This paper introduces a series of lectures Ernst Kantorowicz offered to the Army Specialized Training Program in 1943 in order to reconsider the development of his intellectual biography. These “wartime lectures” constitute Kantorowicz’s only sustained discussion of modern German history and his only intellectual engagement with Nazism. Introducing these lectures thus presents an opportunity to re-examine the relationship between Kantorowicz’s early and mature works through his assessment of Nazi Germany. For Kantorowicz, Nazism was the violent result of a German commitment (...) to political prophecy. At the core of Kantorowicz’s lectures was a criticism of political theology and its role in modern history. In making this criticism, Kantorowicz simultaneously distanced himself from the prophetic register of his earlier writings. Moreover, recovering Kantorowicz’s concern with modern political theology is also important in foregrounding the intellectual genealogy of The King’s Two Bodies, a work often separated from its more telling subtitle: A Study in Medieval Political Theology. Together, this paper argues that the most significant changes in Kantorowicz’s writings can be traced to the intellectual circumstances of the Second World War. (shrink)

This essay focuses on personal love, or the love of particular persons as such. Part of the philosophical task in understanding personal love is to distinguish the various kinds of personal love. For example, the way in which I love my wife is seemingly very different from the way I love my mother, my child, and my friend. This task has typically proceeded hand-in-hand with philosophical analyses of these kinds of personal love, analyses that in part respond to various puzzles (...) about love. Can love be justified? If so, how? What is the value of personal love? What impact does love have on the autonomy of both the lover and the beloved? (shrink)

Among medical researchers and clinicians the dominant view is that it is unethical to deceive patients by prescribing a placebo. This opinion is formalized in a recent policy issued by the American Medical Association (AMA [Chicago, IL]). Although placebos can be shown to be always safe, often effective, and sometimes necessary, doctors are now effectively prohibited from using them in clinical practice. I argue that the deceptive administration of placebos is not subject to the same moral objections that face other (...) forms of deception in clinical practice and medical research. Although deception is normally objectionable on the grounds that it limits autonomy and breaches trust, these grounds do not apply to placebos when they are prescribed within appropriate ethical limits. Patients have reason to prefer that doctors can prescribe placebos in ethically responsible ways. Hence, the AMA has an obligation to endorse and to promote the responsible use of deceptive placebos in clinical practice. (shrink)

This paper is a response to Emily McTernan’s book, Taking Offence. I focus on how to evaluate taking offence comparatively against alternative attitudes such as anger or blame. Drawing on some of my work on blame, emotion and expressive action, I sketch a way in which we might reach a more convincing answer than that provided by McTernan.

Sedlakova and Trachsel (2023) identify a major benefit of conversational artificial intelligence (CAI) in psychotherapy as its ability to expand access to mental healthcare for vulnerable populatio...

I am very grateful to Stephan Leuenberger, Erica Shumener and Naomi Thompson for their excellent and thoughtful commentaries on Making Things Up. I have learned a lot from thinking through their replies. As it happens, they focus on pretty disparate aspects of the book: necessitation, relative fundamentality, and what builds the building facts, respectively. I will thus engage with their remarks separately.

There was a duel at dawn between A and B. A shot B, who lingered on until dusk of that day, and then died of his bulletwound. Certain background conditions are satisfied which make it right to say not just that A caused B's death but that he killed him. So, A shot B and killed him. This seems to be structurally different from "A shot B and he kicked him," but what is this structural difference? How does the shooting (...) relate to the killing? (shrink)

In the first two sections of this reply article, I provide a brief introduction to the topic of ineffability and a summary of Ineffability and Religious Experience. This is followed, in section 3, by some reflections in reply to the response articles by Professors Metz and Cooper. Section 4 presents some concluding remarks on the future of philosophy of religion in the light of the most recent philosophical work on ineffability.

Cornell University Ithaca, NY 14850 kb383@cornell.eduWhat are motorcycles made of? Presumably the answer is something like ‘wheels, pistons, fuel lines …’ or perhaps ‘metal, leather, plastic …’. Whatever precisely the parts of a motorcycle are, surely they are all material. Kathrin Koslicki disagrees. She has recently argued that ordinary material objects like motorcycles not only have material proper parts, but also have formal proper parts . On her view, an accurate list of the proper parts of a motorcycle must include (...) something like motorcyclehood in addition to the sorts of things just listed. Although she remains neutral about what exactly such a formal part is , she is explicit about what it does. The formal part of an object dictates structure; it dictates how the material parts must be arranged. It is ‘a kind of recipe for how to build wholes of that particular kind’ . Koslicki claims that this recipe or structure is itself a proper part of every motorcycle. That is what she calls the Neo-Aristotelian Thesis . A strange claim! So let us examine Koslicki’s argument for it. She begins by asking us to consider a case in which an artist shapes a single lump of clay L, thereby creating a statue S. The argument then proceeds as follows : The argument for the Neo-Aristotelian Thesis:1.It is possible to make an object S from a single preexisting material ingredient L. 2.L is a proper part of S. 3.Weak Supplementation: anything that has a proper part has at least two non-overlapping proper parts. 4.S has a proper part Q that does not overlap L . 5.S has no material proper parts other than L 6.Q is a proper part, but not a material proper part, of S 7.S has …. (shrink)

Following Moore, I use ‘P entails Q’ as a convenient shorthand for ‘Q can be deduced logically from P’, ‘From P, Q follows logically’, ‘There is a logically valid argument with P as sole premise and Q as conclusion’, and the like.1 Apart from a minor point to be raised in Section XVI, distinctions within this cluster do not matter for present purposes. An analysis of the concept of entailment is answerable to careful, educated uses of expressions such as those. (...) An analysis which condemned nearly everything we say about what follows from what simply would not be an analysis of the common concept of entailment. If the concept were inconsistent, some common uses of it would be condemned; but only by standards established by the others. C. I. Lewis maintained this: to say that P entails Q is to say that it is logically impossible that (P & ¬Q).2 If Quine is right, then ‘entails’ and ‘impossible’ are as suspect as all other intensional terms. So perhaps they are; but their uses are not wholly without structure, and there are wrong ways of interrelating them. Lewis’s contention is about the internal geography of the intensional area, not its relations to the surrounding conceptual territory: it is an attempted analysis of one intensional expression in terms of another. I shall argue that Lewis was right, and also - by implication - that his thesis is helpful and clarifying - that is, that it is a genuine analysis. As is well known, Lewis’s analysis implies that each impossible proposition entails every proposition. Accepting the analysis, I accept this result. For one thing, Lewis has an argument for it (I use ‘→’ to abbreviate ‘entails’): (1) P & ¬P.. (shrink)

It is well known that Berkeley had two arguments for the existence of God. A while ago, in trying to discover what these arguments are and how they fit into Berkeley's scheme of things, I encountered certain problems which are hardly raised, let alone solved, in the standard commentaries. I think that I have now solved these problems, and in this paper I present my results.

Corporations can be powerful engines of economic prosperity, but also for the public good more broadly conceived. But they need to be properly incentivized to fulfil these missions. We propose an innovative plan called the Corporate Social Assessment (CSA). Every four years, a randomly selected Citizens’ Assembly will meet to decide a grading scheme for assessing companies’ conduct. At the end of the cycle, a professional assessment body will grade the companies and rank them. The ranking will be the basis (...) for subsidies to higher-tier companies, to be paid out of a fund to which all companies will contribute, to create a race to the top which financially rewards corporations taking public concerns seriously. The CSA radicalizes the corporate license to operate. To retain legitimacy in the eyes of wider segments of society, the proposal aims to democratize the way we hold corporations accountable for the power they wield. (shrink)

The topic of the democratic public's limited competence has preoccupied students of democracy for centuries. Anecdotal concerns about the problem reached their peak of sophistication in the writings of Walter Lippmann and Joseph Schumpeter. Not until Philip E. Converse's “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics” did statistical research overwhelmingly confirm the worst fears of such democratic skeptics. Subsequent work has tended to confirm Converse's picture of a tiny stratum of well‐informed ideological elites whose passionate political debates find little (...) echo, or even awareness, in the mass public. While a great deal of attention has been devoted to “saving” democratic legitimacy from such findings, the Converse‐inspired work of John Zaller (1992) shows how fruitful Converse's basic ideas can be not only in analyzing real‐world political events, but in pulling together and stimulating new lines of research into what moves the “creative synthesizers” of belief systems; into the factors that affect the small numbers of people who grasp such systems and attempt to transmit them to the public; and into the long‐term psychological or cultural sources of the predispositions with which members of the mass public confront the resulting political messages. (shrink)

Nelson Goodman has provided one of the most exciting advances in semiotic aesthetics in years in his recent book, Languages of Art. Among other theses that Goodman defends is the claim that pictures are elements of symbol systems to be understood in the way that languages are understood: that depiction and description are species of a common genus which is to be understood in terms of denotation. One of the consequences Goodman draws from his theory is that depiction is conventional: (...) the fact that a certain picture depicts a man is as much a matter of convention as the fact that a certain phrase describes him. This claim is interesting and exciting, but is it correct? Unfortunately, I do not think we are yet in a position to answer this last question, although I shall try to get nearer to an answer in this paper. (shrink)

This paper gives a concise overview of the history and meaning of Socratic Dialogue and how it has been developed and used in modern times. The process of Socratic dialogue is seen as an environment for enhancing learning and in enabling the emergence of new meaning to be articulated in language, thereby making the understanding more accessible to the group. The authors also share their perspective as participants in Socratic dialogues. It is suggested that Socratic dialogue enables open communication and (...) empathic listening, development of shared meaning, enhanced insight and increased moral accountability. (shrink)

What is responsible agency? I want to consider two perspectives we might take in thinking about responsibility, what we might call an inner and an outer perspective. The inner perspective is that of the agent herself, involving her having and exercising (or failing to exercise) certain agential capacities and so choosing and controlling her actions. The outer perspective is that from which we assess someone’s conduct and—crucially—her will as a matter of holding her to account. In each case, responsibility is (...) always to a certain set of norms. From the internal perspective, these are norms that are binding on her (or to which she binds herself); from the outer perspective these are norms in terms of which we assess her and so to which we hold her. -/- My aim in this paper is to argue that the inner perspective does not have priority over the outer perspective and thus that the theoretical approach is mistaken: our ability, prominent from the inner perspective, to take responsibility and so to hold ourselves accountable is not intelligible apart from our having a place in a broader community in which others hold us accountable. This idea, of course, is familiar to readers of Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment.” However, unlike Strawson, I do not think this implies that the outer perspective is prior to the inner, for ultimately I think we cannot make sense of an agent’s being properly held accountable unless he can take responsibility for his actions in a way that ultimately presupposes his freedom. This is not something I can argue here; rather, my claim will be that we cannot understand an agent’s being accountable as depending simply on the agent herself; rather, accountable agency depends on capacities that are essentially social. (shrink)

Few stage plays have much to do with analytic philosophy: Tom Stoppard has written two of them—Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead and Jumpers. The contrast between these, especially in how they involve philosophy, could hardly be greater. Rosencrantz does not parade its philosophical content; but the philosophy is there all the same, and it is solid, serious and functional. In contrast with this, the philosophy which is flaunted throughout Jumpers is thin and uninteresting, and it serves the play only in (...) a decorative and marginal way. Its main effect has been to induce timidity in reviewers who could not see the relevance to the play of the large stretches of academic philosophy which it contains. Since the relevance doesn't exist, the timidity was misplaced, and so the kid gloves need not have been used. Without doubting that I would have enjoyed the work as performed on the London stage, aided by the talent of Michael Hordern and the charm of Diana Rigg, I don't doubt either that Jumpers is a poor effort which doesn't deserve its current success. I shan't argue for that, however. I want only to explain why Jumpers is not a significantly philosophical play, before turning to the more important and congenial task of showing that Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead is one. (shrink)

Examining the author’s own experiences of narcotics addiction reveals certain aspects of the addicted mentality that have strong ethical valence. In general, this shows that addiction is not a state fundamentally characterized by lack. The rudiments of this position are found in some contemporary philosophy of addiction; also, it is contrasted with a common widely held mistaken view. Addiction should instead be understood in continuity with and as illuminating the nature of human personhood and subjectivity. Under a phenomenology specific to (...) the author’s experience, addiction appears as a mode of experience that has an unmanageable overflow of narratives created as discourses concerning people, events, thoughts, and feelings. (shrink)

What kind of things are damaged art-objects? Are they junk, trash, mere stuff? Or do they remain art by virtue of their distinguished provenance or still discernible design? What kind of powers do such things have as material bodies and forces? Instead of attempting to locate proper concepts for salvaged art-things, this essay, from a perspective centered on the power of bodies-in-encounter – where “power” in Spinoza’s sense is the capacity to affect and be affected – attempts to home in (...) on the presence of a material vibrancy in the hope of better understanding the postures, reactions, and comportments that damaged art pieces inspire as we engage with them. This article proposes that even so-called “inanimate” things convey specific degrees of animacy even if not all of them qualify under the biological definition of life. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs Gilles Deleuze’s interpretation of Epicurean atomism, and explicates his claim that it represents a problematic idea, similar to the idea exemplified in early, “barbaric” accounts of the differential calculus. Deleuzian problematic ideas are characterized by a mechanism through whose activity the components of the idea become determinate in relating reciprocally to one another, rather than in being determined exclusively in relation to an extrinsic paradigm or framework. In Epicurean atomism, as Deleuze reads it, such a mechanism of (...) determination can be found in the famous atomic “swerve”. It is necessary to bear this interpretation of Epicurean atomism in mind when understanding Deleuze and Guattari’s promulgation of a new image of thought in What is Philosophy? , which has an explicitly Epicurean inspiration. The paper argues that this inspiration is particularly evident to the extent that Deleuze and Guattari identify the sub-representative feature that lies at the heart of their new image of thought with “chaos”, defined as “infinite speed”. I claim that infinite speed, this otherwise puzzling feature of What is Philosophy? , ought to be understood in the light of Deleuze’s interpretation of Epicurus. Moreover, the Epicurean distinctions between different speeds must be read together with Deleuze’s appropriation of the metaphysics of the ancient Stoics, who, although widely recognized as Deleuze’s Hellenistic counterparts, lack important theoretical resources that the Epicureans provide for Deleuze. (shrink)

One argument which is frequently levelled against the enhancement of human biology is that we do not understand the evolved function of our bodies well enough to meddle in our biology without producing unintended and potentially catastrophic effects. In particular, this argument is levelled against attempts to slow or eliminate the processes of human ageing, or ‘senescence’, which cause us to grow decrepit before we die. In this article, I claim that even if this argument could usefully be applied against (...) attempts to enhance other human traits, it cannot be valid in the case of attempts to enhance the various processes that constitute senescence. I begin by reviewing the biology of ageing to show how it consists of a number of unrelated traits. Then, following the arguments of a number of evolutionary biologists, I explain that every one of these traits is a product of evolutionary ‘neglect’ rather than ‘intent’. Finally, I consider the strongest version of the argument against enhancing senescence, which acknowledges these facts about the evolution of ageing but insists that we have nevertheless have prudential reasons to avoid enhancement wherever there is some uncertainty about the genetics or evolutionary function of a trait. I provide two reasons for rejecting this version of the argument as well, even in the case of human senescence, where such uncertainty is currently significant. (shrink)

My ambition in this paper is to provide an account of an unacknowledged example of blameless guilt that, I argue, merits further examination. The example is what I call carer guilt: guilt felt by nurses and family members caring for patients with palliative-care needs. Nurses and carers involved in palliative care often feel guilty about what they perceive as their failure to provide sufficient care for a patient. However, in some cases the guilty carer does not think that he has (...) the capacity to provide sufficient care; he has, in his view, done all he can. These carers cannot legitimately be blamed for failing to meet their own expectations. Yet despite acknowledging their blamelessness, they nonetheless feel guilty. My aims are threefold: first, to explicate the puzzling nature of the carer guilt phenomenon; second, to motivate the need to solve that puzzle; third, to give my own account of blameless guilt that can explain why carers feel guilty despite their blamelessness. In doing so I argue that the guilt experienced by carers is a legitimate case of guilt, and that with the right caveats it can be considered an appropriate response to the progressive deterioration of someone for whom we care. (shrink)

Descartes rightly attacked the idea of space as extended nothing, but in inferring that space is an extended something, a substance, he overlooked the possibility that it is instead a system of relations. Even if it is a substance, it does not follow – as Descartes implied that it does – that “space” and “matter” are synonymous. It might instead be that space is a substantial container, portions of which can be colocated with bodies or that space is a substantial (...) separator, portions of which flow into all locations where there are no bodies. (shrink)

Current and recent philosophy of history contemplates a deep change in fundamental notions of the presence of the past. This is called breaking up time. The chief value for this change is enhancing the moral reach of historical research and writing. However, the materialist view of reality that most historians hold cannot support this approach. The origin of the notion in the thought of Walter Benjamin is suggested. I propose a neo-idealist approach called perennialism, centered on recurrent moral dilemmas and (...) choices. This suggests a view of the relations of moral thought and ontology placed in the diachronic context that historians study. (shrink)

A category of enhancement technologies target neural systems as a means of improving physical performance. The author calls these as neurophysical enhancements. This chapter demonstrates why neurophysical enhancements deserve an ethical assessment which is independent of those relating to physical and cognitive enhancements. It focuses almost exclusively on the use of neurophysical enhancements in the sporting arena, where they are for the most part prohibited. World Anti‐Doping Agency (WADA) does permit some drugs which are effective enhancements. Caffeine is permitted on (...) the rationale that it is ineffective at unsafe doses (and hence safe at an effective dose). It makes little sense to ban every performance enhancer from sporting competition, no matter what it is used for, and what the risks are, since sport is essentially a project of performance enhancement. If every form of enhancement is to be considered unethical, competitive sport must be abandoned. (shrink)

The spin-statistics connection has been proved for nonrelativistic quantum mechanics . The proof is extended here to the relativistic regime using the parametrized Dirac equation. A causality condition is not required.

This article provides a novel inroad to the field of process philosophy and its application. It does this by elucidating the relationship between two modes of thought—static and process thinking—as a key to cocreating ecological civilization. Static and process modes of thought are conceptualized in terms of five “basic orientations”: abstract and context, closed and open, isolating and relational, passive and generative, one-dimensional and multidimensional. Inspired by the work of Alfred North Whitehead, Arran Gare, and Julie Nelson, these dynamic dualisms (...) are resolved by nesting static perspectives within process-relational contexts. This article argues that “hegemonic static thinking” is guiding decision-making at root of global crises. While also avoiding “dualistic process thinking,” “encompassing process thinking” that includes and transcends static thinking is posited as a mode of thought conducive to more ecological and community-oriented decision-making across multiple scales. This article establishes the philosophical consistency of this nested “static-process framework,” using it to show how process metaphysics underpins interlinking shifts in worldviews, politics, and economics for moving from industrial to ecological civilization. (shrink)

As a version of creationism—which claims that fictional charac- ters are created by authors who write characters into existence by penning their names in their works—abstract creationism claims that fictional objects are abstract entities. However, I want to modify the conception of what constitutes a fictional object. In short, I am going to give a defense of abstract creationism that offers answers to the questions, as outlined by Stuart Brock, of ontology, identity, and plenitude by developing a claim that—except for (...) rigidly referring proper names—fictional terms and nonfictional terms are all abstract objects.Working off the debates surrounding abstract creationism, and with a nod to D. M. Armstrong's... (shrink)

David Friedell has recently discussed the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic properties of art, specifically in music. Friedell claims that normative social rules dictate who can change the intrinsic or extrinsic properties of a piece of music. I claim that in text-based theater—as a particular art form—the dividing line between intrinsic and extrinsic properties of a play is sometimes tenuous. This tenuousness is due to a play's bifurcated existence as a dramatic text and as many theatrical performances.

There is a growing consensus among neuroscientists that people can become addicted to food, and that at least some cases of obesity have addiction as their cause. By contrast, the rest of the world continues to see obesity as either a disease of the metabolism, or as a reckless case of self-harm. Among obesity researchers, there has been a lively debate on the issue of whether obesity ought to be considered a disease. Few researchers, however, have suggested that obesity is (...) a disease in the same sense as addiction is usually claimed to be a disease—that is, a disease of behaviour with a neurological cause. In this piece, I review what is now a compelling body of evidence for food addiction, to establish that many or most cases of obesity have addiction at their foundation. I then argue that in spite of this, obesity ought not to be considered a neurobehavioural disease in the sense usually attributed to drug addiction. Given the link between addiction and obesity, this implies that the disease conception of addiction must be abandoned. I conclude by assessing some of the implications this move has for policy and ethics, with regard to both obesity and drug addiction. (shrink)

Deleuze and Evolutionary Theory gathers together contributions by many of the central theorists in Deleuze studies who have led the way in breaking down the boundaries between philosophical and biological research. They focus on the significance of Deleuze and Guattari’s engagements with evolutionary theory across the full range of their work, from the interpretation of Darwin in Difference and Repetition to the symbiotic alliances of wasp and orchid in A Thousand Plateaus. In this way, they explore the anthropological, social and (...) biopolitical significance of the convergences and divergences between philosophy and evolutionary science. (shrink)