This article attempts an organological and pharmacological re-interpretation of the later Heidegger’s understanding of modern technology as a provocative mode of revealing of beings, in particular of its central notions of Gestell [enframing] Gefahr [danger], Kehre [turning] and Ereignis [event]. Although these notions in principle allow us to think what is at stake currently in the Anthropocene as the age of total automation, generalized toxicity of the technical milieu and post-truth calling for a radical bifurcation, they need to be reframed (...) and re-imagined in terms of the process of exosomatization issuing from humanity’s original and necessary default of origin and situated within the perspective of entropy and negentropy, both unthought by Heidegger. Only thus will it become possible to really think and take care of what Heidegger called the danger of technology and its turning into the event as the destiny of enframing. This also requires a rethinking of Aristotle’s theory of four causes as it is invoked by Heidegger in his analysis of technology, in particular the efficient and final causes, in terms of what Deleuze called quasi-causality, here understood as the need and the obligation for mortals to make their fault come true, i.e., to make it truly happen or make it advene in truth, out of the experience of the danger as the ordeal of the necessary default. Thus becoming the anti-anthropic cause of anthropic toxicity, humans would restore final causality as quasi-causality and inaugurate, as neganthropos, the bifurcation into the Neganthropocene. (shrink)

A computable structure $\mathcal {A}$ is $\mathbf {x}$-computably categorical for some Turing degree $\mathbf {x}$ if for every computable structure $\mathcal {B}\cong\mathcal {A}$ there is an isomorphism $f:\mathcal {B}\to\mathcal {A}$ with $f\leq_{T}\mathbf {x}$. A degree $\mathbf {x}$ is a degree of categoricity if there is a computable structure $\mathcal {A}$ such that $\mathcal {A}$ is $\mathbf {x}$-computably categorical, and for all $\mathbf {y}$, if $\mathcal {A}$ is $\mathbf {y}$-computably categorical, then $\mathbf {x}\leq_{T}\mathbf {y}$. We construct a $\Sigma^{0}_{2}$ set whose degree (...) is not a degree of categoricity. We also demonstrate a large class of degrees that are not degrees of categoricity by showing that every degree of a set which is 2-generic relative to some perfect tree is not a degree of categoricity. Finally, we prove that every noncomputable hyperimmune-free degree is not a degree of categoricity. (shrink)

Collingwood’s account of re-enactment is often misunderstood as providing methodological guidance to historians. Williams’s chapter is perceptive in seeing through this erroneous interpretation. Williams is however very critical of Collingwood’s account of the relationship between philosophy and history. He reads Collingwood’s account of absolute presuppositions as embracing a form of ‘radical historicism’ and argues that, like many other philosophers who reject foundationalism, Collingwood tends to use the word ‘we’ in an evasive way, both in an inclusive sense “as implying universalistic (...) preconditions on interpretation and intelligibility” and in a contrastive sense “under which ‘we’ here and now are distinct from others elsewhere and elsewhen, who lived in others and different intelligible human formations”. William’s chapter appropriately introduces this volume since the question concerning the nature of absolute presuppositions, and in what sense they can be said to be constitutive of the forms of inquiry which they make possible, is a central concern of this collection and is discussed by several contributors. (shrink)

A summary is out of place because of the outlinish nature of the presentation. I have presented a taxonomy or general theory of ethics. The view is acceptable or not depending on how well it competes with rival theories. One thing that hinders such a comparison is the absence of sufficiently clearly articulated rivals. Perhaps this paper will stimulate the production of some rival views.

Sociobiologists claim that there are important constraints on human behavior that are the result of genetic factors. Some of them also claim that this has important implications for ethics, and even more generally for determining how persons ought to behave. In this paper I shall defend these two claims, though I shall not be defending the views of any particular sociobiologist, unless one is prepared to count Hobbes as a sociobiologist.

This study is based on the self-reporting by circus artists’ concerning their injuries. We refer to the theoretical framework of emersiology and argue that circus artists may be able to soothe their distress and pain by learning through their body. We will draw further on the comparison between our therapeutic approach and the techniques of self-care introduced by Michel Foucault in his History of Sexuality.

L’A. se propose un nouvel examen de l’unité du Phèdre, problème qui mobilise les commentateurs depuis l’Antiquité et a été récemment relancé dans les études françaises et anglo-américaines. De fait, Platon n’a pas explicité la charnière articulant le diptyque formé par le discours sur l’amour comme éros spiritualisé suivi de la réflexion sur la rhétorique du vrai. Au-delà de l’étrangeté formelle, l’enjeu est philosophique : la dualité même du dialogue signale la tentative platonicienne de maintenir à tout prix le travail (...) de la psychagogie, fondement de la recherche amoureuse de la vérité, sur le terrain de la parole politique, jusqu’à se heurter à l’éclatement mutuel des deux ordres. Reste alors, devant nos yeux, l’unité fracturée du métaphysique et du politique. (shrink)

Le polythéisme polynésien était-il une forme métaphorique de panthéisme ?

L’auteur examine la définition de la personne chez John Locke à laquelle se réfère un nombre croissant de philosophes en bioéthique. L’auteur se concentre sur une lecture précise et critique du célèbre passage lockéen qui opère un transfert de la définition de la personne d’un plan substantiel à celui juridique et moral . Il développe les contradictions logiques internes à la définition de la personne comme conscience de soi et conscience morale chez le philosophe anglais, notamment le besoin de réinsérer (...) la corporéité dans sa définition afin de transcender le subjectivisme, comme du critère de souvenir authentique qui le différencie du pseudo-souvenir, du statut de l’être humain qui serait ivre ou qui n’exercerait plus de manière irréversible la conscience de soi en lien avec la théorie des intérêts. L’auteur conclut par une réflexion critique sur les conséquences éthiques contemporaines de la définition lockéenne de la personne performante. (shrink)

À suivre Gérard Genette, son passage de la critique littéraire à la poétique, puis de celle-ci à l’esthétique résulterait d’un « processus génétique en quelque sorte oblique », d’une « filiation collatérale » qui voit le détail d’un livre devenir le sujet du suivant. Un retour sur son parcours fait apparaître que l’enchaînement métonymique est lissé par le tuilage des moments : ceux-ci, pour être focalisés, n’en sont pas moins cumulatifs. Mieux, même, au fil du temps, dans la dynamique cumulative (...) d’un œuvre complet in progress, le principe de cohérence se sera appliqué non seulement à l’idéalité des textes, mais à la physicalité qui détermine le régime d’immanence de la littérature. On peut voir dans « Du texte à l’œuvre », « exercice d’autodiction préposthume » qui ouvre Figures IV, en 1997, plus que le simple bilan d’un chercheur, fût-il de grande envergure, dressant le bilan de son parcours au soir de sa carrière : sous couleur de rendre compte des liens qui unissent ses livres, il s’agit ni plus ni moins de montrer en quoi les textes qu’il a publiés constituent une œuvre. (shrink)

Anderson and Csima :245–264, 2014) defined a jump operator, the bounded jump, with respect to bounded Turing reducibility. They showed that the bounded jump is closely related to the Ershov hierarchy and that it satisfies an analogue of Shoenfield jump inversion. We show that there are high bounded low sets and low bounded high sets. Thus, the information coded in the bounded jump is quite different from that of the standard jump. We also consider whether the analogue of the Jump (...) Theorem holds for the bounded jump: do we have A≤bTB\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$A \le _{bT}B$$\end{document} if and only if Ab≤1Bb\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$A^b \le _1 B^b$$\end{document}? We show the forward direction holds but not the reverse. (shrink)

The 3rd batch of 6 books in this series on the Greatest Philosophers by acclaimed specialists writing for the General reader. From Aristotle to Wittgenstein, from Democritus to Derrida, this series provides a lucid and consise survey of philosophers ancient and modern. Each volume is by an acknowledged expert briefed to address the adventurous but non specialist reader.

Although women hold more negative attitudes toward cheating than do men, they are about as likely to engage in academic dishonesty. Cognitive dissonance theory predicts that this attitude-behavior inconsistency should lead women to experience more negative affect after cheating than would men. This prediction was tested in a sample of 92 male and 78 female college students who reported having cheated on an examination during the prior 6 months. Consistent with the results of previous research, women reported more negative attitudes (...) toward cheating than did men, but cheated at the same rate. However, women did not experience more negative affect than did men, although they reported experiencing less positive affect. The gender difference in positive affect was partially mediated by the gender difference in attitudes. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Identity of Analytical Philosophy Meta‐ethics Ethical Theory Morality, Politics and Analytical Philosophy.

Moral psychology is often ignored in ethical theory, making applied ethics difficult to achieve in practice. This is particularly true in the new field of animal ethics. One key feature of moral psychology is recognition of the moral primacy of those with whom we enjoy relationships of love and friendship – philia in Aristotles term. Although a radically new ethic for animal treatment is emerging in society, its full expression is severely limited by our exploitative uses of animals. At this (...) historical moment, only the animals with whom we enjoy philia – companion animals – can be treated with unrestricted moral concern. This ought to be accomplished, both for its own sake and as an ideal model for the future evolution of animal ethics. (shrink)