The second volume of Ray Monk's biography of Bertrand Russell focuses on Russell's tragic and moving relationship with his first son John. It uses the relationship as a centerpoint to expound on Russell's public achievements, such as his political campaigning for peace.

Review of Ray Monk, Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude.

‘Poor Bertie’ Beatrice Webb wrote after receiving a visit from Bertrand Russell in 1931, ‘he has made a mess of his life and he knows it’. In the 1931 version of his Autobiography, Russell himself seemed to share Webb’s estimate of his achievements. Emotionally, intellectually and politically, he wrote, his life had been a failure. This sense of failure pervades the second volume of Ray Monk’s engrossing and insightful biography. At its heart is the failure of Russell’s marriages (...) to Dora Black and Patricia (Peter) Spence, his poor relationships with his children John and Kate, and the decline in his reputation as a philosopher. Russell, who had changed the direction of philosophy irrevocably, was in later years unable to find permanent academic employment in Britain, ousted from his professorship at the City College of New York because of his views on sex and marriage, and was reduced to giving nonspecialist lectures at a foundation established by the Philadelphia philanthropist Albert C. Barnes. Eventually in 1944 he returned to Cambridge, but by then the philosophical world was in the grip of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ideas, and Russell was largely ignored. (shrink)

Russell's avant-garde philosophy of free love combined with his principled pacificism would make him an icon of the international Left in the 1960s.".

First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This paper attempts to summarise the philosophical career of Bertrand Russell, concentrating in particular on his contributions to logic and the philosophy of mathematics. It takes as its starting point Russell's conception of philosophy as the search for foundations upon which certain knowledge might be built, a search which Russell, at the end of his career, declared to be fruitless. In pursuing this search, however, Russell was led to develop lines of thought and techniques of analysis that have had (...) a profound and lasting influence on the philosophy of the twentieth century. (shrink)

This article contains a detailed discussion of the friendship and the intellectual collaboration between D. H. Lawrence and Bertrand Russell during the spring and summer of 1915. The questions it seeks to answer are why Russell initially was inclined to treat Lawrence's philosophical thought with respect, even to the extent of becoming an evangelist on its behalf; why he subsequently rejected Lawrence's outlook and distanced himself from Lawrence's political program; and what similarities and dissimilarities exist in Russell's thought and (...) Lawrence's as represented by Russell's Principles of Social Reconstruction and Lawrence's essays "Study of Thomas Hardy" and "The Crown." Both writers, it is suggested, were centrally concerned with the possibility of transcending the "prison" of the self, but the ideas each developed as to how this should be done were radically divergent, so much so that each could, in the end, regard the other as the very personification of the kind of egoism they sought to transcend. (shrink)

To really appreciate the range of his achievements, we need an interdisciplinary effort; we need a carefully researched definitive edition of Russell's work, edited by a team consisting of, among others, philosophers and historians, a journal devoted to studying the various aspects of his activities and a whole army of researchers with access to a well-catalogued archive of his papers.

Abstract:In his biography, Ray Monk expresses surprise and disgust that Bertrand Russell should have included a discussion of eugenics in his famous book on marriage and sexual morality, Marriage and Morals (1929). Monk is especially horrified that Russell advocated the sterilization of the “mentally defective”. He draws the conclusion that such views must have been due to a combination of Russell’s negative feelings about his second wife, Dora, and his life-long fear of insanity. In fact Russell came to (...) his views in dialogue with the dominant scientific and political communities of his day. Russell’s position was the logical consequence of his fear of the rise of State intervention in society and the erosion of individual rights. When put into proper historical context, it is clear that it was Russell’s engagement with early twentieth-century politics and science, not personal or psychological demons, that was the motive force behind his views on marriage and eugenics. (shrink)

"Yet Russell was more than a great intellect; he was also a political animal. From the beginning of his long professional life he emphasized the importance of practice as well as theory. He was twice imprisoned by the British government for his political utterances. With his razor-sharp irony and morally impassioned rhetoric, Russell took on the forces of injustice, ignorance, and cruelty; one of his chief weapons was the letter to the editor.".

"Logic and ethics are fundamentally the same, they are not more than duty to oneself"(Otto Weininger). So goes the head quotation of Ray Monk's biography Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius. Monk thereby introduces Wittgenstein's peculiar admiration for the crackpot author of Sex and Character along with Wittgenstein's moralistic dedication to logic. Monk elaborates with anecdotes. For instance, Wittgenstein would pace Bertrand Russell's room mixing logic with selfcriticism. Russell asked Wittgenstein whether he was thinking about logic or his (...) sins. "Both!" barked Wittgenstein. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviews 87 c:\users\arlene\documents\rj issues\type3501\rj 3501 061 red.docx 2015-07-10 4:07 PM RUSSELL AS “SPANISH ASTRONOMER” (A RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW) Sheila Turcon Russell Research Centre / McMaster U. Hamilton, on, Canada l8s 4l6 [email protected] Constance Malleson. The Coming Back. London: Jonathan Cape, 1933. Pp. 328. 7s. 6d. ublished in 1933 and never reprinted, The Coming Back is Constance Malleson’s first novel. She had been publishing shorter fiction as well as articles since (...) 1919.1 Her lover, Bertrand Russell, had encouraged her writing career, assisting with the placement of her first short story in The English Review.2 He thought a writing career preferable to acting. Using the stage name “Colette O’Niel”, she had a successful career on the stage.3 The novel is a fictional account of the love affair between Russell and Colette.They appear as Gregory del Orellano and Konradin Waring. It was not, however, recognized as a roman à clef when it was published, as their affair was not known by anyone except their closest friends and family members. John Slater recognized it for what it was.4 Three of the four Russell biographers mention the novel.5 Presumably all three relied on Slater’s article. Ronald Clark quotes one sentence from the novel, a summation of Gregory’s character by one of the other characters who shared the view of many. Gregory was seen as “a man exhausting other men by his intellect; exhausting women by his intensity; wearing out his friends, sucking them dry, passing from person to person, never giving any real happiness—or finding any” (Coming Back, p. 307; Clark, p. 583). Caroline Moorehead quotes several sentences about the 1 Turcon, “A Bibliography of Constance Malleson” (2012). 2 Malleson, “The End” by “Christine Harte” (1919). 3 Turcon, op. cit., appendix, acting roles, pp. 188–90. 4 John G. Slater, “Lady Constance Malleson, ‘Colette O’Niel’” (1975), pp. 10–11. 5 Clark, The Life of Bertrand Russell (1975); Moorehead, Bertrand Russell (1992); Monk, Bertrand Russell,Vol. 1 (1996). m= 88 Reviews c:\users\arlene\documents\rj issues\type3501\rj 3501 061 red.docx 2015-07-10 4:07 PM importance of work to Konradin—work that Gregory deplored (Coming Back, p. 105; Moorehead, p. 264). Only Ray Monk undertakes a detailed description of the novel, even naming the last chapter of The Spirit of Solitude, “The Coming Back”. He identifies, as did Slater, several other characters with their real life counterparts: Ottoline Morrell is Magdalena de Santa Segunda; T. C. Maynard is T. S. Eliot; Jevons is Clifford Allen; Marcus Beazley is Maurice Elvey; Gertrude West is Dora Black. He quotes the sentence that Clark had used earlier (Monk 1: 607). Monk writes that “Russell claimed never to have read The Coming Back (or any of Colette’s other books). Perhaps he knew it would make painful reading” (1: 608). Monk provides no source for this judgment, and in fact it is untrue. Although The Coming Back is not specifically discussed in their correspondence, her other three books are.6 My reading of the novel is coloured by an attempt to identify what is true in the novel. My knowledge of the truth is based on editing their correspondence.The novel is a fascinating portrait of the Russell and Colette relationship, far more revealing to those in the know than her autobiographies, where libel concerns were always at the forefront. Her first autobiography, AfterTenYears, had been published two years earlier, in 1931, to great acclaim. The Coming Back’s dust-jacket reads: Here is the first novel from the author of that vivid and successful autobiography, After Ten Years. And as might be expected, it shows the same vitality, integrity, and the same passion for beauty as the earlier work. Constance Malleson presents a portrait of a young girl of our times, and of her stand for freedom, through all its stages from selfishness to a fine renunciation. Before the novel begins Colette includes four things. She dedicates the book to “Joneen when he is grown up”. Colette was very fond of Russell’s son John, and this may well refer to... (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein is perhaps the greatest philosopher of the twentieth century, and certainly one of the most original in the entire Western tradition. Given the inaccessibility of his work, it is remarkable that he has inspired poems, paintings, films, musical compositions, titles of books -- and even novels. In his splendid biography, Ray Monk has made this very compelling human being come alive in a way that perfectly explains the fascination he has evoked. Wittgenstein's life was one of great (...) moral and spiritual depth. Although his work addresses problems of logic, language, mind, and knowledge, he often described it as having an ethical point, and once said that he "could not help seeing every problem from a religious point of view." In successfully bridging the gap assumed by many to exist between Wittgenstein's life and his work, Monk's biography helps to explain the interest in Wittgenstein's later philosophy on the part of Buddhist scholars. (shrink)

The paper argues that Russell’s fascination with Conrad’s Heart of Darkness reveals a positive aspect of Russell’s character neglected by Monk’s biography. Section 1 sketches some of the darker aspects of Russell’s character. §2 outlines the relevant themes in Heart of Darkness. §3 argues that Russell’s fascination both with Conrad and his novel derives from his resolute commitment to a painful exercise in self-knowledge. §4 explains the more positive perspective on Russell’s “strength of mind” that emerges from this argument.

First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This article discusses recent attempts to provide the genre of biography with a philosophical, theoretical foundation and attempts to show that such efforts are fundamentally misguided. Biography is, I argue, a profoundly nontheoretical activity, and this, precisely, makes it philosophically interesting. Instead of looking to philosophy to provide a theory of biography, we should, I maintain, look to biography to provide a crucially important example and model of what Ludwig Wittgenstein called "the kind of understanding that (...) consists in seeing connections." This kind of understanding stands in sharp contrast to the theoretical understanding provided by science and is, Wittgenstein maintained, what we as philosophers are, or should be, striving for. (shrink)

PORTRAITS FROM MEMORY and Other Essays by BERTRAND RUSSELL SIMON AND SCHUSTER NEW YORK 1956 VI CONTENTS PAGE Mind and Matter 1 45 The Cult of Common Usage 1 66 ...

In the growing body of academic literature on biography that has developed in the last few decades, Virginia Woolf's essay, "The New Biography,"1 has come to occupy a central place—mentioned, discussed and quoted from, I would estimate, more often than any other piece of writing on the subject. Virginia Woolf's distinctive view of the nature and limitations of biography has thus had, and continues to have, a deep and wide-ranging influence on the way the genre is discussed (...) by critics and theorists. My aim in this essay is to present a detailed analysis of Virginia Woolf's thinking about biography in order to make clear why I believe its influence on contemporary theorising about biography is, on the whole, a misfortune. As is often pointed out, Virginia Woolf's views on biography are closely connected with—indeed, to an extent that I hope to make clear, they are simply an application of—her views on fiction. In the light of this, I have tried to trace some of the most striking features of her thinking about biography back to her earlier thoughts on fiction, as presented in both her novels and her essays. The result, I hope, will be that, while the attractions of her way of looking at fiction and biography are recognised and revealed, the manifest flaws in her thinking on these subjects are clearly exposed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviews 85 RUSSELL’S CONTRIBUTION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE James Connelly Philosophy, Trent U. Peterborough, on k9l 1z6, Canada [email protected] Graham Stevens. The Theory of Descriptions: Russell and the Philosophy of Language. Basingstoke, uk: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Pp. xiii, 197. isbn: 978-0230 -20116-3. £50; us$85. ver the past decade, Graham Stevens has built his reputation as a lucid, durable, and oftentimes ground-breaking historian of analytic philosophy. His latest book, entitled (...) TheTheory of Descriptions: Russell and the Philosophy of Language, will only add to that burgeoning scholarly legacy. If it has not been established already, this book will doubtless cement Stevens’ place amongst the leading Russell scholars in the world today. It may very well herald Stevens ’ arrival on the scene as a noteworthy contributor to contemporary philosophy of language as well. The central goal of the book is “to bring the historical and purely philosophical analyses of [Russell’s] work into closer alignment” (p. 3). Stevens hopes to overcome a “striking disparity” (p. 2) in the ways that Russell’s contributions to the philosophy of language have been conceived by expositors of his philosophy, on the one hand, versus philosophers of language, on the other. In particular, though contemporary philosophers of language would tend to view Russell’s enormous contribution to that subject as being “undeniable” (p. 1), and to be “bewildered” (p. 94) by any suggestion to the contrary, expositors of Russell’s philosophy have nevertheless been at pains to emphasize that Russell “was not engaged in the philosophical study of language” (p. 2). As Stevens notes, this situation is especially puzzling since “these two groups [of scholars] overlap to a considerable extent” (p. 2). Stevens’ strategy for overcoming this disparity is two-pronged. First he aims to tackle, head on, the fallacious arguments of Monk,1 Dummett,2 and others, to the effect that Russell was not engaged in the philosophy of language. According to Stevens, such arguments have principally appealed to either (1) ______ 1 Ray Monk, “What Is Analytical Philosophy?”. 2 Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language. l= 86 Reviews Russell’s dismissal of ordinary language philosophy, (2) his early, non-linguistic, conception of the nature of propositions, or (3) his view that natural language was inherently defective for philosophical purposes, and so called for replacement by a “logically perfect language”. In regards to (1), Stevens argues in a word that “[o]rdinary language philosophy has had its day” (p. 176). Over the past several decades, in other words, leading philosophers of language have come to agree with Russell in viewing ordinary language philosophy as “an outdated, and rather eccentric, relic of mid-twentieth century British philosophy” (ibid.).The classic Russell– Strawson debate over the question whether ordinary language lacks an exact logic3 has been settled decisively in Russell’s favour, as philosophers of language have transformed “the attempt to systematically specify the semantics of large regions of natural language” (ibid.) into a “central project” (ibid.). In regards to (2), moreover, Stevens notes that by this line of reasoning, absurdly, David Kaplan would not qualify as a philosopher of language since he “explicitly invokes the Russellian non-linguistic conception of a proposition as the conception appropriate for providing the content of properly context-situated indexical sentences” (p. 170). And, of course, Kaplan is not at all unique amongst contemporary philosophers of language in appealing to a Russellian conception of propositional content, as the examples of Nathan Salmon,4 Scott Soames,5 and many others show. In regards to (3), finally, Stevens argues that Russell’s dim view of natural language was grounded in his conception of logical form as non-linguistic, and that that conception, in turn, derives simply from the poverty of syntactic theory available to Russell, prior to the Chomskyian revolution in linguistics during the second half of the twentieth century. In light of the conceptual and analytic resources made available by this revolution, however, there exists “no insurmountable obstacle to assimilating Russell ’s notion of logical form to something akin to the modern notion of lf” (p. 172), where lf is conceived as one of four levels of syntactic representation within Chomsky’s Government and Binding Theory... (shrink)

Ray Monk and Anthony Palmer, (eds) Bertrand Russell and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy, Thoemmes Press, Bristol, 1996; pp. xvi + 383; Hans-Johann Glock, (ed.) The Rise of Analytic Philosophy, Blackwell, 1997; pp. xiv + 95; Matthias Schirn, (ed.) Frege: Importance and Legacy, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1996; pp. x + 466; Stuart G. Shanker, (ed.) Philosophy of Science, Logic and Mathematics in the Twentieth Century, Routledge History of Philosophy Volume IX, Routledge, 1996; pp. xxxviii + 461; John Blackmore, (...) (ed.) Ludwig Boltzmann: His Later Life and Philosophy, 1900-1906, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1995; pp. xvi + 266. (shrink)

Ray Monk and Anthony Palmer (eds.), Bertrand Russell and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy. Introduction by Ray Monk and Anthony Palmer. Bristol, U.K.:Thoemmes Press, 1996. xvi + 383 pp. £48.00/$78.00 (cloth); £16.95/$29.95 (paper).

Biography need not be reductive; it need not seek to explain the work of a writer through an appeal to a psychological or sociological theory, neither need it treat all the work of a writer as disguised autobiography. It can simply, like Boswell’s life of Johnson, seek to enable us to get to know someone.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies n.s. 33 (summer 2013): 59–94 The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster U. issn 0036–01631; online 1913–8032 oeviews PRINCIPIA’S SECOND EDITION Russell Wahl English and Philosophy / Idaho State U. Pocatello, id 83209, usa [email protected] Bernard Linsky. The Evolution of Principia Mathematica: Bertrand Russell’s Manuscripts and Notes for the Second Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 2011. Pp. vii, 407; 2 (...) plates. isbn: 978-1-10700-327-9. £96; us$159. ussell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica was a pioneering work which was in many ways overtaken by the success of the new discipline it helped found. There is little doubt that Principia Mathematica was one of the most important works in the development of symbolic logic, as even Quine, one of the critics of the foundations proposed in it, said: “This is the book that has meant the most to me.”Yet few mathematicians or logicians follow the theory of types proposed in Principia as the foundation of mathematics, nor the logicist project of which it is a variant. While much of Principia ’s notation has been incorporated into modern formal logic and set theory, much of it also is dated and not easy for contemporary mathematicians and logicians to read. Among those who were dissatisfied with the philosophical foundations of the first edition were the authors themselves.1 During 1923 and 1924 Russell revised and updated Principia, and the second edition of the first volume appeared in 1925 with the other two volumes appearing in 1927. What resulted was a new edition with the philosophical underpinning modi- fied, but with the superstructure, that is, the resulting theorems of the three volumes, unchanged. Russell wrote a new Introduction and added three Appendices, but other than that made only minor changes.The new philosophy of logic had as its core idea a principle of extensionality which Russell expressed as the view that “functions of propositions are always truth-functions and a function can only occur in a proposition through its values” (PM2 1: ______ 1 Russell wrote the new material for the second edition, but it is clear from a letter to him byWhitehead on 24 May 1923, quoted by Linsky, that he, too, thought the foundational system needed tweaking: “I don’t think that ‘types’ are quite right” (p. 16). o= 60 Reviews xiv). It is interesting that at times Russell seems to have been hesitant about even endorsing this change.2 The second edition of Principia has not been well received; by and large it has either been ignored or scorned. Linsky cites especially negative remarks by Monk, but others have dismissed the second edition additions and it has generally been thought a failure since 1944, when Gödel pointed out an error in the Appendix B proof that mathematical induction can be “rectified” even without the axiom of reducibility. The Evolution of Principia Mathematica makes available to scholars Russell’s notes and manuscripts of the new material added to the second edition. Linsky also seeks to redress the indifference to the second edition, to set the record straight about several misunderstandings, and to give an account of the new material.The book he has produced will be very valuable to scholars of Russell and to anyone interested in the development of type theory and indeed of logic as a whole during this time. This is also a difficult book, both because the material can get quite technical at times and also because the new material included in the introduction to the second edition is somewhat sketchy, and there are philosophical and technical points about which Russell himself is less than clear. As a result there have been disagreements about how the second edition is best to be interpreted. Linsky recognizes that the interpretive issues are under-determined by the text and wants to stay relatively neutral with respect to the different alternatives about the various controversies. At times it can be difficult to keep the various positions straight.The difficulty lies with the material, and Linsky does a very good job of explaining the issues to the layman. The work is divided into... (shrink)

Almost five decades after his death, there is still ample reason to pay attention to the life and legacy of Bertrand Russell. This is true not only because of his role as one of the founders of analytic philosophy, but also because of his important place in twentieth-century history as an educator, public intellectual, critic of organized religion, humanist, and peace activist. The papers in this anthology explore Russell’s life and legacy from a wide variety of perspectives. This is (...) altogether fitting, given the many-sided nature of Russell, his life, and his work. The first section of the book considers Russell the man, and draws lessons from Russell’s complicated personal life. The second examines Russell the philosopher, and the philosophical world within which his work was embedded. The third scrutinizes Russell the atheist and critic of organized religion, inquiring which parts of his critical stance are worth emulating today. The final section revisits Russell the political activist; it directs an eye both at Russell’s own long career of peace activism, but also at his place in a highly political family tradition of which he was justifiably proud. This book thus constitutes an invitation, if one were needed, to the world of Bertrand Russell. Those new to Russell, but with an interest in biography, philosophy, religion, or politics, will hopefully find something to learn here. This may spark an interest in learning more about Russell. But this book is not just intended for the Russell neophyte. The book sheds fresh light on a number of topics central to Russell studies—his connections to other philosophers, for example. Scholars well-versed in Russell studies will enjoy grappling with the treatment given to these topics here. (shrink)

In 1916 Bertrand Russell was prosecuted and fined for publishing (in defence of a conscientious objector) 'statements likely to prejudice the recruiting and discipline of His Majesty's forces.' He was almost immediately afterwards dismissed from his Lectureship at Trinity College, Cambridge, by the College Council. This expulsion provoked a storm of protest and the true facts of the case became obscured by misconceptions, prejudices and uninformed gossip, to the discredit of the College. In 1942, therefore G. H. Hardy the (...) mathematician printed for private circulation to another generation of Fellows at Trinity a full account of the incident in an attempt to explain what really happened. This is now made public. Besides provoking an authoritative record of a celebrated but misinterpreted episode in Russell's eventful academic career, this document contains interesting evidence about attitudes to pacifism in the First World War and in particular about the sympathies of such distinguished colleagues and contemporaries of Russell as Cornford, Housman, McTaggart and Whitehead. (shrink)

Traces the life and career of the controversial British philosopher and pacifist and describes his contribution to mathematics, philosophy, and the anti-nuclear movement.