This paper develops an account of the metaphysics of fundamental laws I call “the Package Deal Account ” that is a descendent of Lewis’ BSA but differs from it in a number of significant ways. It also rejects some elements of the metaphysics in which Lewis develops his BSA. First, Lewis proposed a metaphysical thesis about fundamental properties he calls “Humean Supervenience” according to which all fundamental properties are instantiated by points or point sized individuals and the only fundamental relations (...) are geometrical spatial and temporal relations between these. While the BSA does not require HS Lewis seems to hope that it is true. In contrast, the PDA is not committed to HS or even to the fundamental arena in which fundamental properties are instantiated possessing geometrical structure and thus is able to accommodate relations and structures found in contemporary physics that apparently conflict with HS. Second, although Lewis’ BSA doesn’t require HS his Humeanism does require that fundamental properties are categorical. In contrast, the PDA allows for the possibility that fundamental properties are individuated in terms of laws and so are not categorical. Third, the PDA expands and develops the criteria for what counts in favor of a candidate system with more attention to the criteria employed by physicists in evaluating proposed theories. Fourth and most importantly, unlike Lewis’ BSA, the PDA does not presuppose metaphysically primitive elite properties/quantities that Lewis calls “perfectly natural” properties/quantities or presuppose a metaphysically preferred language whose terms denote such properties/quantities. It replaces Lewis’ account with an account on which natural properties are not metaphysically prior to the laws but are elements of a package that includes a fundamental arena that plays the role of space-time as well as fundamental laws and properties. By doing so it responds to some epistemological and metaphysical issues that have been raised regarding natural properties and their role in the BSA. In sum, the PDA goes further in explicating the notion of laws in terms of the aims and practices of science especially fundamental physics rather than in terms of prior metaphysics. I begin by reviewing Lewis’ account of perfectly natural properties and his Humean BSA of laws. (shrink)

The world as we experience it is full of colour. This book defends the radical thesis that no physical object has any of the colours we experience it as having. The author provides a unified account of colour that shows why we experience the illusion and why the illusion is not to be dispelled but welcomed. He develops a pluralist framework of colour-concepts in which other, more sophisticated concepts of colour are introduced to supplement the simple concept that is presupposed (...) in our ordinary colour experience. The discussion draws on philosophical and scientific literature, both historical and modern, but it is not technical, and will appeal to a broad range of philosophers, cognitive scientists and historians of science. (shrink)

We use normative reasons in a bewildering variety of different ways. And yet, as many recent theorists have shown, one can discern systematic distinctions underlying this complexity. This paper is a contribution to this project of constructive normative metaphysics. We aim to bring a black sheep back into the flock: the balancing model of weighing reasons. This model is threatened by a variety of cases in which distinct reasons overlap, in the sense that they do not contribute separate weight for (...) or against an option. Our response is to distinguish between derivative reasons and load-bearing reasons, only the latter of which contribute non-overlapping weight to an option. This distinction is close at hand for analyses of reasons in terms of the promotion of significant outcomes. But we also develop an account of this distinction for fundamentalist theories of normative reasons. (shrink)

In an article in Cognition, Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich [Machery et al., 2004] present data which purports to show that “East Asian” native Cantonese speakers tend to have descriptivist intuitions about the referents of proper names, while “Western” native English speakers tend to have causal-historical intuitions about proper names. Machery et al take this finding to support the view that some intuitions, the universality of which they claim is central to philosophical theories, vary according to cultural background. Machery et (...) al hypothesize that the differences in intuitions about reference stem from general psychological differences between Eastern and Western subjects. Machery et al conclude from their findings that the philosophical methodology of consulting intuitions about hypothetical cases is flawed vis ` a vis the goal of determining truths about some philosophical domains. To quote Machery et al, “our data indicate that philosophers must radically revise their methodology” because “the intuitions philosophers pronounce from their armchairs are likely to be a product of their own culture and their academic training” ( [Machery et al., 2004] pp.B9). “The evidence suggests that it is wrong for philosophers to assume a priori the universality of their own semantic intuitions” ( [Machery et al., 2004] pp. B8). In the following study, I present data incompatible with Machery et al’s results. Native Cantonese-speaking immigrants from a Cantonese diaspora 1 in Southern California do not have descriptivist intuitions about the referents of proper names when presented with a Cantonese story and Cantonese questions about reference and truth-value. This data raises questions about the quality of Machery et al’s study and the conclusions they draw from it. (shrink)

Dr. Elisabeth Kübler-Ross is credited as one of the first clinicians to formalize recommendations for working with patients with advanced medical illnesses. In her seminal book, On Death and Dying,...

As conceived by analytic philosophers ontology consists in the application of the methods of mathematical logic to the analysis of ontological discourse. As conceived by realist philosophers such as Meinong and the early Husserl, Reinach and Ingarden, it consists in the investigation of the forms of entities of various types. The suggestion is that formal methods be employed by phenomenological ontologists, and that phenomenological insights may contribute to the construction of adequate formal-ontological languages. The paper sketches an account of what (...) might be involved in this new discipline, an account which is illustrated in application to the formal-ontological problems raised by negative states of affairs. (shrink)

In his latest book, Michael Devitt rejects Chomsky’s mentalist conception of linguistics. The case against Chomsky is based on two principal claims. First, that we can separate the study of linguistic competence from the study of its outputs: only the latter belongs to linguistic inquiry. Second, Chomsky’s account of a speaker’s competence as consisiting in the mental representation of rules of a grammar for his language is mistaken. I shall argue, first, that Devitt fails to make a case for separating (...) the study of outputs from the study of competence, and second, that Devitt mis-characterises Chomsky’s account of competence, and so his objections miss their target. Chomsky’s own views come close to a denial that speaker’s have knowledge of their language. But a satisfactory account of what speakers are able to do will need to ascribe them linguistic knowledge that they use to speak and understand. I shall explore a conception of speaker’s knowledge of language that confirrns Chomsky’s mentalist view of linguistics but which is immune to Devitt’s criticism. (shrink)

Polish translation of "John Searle: From Speech Acts to Social Reality", -/- We provide an overview of Searle's contributions to speech act theory and the ontology of social reality, focusing on his theory of constitutive rules. In early versions of this theory, Searle proposed that all such rules have the form 'X counts as Y in context C' formula – as for example when Barack Obama (X) counts as President of the United States (Y) in the context of US political (...) affairs. Crucially, the X and the Y terms are here identical. A problem arises for this theory for cases involving 'free-standing Y terms', as for example in the case of money in a computerized bank account. Here there is no physical X to which a status function might be attached. We conclude by arguing that Searle's response to this problem creates difficulties for his naturalistic framework. (shrink)

It has been argued contra Humean accounts of scientific laws that on Humean accounts laws are flukes since they are merely true generalizations and it would be an accident or a fluke for a generalization to obtain unless there was a non-Humean law "backing" it. This paper argues that this kind of objection is mistaken. It goes on to describe an account of laws called "the Package Deal Account" that is a descendent of Lewis' BSA on which it is not (...) an accident that our universe has a best systematization. (shrink)

In this accomplished, comprehensive and accessible book Barry Smart explores these questions. The book examines the social and economic processes which have shaped and continue to shape life today. It also provides exemplary critical assessments of the various `modern' and `postmodern' thinkers who have sought to explain these processes. Judicious in its judgements and superbly informed, the text is a major contribution to the debate on Modernity and Postmodernity.

“A Pluralistic Universe” began as James’s Hibbert Lectures at Manchester College, 1908. He repeated the lectures at Harvard and they were published the following year. Writing from Cambridge, and alluding to his last experiment with public lectures, recently published as Pragmatism (1907), he told his friend that the new commission “doom[s] me to relapse into the ‘popular lecture’ form just as I thought I had done with it forever. . . . I find that my free and easy personal way (...) of writing, especially in ‘Pragmatism,’ has made me an object of loathing to many respectable academic minds, and I am rather tired of awakening that feeling, which more popular lecturing on my part will probably destine me to increase.” . (shrink)

Objectives“Attachment difficulties” is an umbrella term often used to describe various forms of non-secure attachment. Differentiating “attachment difficulties” from autism spectrum disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder has been characterized as challenging. Few studies have explored how this happens in practice, from the perspective of professionals.DesignQualitative study.MethodsWe conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews with healthcare professionals from five NHS Foundation Trusts in the United Kingdom. Participants were recruited using a combination of snowballing, convenience and purposive sampling. Data were analyzed using a thematic (...) approach.ResultsWe identified six interrelated themes that might reflect difficulties with differential conceptualization. These include: a clinical lexicon of attachment; approaching attachment with caution; contextual factors; perceived characteristic behaviors; assessing attachment and adjacent supports; spotlighting intervention and dual conceptualization.ConclusionOur results indicate some of the ways suspicions around attachment are raised in practice. We advocate for more dialogue between research and practice communities on issues of differential conceptualization. We call for collaboration between a panel of experts consisting of attachment and neurodevelopmental orientated practitioners and researchers, to clarify issues around differentiating between attachment difficulties, ASD, and ADHD. (shrink)

Brian Barry examines the idea that the demands of justice in a given society can be ascertained by interpreting the shared understandings of the meanings of the goods that are to be distributed. Focusing on Michael Walzer's claims regarding the meanings of such goods as money, health, and leisure, Barry argues that for meanings to determine the uniquely right distributions, the criteria of distribution need to be built into the meanings. He criticizes the implications of Walzer's theory for (...) thinking about global justice. (shrink)

Scholars have detected hostility to technology in Daoist thought. But is this a problem with any machine or only some applications of some machines by some people? I show that the problem is not with machines per se but with the people who introduce them, or more exactly with their knowledge. It is not knowledge as such that causes the disorder Laozi and Zhuangzi associate with machines; it is confused, disordered knowledge—superficial, inadequate, unsubtle, and artless. In other words the problem (...) is not with machines but with the ethics of engineering and the government of technology. The Daoist argument does not devalue machines or knowledge of them; instead, it sets a new goal, defining an alternative ideal—alternative to techniques held hostage to despotic ideas about efficiency and profit. (shrink)

The forms and specific situations of the government of men by one another in a given society are multiple; they are superimposed, they cross, impose their own limits, sometimes cancel one another out, sometimes reinforce one another. According to a commonplace in the critical discussion of Foucault's later work, he is supposed to have decided to take up Nietzsche's interpretation of power as Wille zur Macht, ‘will to power.’ For instance, Habermas believes he has criticized Foucault when he says, ‘Nietzsche’s (...) authority, from which this [Foucault’s] utterly unsociological concept of power is borrowed, is not enough to justify its systematic usage.’ Charles Taylor finds in Nietzsche ‘a doctrine which Foucault seems to have made his own,’ viz., that ‘there is no order of human life, or way we are, or human nature, that one can appeal to in order to judge or evaluate between ways of life. (shrink)

Die Entwicklung der Philosophie in Österreich unterscheidet sich in markanter Weise von der Hauptlinie der philosophischen Entwicklung in Deutschland. Dabei fällt bei der österreichischen Philosophie vor allem die konsequente Orientierung an den Wissenschaften auf. In der philosophiegeschichtlichen Forschung sind für diese Besonderheit der österreichischen Philosophie z. B. von Otto Neurath, Rudolf Haller, Friedrich Stadier und J.C. Nyiri verschiedene Erklärungen vorgeschlagen worden. In diesen spielen in jeweils unterschiedlicher Weise Faktoren der spezifisch österreichischen Entwicklungen in historischer, institutioneller, politischer und religiöser Hinsicht eine (...) Rolle. Der vorliegende Aufsatz kritisiert demgegenüber bereits die diese Erklärungsversuche tragende Fragestellung: Die philosophischen Entwicklungen in Österreich bedürfen - so lautet die neue These - gar nicht einer besonderen Erklärung; denn sie stellen den geistesgeschichtlichen Normalfall dar. Vielmehr ist eine Erklärung dafür notwendig, daß sich die wissenschaftliche Philosophie und die mit ihr verbundenen Charakterzüge stilistischer Klarheit, technischer Kompetenz, systematischer Orientierung, Spezialisierung und Professionalisierung im gleichen Zeitraum nicht auch in Deutschland entwickelt haben. Eine solche Erklärung läßt sich - so eine weitere These des Aufsatzes - ziemlich leicht aus der besonderen Rolle der (traditionellen idealistischen) Philosophie im deutschen Nationalbewußtsein herleiten. (shrink)

The practice of giving the wealthy perpetual control of their assets is re-emerging in an era of great wealth inequality, long after it had been banned in common law countries. The philosophical justification for such control rests on the claim that there are posthumous rights to wealth, and that such rights do not extend in problematic way to other goods, such as political suffrage. On the basis of such a claim, we give people freedom of testation, and deem them vulnerable (...) to posthumous harm. I present a short history of legally sanctioned posthumous control of property in common law, and I argue that its philosophical justification is untenable. No principled case for posthumous rights to wealth survives scrutiny, and the large and powerful institutions that enforce such rights are morally illegitimate. (shrink)

This paper argues that Protagoras’ great myth depicts human nature as both Promethean and Epimethean: human foresight depends on the condition of oversight. If Protagoras’ praise of foresight betrays his desire to overcome this condition, Socrates embraces it. While Protagoras repeats Epimetheus’ mistake of forgetting his own nature by aiming to overcome the risks of oversight, Socrates’ foresight recognizes that oversight and perplexity are intrinsic to human nature.

A critical survey of the major philosophical arguments that have been used to justify the institutions and policies of contemporary welfare states considers the claims of rights theory, egalitarianism, and citizenship and communitarian doctrines. It finds that these arguments are both internally confused and inconsistent with conventional welfare policies. It is argued that the welfare state itself has serious ambiguities: it claims to cater for the needy, as part of its ?public good?; obligations, yet in practice it delivers a range (...) of private goods, e.g., health, housing, education and pensions, often irrespective of need. Yet classical liberal theories of state welfare, which favor simple cash payments, are flawed in theory and potentially costly in practice, while neocon?servative theories, by imposing ?values?; on welfare recipients, undermine liberal pluralism. The author concludes that welfare philosophy should be concerned with two neglected areas: the possibility that welfare be provided outside the familiar market and state categories, and the construction of constitutional rules to prevent the middle?class ?capture?; of existing welfare states. (shrink)

Richard Rorty transforms classical American philosophy in a way that overcomes some ideological limitations of the first Pragmatists, and responds to international currents of contemporary thought. The result is a Pragmatism that has for the first time attracted world attention. Rorty skillfully brought together Pragmatism with postmodern European philosophy. In doing so he inevitably accentuates certain aspects of the American tradition at the expense of others. His new Pragmatism “overcomes” most of what distinguishes the first Pragmatism from Nietzsche and European (...) thought influenced by him. Instead of an alternative to continental postmodernism Rorty creates a postmodern Pragmatism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:CAN DETERRENCE BE MORAL? A Review Discussion I HE AUTHORS OF A RECENT BOOK on the subject of nuclear deterrence 1 contend that the United States' nuclear deterrence policy is immoral because its credibility ultimately depends upon U.S. willingness to kill directly and intentionally innocent non-combatants, either in attacks on some cities to establish intra-war deterrence, or in final massive retaliation in response to an all-out Soviet attack. The (...) moral principle the authors use for reaching their conclusion is the inviolability of non-combatants to direct attack which was reaffirmed at Vatican II: " Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at destruction of entire cities or extensive areas along with their population is a crime against God and against man himself. It merits unequiv;ocal and unhesitating condemnation." The empirical evidence the authors use to assess the morality of U.S. nuclear deterrence policy against this moral principle are statements by officials from several administrations, from Kennedy's through Reagan's, from Secretary of Defense MacNamara's statement that" U.S. strategic weapons were being placed in a configuration such that (Soviet) cities could either be spared or destroyed '', through Secretary of Defense Weil1!berger's assertion that "... our fo11ces can and will deny them their objectives at whatever level of nuclear conflict they (the Soviets) contemplate". However, the authors' conclusion that U.S. nuclear deterrence policy is immoral because it violates the just war cri1 Nualear Deterrenae: Morality and ReaUsm. By John M. Finnis, Germain Grisez and Joseph Boyle. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Pp. xv + 429. Hardback, $39.95 719 720 ROBERT L. BARRY, O.P. AND MATTHEW M. MURPHY terion of discrimination differs from that reached by the American Catholic bishops in their Pastoral Letter on War and Peace: This complex question has always produced a variety of responses, official and unofficial in character. The NCCB Committee has received a series of statements of clarification of policy from U.S. government officials. Essentially these statements declare that it is not U.S. strategic policy to target the Soviet civilian population as such or to use nuclear weapons deliberately for the purpose of destroying civilian population centers. These statements respond, in principle at least, to one moral criterion for assessing deterrence policy: the immunity of non-combatants from direct attack either by conventional or nuclear weapons. (The Challenge of Peace, Para. 179) The bishops point out, however, that Administration statements : do not address or resolve another very troublesome moral problem namely, that an attack on military targets or militarily significant industrial targets could involve " indirect " (i.e., unintended) but massive civilian casualties... and that: In our consultations, administration officials readily admitted that, while they hoped any nuclear exchange could be kept limited, they were prepared to retaliate in a massive way if necessary. They also agreed that once any substantial numbers of weapons were used, the civilian casualty levels would quickly become catastrophic, and that even with attacks limited to "military" targets, the number of deaths in a substantial exchange would be almost indistinguishable from what might occur if civilian centers had been deliberately and directly struck. These possibilities pose a different moral question and are to be judged by a different moral criterion: the principle of proportionality. (The Challenge of Peace, Para. 180) Thus, the bishop's objection to U.S. nuclear ·detenent policy is that it violates the just war criterion of proportionality. Note, however, this critical distinction: while the conclusion the bishops state after applying the princip1e of discrimination to U.S. nuclear deterrent policy is an example of a morally CAN DETERRENCE BE MORAL? binding statement, the conclusion they reach after applying the principle of proportionality is an example of a prudential judgment. As such, it is "... based on specific circumstances which can change or which can he interpreted differently by people of good will " and "the moral judgments that we make in specific cases, while not binding in conscience, are to he given serious attention and consideration by Catholics as they determine whether their moral judgments are consistent with the Gospel". (emphasis added) (The ChaJ,lenge of Peace, Para. IO) We, therefore, do not believe that the authors have... (shrink)

What Nietzsche calls “the problem of science” concerns the place or value of science in the wider culture, what science does for or to culture, and to people who believe in its "truth." In framing this question, Nietzsche’s thought becomes a counterweight to a positivism that the philosophy of science has never entirely eliminated from its thinking. Not only is there is important continuity between Comte's original positivism and the later logical positivists; the assumptions about science which they share are (...) precisely those Nietzsche questions. (shrink)

T. D. Barnes has recently impugned the authenticity of these verses and calls for a defence of their genuineness. Although I agree with Fergus Millar that ‘the problem of the Historia Augusta is one into which sane men refrain from entering’,2 yet I think we can at least counter Barnes's objections. Barnes musters four arguments which he naturally calls ‘quite conclusive’. He first points out that the verses are omitted in the epitome of Dio by Xiphilinus, who is our sole (...) source for Dio here, and claims that it is unlikely that Xiphilinus could have omitted such a ‘striking poem’. This is putting an extraordinarily high value on Xiphilinus, who is quite capable of omitting things of greater moment than five Latin verses which he would presumably have had to translate into Greek; as an epitomator of Dio, he is inferior to Zonaras, and his account of Hadrian's reign is particularly poor. (shrink)