Translator's preface -- Commentator's preface -- Commentator's introduction -- J.G. Fichte : on the ground of our belief in a divine world-governance -- Commentary: on the ground of our belief in a divine world-governance -- Text: on the ground of our belief in a divine world-governance -- F.K. Forberg : development of the concept of religion -- Commentary: development of the concept of religion -- Text: development of the concept of religion -- G.: a father's letter to his student son (...) about Fichte's and forberg's atheism -- Commentary: a father's letter to his student son about Fichte's and Forberg's atheism -- Text: a father's letter to his student son abou tFichte's and Gorberg's atheism -- Friedrich August : Saxon requisition letter to the Weimar Court and Karl August : Weimar rescript to the University of Jena -- Commentary: Saxon requisition letter to the Weimar Court and Weimar rescript to the University of Jena -- Text: Saxon requisition letter to the weimar court -- Text: Weimar rescript to the University of Jena -- J.G. Fichte: appeal to the public -- Commentary: appeal to the public -- Text: appeal to the public -- K.l. Reinhold: letter to Fichte -- Commentary:letter to fichte -- Text: letter to Fichte -- J.G. Fichte : juridical defense -- Commentary: juridical defense -- Text: juridical defense -- Ernst I. Ludwig : Gotha rescript to the University of Jena -- Commentary: Gotha rescript to the University of Jena -- Text: Gotha rescript to the University of Jena -- Students of the University of Jena : first petition to Duke Karl, August of Saxony, Weimar, Eisenach and Karl August : first reply to the University of Jena and students of the University of Jena : second petition to Duke Karl, August of Saxony, Weimar, Eisenach and Karl August : second reply to the University of Jena -- Commentary: first and second petitions to Duke Karl, August of Saxony, Weimar, Eisenach and first and second replies to the University of Jena -- Text: first petition to Duke Karl, August of Saxony, Weimar, Eisenach -- Text: first reply to the University of Jena -- Text: second petition to Duke Karl, August of Saxony, Weimar, Eisenach -- Text: second reply to the University of Jena -- J.G. Fichte : from a private letter -- Commentary: from a private letter -- Text: from a private letter -- J.G. Fichte : concluding remark by the editor -- Commentary: concluding remark by the editor -- Text: concluding remark by the editor. (shrink)

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-4, Ahead of Print.

Talk about God is often the source of controversy. Theists and atheists are equally passionate when making their stand for or against belief in God. In this book, a wide range of philosophers of religion have come together to discuss how serious talk about God ought to be conducted for theists and atheists alike in what should be their common pursuit for truth. The essays both address methodological questions and provide a range of concrete samples of serious God-talk, spanning from (...) political, religion, and classical proofs of God's existence to the problem of evil. (Series: Nordic Studies in Theology / Nordische Studien zur Atheism, Vol. 4) [Subject: Religious Studies]Ã?Â?Ã?Â? (shrink)

In this book two philosophers, each committed to unambiguous versions of belief and disbelief, debate the central issues of atheism and theism. Considers one of the oldest and most widely disputed philosophical questions: is there a God? Presents the atheism/theism issue in the form of philosophical debate between two highly regarded scholars, widely praised for the clarity and verve of their work. This second edition contains new essays by each philosopher, responding to criticisms and building on their previous (...) work. (shrink)

Augustyn Jakubisiak (1884-1945), Polish priest, philosopher and theologian, undertook polemics with Jan Łukasiewicz, whom he knew personally. A dispute concerning the so-called logistics (mathematical logic) and its relationship with philosophy developed between the two. The most important arguments were laid out, primarily in the following works: in the case of Jakubisiak, in the book From Scope to Content and in the case of Łukasiewicz, in the texts Logistics and Philosophy and In the Defense of Logistics. Jakubisiak criticized logistics for (...) its anti-metaphysical, anti-theological and anti-religious attitude, which was based on neo-positivist philosophy, and led, in consequence to atheism. He also claimed that one should focus on what is concrete, avoiding idealization and abstraction (meaning the content of concepts, not their scope). Łukasiewicz defended logistics claiming that it possesses its own methods based on intellect, and is also an area of independent knowledge (but not completely detached) from philosophy, due to the fact it can consider the most important philosophical problems such as finiteness and infinity. This dispute, as the researchers identified, basically concerned the reduction of philosophy to the study of language (analytic philosophy) and initiated one of the most important discussions concerning the relationship between philosophy and logic. This debate was crucial because it also concerned questions related to fundamental metaphysical issues (naturalism – supranaturalism, rationalism – irrationalism) and epistemological issues (realism – idealism, boundaries and structure of cognition). (shrink)

Both theists and atheists have attempted to show that their opponent’s orientation towards religion prevents them from living truly meaningful lives. But exclusivists on both sides are wrong. For neither atheists nor theists are necessarily committed to meaninglessness. This essay focuses attention on two key components of theistic meaning of life theories that theists argue are importantly missing from atheistic theories, immortality and a Divine Plan. It also considers atheistic alternatives to theistic accounts of meaningfulness that involve subjectivism, intrinsic values, (...) and Susan Wolf’s hybrid theory of meaning. We come to see that genuine meaning for either theists or atheists requires some conceptual commitments, and the dispute about which side can live meaningfully is yet another case of the two sides talking past each other. Alternatively, if we allow for the different kinds and degrees of meaning we may conclude that both theists and atheists are able to offer rationally acceptable theories of life’s meaning. (shrink)

In this paper I revisit a dispute between Mikel Burley and Robin Le Poidevin about whether or not the B-theory of time can give its adherents any reason to be less afraid of death. In ‘Should a B-theoretic atheist fear death?’, Burley argues that even on Le Poidevin’s understanding of the B-theory, atheists shouldn’t be comforted. His reason is that the prevalent B-theoretic account of our attitudes towards the past and future precludes treating our fear of death as unwarranted. (...) I examine his argument and provide a tentative defense of Le Poidevin. I claim that while Burley rightly spots a tension with a non-revisionary approach to our ordinary emotional life, he doesn’t isolate the source of that tension. The real question is how to understand Le Poidevin’s idea that on the B-theory, we and our lives are ‘eternally real’. I then suggest that there is a view of time that does justice to Le Poidevin’s remarks, albeit a strange one. The view takes temporal relations to be quasi-spatial and temporal entities to exist in a totum simul. (shrink)

From the time of the thinkers of ancient Greece, the question of what can be said about the existence and nature of God has been debated by many philosophers and theologians. In Theism and Atheism: The Eternal Debate, F.F. Centore presents a broad analysis of the major positions that address the question and the thinkers who have contributed to the debate. This is an admirably lucid and thorough examination of the history of natural theology. Covering the material in a (...) thematic rather than in a strictly chronological way, Centore draws out the key positions on topics such as the relationship of science and religion, the problem of evil, Naturalistic and Supernaturalistic theism and the dispute between essence and existence. The proponents of the various positions are considered alongside their most explicit critics. Important thinkers dealt with in this work include Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Pascal, Kant, Hume, Hegel, Nietzsche, Freud and Darwin. The diversity of exploration also goes beyond the Judeo-Christian tradition to look at Hinduism, Buddhism, Stoicism, Zoroastrianism, Confucianism and Classical Paganism. This work, however, is much more than a survey of the major historical arguments and rebuttals concerning God's existence and nature. Overall, it is a work by a well-established Catholic philosopher who concludes that God's existence and nature are indeed compatible with modern science, human freedom and the existence of evil in the world. (shrink)

Nietzsche is one of the most controversial and disputed philosophers, especially because of his association with Hitler and Nazism, but also through his upsetting philosophical decisions that deny the possibility of any morality centered on good and evil as absolute values in themselves. As for his association with Hitler, the sources prove that Nietzsche’s philosophy has nothing to do with the justification or support of the nationalist-socialist dictatorship. In addition, any connoisseur of his work can easily see that Hitler does (...) not fit at all with the description of the overman that Nietzsche conceptualizes and identifies with. As for morality, it seems to support a relativization of the values of good and evil until their dissolution, but a closer look can see that the morality of the masters accredited by Nietzsche is one of austerity, balance, respect, honor, dignity, of preferring loneliness to the amusement of the crowd. All these are values that even Christianity proposes. Lonely and incomprehensible, the master, Nietzsche lives a lifestyle similar to Christian ascetics. And just as the philosopher claims that the life of the masters should not be passed through the sieve of ordinary moral evaluations, who could judge in terms of “good” or “bad” the way the austere ones lived? (shrink)

Resumo O fundamentalismo é um fenômeno relativamente recente, pelo menos como posição articulada e autoconsciente. O presente artigo apresenta, de início, uma reflexão sobre o surgimento do termo fundamentalismo, em breve resgate histórico. A seguir, identifica e analisa as características principais dessa atitude, tanto na sua configuração psicológica (subjetivismo fechado), como na sua teoria epistemológica implícita (fideísmo radical, fé ou submissão a uma autoridade religiosa como fonte exclusiva ou predominante de certeza epistemológica), na sua hermenêutica (liberalismo na interpretação de escrituras) (...) e na sua maneira de priorizar um ativismo radical, na perspectiva pragmática (tendência a medidas radicais, à militância e até ao terrorismo no prosseguimento efetivo dos seus fins). Aplicando essa análise, mostra que os debates atuais entre cristãos e "neoateus" parecem frequentemente fundamentalistas, mas não apenas do lado religioso da disputa. Talvez o nome de fundamentalista possa ser reivindicado por alguns que ficariam bem surpresos pela nova titulação. A última parte do artigo discute a religião "usada" e "abusada". Palavras-chave: Ateísmo; Fundamentalismo; Filosofia da religião.Fundamentalism is a relatively recent phenomenon, at least as an articulated and self-conscious position. The present article begins by reflecting on the origin of the term fundamentalism in a brief historical review. Then the principal characteristics of this attitude are identified and analyzed, both in its psychological configuration (a closed subjectivity), as well as in its implicit epistemological theory (radical fideism, faith or submission to a religiou authority as exclusive or predominant source of epistemological certitude), its hermeneutics (literalism in the interpretation of scriptures) and its manner of prioritizing radical activisim in its pragmatic perspective (tendency to radical means, to militancy and even terrorism in the effective persecution of its ends). Applying this analysis, current debates between Christians and "neo-atheists" appear frequently fundamentalist, but not only on the religious side of the dispute. Perhaps the name fundamentalist can be claimed even by some who would be quite surprised by the new christening. The last part of the article discusses "used" and "abused" religion. Key words : Atheism; fundamentalism; philosophy of religion. (shrink)

야코비는????신적인 것들과 그 계시에 관하여????(1811)에서 셸링 철학을 전반적으로 비판한 바 있다. 이 글은 이에 대한 셸링의 재반박을 그의????기록물????(1812)을 중심으로 살펴본다. 먼저 셸링이 보기에 야코비는 논증적 방식의 학문 이외의 다른학문을 알지 못한다. 그러나 신의 살아있는 현존 이전의 필연적 근거로부터 이 현존에까지 발전하는 과정을 다루는 학문적 유신론은가능하다. 다음으로 야코비는 셸링의 자연을 결코 신적 본성을 드러낼 수없는 기계론적인 것으로 오해한다. 이에 대해 셸링은 자신의 자연개념이 존재하는 것으로서가 아니라 아직 존재하지 않는, 그래서바로 자신의 존재 근거로 고찰되는 한에서의 절대적 동일성 일반을 의미한다고 응수한다. 즉 존재하는 (...) 절대적 동일성으로서의 신이 자신 안에 지니는 존재 근거로서의 본성이라는 것이다. 이를 통해 셸링은 자신의 자연철학이 동시에 유신론일 수 있다고 본다. 마지막으로 셸링은 아무 이유 없이 느낌으로만 무제약자를 전제하는 야코비의 이성이 배타적 유신론에 귀착한다고 비판하며, 이에 현실적 무신론과도 화해할 수 있는 자신의 참된 유신론을 맞세운다. 그러나 셸링의 이러한 비판은 자유로운 인격적 행위의 원인으로서의 신에 주목한 야코비에게 여전히 논란거리가 될 수 있다. (shrink)

This short piece is collected in the complete edition of Fichte's works published by the Bavarian Academy of Sciences (1964-2012), IV/1, pp. 153-167. According to the editors' foreword, it first appeared anonymously as part of a pamphlet titled "Something from Professor Fichte and for him. Published by a veracious schoolmaster" in 1799 in Bayreuth as a response to the so-called atheism dispute, which eventually cost Fichte his chair in Jena. This translation concerns a part appended to the pamphlet (...) which is titled "Professor Fichte's Ideas on God and Immortality. Published from lecture notes". The schoolmaster who published the pamphlet was Christian Wilhelm Friedrich Penzenkuffer, who had studied theology and was at that time teaching biblical exegesis at high school. It was found that among the students who attended Fichte's lectures in the winter semester 1794 there was a Johann Friedrich Penzenkuffer, probably a brother of the pamphlet author. It seems most plausible that the content of the pamphlet came from a student transcript of Fichte's lectures on logic and metaphysics in Jena and the anonymous publication was intended as a defence for Fichte that what he taught was not atheism but rather theism. This pamphlet has importance not only as part of its immediate context - the atheism dispute - but also for Fichte's philosophy of religion more generally. (shrink)

The question of God or the Divine has essential influenced the development of Fichtian thinking and guided it from transcendental I as the first principle in the Jena period to absolute being or God and his absolute phenomenon or manifestation. The turning point came with the so-called atheism dispute due to his article »On the Ground of our Belief in a divine World-Governance« (Fall 1798), which caused him so much trouble. In this article, Fichte defended the idea that (...) the divine is not a substance or object, not a person, so no theistic God, but the moral order – a notion that could not be accepted by the Christian Church. The criticism that he is either atheist or pantheist or nihilist or a merely subjective thinker has greatly hit him and changed his horizon of thought in line with the new more religious spirit of his cultural environment. Die Frage nach Gott oder nach dem Göttlichen hat die Entwicklung des Fichtischen Denkens grundsätzlich beeinflusst, und vom transzendentalen Ich als erstem Prinzip in seiner Jenaer Zeit zum absoluten Sein oder Gott und seiner absoluten Erscheinung geführt. Der Wendepunkt kam mit dem sogenannten Atheismusstreit aufgrund des Aufsatzes von Fichte »Über den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung « (Herbst 1798), der Fichte so viele Schwierigkeiten bereitete. In diesem Artikel verteidigte Fichte den Gedanken, das Göttliche sei keine Substanz oder Objekt und keine Person, also kein theistischer Gott, sondern die moralische Ordnung – eine Vorstellung, die von der christlichen Kirche nicht akzeptiert werden konnte. Die Vorwürfe, er sei entweder Atheist oder Pantheist oder Nihilist oder ein bloß subjektiv Denkender, hat ihn stark getroffen und seinen Denkhorizont im Einklang mit dem neuen religiöseren Geist seiner kulturellen Umgebung verändert. (shrink)

Fichtes Entlassung: Der Atheismusstreit vor 200 Jahren addresses the Atheismusstreit, or the Atheism Dispute. In 1798, the co-editors of the Philosophisches Journal einer Gesellschaft teutscher Gelehrten, Friedrich Niethammer and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, published two essays, by Karl Friedrich Forberg and Fichte. Forberg’s essay, “The Development of the Concept of Religion,” denied the legitimacy of any theoretical discussion of religious issues. Fichte’s essay, “On the Ground of our Belief in a Divine Governance of the World,” identified belief in a (...) moral world order with religion. Frederick August, prince-elector of Saxony, condemned the errant issue of the Philosophisches Journal in the winter of 1798. During the next spring, Duke Carl-August of Weimar censured the content of the Philosophisches Journal and “accepted” Fichte’s “resignation” from the University of Jena. By 1800, the conflict died down. It remains an example of the theological, religious, and philosophical controversies that characterized intellectual life in the eighteenth century. Nonetheless, few works provide a comprehensive account of the Atheismusstreit. Fichtes Entlassung fills this lacuna. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie Jahrgang: 61 Heft: 3 Seiten: 388-413.

Atheism was the most fundamental challenge to early-modern French certainties. Leading educators, theologians and philosophers labelled such atheism as manifestly absurd, confident that neither the fact nor behaviour of nature was explicable without reference to God. The alternative was a categorical naturalism. This book demonstrates that the Christian learned world had always contained the naturalistic 'atheist' as an interlocutor and a polemical foil, and its early-modern engagement and use of the hypothetical atheist were major parts of its intellectual (...) life. In the considerations and polemics of an increasingly fractious orthodox culture, the early-modern French learned world gave real voice and eventually life to that atheistic presence. Without understanding the actual context and convergence of the inheritance, scholarship, fierce disputes, and polemical modes of orthodox culture, the early-modern generation and dissemination of absolute naturalism are inexplicable. This book brings to life that Christian learned culture, its dilemmas, and its unintended consequences. (shrink)

When theists and atheists argue about the existence of God, the dispute is most often framed by a shared assumption: that the appropriate way to consider God's existence is to think of it as a hypothesis posited to explain observational data. Theists argue that such a hypothesis provides the best explanation for agreed-upon facts, while atheists argue that no such explanation is needed or that theistic explanation is incoherent. This way of structuring discussion of God's existence interprets the question (...) as a theoretical issue to be decided by considering empirical evidence objectively and dispassionately in order to determine the most reasonable way of accounting for the observational data. (shrink)

This paper re-examines the dispute concerning Hobbes’s religious beliefs in light of his natural philosophy. First, I argue that atheistic readings of Hobbes can be more plausibly defended provided interpreters make use of a methodological unity thesis. Second, I suggest that theistic readers of Hobbes have good reason to favor the autonomy thesis. I conclude by highlighting how a re-examination of the theism dispute motivates reconsideration of the role of Hobbes’s natural philosophy and scientific methodology vis à vis (...) politics. Maintaining the unity thesis as a methodological device can shed important light on the politics and methods of Leviathan. More importantly, this analysis motivates consideration of De Corpore in any serious study of Hobbes. (shrink)

O artigo apresenta o resultado da pesquisa que abordou a investigação sobre as rupturas epistemológicas e o discurso sobre Deus na obra As palavras e as coisas , de Michel Foucault. Intitulada como "Deus, as palavras e as coisas", a pesquisa parcialmente apresentada aqui pretende ser uma colaboração para a análise do que se tem identificado como fenômeno do neo-ateísmo, um tema de grande relevância para a Filosofia da Religião nos dias atuais. Para compreendê-lo, apresentam-se, seguindo a perspectiva foucaultiana, os (...) distintos matizes epistemológicos que sustentam a concepção sobre Deus. Em seus três momentos, o texto apresenta a episteme renascentista e o discurso de Deus, a episteme clássica e a idéia sobre Deus e, por fim, a episteme moderna, a morte de Deus e a morte do homem. Acredita-se que aquilo que se decide na contemporaneidade não seja necessariamente o acabamento do tempo da morte de Deus e a consequente morte do homem, fruto do modo moderno de compreender e tematizar o divino, o infinito, o absoluto ou o verdadeiro, mas uma clara disputa entre variadas perspectivas epistemológicas em suas concretizações científica, política, cultural e religiosa. Palavras-chaves: Michel Foucault, Filosofia da Religião, Epistemologia, Deus, Ateísmo.The article presents the results of research that investigate on epistemological ruptures and speaking about God in The Order of Things writhed by Michel Foucault. Entitled as "God, words and things," this research partially presented here is intended as collaboration for the analysis of what has been identified as phenomenon of neo-atheism, a topic very important for the Philosophy of Religion today. To understand it, we present, following the Foucaultian perspective, the different epistemological nuances underpinning conception of God. In her three moments, the text presents the Renaissance episteme and the God's discourse, the classical episteme and the idea of God and, finally, the modern episteme , the death of God and man's death. It is believed that what is decided in the contemporary is not necessarily the finish time of the death of God and the consequent man's death, the fruit of modern way of understanding and themes on the divine, the infinite, the absolute or true, but a clear dispute between different epistemological perspectives in their political, cultural and religious diversity achievements. Key words: Michel Foucault; Philosophy of Religion;Epistemology; God; Atheism. (shrink)

Students of the Enlightenment have long assumed that the major movement towards atheism in the Ancien Régime was centered in the circle of intellectuals who met at the home of Baron d'Holbach during the last half of the eighteenth century. This major critical study shows, contrary to the accepted views, that in fact, atheism was not the common bond of a majority of the members and that, far from being alienated figures, most of the members were privileged and (...) publicly successful citizens devoted to peaceful and gradual reform. Alan Charles Kors determines the coterie's membership and discovers it to have been a diverse assemblage of philosophes, men of letters, and scientists. Analyzing the thought and behavior of those members who lived past 1789, the author argues that the hostility to the Revolution expressed by the coterie's survivors was fully consistent with their world view. Originally published in 1976. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Bishop Berkeley Exorcises the Infinite: Fuzzy Consequences of Strict Finitism1 David M. Levy Introduction It all began simply enough when Molyneux asked the wonderful question whether a person born blind, now able to see, would recognize by sight what he knew by touch (Davis 1960). After George Berkeley elaborated an answer, that we learn to perceive by heuristics, the foundations ofcontemporarymathematics wereinruin. Contemporary mathematicians waved their hands and changed (...) the subject.2 Berkeley's answer received a much more positive response from economists. Adam Smith,in particular, seizedupon Berkeley's doctrine that welearn to perceive distance tobuild anelaborate system in which one learns to perceive one's self-interest.3 Perhaps because older histories of mathematics are a positive hindrance in helping us understand the importance of Berkeley's argument against infinitesimals,4 its consequences for economics have passed unnoticed. If infinitesimal numbers are ruled out, and we wish to maintain an algebra, then we rule out infinite numbers. This implication of Berkeley's argumenthas a dramatic implication for our understanding ofthe history ofideas about rule-directed action. Let me motivate this claim with a well-known historical problem. The social doctrine set forth by John Locke outside the Two Treatises depends critically upon individual belief about possible states of infinite pain or pleasure. The critical issue for the intolerance of atheism in Locke's system is his claim that without beUefin the infinite bliss of heaven forgone by a criminal, there is no reason to think a calculating individual will avoid crime.5 Locke's discussion is so different from the discussion of religion by David Hume and Smith. Here, questions of the substance of belief—the infinite worth of Heaven—have largely vanished.6 What happened between Locke and Hume-Smith? One answer is Pierre Bayle and Bernard Mandeville. Berkeley's doctrine that only the finite is perceived is, I think, a better answer. Out of sight, out ofmind. In this paper I propose to give a close look at the content and consequences ofBishop Berkeley's once famous Towards a New Theory ofVision. While there are other aspects ofBerkeley's work that attract Volume XVIII Number 2 511 DAVID M. LEVY attention from historians ofeconomics,7 1 shall claim that Berkeley's insight into human perception in the Theory of Vision is central to Adam Smith's attempt to found economic behaviour on the self-awareness of systematic illusion. There is no doubt that Smith finds that much ofhuman behaviour is characterized by illusion.8 The difficulty arises, or so it seems to me, from modern unwilUngness to beheve that illusion can be systematic. There are four pieces to my argument. First, we consider Berkeley's statementofwhat we shall call his doctrine ofstrict finitism in perception.9 Berkeley puts forward two postulates: 1) there exists some minimum perceptible quantity, and 2) distance is not perceived directly but by experience. Second, we define strict finitism and demonstrate that it translates into the claim that perception is fuzzy in a technical sense. If Berkeleian perception is fuzzy, then some modern criticism of Berkeley's strict finitism is based upon a simple misunderstandingofthe propertiesoffuzzyrelations. Thisis quite easy to set right. (Getting right the doctrine of those who implicitly take perception to be fuzzy—Adam Smith is my prime candidate—will be muchharder.)Third, wereconsiderBerkeley's dispute withMandeville on the role ofinfinite gain in choice. Here, we find Mandeville putting forward the Berkeleian position that if infinite amounts mattered, people would not behave as they do. Berkeley's position against Mandeville, however, seems to depend upon the supposition that infinite distance is sensible.10 Earlier, however, the position that Mandeville argued for was defended by Berkeley. Fourth, we ask why all this isn't well known. The debate between Berkeley and Mandeville has been well studied, as has been the link between Berkeley and the Scots. In fact, our work focuses on one aspect of Berkeley's work that led to his challenge of the contemporary foundations of the calculus. If sense is a matter of perception, and infinitesimals cannot be perceived, then they are quite literally nonsense. Armed with this insight, Berkeley refuted contemporary mathematics. Nevertheless, the calculus was too... (shrink)

The structure of this paper is as follows. First, I start off by briefly explaining the concepts of pro-theism and anti-theism, and by distinguishing both between personal and impersonal versions of those views, and also between a more modest and a less modest claim connected with the impersonal version of pro-theism. -/- I then introduce a distinction that is itself quite trivial, namely, that between pro-theism (and anti-theism), on the one hand, and pro-monotheism (and anti-monotheism), on the other, where the (...) latter are defined in terms of the deity of some particular religion. The triviality notwithstanding, I shall argue at various points in the subsequent discussion that even the best discussions of the pro-theism versus anti-theism issue are vitiated to some extent by a failure to keep that distinction clearly in mind. -/- Next, I consider how the pro-theism versus anti-theism question is related to the theism versus atheism question. These questions are often thought to be quite independent of each other, but I shall argue that that is not so. In particular, I shall argue that these two issues are neither logically nor evidentially independent of one another. -/- The rest of the essay is then devoted to discussing the strength of the case for pro-theism, and there my basic claims are as follows. First, the case for the impersonal pro-theistic thesis––the thesis that, all things considered, the existence of God is better than the non-existence of God––is very strong relative to facts about which there is no dispute. Second, and contrary to the views of many philosophers, there is no respect in which the world is better if God does not exist than if God exists. Third, the case for the personal pro-theistic view that it is better for every person if God exists than it is if God does not exist is also very strong. Fourth, however, it is not clear that these pro-theistic conclusions remain justified if one thinks that one can take one’s evidence as including not just facts about which there is no dispute, but also the proposition that God exists, and I shall argue that if one does assume that theism is true, the support that can otherwise be offered for some pro-theistic claims is seriously weakened, perhaps even to the point where those claims can no longer be sustained. -/- My general conclusion, accordingly, might be put as follows: While there is no significant anti-theistic thesis that can be sustained if one is an atheist, some pro-theistic theses may become problematic if one is a theist. (shrink)

This chapter looks closely at the reception of Hume's ideas in the 18th-century ‘coterie de Milan’: Alessandro and Pietro Verri and Cesare Beccaria. Alessandro, a traveller to Paris and London in 1766–8, sees his own dispute with Beccaria reflected in Hume's dispute with Rousseau, and champions Hume's ‘meek’ (religious) thought against the radical views of the French ‘philosophes’ supported by his brother. Alessandro's interpretation of Hume's philosophical stance and of the Natural history of religion are used here to (...) cast a new light on Hume's alleged denial of ever having met an atheist and on his refusal to write an Ecclesiastical History. The way Alessandro was ‘cutting off the noble parts’ of Hume's work in order to make it religiously mild reminds us of some present-day appropriations and mis-readings. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Bayle, Saint-Evremond, and Fideism:A Reply to Thomas M. LennonGianluca MoriIn a recent article published in this journal Thomas M. Lennon returns to the controversial question of Bayle's attitude towards religion. The point he debates is the particular use that, in expounding his conception of the relationship between faith and reason, Bayle makes of a passage from Saint-Evremond. In Lennon's view the correct interpretation of this point would show that (...) Bayle's fideism is to be "taken at face value" without any hint of irony and with no suspicion of dissimulation or insincerity.1 This would cast doubt on and greatly weaken the interpretation I proposed in my Bayle philosophe.2 My aim here is to respond briefly to Lennon's arguments and to clarify even more briefly what in my opinion is the right perspective in which to consider Bayle's position on this topic.The context in which Bayle quotes Saint-Evremond is to be found in the Eclaircissements he added to the second edition of his Dictionnaire historique et critique (1702) to counter the Dutch religious authorities' harsh criticism of the first edition. In particular the Walloon Consistory accused Bayle of taking a skeptical position that undermined the most important dogmas of Christian faith. In response Bayle wrote the Eclaircissement sur les Pyrrhoniens, a clumsy mosaic of quotations from the Scriptures and from patristic and profane texts, with which he sought to show that his skeptical fideism was not in the least heterodox but indeed the position that most closely reflected true Christianity. The quotation from Saint-Evremond, almost at the end of this text, is taken [End Page 323] from the Conversation du Maréchal d'Hocquincourt et du Père Canaye (written in about 1654).3 The final passage gives a clear idea of the general tone: after having disputed with a churchman the need to subject one's intellect to the yoke of faith, the marshal concludes by saying that he is ready to be crucified "without knowing why." Father Canaye replies: "No reason! That is the true religion. No reason! God has granted you a fine grace, mylord." So, and here Lennon obviously agrees (229), Saint-Evremond's is a text with no shadow of mystical inspiration, indeed strongly tending in the libertine direction, as is clear from the blatant way it pours scorn on the fideist approach.In my interpretation Bayle's use of this quotation does not at all demonstrate his atheism or unbelief, for in my view that question is undecidable. However, the quotation from Saint-Evremond is sufficient—and this is the onlyreason I mentioned it4 —to show that Bayle's approach to fideism is in no way innocent and naive as is sometimes claimed. On the contrary, his texts on this subject contain what amounts to provocations aimed at orthodox readers (to which they immediately reacted). This, together with other more important reasons, leads me to believe that Bayle's professions of Christian faith, though frequent, are generally far from being above suspicion: indeed, almost every line of them raises questions about their actual significance.The provocation contained in the quotation from Saint-Evremond appears in all its rhetorical weight if we associate this text with three other passages from Bayle's works. The first is from the Nouvelles de la république des lettres of December 1686, in which Bayle stresses the unedifying nature of the religious maxims contained in Saint-Evremond's Conversation (which, incidentally, he himself had just had printed in the collection Le Retour des pièces choisies).5 The second is taken from a letter by Jean d'Oulès to Bayle, written in 1696, in which the author deals with exactly the same passage from the Conversation that was later to be reproduced in the Eclaircissement. In this letter d'Oulès quotes the full passage which he considers to be a "naughty text" deliberately written to throw ridicule on the fanatical fideism of Pierre Jurieu.6 The third passage is from Bayle's Continuation des pensées diverses of 1704 in which, shortly after the death of Saint-Evremond, he publicly reveals the poet... (shrink)

This paper defends the view that, in certain actual circumstances that aren’t uncommon for educated westerners, an awareness of the facts of religious disagreement doesn’t make theistic belief irrational. The first section makes some general remarks about when discovering disagreement (on any topic) makes it rational to give up your beliefs: it discusses the two main possible outcomes of disagreement (i.e., defeat of one’s disputed belief and demotion of one’s disputant), the main kinds of evidence that are relevant to demoting (...) one’s disputant, and the kinds of epistemic assessment involved in demoting a disputant. The second section argues that in cases of disagreement about theism, the theist’s evidence for theism and for the reliability of her theistic belief is often strong enough to support steadfastness in the face of disagreement. The third section argues that the theist’s evidence for the reliability of her disputant’s atheistic beliefs is often weak enough to allow her to rationally demote her atheist interlocutor and it explains how this demotion can occur in a sensible and appropriate way. The final section focuses on theists whose disagreement-based doubts about theism persist, despite the defenses offered on behalf of theism against such doubts. It concludes that these persistent doubts could in some cases result in defeaters for theistic belief, even if the doubts are irrational, but that the gift of faith can compensate for this. (shrink)

This guide accompanies the following article: ‘Logic and Divine Simplicity’. Philosophy Compass 6/4 : pp. 282–294, doi: Author’s IntroductionFirst‐order formalizations of classical theistic doctrines are increasingly used in contemporary work in philosophy of religion and philosophical theology, as a means for clarifying the conceptual structure of the doctrines and their role in inferential procedures. But there are a variety of different ways in which such doctrines have been formalized, each representing the doctrines as having different conceptual structures. Moreover, the adequacy (...) of such formalizations as such has, at least with respect to some classes of doctrines, been disputed. One reason for disputing their adequacy derives from the conceptual impact of classical theism’s doctrine of divine simplicity.Author RecommendsFrege, Gottlob ‘Begriffsschrift: a formula language of pure thought,’ trans. Michael Beany, in The Frege Reader, ed. Beany. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 47–78. The preface contains interesting remarks about the purpose of formalization as understood by the chief pioneer of modern formal logic. These remarks are also connected by Frege to his views on the relation between thought and language more generally.Russell, Bertrand, and Whitehead, A.N. Principia Mathematica, Vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.The preface and first section of the long introduction contain remarks on the purpose and advantages of formalization. Chapter 1 of the introduction contains what is probably one of the first formalizations ever of a theistic doctrine, and is given in terms of a definite description analysis.Suppes, Patrick ‘The Desirability of Formalization in Science,’The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 65, No. 20, pp. 651–64.Clear and concise discussion of some of the advantages of formalization in philosophical inquiry, written by a prominent contemporary American philosopher‐logician.Nieznański, Edward ‘The Beginnings of Formalization in Theology,’ in Advances in Scientific Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Paul Weingartner, eds. Gerhard Schurz and Gregory J.W. Dorn. Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Ropodi, pp. 551–9.A valuable paper that narrates, among other things, the programme of formalizing theistic doctrines that emerged in Poland in the 1920s under the influence of the Lvov‐Warsaw School. Various examples of formalizations are also given.Quine, W.V.O. Mathematical Logic. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.In Section 27 of this classic study, Quine offers a formalization of theistic doctrines which seeks to avoid the difficulties of earlier formalizations by means of a subtle extensional singleton set analysis. The proposal has not won many adherents, but is worthy of careful study nonetheless.Woleński, Jan ‘Theism, Fideism, Atheism, Agnosticism,’ in Logic, Ethics and All That Jazz: Essays in Honour of Jordan Howard Sobel, eds. Lars‐Göran Johansson, Jan Österberg, and Rysiek Sliwinski. Uppsala: Uppsala Philosophical Studies, pp. 387–400.A concise but lucid survey of some attempts to formalize theistic doctrines and some problems besetting these attempts. Woleński also proposes his own method of formalization, which could be described as a simplified version of Quine’s method in Mathematical Logic.Bocheński, Joseph The Logic of Religion. New York: New York University Press.The first book‐length treatment of the relation between modern logic and theism. It covers much ground, and remains very readable.Alston, William P. ‘Religious Language and Verificationism,’ in The Rationality of Theism, eds. Paul Moser and Paul Copan. London: Routledge, pp. 17–34.Identifies some problems with attempts at articulating theistic doctrines by means of subject‐predicate language. Highly relevant to formalizations of theistic doctrines, even though this topic is not dealt with explicitly.Kraal, Anders ‘Logic and Divine Simplicity,’Philosophy Compass.Offers a survey of three main methods of formalizing theistic doctrines, and of some variants of these methods. Argues that certain formalizations of theistic doctrines are bound to be rejected as conceptually inadequate by all who understand the doctrines at hand within the framework provided by the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity.Sample Syllabus Week I: The Idea of Formalization and the Project of Formalizing Theistic Doctrines Reading:Frege, Gottlob ‘Begriffsschrift: a formula language of pure thought,’ trans. Michael Beany, in The Frege Reader, ed. Beany. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 47–78. Russell, Bertrand, and Whitehead, A.N. Principia Mathematica, Vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Suppes, Patrick ‘The Desirability of Formalization in Science,’The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 65, No. 20, pp. 651–64.Nieznański, Edward ‘The Beginnings of Formalization in Theology,’ in Advances in Scientific Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Paul Weingartner, eds. Gerhard Schurz and Gregory J.W. Dorn. Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Ropodi, pp. 551–9. Week II: Formalizing Theistic Doctrines: Three Alternative Methods Reading:Woleński, Jan ‘Theism, Fideism, Atheism, Agnosticism,’ in Logic, Ethics and All That Jazz: Essays in Honour of Jordan Howard Sobel, eds. Lars‐Göran Johansson, Jan Österberg, and Rysiek Sliwinski. Uppsala: Uppsala Philosophical Studies, pp. 387–400.Russell, Bertrand, and Whitehead, A.N. Principia Mathematica, Vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Quine, W.V.O. Mathematical Logic. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Week III: Arguments for and Against Some Formalizations of Theistic Doctrines Reading:Bocheński, Joseph The Logic of Religion. New York: New York University Press. Kraal, Anders ‘Logic and Divine Simplicity,’Philosophy Compass, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 282–94.Focus Questions1 What do Frege, Russell and Whitehead, and Suppes understand the purpose or purposes of logical formalization to be, and why do they think formalization can achieve these purposes?2 Woleński sketches some simple ways of formalizing theistic doctrines such as ‘God exists’ or ‘God is almighty’ in terms of 1‐place predicates which he subsequently abandons in favour of other methods. What reasons lead him to abandon these more simple methods of formalization?3 What are the advantages of the definite description formalization of theistic doctrines offered by Russell and Whitehead?4 Quine offers a subtle formalization of the theistic doctrine ‘God exists’ in terms of singleton sets. What problems are Quine’s formalization intended to accommodate, and how does it seek to accommodate them?5 Which relative merits or demerits are there in Bocheński’s and Kraal’s respective arguments for and against the adequacy of certain formalizations of theistic doctrines? (shrink)

In this article, I begin by arguing that justification of religious beliefs can involve at least two types of defeaters, namely partial evidence and peer disagreements. Belief in the existence (or nonexistence) of God, for example, is based on partial evidence. The body of evidence for this question is huge. No one is apt to consider all information and all arguments about the topic. In topics like this we have only partial evidence. Besides, there is persistent disagreement on the question (...) of God’s existence. Theists and atheists have never come to an ultimate answer. The disagreement with epistemic peers is also a sort of defeater for our religious beliefs. Thus, in the face of this scenario of dispute and defeaters, I argue for an attitude of intellectual humility. This intellectual virtue consists in owning or accepting our intellectual limitations. In this case, independently of having a belief in favor of or against God’s existence, both parties in the dispute – theists and atheists – should recognize their intellectual limitations and reduce confidence in their own beliefs. (shrink)

This article shows that the conspicuous and consistent idiosyncrasy of Grotius's Biblical interpretation is an important part of his revolutionary effort to secularize natural law. In De iure praedae and related works, Grotius systematically deployed a range of exegetical techniques in order to demonstrate that the Bible, like all texts, is open to multiple interpretations and susceptible to hijacking by rival agendas. This strategy aimed to render the Bible inadmissible as evidence in legal disputes and political legitimacy claims. The consistent (...) instrumentality of Grotius's use of the Bible in IPC cannot be dismissed as mere legalistic opportunism or described as an atheistic move. Rather, Grotius's exegetical strategy was motivated by pacifism and a desire to protect religion from politicization. The article positions this secularization strategy in the intellectual environment of the Leiden Circle, and shows how competing Catholic, Calvinist, and Mennonite political readings of the same key biblical passages during the Dutch-Iberian conflict provided the immediate occasion for writing IPC. In order to construct a natural law theory that was independent from, and therefore acceptable to, all religious sides, it was necessary to ensure that the Bible have no final word in law or politics, lest its invocation link disagreements to belief and thereby render them impossible to resolve. (shrink)

Is it possible to prove or disprove God's existence? Arguments for the existence of God have taken many different forms over the centuries: in The Non-Existence of God, Nicholas Everitt considers all of the arguments and examines the role that reason and knowledge play in the debate over God's existence. He draws on recent scientific disputes over neo-Darwinism, the implication of 'big bang' cosmology, and the temporal and spatial size of the universe; and discusses some of the most recent work (...) on the subject, leading to a controversial conclusion. (shrink)

Father Frederick Copleston is best known for his carefully crafted works History of Philosophy and Thomas Aquinas. Copleston’s most notable metaphysical thesis is his interpretation of the argument from contingency, which he sees as the superior choice for theists. He draws on Aquinas and distinguishes between causa fieri and causa esse to argue that God is a higher order cause of contingent causal series. Copleston presents God not as a temporal first cause, but an ontologically ultimate cause necessary to explain (...) a contingent universe. His contribution changed the way we read Aquinas. Copleston’s willingness to debate his thesis with different philosophical perspectives is illustrated by his acceptance to discuss God’s existence with Bertrand Russell, in 1948. This BBC radio debate epitomises the dispute between theists and atheists from the 1940s onwards. I undertake to expound and comment Copleston’s contribution to metaphysics, present relevant parts of the debate and provide criticism. (shrink)

Since the early decades of the sixteenth century, Pomponazzi has been a name to conjure with: to some, the first of the modern atheists; to others, a hero of the new philosophy. But how much direct influence did his work have? This question is explored in terms of the way in which oracular divination is treated. In the sixteenth century, the range of conceptual categories available to explain such phenomena was threefold: natural, supernatural or simply unreal. In some cases, such (...) as those of demonic possession, the person was able to be examined directly. But the same conceptual triad was also applied to another kind of case, one whose subject could not be examined, since she had long been consigned to history ? the Pythia or priestess of the ancient Delphic oracle, who had famously foamed and babbled during her prophetic frenzy. For some writers on divination, this subject was of particular interest, since it had been explicitly discussed by ancient sources: whether the Pythia's ravings were real or invented, natural or supernatural, could be analysed with categories borrowed from Cicero, Plutarch and, above all, Aristotle. Within the sixteenth?century territory disputes over Aristotle's corpus, the pagan oracles, represented above all by the Pythia, offered a test case for the broader problem of the place of divination within the natural world. The central antagonist in this tussle was Pietro Pomponazzi, whose treatment of the ancient oracles, although brief, played an important part in his radical interpretation of Aristotle. For many of his contemporary readers, it was this subject, with its specific historical dimension, that highlighted the faults in his positions on nature and divination. (shrink)

The twentieth century was a period of prolonged crisis of spirituality in the Soviet Union. The atheist state used all possible and impossible levers of various influences on religious associations and ordinary believers. Since the assertion of the Soviet authorities, an open war has been declared against any manifestation of religion. There were real battles: with their ideological fronts, offensives and retreats, the whole system of operations developed and the tactical plan in line with the party-approved strategy. The result of (...) such disputes between the state and its believing citizens has been the church crises, schisms, and even the elimination of entire denominations. The most violent was the struggle against religious organizations disloyal to the Soviet authorities. It should be noted that even external loyalty did not save religious associations from the onslaught of anti-Sovietism. (shrink)

Even after 14 years of independence, Ukrainian society has not lost many of its problems, which are rooted in the legacy of Soviet militant atheism. One of the problems that has caused heated debate in religious and educational settings in almost all years of independence is the perception / non-acceptance of the need for religious education by secular school students. Against the backdrop of equally acute property problems related to the return to religious buildings of the Church, disputes about (...) the status and content of religious courses have been leading in relevance for the last five to six years. (shrink)

Current debates in the analytic mainstream about the existence of God have often an air of the fantastic about them. Discussions of the God question typically begin with an inventory of properties definitive of the disputed entity and then proceed to a consideration of the question whether there is anything that answers to the definition. The theist adduces arguments to show, not so much that God actually exists—an enterprise much to bold for anyone laboring in the shadow of the Kantian (...) Critiques—but that the divine existence is logically possible, or at best, of some degree of probability. His opponent presents arguments designed to impugn the rationality of belief in God by showing either that the existence of God is improbable or even logically impossible. Of course, theist and atheist also each work at discrediting the other’s positive arguments. Now all of this makes for a lively and instructive exchange, except that an important assumption common to both partners in the dialogue is seldom mentioned, let alone defended. This assumption, which is responsible for the aura of the fantastic mentioned above, is that God, if he exists, is a being among beings, albeit the highest being. It may seem that this assumption is so unproblematic as neither to require nor be capable of defense. If the affirmation of God is not the affirmation of a being, what could it be? Surely, if God is anything at all, God is a being. Or so it will seem to many. But as I shall argue, the assumption, far from being obvious, is in fact false: God is not an existent among other existents, but existence itself. (shrink)

The notion of a properly functioning human nature as a moral standard is a tenet of Western culture and is at the core Western humanism, Christian moral teaching, and natural law theory. Although these traditions recognize that the virtue of justice is exercised by giving one’s neighbor his due, they did not explore a person’s legitimate claims to goods in a modern theory of human rights. Enlightenment thinkers, as materialists and atheists, theorized that human rights are not related to God (...) or human nature but are privileges granted by government. Jacques Maritain developed theories of natural law and human rights. Maritain’s theory of human rights, employing a Thomistic methodology and founded on God and nature, is applicable to contemporary disputes, such as claims to a right to “same-sex” marriage. (shrink)

For decades, the problem of evil has occupied a centre stage in the Western philosophical discourse of the existence of God. The problem centres on the unlikelihood to reconcile the existence of an absolute and morally perfect God with the evidence of evil in the universe. This is the evidential problem of evil that has been a source of dispute among theists, atheists, agnostics, and sceptics. There seems to be no end to this dispute, making the problem of (...) evil a perennial one in Western Philosophy of Religion. In this essay, I will contribute to this discourse from an African perspective. This essay, therefore, explores the evidential problem of evil within the African philosophy of religion. I argue that it is unlikely for the evidential problem of evil to be a problem in African philosophy of religion. I invoke an Ejima-based argument to support this claim. I conceptualize the Igbo word Ejima to metaphysically mean the inevitable coexistence of two opposite variables as complements to argue that God could be both good and evil within the African Traditional Religion, which explains why good and evil exist in the universe. (shrink)

At the end of the Fifth Meditation, Descartes has the Meditator proclaim: “the certainty and truth of all knowledge depends uniquely on my awareness of the true God, to such an extent that I was incapable of perfect knowledge [perfecte scire] of anything else until I became aware of him”. Not so, complained the Second Objectors, for it seems an atheist can know, in the sense of being “clearly and distinctly aware,” that the angles of a triangle are equal to (...) two right angles. In response, Descartes simply agreed, writing, “[t]he fact that an atheist can be ‘clearly aware that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles’ is something I do not dispute” (AT... (shrink)

This book is an account of the philosophical movement named Lebensphilosophie, which flourished at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. There many philosophers who participated in the movement, but this book concentrates on the three most important: Friedrich Nietzsche, Wilhelm Dilthey and Georg Simmel. The movement was called Lebensphilosophie—literally, philosophy of life—because its main interest was not life as a biological phenomenon but life as it is lived by human beings. They regarded human life (...) and experience as the fundamental reality, the basis of all knowledge and value, and disputed the relevance of any supernatural realm transcending human experience. The purpose of life was therefore life itself. Lebensphilosophie was the first modern philosophical movement in the Western tradition. It was “modern” in the sense that it was entirely humanist and secular, deriving all values from a non-religious perspective. Nietzsche, Dilthey and Simmel were either atheists or agnostics; they denied the relevance of any transcendent reality or being for human life. They abjured the traditional Christian concern with salvation and immortality. They also disputed the existence of natural law, teleology or a providential order; human beings created their own values and they did not conform to any made by nature. In anticipation of later existentialism, the Lebensphilosophen maintained that human beings are the makers of their own fate. Contrary to pessimism, they affirmed the great value of life while still acknowledging its frequent tragedy. The Lebensphilosophen were champions of an individualist ethics, which maintained that the highest good for a human being was self-realization, the development of a persons’s unique individuality. Their ethics was neither utilitarian nor de-ontological: it was not utilitarian because it did not regard the highest good as pleasure; self-realization could be a very unpleasant experience; and it was not de-ontological because it grounded moral norms upon the facts of human development and experience. The Lebensphilosophen were major advocates of historicism. They believed that human experience is formed by history, and that its horizons and limits are historical. Just as it was impossible to transcend human experience, so it was impossible to transcend history. All values and norms were therefore historical. In attempting to describe historical experience, the Lebensphilosophen developed the discipline of hermeneutics. They refused to accept mechanical explanation as a paradigm of explanation. This book attempts to describe and analyze the fundamental aspects of Lebensphilosophie by looking in detail at the views of its three leading figures. It examines their ethics, their religious background, their responses to pessimism and relativism, and their contributions to hermeneutics and historicism. (shrink)

I argue that the most familiar forms of presentism can be seen, upon reflection, to involve two very different claims. Most arguments against such forms of presentism are directed against one of those claims, and I think that the arguments in question, properly formulated, are sound. In this paper, however, I want to set out an argument directed against the second claim, and to consider the prospects for that type of argument. My discussion is organized as follows. In section 1, (...) I describe four different forms that presentism can take, which I refer to as extreme presentism, austere, reductive presentism, tensed-facts presentism, and ersatzer presentism. Of these four forms of presentism, only the last two are popular today. In section 2, I briefly describe the more important types of objections that are standardly advanced against presentism. Then, in section 3, I argue that the dispute between presentists other than extreme presentists, on the one hand, and non-presentists, on the other, is very different from the dispute between, say, theists and atheists, and that this difference has important implications with regard to the types of objection that can be directed against presentism. Finally, in section 4, I set out the alternative line of argument against presentism that arises out of that difference. (shrink)

These comments, on the paper by Branden Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican, and on the critique of that paper by Janusz Salamon, divide into four sections. In the first two sections, I briefly sketch some of the major themes from the paper by Thornhill-Miller and Millican, and then from the critique by Salamon. In the final two sections, I provide some critical thoughts on Salamon’s objections to Thornhill-Miller and Millican, and then on the leading claims made by Thornhill-Miller and Millican. I (...) find much to commend, but also some things to dispute, in both papers. As is so often the way, I shall focus on areas of disagreement. (shrink)

The article deals with the relationship between morality and religion in Kant’s and Fichte’s thought. These two spheres are carefully distinguished by Kant: the knowledge of moral law as genuine conviction has a completely different status than religious faith, and the certainty of faith is just a “moral” certainty, which derives from a need. In the years of Jena Fichte stresses the immediate, active dimension of conviction, which characterizes also the conscience. In the writings of the dispute concerning (...) class='Hi'>atheism this conviction of the conscience implies the absolute certainty of the faith: the voice of the conscience is identified with faith. Der Aufsatz behandelt die Beziehung zwischen Moralität und Religion im Denken Kants und Fichtes. Diese zwei Sphären werden von Kant mit Aufmerksamkeit unterschieden: das Wissen des Moralgesetzes als eigentliche Überzeugung hat einen ganz anderen Status als das Glauben der Religion, und die Gewissheit des Glaubens ist eine nur „moralische“ Gewissheit, die aus einem Bedürfnis entsteht. In der Jenaer Zeit betont Fichte die unmittelbare, tätige Seite der Überzeugung, die auch das Gewissen kennzeichnet. In den Schriften des Atheismusstreit bringt diese Überzeugung des Gewissens die absolute Gewissheit des Glaubens mit sich: die Stimme des Gewissens wird mit dem Glauben identifiziert. (shrink)

Is religion “noxious rubbish to be buried as deeply, as thoroughly, and as quickly as possible”? Philip Kitcher tells us that’s the dominant idea among atheists. In this paper I take a step back from the minutiae of standard journal articles to dispute the broad atheistic claim, and in the process suggest there is in fact a great deal to be said for religious belief. I argue that: (1) It’s not highly implausible that there is a cause of the (...) universe distinct from the universe—a World-Maker; (2) Because the act of cognizing instantiables is not purely a physical action, Christian teachings on the nature and status of humans are defensible against common claims to the contrary based on neo-Darwinism, and there’s reason to think the World-Maker is a Mind-Maker; (3) Kitcher’s case that there is no true religion is vulnerable to myriad objections, and since it’s been lauded as the best attack on the credibility of religion to date, it’s entirely reasonable not to abandon all religion, and in particular Christianity: there’s good reason for thinking the World-Maker and Mind-Maker is also a Revealer. (shrink)

Right after Philo’s about-face in Part 12 of the Dialogues, he gives an argument that the dispute between the theist and the atheist is merely verbal. Since everything is at least a little like everything else, the atheist must concede that the source of order is at least remotely like a human intellect, even if this source is something like a rotting turnip. This passage provides a major argument for dismissing Hume’s apparent avowals of theism in the Dialogues and (...) elsewhere, since Philo’s assertions are so loose as to let in a rotting turnip. The right reading of the passage is more interesting. The paragraph was written in 1776, right before Hume’s death. It’s thus one of the few philosophical texts written late enough to reflect his encounter with the French philosophes in the 1760s. We have good biographical evidence that Hume was criticized for being too much of a theist in France. The turnip is rotting not in order to make fun of the argument from design, but in order to make fun of d’Holbach's and Diderot's account of the origin of life, accounts that generalized dramatically from John Needham’s observations of nematodes in rotting wheat. In the rotting turnip paragraph, Hume is attempting to establish that the dispute between the theist and the atheist isn’t empirically tractable, that atheists will never outflank the apophatic theologian on the question of whether human minds are unlike God, and that if atheists are consistent with their analogical methods, they ought to be more open to the argument from design. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Descartes’s Lettre Apologétique aux Magistrats d’Utrecht:New Facts and MaterialsErik-Jan BosThe lettre apologétique aux magistrats d’utrecht was Descartes’s final effort to obtain satisfaction from the Municipality or ‘Vroedschap’ of Utrecht. In 1643 the Vroedschap had condemned Descartes’s Epistola ad Dinetum and Epistola ad Voetium in defence of Descartes’s opponent Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676), professor of Theology at the University of Utrecht.1 In the Lettre apologétique Descartes requests the Utrecht Vroedschap to (...) revoke their condemnation, to clear his name and to reconsider Voetius’s position.The Lettre apologétique receives little attention in modern editions of Descartes’s works. Adam and Tannery give both the French and the Latin version of the Lettre apologétique, but with scanty annotation and an unsatisfactory introduction (AT VIIIB).2 The only other edition of the Lettre apologétique is provided by Verbeek, in La Querelle d’Utrecht (1988), but it does not go beyond Adam and Tannery’s edition.3In 1992, however, Verbeek noted that the Lettre apologétique could not possibly date from 1645, which was the hypothesis of Adam and Tannery and still is the [End Page 415] prevailing view.4 This raises once again the question of the real date of the Lettre apologétique as well as of the history of the text. In this essay I propose a new date and a new account of the history of the text. I also draw attention to the Dutch version of the Lettre apologétique, which Descartes sent to the Utrecht Vroedschap in 1648, but first I will give a short survey of Descartes’s dispute with Voetius.1. THE UTRECHT QUARRELIf we are to believe Descartes in his Lettre apologétique, it was Voetius who started the quarrel in 1639 by accusing him of atheism in several disputations, an accusation to which Voetius stuck throughout the affair.5 Descartes admits he is not mentioned in the writings of the Utrecht theologian, but “[Voetius] counted among the characteristics of atheism everything he knew to be commonly attributed to me” (AT VIIIB 205). A few years later, in 1641, Voetius called the adherents of the New Philosophy atheists outright. In a reaction to Descartes’s champion in Utrecht, the professor of medicine Henricus Regius (1598–1679), who claimed Aristotelian philosophy to be of no use for explaining natural phenomena, Voetius warned that the rejection of traditional philosophy would lead to scepticism and eventually to disbelief. With Descartes’s help Regius furnished a reply, in which he insinuated that it was, instead, the obscurities in Neo-Scholastic thought which led to the denial of God.6 This answer elicited protest from the University Senate. On the Senate’s request the Utrecht Vroedschap confiscated Regius’s book and forbade the teaching of any ideas deviating from Aristotle. Regius having been silenced, Descartes proceeded in a personal capacity. He vehemently attacked Voetius, first in the Epistola adDinetum, then in an elaborate work, the Epistola ad Voetium. The latter was meant as a response to a book opposing Descartes published by the professor of philosophy in Groningen, Martin Schoock (1614–1669), a friend of Voetius.7 The Vroedschap then condemned the works and Descartes became [End Page 416] subject to criminal charges. Thanks to his influential friends, Descartes was never put on trial, yet he felt that his reputation had been badly damaged. Several times he demanded satisfaction from the Utrecht Vroedschap, but to no avail.Until recently, the texts published in the polemic between Descartes and Voetius were considered to be of no more than anecdotal value in Descartes’s biography. It is only for the past decade that their philosophical relevance has been recognized. From what seemed to be unpromising material, various scholars have presented new perspectives on both Voetius and Descartes.8 They have shown that the objections raised by Voetius and Schoock against Cartesian philosophy prove to be more fundamental and to the point than formerly believed. Although Descartes never made a serious attempt on his own to meet Voetius on philosophical grounds, his writings are interesting because he brings forward theoretical positions which before he had... (shrink)

In this book, Colin Howson disputes the proofs for the existence of God. Howson is an ardent defender of Bayesian inference, a method of logical statistical reasoning. The book will please the unbeliever, but will prove bitter and deeply unfair to believers.The first part (chapters 1 and 2) intends to discredit the religious phenomenon. Howson uses the usual style of polemical atheists that touches the heart more than reason. So this part can hardly be taken seriously as a rational discourse. (...) All religions are sketched and gruffly censored as totalitarian systems responsible for much suffering, immorality, racism and oppression. They are enemies of freedom, especially in matters of sex, politics, science and culture. These ad hominem arguments are weak and commonly used to blame all biased types of ideologies whatever they are: political, religious, atheistic, etc. But Howson is silent about many historical episodes which show that atheistic ideologies are at least equally repressive a .. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:272 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY than most that his great original intellects cannot be crammed into any conceptual pigeonhole. By juxtaposing them all as he does he deepens our understanding of each. ALAN B. SPITZER State University o/ Iowa Alla Soglia Dell" et~ Romantica. By A. Pupi. (Milan: Vitae pensiero, 1962. L. 3000.) Pupi's object in this book, At the Dawn o/the Romantic Age, is to recapture the milieu and (...) the personalities of those who had what Kant called "rational faith." The two main issues of the polemics which produced the Kantian theory of the supremacy of practical reason are formulated in Jacobi's and Mendelssohn's philosophies. Jacobi, rejecting Spinozism as atheism, appeals to faith as an element of all human knowledge and of reality (p. 49), using Kant to justify his appeal to practical faith and in this way evading the Kryptokatholicismus of which he was accused (p. 230). Mendelssohn, on the other hand, denies the existence of things in themselves, mistaking, according to Jacobi's version of Kant (p. 210), Kant's theory of the limits of human knowledge for a theory of knowledge as such (p. 279). Meanwhile, in the face of the fall of philosophical reason, Hamann praises reason as "God's original light" (p. 225). These are the terms of the polemic created by Kant's short treatise, What Does It Mean to See One's Way Clearly? We must never forget these sayings because "the Kantian language and other great systematic formulations are always based on them and have an organic continuity through the circular medium of men's daily and concrete speech" (p. 214). Kant intervenes in the dispute with the notion of Vernun/tglaube whose Griinde should be interpreted as the very nature of reason (p. 289). However, while we may interpret the word "opinion" (Meinung) as knowledge (Wissen), when the objective Griinde are given, the VernunItglaube will always be a Glaube because it is based only on "ge[iihltes Bediir[nis der VernunIt," and consequently its Grund must be taken as only subjective (pp. 288--290). What Kant wants to point out is that "thought detached from experience (pure reason) is no longer able to show that it knows reality, but it can see its own way in the sphere of the possible" (pp. 283--284); however, the Vernuntt of the Vernun/tglaube is neither the speculative and demonstrative reason, as Mendelssohn supposed, nor an obscure intuition "without the consent of reason," called "faith" by Jacobi. This is, in short, the theme of the book. I cannot agree with the author's thesis that the Kantian supremacy of practical reason settled the issue in the age-old dispute between philosophy and faith (p. 275). The very protest of Wizemann, which the author cannot omit, is an example of it, and certainly this was not the only protest; it was followed by lively criticism, particularly by Schelling, who soon expressed himself in his Philosophical Letters. See particularly the first letter (on p. 8 of the Italian Edition by G. Semerari, Florence: 1958). I think too that this attempt to make practice the objective guaranty of theoretical philosophy is somewhat problematic, all the more if one admits the impossibility of a theoretic reasoning about God's existence only in practice. It seems to me that the author, whose strict and relevant philology is admirable, leaves out too much of the theoretic problematicity of the subjects he faces, as, for instance, the ambiguity of the talk about faith, which is formally assertive but really hypothetical; the assertiveness, if practical, should be justified in action, not in talk. In consequence of his recourse to practice as a last resort for justification, Kant is compared to Pascal by Goldmann, who sees in both of them the theme of the "wager" (see pp. 445-446, Le Dieu Cachd, Paris, 1955) which shows, to my mind, the problematicity of the whole matter. This cannot be settled merely by historical exposition. The limitation of Pupi's study, though philologically rich and detailed, lies, according to BOOK REVIEWS 273 my judgment, in the fact that he has limited the historical inquiry to the scholarly study of documents and... (shrink)