La réflexion sur l’éthique et la déontologie des médias en Afrique de l’Ouest suscite diverses questions. Il convient d’abord de clarifier les concepts pour alimenter le débat qui a ses moments forts, notamment pendant les périodes électorales.D’un côté, les professionnels de l’information, les acteurs des médias mettent l’accent sur la nécessaire liberté de la presse et peuvent être en porte-à-faux dans leur pratique avec la philosophie et les règles de la profession. D’un autre côté, différentes institutions, que ce soit les (...) institutions gouvernementales, la société civile ou de « simples » citoyens, s’appuient sur les médias, mais les interpellent au sujet d’une liberté qui ne saurait être sans responsabilité.Il s’agira donc de contextualiser l’environnement d’intervention des médias et d’examiner les réponses données aux problèmes posés y compris par les citoyens dans leurs rapports aux médias. La mise en place d’une législation et de structures institutionnelles – que ce soit les organes de régulation, dans leur diversité, ou de manière plus problématique, les organes d’autorégulation ou le tribunal des pairs – montre qu’il existe une dynamique à prendre en compte dans le dévelop­pement des médias en Afrique de l’Ouest.Enfin, nous nous attaquerons à quelques défis, qu’il s’agisse de la formation des professionnels, de la pratique des médias en période de conflit ou des technologies de l’information et de la communication, pour montrer que l’éthique et la déontologie sont au cœur du développement démocratique en Afrique de l’Ouest et en sont un élément constitutif. (shrink)

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

We prove that each proper ideal in the lattice of axiomatic, resp. standard strengthenings of the intuitionistic propositional logic is of cardinality 20. But, each proper ideal in the lattice of structural strengthenings of the intuitionistic propositional logic is of cardinality 220. As a corollary we have that each of these three lattices has no atoms.

The paper applies the theory presented in A Formal Ontology of Situations (this journal, vol. 41 (1982), no. 4) to obtain a typology of metaphysical systems by interpreting them as different ontologies of situations. Four are treated in some detail: Hume's diachronic atomism, Laplacean determinism, Hume's synchronic atomism, and Wittgenstein's logical atomism. Moreover, the relation of that theory to the situation semantics of Perry and Barwise is discussed.

A generalized Wittgensteinian semantics for propositional languages is presented, based on a lattice of elementary situations. Of these, maximal ones are possible worlds, constituting a logical space; minimal ones are logical atoms, partitioned into its dimensions. A verifier of a proposition is an elementary situation such that if real it makes true. The reference (or objective) of a proposition is a situation, which is the set of all its minimal verifiers. (Maximal ones constitute its locus.) Situations are shown to form (...) a Boolean algebra, and the Boolean set algebra of loci is its representation. Wittgenstein's is a special case, admitting binary dimensions only. (shrink)

This paper deals with Boolean algebras supplied with an additional binary operation, calledB-algebras for short.The aim of the paper is to generalize some theorems concerning topological Boolean algebras to more comprehensive classes ofB-algebras, to formulate fundamental properties ofB-algebras, and to find more important relationships of these algebras to other known algebras.

The main theorem says that a consequence operator is an effective part of the consequence operator for the classical prepositional calculus iff it is a consequence operator for a logic satisfying the compactness theorem, and in which every finitely axiomatizable theory is decidable.

Various notions of independence of observables have been proposed within the algebraic framework of quantum field theory. We discuss relationships between these and the recently introduced notion of logical independence in a general operator-algebraic context. We show that C*-independence implies an analogue of classical independence.

Hegel i Nietzsche twierdzili, że żyją w czasach przełomu, który wymusi pojawienie się nowego etapu w dziejach ludzkości. Sytuację człowieka współczesnego określa „fakt” roztrzaskania dotychczasowych horyzontów oraz konieczność stworzenia, lub odkrycia, horyzontów nowych. Postulują oni zatem ustanowienie nowego celu ludzkości. Filozofia polityki winna stać się częścią tego ogólnokulturowego projektu. Tym samym rzucają wyzwanie współczesnej filozofii politycznej, która zrzeka się prawa do ustanawiania takiego celu. Obaj są też przekonani – znów wbrew twierdzeniom współczesnym – że cel ów może i powinien być (...) ugruntowany w naturze całej rzeczywistości i w naturze człowieka. W ich założeniu ma to być cel człowieka empirycznego, historycznego, człowieka, który osiągnął bolesną świadomość tego, że to on był twórcą tych wartości, które dotąd uznawał za obiektywne. Potrzeba sformułowania nowego celu każe Heglowi i Nietzschemu powrócić do klasycznego pojmowania filozofii polityki, do postrzegania w doskonałości człowieka ideału, któremu ma być podporządkowana polityczna działalność. Właściwe rozumienie miejsca człowieka w świecie, ujęcie go jako istoty stwarzającej horyzonty i przekształcającej zgodnie z nimi rzeczywistość, pozwala według nich dotrzeć do prawdy o bycie jako całości, do konstytuującej go zasady samo-rozwoju, będącego zarazem samo-przezwyciężaniem i samo-przekraczaniem. Zaakceptowanie tej prawdy o świecie pozwala ugruntować w nim ideał doskonałości, który można od tej pory ujmować jako istotowy cel człowieka, i żądać podporządkowaniu mu całej kulturowej działalności, w tym także – filozoficzno-politycznej teorii i praktyki. (shrink)

We propose a new schema for the deduction theorem and prove that the deductive system S of a prepositional logic L fulfills the proposed schema if and only if there exists a finite set A(p, q) of propositional formulae involving only prepositional letters p and q such that A(p, p) L and p, A(p, q) s q.

Let q(K) denote the least quasivariety containing a given class K of algebraic structures. Mal'cev [3] has proved that q(K) = ISP r(K)(1). Another description of q(K) is given in Grätzer and Lakser [2], that is, q(K) = ISPP u(K)2. We give here other proofs of these results. The method which enables us to do that is borrowed from prepositional logics (cf. [1]).

In this paper we define the relation t of elementary extension of topological models in the language L t and show a Back and Forth criterion for t. We introduce some new operations on partial homeomorphisms preserving Back and Forth properties. Some properties of t are proved by the Back and Forth technique.

In classes of algebras such as lattices, groups, and rings, there are finite algebras which individually generate quasivarieties which are not finitely axiomatizable (see [2], [3], [8]). We show here that this kind of algebras also exist in Heyting algebras as well as in topological Boolean algebras. Moreover, we show that the lattice join of two finitely axiomatizable quasivarieties, each generated by a finite Heyting or topological Boolean algebra, respectively, need not be finitely axiomatizable. Finally, we solve problem 4 asked (...) in Rautenberg [10]. (shrink)

In the paper [2] the following theorem is shown: Theorem (Th. 3,5, [2]), If =0 or = or , then a closure space X is an absolute extensor for the category of , -closure spaces iff a contraction of X is the closure space of all , -filters in an , -semidistributive lattice.In the case when = and =, this theorem becomes Scott's theorem.

The most difficult problem that Leniewski came across in constructing his system of the foundations of mathematics was the problem of defining definitions, as he used to put it. He solved it to his satisfaction only when he had completed the formalization of his protothetic and ontology. By formalization of a deductive system one ought to understand in this context the statement, as precise and unambiguous as possible, of the conditions an expression has to satisfy if it is added to (...) the system as a new thesis. Now, some protothetical theses, and some ontological ones, included in the respective systems, happen to be definitions. In the present essay I employ Leniewski's method of terminological explanations for the purpose of formalizing ukasiewicz's system of implicational calculus of propositions, which system, without having recourse to quantification, I first extended some time ago into a functionally complete system. This I achieved by allowing for a rule of implicational definitions, which enabled me to define any propositionforming functor for any finite number of propositional arguments. (shrink)

The first part of the paper deals with some subclasses of B-algebras and their applications to the semantics of SCI B , the Boolean strengthening of the sentential calculus with identity (SCI). In the second part a generalization of the McKinsey-Tarski construction of well-connected topological Boolean, algebras to the class of B-algebras is given.

Universality of generalized Alexandroff's cube plays essential role in theory of absolute retracts for the category of , -closure spaces. Alexandroff's cube. is an , -closure space generated by the family of all complete filters. in a lattice of all subsets of a set of power .Condition P(, , ) says that is a closure space of all , -filters in the lattice ( ).