A tissue is a geometrical, space-filling, random cellular network; it remains in this steady state while individual cells divide. Cell division is a local, elementary topological transformation which establishes statistical equilibrium of the structure. We describe the physical conditions to maintain stationary the epidermis (of mammals or of the cucumber), in spite of the fact that cells constantly divide and die. Specifically, we study the statistical equilibrium of the basal layer, a corrugated surface filled with cells, constituting a two-dimensional topological (...) froth. Cells divide and detach from the basal layer, and these two topological transformations are responsible for the stationary state of the epidermis. The topological froth is capable of responding rapidly and locally to external constraints, and is a good illustration of the plasticity of random cellular networks.Statistical equilibrium is controlled by entropy, both as a measure of disorder and as information, and is characterized by observable relations between average cell shapes and sizes. The technique can be applied to any random cellular network in dynamical equilibrium. Mitosis as the dominating topological transformation and the fact that the distribution of cell shapes is very narrow are the only inputs specific to biology. (shrink)

In this book, Benoît Dubreuil explores the creation and destruction of hierarchies in human evolution. Combining the methods of archaeology, anthropology, cognitive neuroscience and primatology, he offers a natural history of hierarchies from the point of view of both cultural and biological evolution. This volume explains why dominance hierarchies typical of primate societies disappeared in the human lineage and why the emergence of large-scale societies during the Neolithic period implied increased social differentiation, the creation of status hierarchies, and, eventually, (...) political centralisation. (shrink)

One of the first frameworks developed for understanding the relation of science and technology to the economy has been the linear model of innovation. The model postulated that innovation starts with basic research, is followed by applied research and development, and ends with production and diffusion. The precise source of the model remains nebulous, having never been documented. Several authors who have used, improved, or criticized the model in the past fifty years rarely acknowledged or cited any original source. The (...) model usually was taken for granted. According to others, however, it comes directly from V. Bush’s Science: The Endless Frontier. This article traces the history of the linear model, suggesting that it developed in three steps corresponding to three scientific communities looking at science analytically. The article argues that statistics is a main reason the model is still alive despite criticisms, alternatives, and having been proclaimed dead. (shrink)

Following a common assumption, when one inquires into a question, one has an inquisitive attitude towards it. More precisely, I shall assume that there is an inquisitive attitude towards Q that all of those who inquire into Q have in common and in virtue of which they can be said to be in an inquisitive state of mind towards Q. This paper is about the nature of this attitude. I elucidate it by examining whether it boils down to doubt, curiosity, (...) epistemic desire, or wondering. I shall do this by examining whether having these attitudes is necessary and sufficient for being in an inquisitive state of mind. The test will prove negative for the first three, but the case of wondering is more complex. (shrink)

This book revisits the encounter between Chinese and Western philosophy while unfolding questions about the way "comparative philosophy" is conducted today. In the vulgate of intellectual history, "Western thought" has constructed a substantialist view of reality that puts "relations" and "processes" into a subordinate position. The same view explains for the primacy given to the autonomy of individual beings. In contrast, according to the same vulgate, Chinese thought has been mainly stressing the fluidity of all phenomena and forms of life (...) so as to best adapt to their overarching patterns. I label such vision the Disneyland of comparative philosophy. It deciphers texts, partly in function of concepts that it extracts from them, partly according to notions that are superimposed over these texts. The two first chapters are focused upon the Western version of the "Disneyland of comparative philosophy." The third chapter shifts to Chinese narratives about local, comparative and global philosophies. In contrast to these approaches, the fourth chapter offers a blueprint as to the way to engage different philosophical traditions into tasks they define and share together. A last chapter presents four cases of ongoing transcultural philosophical dialogues and the promises they bear. Once it develops outside pre-formatted narratives, the web shaped by our philosophies and wisdoms suggests the outlines of a world that we could inhabit together. (shrink)

My main aim in this paper is to contribute to the elucidation of the nature of non-religious faith. I start by summarising several well-known arguments that belief is neither necessary nor sufficient for faith. I then try to identify the nature of the positive cognitive attitude towards p that is involved in having faith that p. After dismissing some candidates for the role, I explore the idea that faith and hope are similar attitudes. On this basis, I then advance a (...) new characterisation of faith. Finally, I turn to the question of the rationality of faith. I argue that faith is intrinsically irrational because it is an intrinsically incoherent propositional attitude, but that there is nonetheless a sense in which faith is neither intrinsically epistemically irrational nor intrinsically practically irrational. (shrink)

The Prometheus myth has long now provided inspiration for those who envision solutions to environmental issues. Prometheus is the figure par excellence of human forethought and progress in the anthropocene. In this article, we introduce the concept of ambient Prometheanism to describe the way of thinking that foregrounds foresight and anticipation and advances technological solutions developed by capital and energy-intensive projects. We question this stance, arguing that ambient Prometheanism, with its emphasis on technofix, leads to the economisation and depoliticisation of (...) planetary environmental issues. Following Bernard Stiegler, we recover from the myth the figure of Epimetheus, Prometheus’ brother, as well as his associated faculty, epimetheia to theorise what we call an ‘Epimethean politics’. Thinking the anthropocene from the perspective of ambient Prometheanism and Epimetheanism means to consider the role of technology in climate politics, and in particular to make the case for the importance of afterthought in face of unintended consequences and accumulated errors. To substantiate our argument, we outline the challenge posed by emerging solutions focussed on technological intensification and socio-economic acceleration. An Epimethean politics of the climate requires to use reflexivity as a capacity to anticipate, but also to mobilise epimetheia to account for accidents and past mistakes. Such a politics builds from an alternative conception of technology, one that radically differs from ambient Prometheanism. Finally we read as actualisations of Epimethean politics contemporary eco-political struggles and their imperatives for multispecies living and convivial livelihoods. (shrink)

The progressive dominance of historical-critical methods in the reading of ancient Chinese classics has led scholars to privilege micro levels of textual analysis. Consequently, the question as to whether laws of composition could be identified in this corpus has often been ignored, or considered irrelevant. Working on Chinese number symbolism as well as on rules governing “ring composition” in other cultural contexts, this article aims at fashioning anew the question of the possibility of an ancient Chinese “structural rhetoric” and at (...) envisioning the patterns that might have governed it. It specifically applies the approach it propounds to Huainanzi 淮南子, showing how numerology frames its structure and argument, the text being built after the image of the “roundness” of the Way and of the Ruler. It then endeavors to apply these results to the unearthing of “inter-structural” patterns that would help us to locate Huainanzi, Lüshi Chunqiu 呂氏春秋, the versions at hand of Zhuangzi 莊子, Lunyu 論語, or yet Laozi 老子 into a textual universe that shares correlated rhetorical features. (shrink)

It is widely agreed that humans have specific abilities for cooperation and culture that evolved since their split with their last common ancestor with chimpanzees. Many uncertainties remain, however, about the exact moment in the human lineage when these abilities evolved. This article argues that cooperation and culture did not evolve in one step in the human lineage and that the capacity to stick to long-term and risky cooperative arrangements evolved before properly modern culture. I present evidence that Homo heidelbergensis (...) became increasingly able to secure contributions form others in two demanding Paleolithic public good games (PPGGs): cooperative feeding and cooperative breeding. I argue that the temptation to defect is high in these PPGGs and that the evolution of human cooperation in Homo heidelberngensis is best explained by the emergence of modern-like abilities for inhibitory control and goal maintenance. These executive functions are localized in the prefrontal cortex and allow humans to stick to social norms in the face of competing motivations. This scenario is consistent with data on brain evolution that indicate that the largest growth of the prefrontal cortex in human evolution occurred in Homo heidelbergensis and was followed by relative stasis in this part of the brain. One implication of this argument is that subsequent behavioral innovations, including the evolution of symbolism, art, and properly cumulative culture in modern Homo sapiens , are unlikely to be related to a reorganization of the prefrontal cortex, despite frequent claims to the contrary in the literature on the evolution of human culture and cognition. (shrink)

The recent literature on social norms has stressed the centrality of emotions in explaining punishment and norm enforcement. This article discusses four negative emotions (righteous anger, indignation, contempt, and disgust) and examines their relationship to punitive behavior. I argue that righteous anger and indignation are both punitive emotions strictly speaking, but induce punishments of different intensity and have distinct elicitors. Contempt and disgust, for their part, cannot be straightforwardly considered punitive emotions, although they often blend with a colder form of (...) indignation to favor low-cost, indirect, and collective forms of punishment such as mockery, exclusion, and ostracism. (shrink)

Theories of knowledge as credit for true belief, or as cognitive achievement, have to face the following objection: in the famous Barn façades case, it seems that the truth of Barney's belief that he is in front of a barn is to be explained by the correct functioning of his cognitive capacities, although we are reluctant to say that he knows he is in front of a barn. Duncan Pritchard concludes from this that a safety clause, irreducible to the conditions (...) a true belief must satisfy in order to be credited to the believer, constitutes a necessary condition of knowledge. Because those who define knowledge as a cognitive achievement have not convincingly answered this objection, I intend, in the first section of this paper, to refute it by showing how practical and doxastic achievements differ. Then I defend the idea that we should also distinguish two kinds of environmental epistemic luck, and, correlatively, two kinds of safety, that are not equally incompatible with knowledge. Finally, I argue that this distinction is inevitably vague and I indicate some consequences of this vagueness for our knowledge‐intuitions. (shrink)

The last sentence of Chapter 10 of the Analects describes a brief encounter between Confucius and a hen-pheasant, and it does so in puzzling terms, ridden with lexical difficulties. At the same time, intertextual references insert this fragment into the context of Confucius’ life mission as well as of Chinese mythological narratives. This contribution assesses the fragment’s meaning and significance: Confucius’ reaction to the hen-pheasant unveils his evolving understanding of the Heavenly Mandate bestowed upon him. The fragment thus forcefully concludes (...) the chapter in which it is inserted. Additionally, I put forward a hypothesis: the focus of this narrative, coupled with its positioning at the end of Chapter 10, induce us to postulate that it may have been purposefully located at the very center of the Analects, a proposition that reverberates on the way we look at the composition of the book. (shrink)

When on the last page of What Is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari (1995: 218) claim that philosophy needs a non-philosophy, this statement is the result of a long engagement with the problem of thinking in society. It is this engagement that we intend to reconstruct in this article. By developing an original definition of thinking after Heidegger, Deleuze is able to claim that philosophy is not the only ‘thinking’ discipline. Our point of departure is Deleuze's constant reference to a phrase (...) from Heidegger's lecture course What Is Called Thinking?: ‘We are not yet thinking’ (Deleuze 1988: 116, 1989: 167, 1994: 144, 2002: 108; Deleuze and Guattari 1995: 56). This phrase points to the demand for a new distribution of the relation between philosophy and its outside. The purpose of this article is to trace Heidegger's influence on Deleuze's definition of thinking and to raise two points. First, Deleuze borrows some elements of Heidegger's definition of thinking to further his own understanding of politics as an involuntary practice. For both, the question of thinking is political. Second, by departing from Heidegger, Deleuze can democratise the definition of thinking, beyond its confinement to philosophy, by turning to cinema. Deleuze calls cinema the art of the masses because it brings the masses in contact with external signs. Finally, in the last part of this article, we will discuss how Deleuze raises stupidity (and not error) as a transcendental problem that should be constantly fought. In this way, we hope to shed light on how Deleuze moves from Heidegger's question ‘what is called thinking?’ to the problem of stupidity and shame. (shrink)

In the late 1980s, a new conceptual framework appeared in the science, technology, and innovation studies: the National Innovation System. The framework suggests that the research system's ultimate goal is innovation, and that the system is part of a larger system composed of sectors such as government, university, and industry and their environment. The framework also emphasized the relationships between the components or sectors, as the ``cause'' that explains the performance of innovation systems. Most authors agree that the framework came (...) from researchers like Freeman, Nelson, and Lundvall. In this article, the author want to go further back in time and show what the ``system approach'' owes to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and its very early works from the 1960s. This article develops the idea that the system approach was fundamental to OECD work, and that, although not using the term National Innovation System as such, the organization considerably influenced the above-mentioned authors. (shrink)

Gallicagram est un nouvel outil de lexicométrie, fondé notamment sur les archives océrisées de la Bibliothèque nationale de France et sur celles du journal Le Monde ; il dénombre dans le corpus choisi et pour une période donnée les occurrences d’un mot ou d’un syntagme, et offre différents modes de visualisation des données obtenues. Ce logiciel mérite à plusieurs titres d’être investi par les chercheurs : outre le volume des données qu’il exploite, suffisant pour fonder des analyses lexicométriques depuis le (...) XVIIe siècle jusqu’à nos jours, Gallicagram a sur son concurrent immédiat, Ngram Viewer, l’avantage d’une transparence très supérieure et d’une structure plus constante au cours du temps. L’article présente Gallibase, son extension qui lui applique les outils de la statistique textuelle – en particulier les analyses factorielles et arborées. Il illustre son potentiel et insiste sur l’intérêt spécifique des corpus de presse, qui permettent des études sur périodes courtes. (shrink)

This article aims to contribute to the elucidation of the nature of inquiry. I start with some common desiderata for any theory of inquiry. I then categorize inquiry as a structured process. By focusing on its essential components, I advance a new characterization of inquiry as a combination of questioning attitudes guiding actions. Finally, I turn to the recent objection that questioning attitudes are not necessary for inquiry. I argue that inquiry is a structured process essentially constituted by questioning attitudes (...) having two precise functional roles, initiating and guiding the deployment of cognitive capacities towards an epistemic goal. (shrink)

This article argues for the need to recover the concept of political myth in order to understand the crucial phenomena of our epoch. By drawing on Blumenberg’s philosophical reflections on myth, it proposes to understand political myth as the continual process of work on a common narrative by which the members of a social group can provide significance to their political conditions and experience. In order to show how this understanding of political myth can throw light on important aspects of (...) contemporary politics, the article analyses the work on one of the most conspicuous political myths of our time: the clash of civilizations. By reconstructing the mechanisms through which this myth works, the article shows how a paradigm that has been strongly criticized as too simplistic and scientifically inadequate could have turned into a successful political myth, i.e. into a self-fulfilling prophecy. (shrink)

Science as a body of knowledge (natural and/or social) and as a method (experimental and hermeneutic) has been discussed and debated for centuries among philosophers and ‘men of science’ (scientists). This paper looks at research, the latest element added to the discourse on science. Science as research (an activity or practice), conducted at the level of individuals or organizations, has received increased attention over the course of the twentieth century in public discourse on what science is. This paper documents how (...) different players enlarged the meaning of research from the academic sphere to also encompass government and industry, and from research to research and development. It also examines the restriction of research to mean laboratory research, and the marginalization of the role of research in explaining economic progress. It is suggested that these changes bear witness to a shift in society’s cultural values: from (basic) research to (industrial) development to (technological) innovation. (shrink)

We are naturally inclined to judge that it is better to know that p than to merely truly believe that p. How to account for this intuition? In this paper, I examine Williamson, Goldman and Olsson, and Pritchard's answers, and agree with Pritchard that it cannot be consistently claimed that knowledge is epistemically superior to mere true belief, and that truth is the only finally valuable epistemic good. Contrary to Pritchard, I argue that the latter claim is deeply mistaken. I (...) do so by showing that mere true beliefs have no epistemic value at all. I sketch the consequences of this point concerning the epistemic value of knowledge, and answer some objections to the thesis that mere true beliefs do not possess epistemic value. (shrink)

How is it possible for deontic evaluations of beliefs to be appropriate if we do not have voluntary control over our beliefs? Gaultier argues that we should reject the claim that we can have indirect control over beliefs in virtue of the basic voluntary control we have over our actions. We have another kind of indirect control over beliefs: we can demonstrate doxastic strength or, on the contrary, doxastic weakness when forming our beliefs. That is, we can resist or, on (...) the contrary, fail to resist the influence of some of our conative attitudes. And in the same way that we take our actions to be open to blame when they result from having demonstrated weakness of will even though this does not consist in doing something at will, we take our beliefs to be open to blame and hence subject to deontic evaluation, when they result from having demonstrated doxastic weakness even though this does not consist in doing something at will. (shrink)

My main intention in this article is to settle the question whether having the ability to \ is, as Ryleans think, necessary for knowing how to \, and to determine the kind of role played by procedural knowledge in knowing how to \ and in acquiring and possessing the ability to \. I shall argue, in a seemingly anti-Rylean fashion, that when it comes to know-hows that are ordinarily categorised as physical skills, or—to be, for the moment, philosophically neutral—as enabling (...) one to possess such skills, it is necessary to have procedural knowledge of how to \ in order to possess those know-hows. However, I shall contend that this knowledge cannot be acquired without acquiring the kind of ability to \ in which having the skill to \ consists. And that having acquired the ability to \ is not only necessary but also sufficient for having acquired procedural knowledge of how to succeed in \-ing. (shrink)

Benoit Delbecq reflects upon the conditions under which his creative activity, as a pianist, a composer and an improviser, has to take place within the French context. Status of the copyrights, contribution of public funding, new modes of distribution, ambiguous irruptions of the show business mega-machine, fictions of freedom generated within the creative moment, polymorphous collective structures: this concrete work of knitting a new autonomous artistic network sheds light, beyond the microcosm of jazz, on the production of sociality in today’s (...) France. (shrink)

Benoit Mathot | : La négativité, comme catégorie fondamentale de l’existence humaine, connaît aujourd’hui une crise profonde qui la conduit à son effacement progressif des pratiques et des discours sociaux, culturels, religieux, au profit d’une logique de la coïncidence. Dans cette perspective, cet article a pour projet de proposer un parcours interdisciplinaire à travers la psychanalyse, les études littéraires et la théologie chrétienne, afin de montrer la centralité de ce phénomène. | : The negativity, as fundamental category of the human (...) existence, knows a deep crisis today which leads it to the progressive disappearance of the socials, cultural and religious practices and speeches, for the benefit of a logic of the coincidence. In this perspective, this article plans to propose an interdisciplinary work through the psychoanalysis, the literary studies and the Christian theology, to show the centrality of this phenomenon. (shrink)

Benoit Mathot À partir du cadre théorique de la décoïncidence proposé par le philosophe François Jullien, cet article explore les enjeux d’humanisation des soins médicaux, ainsi que l’introduction de la dimension spirituelle dans la prise en charge des patients. Il revient enfin sur le dialogue possible entre ces réflexions contemporaines et les considérations du théologien luthérien Paul Tillich sur la santé.

Introduction: the Study of Argumentation Although our overall organization of the readings suggests one way of dividing our selected literature, ...

In this paper I raise a paradox of belief inspired by Kripke’s ‘paradox of knowledge', which states that knowledge seems to make permissible an intuitively unacceptable form of dogmatism. This paradox of belief is based on an intuitively correct principle of doxastic coherence. My aim is to show that this paradox contributes to elucidating the puzzling nature of belief.

English summary: Benoit Spinosa presents a much needed French biography and study of the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Spinosa discusses Hobbes controversial Leviathan and his unique understanding of the political machine in the Early Modern period. French description: Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), philosophe anglais, doit sa celebrite au Leviathan, a une conception de la souverainete politique longtemps jugee monstrueuse. Par-dela contresens et accusations, Hobbes est bien le premier penseur de la modernite a avoir voulu maitriser la machination politique comme la (...) science galileenne controlait les mecanismes naturels. Il eut l'idee d'un systeme global, allant du corps en general, chose physique, au corps politique engendre par la puissance humaine d'artifice, en passant par le corps humain, objet d'une anthropologie nouvelle qui s'appuie sur une vision originale du desir. Sans le langage, la science des corps serait pourtant impossible. C'est par l'imposition de noms, que les hommes peuvent se soustraire aux aleas de l'experience, construire des chaines de raisonnement et envisager ainsi les choix politiques que la necessite laisse ouverts. Dans un monde expose aux violences de la revolution et des conflits religieux, Hobbes a cherche les moyens rationnels de resister aux folies de l'histoire. La question n'est visiblement pas close. (shrink)

The emotion of anger has a long love–hate relationship with morality. On the one hand, anger often motivates us to sanction wrongdoing and uphold demanding moral standards. On the other hand, it can prompt aggression behaviors that are at odds with morality and even lead to moral disasters. This article describes this complex relationship. I argue that the intensity of anger elicited by moral transgressions is highly sensitive to key variables, including the identity of the person wronged, the nature of (...) the wrongdoing, and expectations about what should and will be done. Depending on the context, we sometimes experience more anger than would be commendable and sometimes less. These characteristics of anger, in turn, explain the ubiquity of norms and discourses aimed at governing the expression of this emotion. (shrink)

For centuries, _innovation_ was a political and contested concept and linguistic weapon used against one's enemy. To support their case, opponents of innovation made use of arguments from ethos and pathos to give power and sustenance to their criticisms and to challenge the innovators. However, since the nineteenth century the arguments have changed completely. _Innovation_ gradually got rehabilitated. This article looks at one type of rehabilitation: the semantic rehabilitation. People started to reread history and to redescribe what _innovation_ is. What (...) was bad innovation became good innovation because of long-lasting and beneficial effects, so it was believed. (shrink)

The measurement of science and technology is now fifty years old. It owes a large part of its existence to the work of the National Science Foundation and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in the 1950s and 1960s. Given the centrality of S&T statistics in science studies, it is surprising that no history of the measurement exists in the literature. This article outlines such a history. The history is cast in the light of social statistics. Like social statistics, (...) S&T indicators are produced mainly by governments but differ in a number of aspects. First, they have not been developed to control individuals. Second, they have taken shape from the start at the international level. Third, they reflect a consensus among states and their organizations. This article shows that this specificity is due to the sociopolitics that drives S&T measurement. (shrink)

There clearly seems to be something problematic with certain forms of epistemic dependence. However, it has proved surprisingly difficult to articulate what this problem is exactly. My aim in this paper is to make clear when it is problematic to rely on others or on artefacts and technologies that are external to us for the acquisition and maintenance of our beliefs, and why. In order to do so, I focus on the neuromedia thought experiment. After having rejected different ways in (...) which one might want to capture the intuition in question, I argue that this device deprives us of understanding and therefore of the most valuable epistemic good. I then address the question of whether the moral of the story is that we should not develop, be equipped with, or use devices such as the neuromedia. (shrink)

When one tries to determine what the iconic dimension of thought consists in for Peirce and what its range is, one might have the impression that his remarks on this matter are inconsistent. For instance, on the one hand he writes the following: Remember it is by icons only that we really reason, and abstract statements are valueless in reasoning except so far as they aid us to construct diagrams. The sectaries of the opinion I am combating seem, on the (...) contrary, to suppose that reasoning is performed with abstract "judgments," and that an icon is of use only as enabling me to frame abstract statements as premisses. In an apparently similar fashion, Peirce argues that the predicate of a... (shrink)

For F. P. Ramsey, “there is no separate problem of truth,” but, rather, substantive problems about the nature of belief and judgment and the place and function of truth in these propositional attitudes. In this paper, I expound and defend an important but largely overlooked aspect of Ramsey’s view of belief and inquiry: his thesis that truth does not intervene at all in one’s ordinary beliefs, nor in one’s ordinarily inquiring into—in the sense of wondering, or reflecting on—whether or not (...) something obtains. More specifically, I show that this thesis can solve a particularly perplexing problem that Davidson helped to bring into focus: that of explaining how it is possible for one to inquire into any empirical issue, and to form any empirical beliefs, if one takes truth to be objective. (shrink)

J'ai choisi de travailler un portrait de Bachelard pour retrouver son humanité, sa qualité de coeur, d'âme, ce qui est trop souvent absent dans les ouvrages traitant de ses travaux, ses livres. Fils de cordonnier, le chant des outils, le parfum des cuirs, l'attitude de l'artisan appliqué à faire et à parfaire son travail : le quotidien resta vivant en sa mémoire. Il n'avait pas oublié d'où il venait, l'admiration vient de là. Son humanité porte aussi la mort prématurée de (...) son épouse, Jeanne, le 20 juin 1920. Marié le 8 juillet 1914, mobilisé le 2 août de la même année jusqu'au 16 mars 1919, il a vécu 38 mois dans les tranchées. De leur union est née une fille, Suzanne. On peut dire qu'en dépassant ses peines, son deuil, il est devenu un fin guetteur de la beauté de vivre et du monde. La poésie a été pour lui une matière lui donnant de vibrer et respirer l'Univers. "La sagesse, dit-on, a pour origine et pour creuset de savoir lutter". Au long de son oeuvre, Bachelard a plaidé pour "la liberté, les hautes valeurs morales". En écrivant "Le visage de Bachelard", peu à peu, s'est instauré un dialogue, s'est imposée une façon de maïeutique ouvrant à des réflexions sur la vie, l'amitié, l'amour, agressivité, égocentrisme, haine, racisme, "la mauvaise foi" selon Sartre, "l'illusion" selon Pascal. En outre, il ressort en rapprochant plusieurs de leurs pensées que Gaston Bachelard et Léonard de Vinci étaient et restent en parenté de génie. Benoît Aubierge. (shrink)

Charles S. Peirce holds some views about science and inquiry whose exact significance and ratio essendi are notoriously hard to grasp. One of these is particularly intriguing, namely, his frequently inferring from the intuitive ideas that science consists “in diligent inquiry into truth for truth’s sake”, and that the greatest threat to science is to “block the way of inquiry”, the conclusions that “belief […] has no place in science” and that the “scientific man”, when inquiring, has only “provisional” opinions. (...) In this article, I examine the ground and validity of the infamous and, arguably, strongly counterintuitive thesis that “belief has... (shrink)

The infinite pigeonhole principle for 2-partitions asserts the existence, for every set A, of an infinite subset of A or of its complement. In this paper, we study the infinite pigeonhole pr...

Quelle est aujourd’hui la place des Espaces-Rencontre parmi les interventions qui portent sur les relations enfants-parents, notamment dans les situations de rupture? Quelle est la spécificité de l’action des Espaces-Rencontre et d’où tiennent-ils leur identité? Quelle place occu-pent-ils dans le champ judiciaire, la santé mentale, le travail social? Et quel enseignement tirer de cette analyse pour l’avenir des Espaces-Rencontre? L’auteur, sociologue et chercheur, fait le point pour les dix ans du Point-Rencontre de Lille.

The current SARS-CoV-2 crisis raises questions about the challenges faced by nation states and international organisations in offering a coordinated international response to the pandemic, and reveals the great vulnerability of European countries, which are implementing lockdown measures and imposing restrictions on international travel, for the most part on a unilateral basis. Such measures run counter to the prevailing approach of the previous two centuries that developed an international public health space. This article examines the measures adopted by European states (...) in order to contain 19th-century cholera pandemics, which took shape through the development of an international maritime quarantine system, based primarily on the implementation of national regulations and local decision-making. This regime was quickly viewed as ineffective and out of step with liberal ideas that urged a “laissez-faire” approach to public health matters. In its stead, a long-term trend developed towards easing quarantine measures. Nation states supported the internationalisation of the fight against pandemics, which chiefly consisted of externalising quarantine measures to the East in order to eliminate them in Europe. This process was based on a subtle dialectical relationship between the construction of an international public health space and the affirmation of state sovereignty, and continued into the 20th century with the progressive creation of international institutions responsible for advancing global health. (shrink)

This paper studies how in his Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smith answered to Mandeville on the role of pride and vanity in the economic and social dynamics of commercial societies. We show why vanity supersedes pride in his analysis and how he offers a more positive view of these two passions. We study in particular the economic and social consequences of pride and vanity and describe the psychological foundations of excessive self-esteem that these passions entail.

My aim in this article is to elucidate the nature of a form of intellectual and practical neutrality that is not covered by existing accounts of suspension of judgment. After rejecting some inadequate characterizations of this attitude of neutrality, I provide a positive characterization of it: it is a successful effort to resist certain tendencies that are part of the dispositional profile of the doxastic state one is in on a given issue. I conclude by saying a few words about (...) the reasons for which this effort can be made, and by answering in the negative the question of whether all the attitudes that can be characterized as attitudes of committed neutrality are of the same type. (shrink)