Each of us is uniquely subject to certain kinds of stimulation from a small part of the universe within our skins. Mentalistic psychologies insist that other kinds of events, lacking the physical dimensions of stimuli, are accessible to the owner of the skin within which they occur. One solution often regarded as behavioristic, granting the distinction between public and private events and ruling the latter out of consideration, has not been successful. A science of behavior must face the problem of (...) privacy by dealing with events within the skin in their relation to behavior, without assuming they have a special nature or must be known in a special way. (shrink)

The evolution of behaviorism from its explicit beginning with John B. Watson's declaration in 1913 to the behaviorisms of the present is considered briefly. Contributions of behaviorism to scientific psychology then and now are critically assessed, arriving at the conclusion that regardless of whether or not its opponents and proponents are aware, the essential points of behaviorism have now been absorbed into all of scientific psychology. It will assist the progress of the science of (...) class='Hi'>psychology if its focus now shifts away from incessant relivings of outdated argumentation to empirical discovery and theory construction based on those discoveries. (shrink)

Beyond Behaviorism explores and contrasts means and ends psychology with conventional psychology -- that of stimuli and response. The author develops this comparison by exploring the general nature of psychological phenomena and clarifying many persistent doubts about psychology. Dr. Lee contrasts conventional psychology (stimuli and responses) involving reductionistic, organocentric, and mechanistic metatheory with alternative psychology (means and ends) that is autonomous, contextual, and evolutionary.

Harry Harlow is credited with the discovery of learning set, a process whereby problem solving becomes essentially complete in a single trial of training. Harlow described that process as one that freed his primates from arduous trial-and-error learning. The capacity of the learner to acquire learning sets was in positive association with the complexity and maturation of their brains. It is here argued that Harlow's successful conveyance of learning-set phenomena is of historic significance to the philosophy of psychology. Learning (...) set is said to reflect the affirmation or rejection of hypotheses. Hypotheses are generated by the learner's brain, not its muscles. Thus, learning-set research served to advance the perspective that even nonhuman primates think and that their thinking reflects the active processing of information accrued from efforts to solve problems. Their learning processes are not simply the strengthening of some motor responses over others. Hence, learning-set research served to advance studies of animals as rational agents. This trend is serving to supplant the radical-behavioristic models, formulated earlier this century, with models predicated on rational processes for animals' complex learning and behavior. (shrink)

Cognitive psychology and behaviorism are often held to be competing, mutually exclusive paradigms in contemporary psychology. The present paper argues that cognitive psychology is actually quite compatible with the most widely recognized version of behaviorism, here designated as mediational S–O–R neobehaviorism. The paper argues this case by suggesting that neobehaviorist theoretical terms have tended to be interpreted as "hypothetical constructs." Such an interpretation permits neobehaviorist theoretical terms to refer to a wide variety of nonbehavioral acts, (...) states, mechanisms, and processes, with extensive "surplus meaning." Consequently, an interpretation of neobehaviorist theoretical terms as hypothetical constructs can readily accommodate the kind of mental entities postulated by cognitive psychology. (shrink)

Scientific points of view, according to which my existence is a moment of the world's, are always both naive and at the same time dishonest, because they take for granted, without explicitly mentioning it, the other point of view, namely that of consciousness, through which from the outset a world forms itself round me and begins to exist for me.

Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism is intended for advanced undergraduate or beginning graduate students in courses within behavior analytic curricula dealing with conceptual foundations and radical behaviorism as a philosophy. Each chapter of the text presents what radical behaviorism says about an important topic in a science of behavior, and then contrasts the radical behaviorist perspective with that of other forms of behaviorism, as well as other forms of psychology.

Humanism and radical behaviorism are two of today's most anxiety-provoking systems of thought. While they have challenged some of society's most comforting notions, each has long been viewed as opposed to the other's practice of psychology. In this adversarial climate of contemporary psychology, Bobby Newman's compelling assessment in The Reluctant Alliance effectively tears down many of the ideological walls separating these two powerful schools of thought. He carefully researches the positions of both camps to dispel the myths (...) that behaviorists are "manipulators" and humanistic psychologists are "armchair philosophers". After examining both systems, Newman outlines their shared philosophical and historical roots and explores such questions as: How should psychotherapy be conducted? How is moral behavior created and maintained? Is behaviorism inherently unethical? What forms of education are most effective at imparting information and improving self-concepts? As Newman points out, "It is my intention to demonstrate that the differences between the two systems are not as great as they are made to seem. More importantly, I will suggest that each system contains flaws that can be corrected by combining elements of the other". After reading The Reluctant Alliance humanists will come to appreciate that behaviorism is not destructive determinism, and behaviorists will learn that much of what they hold to be true is a natural outgrowth of humanistic thought. (shrink)

The Philosophical Legacy of Behaviorism is the first book to describe the unique contributions of a behavioral perspective to the major issues of philosophy. Leading behavioral philosophers and psychologists have contributed chapters on: the origins of behaviorism as a philosophy of science; the basic principles of behaviorism; ontology; epistemology; values and ethics; free will, determinism and self-control; and language and verbal behavior. A concluding chapter provides an overview of some scholarly criticisms of behavioral philosophy. Far from espousing (...) a `black box' perspective on human cognition and philosophical reasoning, behaviorism (as derived from the works of B. F. Skinner) represents a contemporary and viable approach to conceptualizing important philosophical and psychological issues. Audience: This work will make an excellent text for upper-level undergraduates and graduate students in the fields of philosophy and psychology, as well as being of interest to established scholars in those disciplines. (shrink)

Neo-Skinnerianism differs from Radical Behaviorism in at least three important respects: (1) its willingness to entertain cognitive accounts of the processes underlying behavioral dispositions, (b) its reluctance to assert that the results of animal experiments can be used to predict and control human behavior, and (c) its ability to side step folk psychology's major criticism of operant theory. While eschewing Radical Behaviorism's ambition to transform psychology (and, indeed, human society itself), it nonetheless joins issue with a (...) centuries-old debate over human nature, and may eventually help to resolve it. (shrink)

Philosophical critics standardly read behaviorism as a program for defining the concepts of folk psychology in equivalent behavioral terms. This is a misreading. Behaviorism is a program for getting rid of ill-defined mentalistic terms in favor of better defined behavioral idiom. In short, it is a program not for conceptual analysis but for verbal reform. Therefore, criticizing behaviorists for failing to define mentalistic concepts is like criticizing opponents of the Spanish Inquisition for failing to define witchcraft.

Evolutionary explanations for sexual behavior and orgasm most often posit facilitating reproduction as the primary function. Other reproductive benefits of sexual pleasure and orgasm such as improved bonding of parents have also been discussed but not thoroughly. Although sex is known to be highly reinforcing, behaviorist principles are rarely invoked alongside evolutionary psychology in order to account for human sexual and social behavior. In this paper, I will argue that intense sexual pleasure, especially orgasm, can be understood as a (...) primary reinforcer shaped by evolution to reinforce behavior that facilitates reproductive success. Next, I will describe an evolutionary account of social shaping. In particular, I will focus on how humans evolved to use orgasm and sexual arousal to shape the social behavior and emotional states of others through both classical and operant conditioning and through both reproductive and non-reprod... (shrink)

Since James defined emotion as consciousness of bodily reactions and Cannon and others detailed the nature of these reactions, there has been an increasing tendency among behaviorists to equate emotions with visceral reactions and to neglect some of the genetic and adaptive aspects of emotion which had been discussed by Darwin.

ONE Introduction The history of psychology in the twentieth century is a story of the divorce and remarriage of psychology and philosophy. ...

Psychology is in a preparadigmatic or pre-unified stage of scientific development. Two characteristics of psychology's status are: lack of cumulative scientific growth and experimental-theoretical overgeneralization. The reinforcer, as a construct in theories and as a critical element of behavioral change, has been a casualty of the separatism between such factions as radical behaviorism and cognitive psychology. In the end, psychology as a progressive science has been impeded, and psychological practitioners have been left to use intervention (...) techniques that are not the most effective or efficient. In order to improve upon this situation, unification is needed between radical behaviorism and cognitive psychology, among other disciplines. However, the issue of the reinforcer is only one of many areas where such unification should be pursued and attained. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Convergences between phenomenological psychology (PP) and behaviorism include opposition to dualism between the physical world and mental representations, and between a real visible man and an "inner" man with conscious states of which he alone is aware. Additionally, both views favor cautious use of theories, especially those which utilize hypothetico-deductive methodology, and a careful, descriptive, rather than inferential approach to behavior. Behaviorism and PP also share opposition to physiological reductionism. The 2 viewpoints diverge regarding their understanding of (...) science. PP is more sensitive to the difference between natural and human phenomena and contends that the latter cannot be adequately dealt with by means of the scientific approach applicable with the former. Rather, a broader and more naively descriptive approach must be adopted. A further difference is that PP accepts intentionality in man's viewpoint of the world while behaviorism accounts for man strictly in terms of external relations. Finally, the phenomenologist is more likely to eschew the language of control in describing man and, instead, emphasize a careful description of the meanings man imposes on his world. (shrink)

"Intentional behaviorism" is Gordon Foxall's name for his proposal to mix the oil of mentalist language with the water of empiricist behaviorism. The trouble is, oil and water don't mix. To remain scientific, the language of behavioral science must remain non-mental. Folk psychological ascriptions of belief and desire do not explain the patterns of behavior identified by behavior analysis; they merely describe these patterns in less scientific language. The underpinnings of these patterns, if not intentionality, must be sought (...) in physiology, particularly neurophysiology. Intentionality is an aspect of language, not the world. If we find it in the world, it is because we have put it there. (shrink)

This book shows how the three-term contingency paradigm created by B.F. Skinner can be applied to describe and explain cultural practices phenomena produced by complex relations between behavior and environment. It updates the academic debate on the best paradigm to analyze complex social interactions, arguing that Skinner’s three-term contingency - the conceptual tool created to analyze human behavior by decomposing it in three parts: discriminative stimulus, operant response and reinforcement/punishment - is the best unit of analysis since what is selected (...) in social interactions are not the actions of the group but of individuals gathered in a group situation to form an articulated and interlocked behavioral practice. The author argues in favor of a relational approach to study behavior and identifies its theoretical foundations in the philosophy of Ernst Mach, especially in Mach’s concept of functional relations and its influence on Skinner. Departing from this theoretical framework, the author argues that behavior can only be studied through the analysis of how it emerges from relations, and cannot be explained by hypothetical constructs such as cognitive maps, personality formation mechanisms, drives, traits and preconceived motivational forces. Radical Behaviorism and Cultural Analysis will be of interest to psychology researchers and students interested in the theoretical foundations of behavior analysis, as well as to social scientists and policy makers from other areas interested in how behavior analysis can be used to study complex social interactions and how it can be applied to build a more fair and sustainable society through cultural planning and the development of prosocial behavior. (shrink)

At one time behavioristic psychology depreciated the value of introspection and descriptive observation in an attempt to exorcise the ghosts of mentalism and introspectionism. The roots of this bias were traced to a Cartesian dualism of subject and object. Behavioristic research has typically concentrated on a specific kind of data requiring the controls of a detached third-person observer. Its findings have been far removed from the concrete "lived world" of the subject, notwithstanding the sophistication and utility of its experimental (...) designs. The task of understanding the human world of everyday life has been precluded from investigation by an exclusive reliance on explanation for the purpose of facilitating prediction. A case has been made that such a position is neither philosophically tenable nor conducive to the growth of psychology as a science. The contention of contemporary philosophers and behavioral scientists is that psychology cannot proceed as an independent science of man without combining empirical induction with experiential descriptions. Psychologists cannot exclude the role of intentionality and remain consistently within the orbit of causality. A science of psychology as the study of behavior and experience is possible through a comprehensive approach with equitable sharing of methodologies. Two methods were presented: The method of Phenomenal Study, and the method of Individual Reflection. Experiences from the real world may be studied without the earlier pitfalls of "introspectionism," or the present outcries against a meaningfulness. An application of the two methods to the experience of "feeling understood," suggests a necessary and possible rapprochement between the methods of behaviorism and phenomenology. (shrink)

Reviews the book, Behavior and personality: Psychological behaviorism by Arthur W. Staats . Staats' latest book provides a brief introduction to his philosophy of science known as unified positivism and a comprehensive review of his specific theory known as psychological behaviorism . Readers unfamiliar with Staats' work can, through this book, become acquainted with his earnest, if not somewhat totalitarian, strategy for uniting psychology under a single theoretical framework. Although Staats' earlier publications provide a more clear and (...) accessible exposition of his project than the current work, this book nonetheless constitutes an important contribution to the literature of fragmentation. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Ned Block. Psychologism and behaviorism. Philosophical Review, 90, 5-43.) argued that a behaviorist conception of intelligence is mistaken, and that the nature of an agent's internal processes is relevant for determining whether the agent has intelligence. He did that by describing a machine which lacks intelligence, yet can answer questions put to it as an intelligent person would. The nature of his machine's internal processes, he concluded, is relevant for determining that it lacks intelligence. I argue against Block that (...) it is not the nature of its processes but of its linguistic behavior which is responsible for his machine's lack of intelligence. As I show, not only has Block failed to establish that the nature of internal processes is conceptually relevant for psychology, in fact his machine example actually supports some version of behaviorism. As Wittgenstein has maintained, as far as psychology is concerned, there may be chaos inside. (shrink)

Behaviorism and mentalism are commonly considered to be mutually exclusive and conjunctively exhaustive options for the psychological explanation of behavior. Behaviorism and mentalism do differ in their characterization of inner causes of behavior. However, I argue that they are not mutually exclusive on the grounds that they share important foundational assumptions, two of which are the notion of an innerouter split and the notion of control. I go on to argue that mentalism and behaviorism are not conjunctively (...) exhaustive either, on the grounds that dropping these common foundational assumptions results in a distinctively different framework for the explanation of behavior. This third alternative, which is briefly described, is a version of non-individualism. (shrink)

This book is about the eminent behavioral scientist B. F. Skinner, the American culture in which he lived and worked, and the behaviorist movement that played a leading role in American psychological and social thought during the twentieth century. From a base of research on laboratory animals in the 1930s, Skinner built a committed and influential following as well as a utopian movement for social reform. His radical ideas attracted much public attention and generated heated controversy. By the mid-1970s, he (...) had become the most widely recognized scientist in America, surpassing even Margaret Mead and Linus Pauling. Yet Skinner himself was an unassuming family man from a modest middle-class background, a machine-shop tinkerer whose tastes ran to English and French literature. Drawing on archival research, interviews, and historical styles appropriate to the evidence, the authors assembled in this volume examine Skinner's remarkable rise to prominence in the wider context of America's intellectual, cultural, and social history. (shrink)