Results for 'Believing More'

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  1. (Hard ernst) 126–132 corrigendum.J. van Brakel, Erik J. Olsson, Believing More & U. Kriegel - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (1):457-458.
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  2.  86
    Believing more, risking less: On coherence, truth and non-trivial extensions.Luc Bovens & Erik J. Olsson - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (2):137 - 150.
    If you believe more things you thereby run a greater risk of being in error than if you believe fewer things. From the point of view of avoiding error, it is best not to believe anything at all, or to have very uncommitted beliefs. But considering the fact that we all in fact do entertain many specific beliefs, this recommendation is obviously in flagrant dissonance with our actual epistemic practice. Let us call the problem raised by this apparent conflict (...)
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  3. Do Muslims Believe More in Protestant Work Ethic than Christians? Comparison of People with Different Religious Background Living in the US.Yavuz Fahir Zulfikar - 2012 - Journal of Business Ethics 105 (4):489-502.
    This study examines the work ethic characteristics of Protestant, Catholic, and Muslim people who are living in the US. People originally from Turkey were targeted under the Muslim group. Since a significant number of people selected “none” as their religious affiliation in the survey, this group has also been included in the final analysis. Eight hundred and three people (313 Protestants, 180 “none”, 96 Muslims, 86 Catholics, and 128 other) participated in this questionnaire study. The analyses revealed that Muslim Turks (...)
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  4.  29
    Road to language: Longer, more believable, more relevant.R. Allen Gardner - 2006 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (3):285-286.
    A realistic developmental view of language acquisition recognizes vocabulary and pragmatics as well as grammar with a lengthy period of growth in a favorable environment. Cross-fostering is a tool of behavioral biology for studying the interaction between genetic endowment and developmental environment. Sign language studies of cross-fostered chimpanzees measure development in a nearly human environment.
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  5.  9
    Developing Scotland’s First Green Health Prescription Pathway: A One-Stop Shop for Nature-Based Intervention Referrals.Viola Marx & Kimberly R. More - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    IntroductionLifestyle modifications are part of comprehensive treatment plans to help manage the symptoms of pre-existing chronic conditions. However, behavior change is notoriously difficult as patients often lack the necessary support. The present manuscript outlines the development of a Green Health Prescription pathway that was designed to link patients with appropriate lifestyle interventions and to support attendance. Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats analysis was undertaken in three focus groups to highlight areas of strength and weakness within the proposed pathway prior to (...)
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  6.  16
    Making More Plausible What is Hard to Believe: Historical Justifications and Illustrations of Newton's Third Law.Colin Gauld - 1998 - Science & Education 7 (2):159-172.
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  7.  70
    Paranormal believers are more prone to illusory agency detection than skeptics.Michiel van Elk - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (3):1041-1046.
    It has been hypothesized that illusory agency detection is at the basis of belief in supernatural agents and paranormal beliefs. In the present study a biological motion perception task was used to study illusory agency detection in a group of skeptics and a group of paranormal believers. Participants were required to detect the presence or absence of a human agent in a point-light display. It was found that paranormal believers had a lower perceptual sensitivity than skeptics, which was due to (...)
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  8.  5
    More seeing is believing: dramatic evidence of a Creator-God.Mark Finley - 1999 - Boise, Idaho: Pacific Press. Edited by Steven R. Mosley.
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  9. I believe it, but soon I'll not believe it any more: Scepticism, empiricism, and reflection.John M. Vickers - 2000 - Synthese 124 (2):155-174.
  10.  86
    Atheists and Agnostics Are More Reflective than Religious Believers: Four Empirical Studies and a Meta-Analysis.Gordon Pennycook, Robert M. Ross, Derek J. Koehler & Jonathan A. Fugelsang - 2016 - PLoS ONE 11 (4):e0153039.
    Individual differences in the mere willingness to think analytically has been shown to predict religious disbelief. Recently, however, it has been argued that analytic thinkers are not actually less religious; rather, the putative association may be a result of religiosity typically being measured after analytic thinking (an order effect). In light of this possibility, we report four studies in which a negative correlation between religious belief and performance on analytic thinking measures is found when religious belief is measured in a (...)
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  11. “The Diagram is More Important Than is Ordinarily Believed”: A Picture of Lonergan’s Cognitional Structure.Ryan Miller - 2021 - The Lonergan Review 12:51-78.
    In his article “Insight: Genesis and Ongoing Context,” Fred Crowe calls out Lonergan’s line “the diagram is more important than…is ordinarily believed” as the “philosophical understatement of the century.” Sixteen pages later he identifies elaborating an invariant cognitional theory to underlie generalized emergent probability and thus “the immanent order of the universe of proportionate being,” as “our challenge,” “but given the difficulty” he does not “see any prospect for an immediate answer.” Could this have something to do with the (...)
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  12.  15
    Seeing Is Believing: Making Wellbeing More Tangible.Dianne A. Vella-Brodrick, Anneliese Gill & Kent Patrick - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    Positive Psychology has been instrumental in promoting wellbeing science in the modern era. However, there are still ways in which positive psychology interventions and positive education programmes can be improved to achieve more robust and sustained effects. One suggested method is to make wellbeing more salient and tangible through the use of objective tools that assess the relationship between psychological and physiological wellbeing, and enable wellbeing status and change to be seen. With the addition of an interdisciplinary team, (...)
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  13.  48
    There is more to belief than Van Leeuwen believes.Neil Levy - 2024 - Mind and Language 39 (4):584-589.
    Neil Van Leeuwen argues that many religious people do not act and infer as we would expect believers to act and infer, and on this basis argues that they are not genuine believers. They take some other, nondoxastic, attitude to the claims they profess to believe. In this short commentary, I argue that in many (but far from all) such cases, the content, and not the attitude, explains the departures from the inferential and behavioral stereotype we associate with belief.
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  14. Believe, but won't argue for here, that responsibility for injustices against indigenous australians lies more broadly with the collective australian public. Whilst relevant to the issue of reconciliation in australia, my focus in this paper is more modest. On the collective responsibility of current responsibility and apology 73 74 public affairs quarterly see Berel Lang," forgiveness,". [REVIEW]I. Indeed - 1994 - American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (2):6.
     
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  15.  51
    The ventral stream offers more affordance and the dorsal stream more memory than believed.Albert Postma, Rob van der Lubbe & Sander Zuidhoek - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):115-116.
    Opposed to Norman's proposal, processing of affordance is likely to occur not solely in the dorsal stream but also in the ventral stream. Moreover, the dorsal stream might do more than just serve an important role in motor actions. It supports egocentric location coding as well. As such, it would possess a form of representational memory, contrary to Norman's proposal.
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  16. Believing versus disbelieving in free will: Correlates and consequences.Roy Baumeister - 2012 - Personality and Social Psychology Compass 6 (10):736-745.
    Some people believe more than others in free will, and researchers have both measured and manipulated those beliefs. Disbelief in free will has been shown to cause dishonest, selfish, aggressive, and conforming behavior, and to reduce helpfulness, learning from one’s misdeeds, thinking for oneself, recycling, expectations for occupational success, and actual quality of performance on the job. Belief in free will has been shown to have only modest or negligible correlations with other variables, indicating that it is a distinct (...)
     
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  17.  58
    Believability and syllogistic reasoning.Jane Oakhill, P. N. Johnson-Laird & Alan Garnham - 1989 - Cognition 31 (2):117-140.
    In this paper we investigate the locus of believability effects in syllogistic reasoning. We identify three points in the reasoning process at which such effects could occur: the initial interpretation of premises, the examination of alternative representations of them (in all of which any valid conclusion must be true), and the “filtering” of putative conclusions. The effect of beliefs at the first of these loci is well established. In this paper we report three experiments that examine whether beliefs have an (...)
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  18.  67
    Believing is Seeing: Feminist Philosophy, Knowledge, and Perception.Briana Toole - 2020 - In Elly Vintiadis (ed.), Philosophy by Women 22 Philosophers Reflect on Philosophy and Its Value. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 161-168.
    “Seeing is believing!”, or so the old adage goes. Roughly, the idea expressed by the adage is this: one needs to see x before one is willing to believe that x exists. In this chapter, I examine the extent to which it is more apt to say that believing is seeing​. Expanding on the work of feminist epistemologists and critical race scholars, I consider a number of cases in which one needs to believe that x exists before (...)
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  19.  25
    Believer Personality in the Perspective of Verification and Imitation.Süleyman Yavuzer - 2022 - van İlahiyat Dergisi 10 (16):48-70.
    The concept of faith is a word that comes from the root e-m-n, meaning to believe, to trust, to be attached, to obey, to obey and to follow. It is a concept that is used with different conjunctions/letters in Arabic language grammar and semantics and gains different meanings according to the conjunction/letter used together, also differs and diversifies depending on the starting points and approaches, and has special field uses as well as meaning contractions and expansions. Investigative faith includes a (...)
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  20. Why Do We Believe Humans Matter More than Other Animals?Scott Hill & Michael Bertrand - 2020 - Journal of Applied Animal Ethics Research:1 - 8.
    Some recent psychological studies suggest that the belief that humans matter more than other animals can be strengthened by cognitive dissonance. Jaquet (forthcom- ing) argues that some of these studies also show that the relevant belief is primar- ily caused by cognitive dissonance and is therefore subject to a debunking argument. We offer an alternative hypothesis according to which we are already speciesist but cognitive dissonance merely enhances our speciesism. We argue that our hypothesis explains the results of the (...)
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  21.  62
    On Believing.R. W. Sleeper - 1966 - Religious Studies 2 (1):75 - 93.
    In an important article in the opening issue of Religious Studies , Professor H. H. Price states that: ‘Epistemologists have not usually had much to say about believing “in”, though ever since Plato's time they have been interested in believing “that”’ . We are all considerably in debt to Professor Price for his extremely lucid analysis which will, I think, go a very long way towards filling the lacuna to which he points. As I find myself in agreement (...)
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  22.  62
    Does believing that everyone else is less ethical have an impact on work behavior?Thomas Tyson - 1992 - Journal of Business Ethics 11 (9):707 - 717.
    Researchers consistently report that individuals see themselves acting far more ethically than comparable others when confronted with ethically uncertain work-related behaviors. They suggest that this belief encourages unethical conduct and contributes to the degeneration of business ethics; however, they have not specifically investigated the consequences of this belief. If undesirable work behaviors actually do occur, educators and other ethics advocates would be strongly encouraged to dispel this widely held notion.In the present study, data was collected from college students and (...)
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  23. Believing on trust.Klemens Kappel - 2014 - Synthese 191 (9):2009-2028.
    The aim of the paper is to propose a way in which believing on trust can ground doxastic justification and knowledge. My focus will be the notion of trust that plays the role depicted by such cases as concerned Hardwig (J Philos 82:335–49, 1985; J Philos 88:693–708, 1991) in his early papers, papers that are often referenced in recent debates in social epistemology. My primary aim is not exegetical, but since it sometimes not so clear what Hardwig’s claims are, (...)
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  24. On believing indirectly for practical reasons.Sebastian Schmidt - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1795-1819.
    It is often argued that there are no practical reasons for belief because we could not believe for such reasons. A recent reply by pragmatists is that we can often believe for practical reasons because we can often cause our beliefs for practical reasons. This paper reveals the limits of this recently popular strategy for defending pragmatism, and thereby reshapes the dialectical options for pragmatism. I argue that the strategy presupposes that reasons for being in non-intentional states are not reducible (...)
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  25.  17
    Thomas More's Historical Legacy: The Tudor Tragedies of King Richard III.Elliott M. Simon - 2020 - Moreana 57 (2):171-201.
    Thomas More's History of Richard III is a metahistory, rich in factual and fictional details. I will discuss More's concept of historiography as a rhetorical art and how his presentation of history transformed details of what was imperfectly known about Richard III into a polemic about what should be believed as an irrefutable truth. More's conception of history is much more amorphous than modern theories. He incorporated classical myths, literature, history, and philosophy along with phantasies, dreams, (...)
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  26.  27
    Believing Things.Robert C. Coburn - 1971 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):93 - 103.
    The account of belief adumbrated by Ryle in The Concept of Mind is, I think, a very tempting one despite its relative vagueness. According to this account, a belief that such and such is the case is a disposition of a certain kind. More specifically, it is a tendency or a propensity to behave and to react in more or less definite ways under certain circumstances. Thus “to believe that the ice is dangerously thin,” Ryle writes, “is to (...)
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  27. The moral obligations of reasonable non-believers: A special problem for divine command metaethics.Wes Morriston - 2009 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65 (1):1 - 10.
    People who do not believe that there is a God constitute an obvious problem for divine command metaethics. They have moral obligations, and are often enough aware of having them. Yet it is not easy to think of such persons as “hearing” divine commands. This makes it hard to see how a divine command theory can offer a completely general account of the nature of moral obligation. The present paper takes a close look at this issue as it emerges in (...)
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  28. Believing is said of groups in many ways (and so it should be said of them in none).Richard Pettigrew -
    In the first half of this paper, I argue that group belief ascriptions are highly ambiguous. What's more, in many cases, neither the available contextual factors nor known pragmatic considerations are sufficient to allow the audience to identify which of the many possible meanings is intended. In the second half, I argue that this ambiguity often has bad consequences when a group belief ascription is heard and taken as testimony. And indeed it has these consequences even when the ascription (...)
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  29.  7
    Unbelievable: why we believe and why we don't.Graham Ward - 2014 - New York: I.B. Tauris.
    Why believe? What kinds of things do people believe in? How have they come to believe them? And how does what they believe -- or disbelieve -- shape their lives and the meaning the world has for them? For Graham Ward, who is one of the most innovative writers on contemporary religion, these questions are more than just academic. They go to the heart not only of who but of what we are as human beings. Over the last thirty (...)
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  30.  85
    Really believing in fiction.David B. Suits - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):369–386.
    How is it possible to respond emotionally to that which we believe is not the case? All of the many responses to this "paradox of fiction" make one or more of three important mistakes: (1) neglecting the context of believing, (2) assuming that belief is an all-or-nothing affair, and (3) assuming that if you believe that p then you cannot also reasonably believe that not-p. My thesis is that we react emotionally to stories because we do believe what (...)
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  31. Believing in things.Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):584–611.
    I argue against the standard view that ontological debates can be fully described as disagreements about what we should believe to exist. The central thesis of the paper is that believing in Fs in the ontologically relevant sense requires more than merely believing that Fs exist. Believing in Fs is not even a propositional attitude; it is rather an attitude one bears to the term expressed by 'Fs'. The representational correctness of such a belief requires not (...)
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  32. (1 other version)Why Believe in Normative Supervenience?Debbie Roberts - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.
    According to many, that the normative supervenes on the non-normative is a truism of normative discourse. This chapter argues that those committed to more specific moral, aesthetic, and epistemic supervenience theses should also hold : As a matter of conceptual necessity, whenever something has a normative property, it has a base property or collection of base properties that metaphysically necessitates the normative one. The main aim in this chapter is to show that none of the available arguments establish, or (...)
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  33.  17
    (1 other version)Believing at Will.Kieran Setiya - 1981 - In Felicia Ackerman (ed.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. pp. 36–52.
    This chapter contains sections titled: I II III IV References.
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  34.  41
    Lying, more or less: a computer simulation study of graded lies and trust dynamics.Borut Trpin, Anna Dobrosovestnova & Sebastian J. Götzendorfer - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1-28.
    Partial lying denotes the cases where we partially believe something to be false but nevertheless assert it with the intent to deceive the addressee. We investigate how the severity of partial lying may be determined and how partial lies can be classified. We also study how much epistemic damage an agent suffers depending on the level of trust that she invests in the liar and the severity of the lies she is told. Our analysis is based on the results from (...)
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  35.  38
    In Defence of Believing Wishfully.Mark Mercer - 2010 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (2):211-224.
    To believe a proposition wishfully is to believe it because one wants to believe it, and not because one has evidence or reason that it is true. Is it wise to be open to believing wishfully? After criticising one popular argument that we ought be closed to believing wishfully, I develop an argument that being closed to believing wishfully is to labour under a debilitating prejudice. As a rule, then, we ought to be open to believing (...)
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  36. Believing without Evidence: Pragmatic Arguments for Religious Belief in Life of Pi.Alberto Oya - 2020 - In Adam T. Bogar & Rebeka Sara Szigethy (eds.), Critical Insights: Life of Pi. Ipswich, MA: Salem Press. pp. 136-147.
    The aim of this essay is to show that Yann Martel’s Life of Pi can be read as illustrating what philosophers usually name as pragmatic arguments for religious belief. Ultimately, this seems to be the reason why, in the short prologue that accompanies the novel, Martel claims Life of Pi to be “a story to make you believe in God”. To put it briefly, these arguments claim that even conceding that the question of whether to believe that God exists or (...)
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  37.  7
    Freedom to Believe: Essays and Letters.Slava I. Yastremski & Michael M. Naydan (eds.) - 2010 - Bucknell University Press.
    Freedom to Believe is a powerful collection of philosophical and religious essays by a modern poet of distinction. It introduces a highly original and controversial thinker to the Western reader. Olga Sedakova's central philosophical thought lies in the notion of existential freedom in its association with the liberating power of the arts, especially poetry. These convictions place her firmly in the Russian and European classical cultural traditions, which, in turn, have deep roots in Christianity. Devoutly Orthodox yet fiercely independent in (...)
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  38.  15
    Old Believer Monasteries of right-bank Ukraine in the first half of the nineteenth century.Yu V. Voloshyn - 2000 - Ukrainian Religious Studies 14:44-53.
    One of the least investigated, which now exists in Ukraine is the Old Believers. Despite the fact that their communities have been operating in our territory for more than two centuries, researchers have long devised this topic with their attention. The main reason for this attitude to the study of the Old Believers should be considered political realities of the XX century, and they are known to have not contributed to the objective study of even traditional Ukrainian denominations. Therefore, (...)
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  39.  12
    Freedom to Believe: Essays and Letters.Olga Sedakova - 2010 - Bucknell University Press.
    Freedom to Believe is a powerful collection of philosophical and religious essays by a modern poet of distinction. It introduces a highly original and controversial thinker to the Western reader. Olga Sedakova's central philosophical thought lies in the notion of existential freedom in its association with the liberating power of the arts, especially poetry. These convictions place her firmly in the Russian and European classical cultural traditions, which, in turn, have deep roots in Christianity. Devoutly Orthodox yet fiercely independent in (...)
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  40. Vice Epistemology of Believers in Pseudoscience.Filip Tvrdý - 2021 - Filozofia 76 (10):735-751.
    The demarcation of pseudoscience has been one of the most important philosophical tasks since the 1960s. During the 1980s, an atmosphere of defeatism started to spread among philosophers of science, some of them claimed the failure of the demarcation project. I defend that the more auspicious approach to the problem might be through the intellectual character of epistemic agents, i.e., from the point of view of vice epistemology. Unfortunately, common lists of undesirable character features are usually based on a (...)
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  41.  66
    Some More Reflections on Emotions, Thoughts, and Therapy.Demian Whiting - 2006 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (3):255-257.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Some More Reflections on Emotions, Thoughts, and TherapyDemian Whiting (bio)Keywordsdepression, pedophilia, phenomenology, noncognitive, treatmentThe primary objective of my paper was to show that where a person's representations of the world are eliciting the wrong emotions then treatment of those problems in emotion cannot be about treating the eliciting representations. And it is worth clarifying two points about my claim here. First, although I take my claim to apply (...)
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  42.  91
    Incontinent believing.Alfred R. Mele - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (143):212-222.
    In this paper I shall attempt to characterize a central case of incontinent believing and to explain how it is possible. Akrasiais exhibited in a variety of ways in the practical or "actional" sphere; but in the full-blown and seemingly most challenging case the akratic agent performs an intentional, free action which is contrary to a judgment of what is better or best to do that he both consciously holds at the time of action and consciously believes to be (...)
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  43.  7
    To Believe Or Not to Believe: Readings in the Philosophy of Religion.E. D. Klemke - 1992 - Cengage Learning.
    A comprehensive anthology of selections for the Introductory Philosophy of Religion course, this text surveys more than 50 responses to the question, "Is religious belief a viable option in today's world?" Organizes selections around central theistic positions and attacks on those positions. Pro-con format encourages lively discussions.
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  44. Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism.Berislav Marušić & John Schwenkler - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):309-340.
    We argue that intentions are beliefs—beliefs that are held in light of, and made rational by, practical reasoning. To intend to do something is neither more nor less than to believe, on the basis of one’s practical reasoning, that one will do it. The identification of the mental state of intention with the mental state of belief is what we call strong cognitivism about intentions. It is a strong form of cognitivism because we identify intentions with beliefs, rather than (...)
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  45.  37
    If You Believe, You Believe.Peter Baumann - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (4):389-416.
    Can I be wrong about my own beliefs? More precisely: Can I falsely believe that I believe that p? I argue that the answer is negative. This runs against what many philosophers and psychologists have traditionally thought and still think. I use a rather new kind of argument, – one that is based on considerations about Moore's paradox. It shows that if one believes that one believes that p then one believes that p – even though one can believe (...)
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  46.  82
    The 'will to believe' in science and religion.William J. Gavin - 1984 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 15 (3):139 - 148.
    “The Will to Believe” defines the religious question as forced, living and momentous, but even in this article James asserts that more objective factors are involved. The competing religious hypotheses must both be equally coherent and correspond to experimental data to an equal degree. Otherwise the option is not a live one. “If I say to you ‘Be a theosophist or be a Mohammedan’, it is probably a dead option, because for you neither hypothesis is likely to be alive.” (...)
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  47.  98
    Is believing at will 'conceptually impossible'?Nikolaj Nottelman - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (2):105-124.
    In this paper I discuss the claim that believing at will is ‘conceptually impossible’ or, to use a formulation encountered in the debate, “that nothing could be a belief and be willed directly”. I argue that such a claim is only plausible if directed against the claim that believing itself is an action-type. However, in the debate, the claim has been univocally directed against the position that forming a belief is an action-type. I argue that the many arguments (...)
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  48.  73
    The Passional Nature and the Will to Believe.James Southworth - 2016 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 52 (1):62.
    A central criticism of William James’s “The Will to Believe” is that it gives individuals a license for wishful thinking. There may be insufficient evidence with respect to the existence of God, but our willing to believe that God exists does not make it the case. Simply put, wanting something to be true does not make it true. Accordingly, some of James’s early critics proposed that the essay would have been more accurately titled “The Will to Deceive” or “The (...)
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  49. Can groups be genuine believers? The argument from interpretationism.Marvin Backes - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10311-10329.
    In ordinary discourse we often attribute beliefs not just to individuals but also to groups. But can groups really have genuine beliefs? This paper considers but ultimately rejects one of the main arguments in support of the claim that groups can be genuine believers – the Argument From Interpretationism – and concludes that we have good reasons to be sceptical about the existence of group beliefs. According to the Argument From Interpretationism, roughly speaking, groups qualify as genuine believers because we (...)
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  50.  61
    Believing that everyone else is less ethical: Implications for work behavior and ethics instruction. [REVIEW]Thomas Tyson - 1990 - Journal of Business Ethics 9 (9):715 - 721.
    Studies consistently report that individuals believe they are far more ethical than co-workers, superiors, or managers in other firms. The present study confirms this finding when comparing undergraduate students' own ethical standards to their perceptions of the standards held by most managers or supervisors. By maintaining a holier than thou ethical perception, new and future managers might rationalize their unethical behavior as being necessary for success in an unethical world. A prisoner's dilemma type problem can be said to exist (...)
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