We are concerned with two modes of describing the dynamics of natural systems. Global descriptions require simultaneous global coordination of all dynamical operations. Global dynamics, including mechanics, remain invariant in the absence of external perturbation. But, failing impossible global coordination, dynamical operations could actually become coordinated only locally. In local records, as in global ones, the law of the excluded middle would be strictly observed, but without global coordination it could only be fullfilled sequentially by passing causative factors forward onto (...) subsequent contiguous operations.The local dynamics of sequential operations would be indefinite with regard to how commitments will be made which will avoid violating the law of the excluded middle, but any resulting record will be as definite as if there had been global coordination. While maintaining an agential capacity for making contingent choices internally, local dynamics could be cumulated into a global record of seemingly simultaneous operations. Natural selection within a framework of local dynamics would have a capacity for making opportunistic commitments, but its effects in a posterior record can be reduced to the mechanistic neodarwinian version as if there had been a global dynamics. However, the resulting global description falsifies the actual material nature of the dynamics. (shrink)

Lack of distinction between the formalism of quantum mechanics and its various interpretations leads to some popular misrepresentations. As long as none of the interpretations can present an unambiguous empirical validation, their status remains purely philosophical. These arguments are shown to apply to Snyder's claims. Next it is shown that Snyder's critcism does not address the main points in the argument concerning the physical impact of consciousness. The reply concludes with some reflections on methodology in the search for a physical (...) theory of consciousness. (shrink)

This article examines a contemporary proposal of how to conceive of materialism, more specifically of a materialist dialectics. This proposal was formulated by Alain Badiou and it is of huge interest for the contemporary discussion as it inscribes the very historical coordinates in which it was articulated into its own proposal. The article develops this by arguing that Badiou's materialist dialectic historically situates itself after idealist options seem to have become impossible. However, the very dialectical kernel of this (...) class='Hi'>materialism leads Badiou to claim that after the perpetuated struggle between materialism and idealism is declared to have been overcome, the very split separating the two returns in an inverted form inside materialism, splitting it again into two. Thereby the immanent split in materialism leads to two options: either one defends a materialism devoid of any idealist reference or a materialism which seeks to rescue something of idealism. The article concludes by suggesting that only from a detailed reconstruction of the functioning of philosophy in Badiou's system does it become possible to conceive of the threats that any materialism today faces and to delineate the proposed option of how to avoid them consistently. The article demonstrates how, today, materialism can only be properly materialist by resurrecting something of idealism, which is why it deserves the name of what I call an “idealism without idealism.”. (shrink)

Professor [H.W.] Sheldon's critique of contemporary naturalism as professed in the volume Naturalism and the Human Spirit consists of one central "accusation": naturalism is materialism pure and simple. This charge is supported by his further claim that since the scientific method naturalists espouse for acquiring reliable knowledge of nature is incapable of yielding knowledge of the mental or spiritual "nature" for the naturalist is definitionally limited to "physical nature." He therefore concludes that instead of being a philosophy which can (...) settle age-old conflicts between materialism and idealism, naturalism is no more than a partisan standpoint, and contributes no new philosophical synthesis. ... (shrink)

I‘m a materialist, and not too embarassed about it. It would be nice to have a knock down argument to defend materialism, but not having one, I instinctively fight off idealists, dualists, skeptics, or whatever, with the same punches and feints used by materialists from time immemorial. Like, say, the snide observation that a material like liquor gets even my idealist friends drunk, or that the senile dualists I have known don't seem at all to consist of ageless minds (...) trapped in aging bodies. I will not resort to ad baculum, because all non-materialists I‘ve known, of whatever stripe, act as though tampering with their bodies is the same as tampering with their very selves. (shrink)

The present article is a continuation of an earlier paper, entitled “Dialectical Materialism: A Friendly Interpretation”, which appeared in this journal. In the “Friendly Interpretation”, the emphasis was on formal and systematic exposition. Here, familiarity with the basic tenets of dialectical materialism is presumed, and some peripheral topics, which were deleted from the “Friendly Interpretation” lest they interrupt its continuity, are treated in five essay-type sections. First, an interpretation of dialectical materialism proposed by Rosenfeld, according to which (...) the usual acausal interpretation of quantum mechanics is consistent with, and even an instructive illustration of dialectical materialism, is criticized. In the second section, the connection between positivism and Orwell's “doublethink” is pointed out. This is done in order to exhibit certain difficulties to which consistent positivism leads, but which are avoided by both materialism and objective idealism; in particular, the language of positivism, lacking the concept of “existence”, is inadequate to distinguish by any absolute criterion between reality and a dream world. In the last three sections, two acausal philosophies are compared and contrasted to dialectical materialism. First, in the third section, Landé‘s argument, showing the incompatibility of the principles of complete causality and of continuity of cause and effect, is summarized. It is shown that Landé‘s choice, in favor of continuity of cause and effect, is not the only consistent one, and that if one accepts the outlook of dialectical materialism, the opposite choice can and should be made. In the fourth section, Margenau's interpretation of quantum mechanics is criticized, both in terms of the criteria proposed by Margenau, and from the point of view of the doctrine of rationalism, which, in the “Friendly Interpretation”, was included as part of dialectical materialism. The interpretation of Bohm, de Broglie, and Takabayasi is preferred to that of Margenau, which is akin to the usual Bohr-Heisenberg interpretation of quantum mechanics. Margenau's sharp distinction between concepts applicable to the microcosm, and those useful in macroscopic considerations, is criticized. In the fifth section, Margenau's use of the term “historical reality” in connection with the microcosm is criticized. It is argued that the reality of historical concepts is not intrinsically different from the reality of physical concepts. This leads to a further discussion of “free will”. (shrink)

This discussion concerns whether philosophical materialism is false or not. The exchange between Graham Harman and Javier Pérez-Jara goes to the core of the present book: what is materialism, how many varieties are there, and what use are they today? While Harman identifies materialism with reductionism, Pérez-Jara offers a broader definition that includes non-reductionist materialisms. It might seem to be just as a matter of differing definitions. And yet, each approach gives rise to a whole different way (...) of reconstructing the history of philosophy as well as of deciding which are the current available options in metaphysics. (shrink)

"Scientific materialism" is one of the most influential currents in modern Anglo-American philosophy. An examination of its content and the paths that have emerged for its further evolution is of prime interest for Marxist philosophers. "Scientific materialism" was born in the fifties and has developed rapidly on many levels, signaling a sharp increase in materialist tendencies in contemporary bourgeois philosophy and an attendant intensified confrontation between materialism and idealism. This, of course, deserves especially careful attention.

I develop a nontheistic (quasi-)Berkeleyan idealism. The basic strategy is to peel away the attributes of God that aren't essential for role he plays in idealist metaphysics. God's omnibenevolence, his desires, intentions, beliefs, his very status as an agent ... aren't relevant to the work he does. When we peel all these things away, we're left with a view on which reality is a vast unity of consciousness, weaving together sensory experiences of colors, shapes, sounds, sizes, etc. into the (...) trees, electrons, black holes, and central nervous systems that fill the world around us. This phenomenal unity is governed by laws analogous to those posited by materialists, governing the unfolding of reality. I argue that if reality is fundamentally phenomenal in this way, we can give a unique account of perception that robustly captures direct realist intuitions of reality forming the "constituents" of our experiences: In perception, our finite unities of consciousness come to literally overlap with the unity of consciousness that is reality. I assess the unique virtues and challenges such a view faces, paying particular attention to the question of whether idealism entails a profligacy of physical laws. (shrink)

Situated within the growing literature on green alternatives to research and innovation-led green transition approaches, this paper sketches the contours of an emerging transition policy evaluation matrix aiming at going beyond contemporary (new) materialist concerns. To do so, I introduce a vitalist focus on life and establishing all connectedness as a long-term normative goal of just and deep global development policy. For this purpose, I draw from key insights from the recent interim evaluation of the European Framework program ‘Horizon (...) Europe’, as well as non-Western and indigenous and feminist approaches to environmental justice to argue for overcoming an exclusive materialist and individualist preoccupation with green transition as it has been characteristic hitherto. Building on the requirement of a theory of change for encompassing well-being that includes a shifted yet assessable notion of being, I describe the non-linear sequence of green transition phases transcending materialist approaches to shifted energy supply and large-scale decarbonization to include an imaginary of a connected biocentric humanity with a just vitalist concern for life and well-being. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Philosophical Tale.

In this essay I argue that Darwinian theory, far from supporting a philosophy of metaphysical materialism, actually calls materialism into question. Once this is recognized we see that evolutionary theory, for all its successes (which are considerable), is more limited than is generally supposed in its ability to reveal or explain the ultimate thrust of life.

This is a book about Jurgen Habermas's attempt to replace historical materialism with communicative action as a social theory that is not external to society in the manner of traditional theories but is at work within it as an agency for human freedom. However, Rockmore is not so much interested in the genealogy of Habermas's theory of communicative action as in the complicated and sometimes confusing story of Habermas's own struggle with historical materialism as a way of accounting (...) for social phenomena. The concept of historical materialism is itself very far from clear, and Habermas's own relation to it is highly unstable. Rockmore maps out the itinerary for Habermas's "reading of Marx and Marxism as a process in four stages, leading to his own theory of communicative action, consisting of the interpretation, critique, reconstruction, and rejection of historical materialism". In addition, Rockmore's book is in certain unsystematic ways a critique of Habermas's reading of Marx and Marxism; that is, it is not so much a defense of historical materialism as a criticism of the incompleteness of Habermas's efforts to get beyond it--an incompleteness that amounts, in Rockmore's view, to a backsliding into idealism, or at least into a German idealist theory of reason, including a restoration of the transcendental subject. (shrink)

Subjective idealism today -- Scientific cognition and the external world -- 80 years on, Lenin's "What is to be done?" -- Studies on dialectical materialism -- Some lessons from our summer school on dialectical materialism.

I present a condensed exposé of systemic materialism, a synthesis of materialism and systemism originally proposed by Mario Bunge. Matter is identified with mutability of propertied particulars, and a concrete or material system is defined as an object with composition, structure, mechanism, and environment. I review different aspects of this ontology, and discuss some of its implications for epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. I also try to identify some problems of this view and offer some ways to overcome the (...) difficulties. I conclude that systemic materialism is a promising philosophical project still in the making. (shrink)

Marxist studies in the history of philosophy are based on the assumption that all philosophical schools and currents fall into two main traditions, materialism and idealism, and that the whole of the history of philosophy can be described as an opposition between the two. Lenin observed that this distinction goes back to antiquity, and that even then the "tendencies "l of Democritus and Plato were already in evidence.

William Sweet gathers responses to the major writings of the leading figures of the British idealist movement, including contributions by Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, Sir Ernest Barker, Sir Henry Jones, R.F.A. Hoernle, J.S. MacKenzie, Brand Blanshard and others.

This is a short (1,000 word) introduction to Hobbes's materialism, covering (briefly) such issues as what the relevant notion of materialism is, Hobbes's debate with Descartes, and what Hobbes's arguments for materialism were.

Materialism is the oldest known philosophy. Philosophy was born as materialism and man had been essentially materialistic in character. In general, all our earliest experiences are of the material world. Philosophy means love for knowledge which is the unique characteristic of man. Man is never satisfied with mere food and shelter. Reason impels him towards a quest for knowledge. Philosophy is born at a man's attempt to have rational explanation of the universe around him and of himself as (...) a part of the universe out of which he had originated and where he has to live, act and think. There is strong and widely prevalent notion that we Indians are basically spiritualistic in outlook and materialism belongs to western thought. This popular view Indian Philosophy perhaps originated from the false notion that "East is East and West is West"- a notion which according to Radhakrishnan, is sign of "abysonal ignorance". Man is either naturally materialists or naturally idealist the study of the history of philosophy, on the contrary, shows that materialism is the earliest philosophy. Prof. Stace rightly points out: "Materialism is ingrained in all men. We easterns and westerns, are born materialists. (shrink)

Digital materiality (digimat) proposes a set of basic principles for how we understand the world through digital processes. This short book sets out a methodical materialist understanding of digital technologies, where they come from, how they work, and what they do.

In her book, Vibrant Matter, Jane Bennett thinks through what ontological, political, and ecological questions would look like if humans could admit that matter and nonhuman things are living, creative agents; the contributors to this issue of Evental Aesthetics begin to think through what aesthetic questions would look like.

Recognition -- German Idealism as an Ongoing Challenge seeks to answer the question: does the present philosophical debate about recognition incorporate sufficiently the systematical requirements of the philosophy it pretends to inherit and rejuvenate, i.e. German idealism?

According to its proponents, eliminative materialism is a promising alternative to the problem-beset identity theory. A popular materialist strategy for handling thoughts, sensations, beliefs, and intentions has been to identify such mental states with physical states. The identity theorist, however, must confront difficult questions concerning identity criteria, essential properties and category mistakes. The eliminative theorist wants to bypass these problems by maintaining that we will someday discover that mental entities simply do not exist. If there are no mental entities, (...) then we need not worry about determining their essential properties or determining the conditions under which they would be identical with physical entities. ‘Category mistake’ objections, which might apply to an identity thesis, would clearly be irrelevant.As formulated by its chief proponent, Richard Rorty, the eliminative theory is suspiciously straightforward. Indeed, a closer look at its underpinnings reveals a highly questionable assumption. I will propose a reformulation of eliminative materialism which avoids this assumption. (shrink)