascribing them to ourselves and others without instruction in formal psychology. How do we do this? And what are the dimensions of our grasp of the mental realm? In this book, Alvin I. Goldman explores these questions with the tools of philosophy, developmental psychology, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He refines an approach called simulation theory, which (...) starts from the familiar idea that we understand others by putting ourselves in their mental shoes. Can this intuitive idea be rendered precise in a philosophically respectable manner, without allowing simulation to collapse into theorizing? Given a suitable definition, do empirical results support the notion that minds literally create surrogates of other peoples mental states in the process of mindreading? Goldman amasses a surprising array of evidence from psychology and neuroscience that supports this hypothesis. (shrink)

Amblyopia, or lazy eye, is a neurological vision disorder that studies have shown to affect two to five percent of the population. Current methods of treatment produce the best visual outcome, if the condition is identified early in the patient's life. Several early screening procedures are aimed at finding the condition while the patient is a child, including an automated vision screening system. This paper aims to use artificial intelligence techniques to automatically identify children who are at risk for developing (...) the amblyopic condition and should therefore be referred to a specialist, i.e., pediatric ophthalmologist. Three techniques, namely, decision tree learning, random forest, and artificial neural network, are studied in this paper in terms of their effectiveness, using metrics of sensitivity, specificity, and accuracy. The features used by the techniques are extracted from images of patient eyes and are based on the color information. The efficacy of pixel color data is investigated with respect to the measurement of the rate of change of the color in the iris and pupil, i.e., color slope features. A 10-fold stratified cross validation procedure is used to compare the effectiveness of the three AI techniques in this medical application domain. (shrink)

This article presents the design and development of a genetic algorithm to generate long-range transmit codes with low autocorrelation side lobes for radar to minimize target profile estimation error. The GA described in this work has a parallel processing design and has been used to generate codes with multiple constellations for various code lengths with low estimated error of a radar target profile.

The aim of this paper is to sketch a theory of justified belief. What I have in mind is an explanatory theory, one that explains in a general way why certain beliefs are counted as justified and others as unjustified. Unlike some traditional approaches, I do not try to prescribe standards for justification that differ from, or improve upon, our ordinary standards. I merely try to explicate the ordinary standards, which are, I believe, quite different from those of many classical, (...) e. g., ‘Cartesian’, accounts. (shrink)

These essays by a major epistemologist reconfigure philosophical projects across a wide spectrum, from mind to metaphysics, from epistemology to social power. Several of Goldman's classic essays are included along with many newer writings. Together these trace and continue the development of the author's unique blend of naturalism and reliabilism. Part I defends the simulation approach to mentalistic ascription and explores the psychological mechanisms of ontological individuation. Part II shows why epistemology needs help from cognitive science - not only (...) to evaluate cognitive agents but also to illuminate the practices of epistemic evaluators. Parts III and IV explain how philosophical projects can be reshaped through interchange with social science. An epistemological study of scientific activity exploits the economic paradigm, and philosophical tools are applied to analyze power in society. (shrink)

This paper presents a partial analysis of perceptual knowledge, an analysis that will, I hope, lay a foundation for a general theory of knowing. Like an earlier theory I proposed, the envisaged theory would seek to explicate the concept of knowledge by reference to the causal processes that produce (or sustain) belief. Unlike the earlier theory, however, it would abandon the requirement that a knower's belief that p be causally connected with the fact, or state of affairs, that p.

Stephen Stich and Shaun Nichols advance the debate over folk psychology with their vivid depiction of the contest between the simulation theory and the theory-theory (Stich & Nichols, this issue). At least two aspects of their presentation I find highly congenial. First, they give a generally fair characterization of the simulation theory, in some respects even improving its formulation. Though I have a few minor quarrels with their formulation, it is mostly quite faithful to the version which I have found (...) attractive (Goldman, 1989).Second, I concur with Stich and Nichols in their assertion that the theory-theory and the simulation theory are the only two games in town. Where I disagree, of course, is in Stich and Nichols’s contention that their arguments so dim the prospects of the simulation theory that it should no longer be taken seriously. On the contrary, I shall maintain, the simulation theory remains a very plausible contender, and should receive careful and respectful consideration in the continuing investigation. (shrink)

How can we know? How can we attain justified belief? These traditional questions in epistemology have inspired philosophers for centuries. Now, in this exceptional work, Alvin Goldman, distinguished scholar and leader in the fields of epistemology and mind, approaches such inquiries as legitimate methods or "pathways" to knowledge. He examines the notion of private and public knowledge, arguing for the epistemic legitimacy of private and introspective methods of gaining knowledge, yet acknowledging the equal importance of social and public mechanisms (...) in the quest for truth. Throughout, he addresses this opposition but proposes a rigorous framework that continues to resolve such contradictions, making this exciting text one of the most important contributions to the theory of knowledge in recent years. (shrink)

Since Edmund L. Gettier reminded us recently of a certain important inadequacy of the traditional analysis of "S knows that p," several attempts have been made to correct that analysis. In this paper I shall offer still another analysis (or a sketch of an analysis) of "S knows that p," one which will avert Gettier's problem. My concern will be with knowledge of empirical propositions only, since I think that the traditional analysis is adequate for knowledge of nonempirical truths.

Mainstream epistemology is a highly theoretical and abstract enterprise. Traditional epistemologists rarely present their deliberations as critical to the practical problems of life, unless one supposes—as Hume, for example, did not—that skeptical worries should trouble us in our everyday affairs. But some issues in epistemology are both theoretically interesting and practically quite pressing. That holds of the problem to be discussed here: how laypersons should evaluate the testimony of experts and decide which of two or more rival experts is most (...) credible. It is of practical importance because in a complex, highly specialized world people are constantly confronted with situations in which, as comparative novices, they must turn to putative experts for intellectual guidance or assistance. It is of theoretical interest because the appropriate epistemic considerations are far from transparent; and it is not clear how far the problems lead to insurmountable skeptical quandaries. This paper does not argue for flat-out skepticism in this domain; nor, on the other hand, does it purport to resolve all pressures in the direction of skepticism. It is an exploratory paper, which tries to identify problems and examine some possible solutions, not to establish those solutions definitively. (shrink)

What is the mission of epistemology, and what is its proper methodology? Such meta-epistemological questions have been prominent in recent years, especially with the emergence of various brands of "naturalistic" epistemology. In this paper, I shall reformulate and expand upon my own meta-epistemological conception (most fully articulated in Goldman, 1986), retaining many of its former ingredients while reconfiguring others. The discussion is by no means confined, though, to the meta-epistemological level. New substantive proposals will also be advanced and defended.

Alan H. Goldman argues for the internalist or subjectivist view of practical reasons on the grounds that it is simpler, more unified, and more comprehensible ...

The aim of this paper is to study interpretation, specifically, to work toward an account of interpretation that seems descriptively and explanatorily correct. No account of interpretation can be philosophically helpful, I submit, if it is incompatible with a correct account of what people actually do when they interpret others. My question, then, is: how does the (naive) interpreter arrive at his/her judgments about the mental attitudes of others? Philosophers who have addressed this question have not, in my view, been (...) sufficiently psychological, or cognitivist, even those who are otherwise psychologically inclined. I shall defend some proposals about the activity of interpretation that are, I believe, psychologically more realistic than their chief competitors. (shrink)

In this concise survey, intended for advanced undergraduate students of aesthetics, Alan Goldman focuses on the question of aesthetic value, using many practical examples from painting, music, and literature to make his case. Although he treats a wide variety of views, he argues for a nonrealist view of aesthetic value, showing that the personal element can never be factored out of evaluative aesthetic judgments and explaining why this is so.

The central mission of cognitive science is to reveal the real nature of the mind, however familiar or foreign that nature may be to naive preconceptions. The existence of naive conceptions is also important, however. Prescientific thought and language contain concepts of the mental, and these concepts deserve attention from cognitive science. Just as scientific psychology studies folk physics (McCloskey 1983, Hayes 1985), viz., the common understanding (or misunderstanding) of physical phenomena, so it must study folk psychology, the common understanding (...) of mental states. This subfield of scientific psychology is what I mean by the phrase 'the psychology of folk psychology'. (shrink)

In recent decades, epistemology has witnessed the development and growth of externalist theories of knowledge and justification. Critics of externalism have focused a bright spotlight on this approach and judged it unsuitable for realizing the true and original goals of epistemology. Their own favored approach, internalism, is defended as a preferable approach to the traditional concept of epistemic justification. I shall turn the spotlight toward internalism and its most prominent rationale, revealing fundamental problems at the core of internalism and challenging (...) the viability of its most popular rationale. Although particular internalist theories such as (internalist) foundationalism and coherentism will occasionally be discussed, those specific theories are not my primary concern. The principal concern is rather the general architecture of internalism, and the attempt to justify this architecture by appeal to a certain conception of what justification consists in. (shrink)

This paper offers a sizeable menu of approaches to what it means to be an expert. Is it a matter of reputation within a community, or a matter of what one knows independently of reputation? An initial proposal characterizes expertise in dispositional terms—an ability to help other people get answers to difficult questions or execute difficult tasks. What cognitive states, however, ground these abilities? Do the grounds consist in “veritistic” states or in terms of evidence or justifiedness? To what extent (...) is expertise a matter of superior knowledge or other factors? Some authors seek to debunk the notion of expertise entirely. The present approach resists this stance, but doesn’t dispute the variability and fluidness of the concept. Even more challenging is the problem of how laypersons can determine who is the superior expert, especially when experts disagree. (shrink)

Intuitions play a critical role in analytical philosophical activity. But do they qualify as genuine evidence for the sorts of conclusions philosophers seek? Skeptical arguments against intuitions are reviewed, and a variety of ways of trying to legitimate them are considered. A defense is offered of their evidential status by showing how their evidential status can be embedded in a naturalistic framework.

For most of their respective existences, reliabilism and evidentialism (that is, process reliabilism and mentalist evidentialism) have been rivals. They are generally viewed as incompatible, even antithetical, theories of justification.1 But a few people are beginning to re-think this notion. Perhaps an ideal theory would be a hybrid of the two, combining the best elements of each theory. Juan Comesana (forthcoming) takes this point of view and constructs a position called “Evidentialist Reliabilism.” He tries to show how each theory can (...) profit by borrowing elements from the other. Comesana concentrates on reliabilism’s problems and how it might be improved by infusions from evidentialism. This paper follows a similar tack. My emphasis, however, is the reverse of Comesana’s. I highlight problems for evidentialism and show how it could benefit by incorporating reliabilist themes. I am not sanguine that evidentialists will see it my way. They might even view my proposals as an insidious attempt to convert evidentialists to reliabilism. Well, I won’t debate the best way to formulate this paper’s recipe. At any rate, it began with the idea (which anteceded my reading of Comesana) of creating a synthesis of reliabilism and evidentialism. It retains significant strands of that idea, although the synthesis theme does not pervade the entire paper. What is mentalist evidentialism? Its original formulation was succinct. (shrink)

It is common in recent epistemology to distinguish different senses, or conceptions, of epistemic justification. The proposed oppositions include the objective/subjective, internalist/externalist, regulative/nonregulative, resource-relative/resource-independent, personal/verific, and deontological/evaluative conceptions of justification. In some of these cases, writers regard both members of the contrasting pair as legitimate; in other cases only one member. In this paper I want to propose another contrasting pair of conceptions of justification, and hold that both are defensible and legitimate. The contrast will then be used to construct (...) a modified version of reliabilism, one which handles certain problem cases more naturally than my previous versions of reliabilism. (shrink)

I begin with some familiar conceptions of epistemic relativism. One kind of epistemic relativism is descriptive pluralism. This is the simple, non-normative thesis that many different communities, cultures, social networks, etc. endorse different epistemic systems (E-systems), i.e., different sets of norms, standards, or principles for forming beliefs and other doxastic states. Communities try to guide or regulate their members’ credence-forming habits in a variety of different, i.e., incompatible, ways. Although there may be considerable overlap across cultures in certain types of (...) epistemic norms (e.g., norms for perceptual belief), there are sharp differences across groups in other types of epistemic norms. (shrink)

This is a collection of chapters by the leading proponent of process reliabilism, explaining its relation to rival and/or neighboring theories including evidentialism, other forms of reliabilism, and virtue epistemology. It addresses other prominent themes in contemporary epistemology, such as the internalism/externalism debate, the epistemological upshots of experimental challenges to intuitional methodology, the source of epistemic value, and social epistemology. The Introduction addresses late-breaking responses to ongoing exchanges with friends, rivals, and critics of reliabilism.

Early Greek philosophers doubled as natural scientists; that is a common-place. It is equally true, though less often remarked, that numerous historical philosophers doubled as cognitive scientists. They constructed models of mental faculties in much the spirit of modern cognitive science, for which they are widely cited as precursors in the cognitive science literature. Today, of course, there is more emphasis on experiment, and greater division of labor. Philosophers focus on theory, foundations, and methodology, while cognitive scientists are absorbed by (...) experimental techniques and findings. Nonetheless, there are sound reasons for massive communication between philosophy and cognitive science, which happily proceeds apace. On this occasion I shall not try to enumerate or delineate these lines of communication in any comprehensive fashion. I just wish to illustrate the benefits to philosophy in two domains: the theory of mind and moral theory. Though this may sound like an ambitious agenda, I shall in fact examine just a single phenomenon: empathy. Using that term first broadly and later narrowly,I shall argue that empathy may be the key to one sector of the philosophy of mind and to several sectors of moral theory. But whether empathy can in fact unlock any doors depends heavily on the outcome of empirical research in cognitive science. (shrink)

Life's Values offers new analyses of the nature of pleasure, happiness, well-being, and meaning in life. Recognizing how individuals have different priorities, Goldman explains what is of ultimate value in our lives and argues that making our desires rational - relevantly informed of what it's like to satisfy them - maximizes well-being.

This remarkably clear and comprehensive account of empirical knowledge will be valuable to all students of epistemology and philosophy. The author begins from an explanationist analysis of knowing—a belief counts as knowledge if, and only if, its truth enters into the best explanation for its being held. Defending common sense and scientific realism within the explanationist framework, Alan Goldman provides a new foundational approach to justification. The view that emerges is broadly empiricist, counteracting the recently dominant trend that rejects (...) that framework entirely. Topics treated include the Gettier problem, the nature of explanation and inductive inference, the justification of foundations for knowledge in terms of inference to the best explanation, the possibility of realist interpretations of contemporary science, reference, and the relations between empirical psychology and epistemology. Professor Goldman defends the need for a foundational theory of justification and presents a version that refutes standard criticisms of that doctrine. His defense of realism takes into account contemporary advances in semantics and philosophy of science. It attempts to clarify the kinds of skeptical argument the philosopher must take seriously, without succumbing to them. While recent epistemology has tended to dismiss the traditional foundational approach, it has not provided a suitable alternative. Goldman breaks new ground by adapting that approach within his explanationist, inductive theory. (shrink)