The so-called "Big Typescript" is Wittgenstein's first attempt to publish in a book his collected thoughts since his return to Cambridge and to philosophical writing, thus correcting the "serious errors" (Wittgenstein) of his early work. Among the texts in Wittgenstein's estate, the "Big Typescript" is the one that, next to the "Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung" (the "Tractatus") of 1918, appears to be the most "finished", with a table of contents structured in chapters and sections. It is, however, a fragment, without (...) either title, motto or conclusion. To Wittgenstein, it was important "that the thoughts in [the book] should progress from one subject to another in well-ordered consecutiveness." It is precisely this structure of the "Big Typescript", though ultimately rejected by Wittgenstein, which constitutes the immeasurable value of the text for the study of and as an introduction to Wittgenstein's thinking. (shrink)

Long awaited by the scholarly community, Wittgenstein's so-called Big Typescript is presented here in an en face English-German scholar's edition. Presents scholar's edition of important material from 1933, Wittgenstein's first efforts to set out his new thoughts after the publication of the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Includes indications to help the reader identify Wittgenstein's numerous corrections, additions, deletions, alternative words and phrasings, suggestions for moves within the text, and marginal comments.

Neste artigo começo por argumentar que devemos ver o Big Typescript como algo muito diferente de um livro planejado para a publicação. Ele deve ser tomado meramente como uma coleção de observações, que expressam a concepção de Wittgenstein de “gramática” por volta de 1932-33, quando as observações foram reunidas. Em seguida, explico a concepção substancial de “gramática” do BT. Espero tornar claro, nesta segunda parte, que o BT e o Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus são próximos no sentido de que partilham a (...) idéia de que a linguagem tem uma estrutura que opera de acordo com regras fixas de sentido (um cálculo). (shrink)

The paper clarifies therapeutic ideas about philosophical method which Wittgenstein puts forward in his "Big Typescript". It does so by analysing how Wittgenstein treats the question 'What is meaning?', in that part of the same work from which the opening sections of his "Philosophical Investigations" derive. On this basis, the paper explains why Wittgenstein set himself a therapeutic goal, why this is reasonable, and how he sought to attain that goal without 'pronouncing new truths about the subject of the (...) investigation', viz. meaning. (shrink)

Dans cet article, j’essaie de montrer que l’idée du langage comme calcul structure la philosophie de Wittgenstein dans le Big Typescript. Pour ce faire, je commence par mettre en relief les différences entre la conception du langage comme calcul dans le Tractatus, et sa reformulation dans le Big Typescript ; j’explique ensuite comment l’idée de l’autonomie de la grammaire est à la base de la conception de la « grammaire » ou du langage comme calcul. J’espère pouvoir montrer (...) ainsi l’unité de la philosophie de Wittgenstein aux alentours de 1932-1933. Il doit en ressortir que sa philosophie à l’époque du Big Typescript présente un intérêt en elle-même, quoiqu’il ne s’agisse pas encore de la philosophie des Recherches philosophiques.I aim at showing that the idea of language as a calculus is the central view that shapes Wittgenstein’s philosophy in the Big Typescript. In order to do so, I first contrast the conception of language as a calculus in the Tractatus with its reformulation in the BigTypescript ; then I explain how the idea of the autonomy of grammar grounds the conception of “grammar” or language as calculus. With this on hand, I give an overview of the unity of Wittgenstein’s philosophy around 1932-1933. It should become clear that his philosophy at the time is worth arguing for, even though it is not yet the philosophy of the PhilosophicalInvestigations. (shrink)

The edition of the Nachlass from the early thirties by Michael Nedo and the completion of the "Bergen Electronic Edition" (BEE) have provided Wittgenstein scholars with all the material required to investigate the author's philosophical development starting with his auto-criticism of the "Tractatus" and leading to his later views. Wittgenstein's strategy of dictating from his notebooks and cutting up the typescripts to rearrange paragraphs into sequences of remarks is well documented in Nedo's edition and the BEE provides convenient facsimile access (...) to every page Wittgenstein wrote or edited throughout the process. Some researchers have begun to revise received opinions that were based upon the "books" previously published by the trustees. (Hrachovec 2002, 2004, Kientzler 1997, Nyiri 2002, Pichler 2004, Stern 2002) Yet, the scientific community has barely begun to discover the richness and density of the philosophical endeavor manifesting itself in this material. There has, understandably, been an interest to trace the origin of remarks, well-known from the "Philosophical Investigations", providing some background to Wittgenstein's most popular ideas. Various doctrines of what is becoming known as the "middle Wittgenstein" have been noticed, but they have themselves been perceived as more or less consolidated theories. Wittgenstein's editorial activity has been recognized as a hypertextual undertaking avant la lettre, yet there has been insufficient attention to the philosophical impact of these hypertextual strategies themselves. It is all too easy to be caught by someprovisional result captured on a printed page and to overlook the fact that some of its philosophical significance can only be recognized by considering its genesis. (shrink)

Throughout his whole work, Wittgenstein seizes on a distinction between logical and physical possibility, and impossibility. Despite this continuity and although, Wittgenstein brings in this distinction in various contexts and from different vantage points, he often solely brushes over it without elaborating in detail. In the so-called Big Typescript, however, he dedicates himself not only to the distinction between logical and physical possibility but also to the distinction between logical possibility and impossibility in particular investigations. In the course of (...) these investigations, another aspect arises and is tossed and turned repeatedly by Wittgenstein – namely, the place of “imaginability” in these considerations. On the basis of three focussed chapters in the Big Typescript, I argue that “imaginability” as an utterance of the form “being able to imagine ‘what it would be like’” can be allocated the place of a criterion for logical possibility. To this end, I will first outline the chapters 96., 27. and 26. in one section each. Although in these chapters, Wittgenstein only indicates rather than claiming explicitly “imaginability” to be a criterion for logical possibility, I will discuss in the last section how this conclusion can be drawn by combining the results of the previous sections. (shrink)

The paper seeks to interpret and then to criticize Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus paragraph 6.4 to 7, connecting this so-called mystical section with the “Lecture on Ethics” given in Cambridge in 1929, the Notebooks, and a passage in the Big Typescript. Interpretive and critical efforts focus on the claims: that if having intrinsic value, good or evil, is nothing zufällig, then its basis is nothing in the world; that value can only enter through the willing subject; that “how things are (...) in the world is a matter of indifference for what is higher”. Concerning, it is proposed that the zufällig is here that which simply or merely happens. The argument for rests on Wittgenstein's misconception of the categorical. It is remarked that and result in a philosophy of life that is unliveable. Witness the travails of Wittgenstein's own life and his struggle to “get over a particular fact”. Finally will even undermine, which is in any case fatally ambiguous. In conclusion, it is suggested that both the stresses and strains that are induced within the Tractatus itself by its circumscription of the sayable and the difficulties of can be overcome within Wittgenstein's later philosophy, but in ways already prefigured in the doctrine of “showing” as that appears in both Tractatus and “Lecture on Ethics”. (shrink)

Using new archival material, this article reconstructs the editorial history of Philosophical Grammar, an edition that Rush Rhees crafted from Wittgenstein's papers. Contrasting the often‐held view that Rhees, in editing Philosophical Grammar, arbitrarily interfered with Wittgenstein's Big Typescript, the article illuminates the work, motives and reasons that underlie Rhees’ editing. Although recent philological evidence supports his editorial decisions, Rhees, at the time, made them based on his desire to do justice to his understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophical orientation. Against this (...) background, purely text‐philological criticism of Philosophical Grammar seems to come from a philosophical culture that was alien to Rhees. (shrink)

This paper outlines an interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s remark in the _Big Typescript_ in which he compares the philosopher bewitched by the workings of language to “the suffering of an ascetic”. The interpretation takes as its starting point Friedrich Nietzsche’s terse account of the philosopher, the history of philosophy, and his diagnosis of ascetic self-misunderstanding, from the Third Essay, “What do ascetic ideals mean?”, in _On the Genealogy of Morality_. In its assumption of an affinity between Wittgenstein’s remark and Nietzsche’s (...) descriptions, and in its analysis, this paper introduces a “method of voice borrowing” to approach the question: “Wittgenstein and Nietzsche?” The juxtaposition of Wittgenstein’s conception of the philosopher’s linguistic self-misunderstanding with Nietzsche’s notion of the ascetic self-misunderstanding leads finally to the question of what is gained by introducing this method, and hence by reading Wittgenstein’s remark on the suffering of an ascetic with the help of Nietzsche’s voice. (shrink)

This book deals with some large tracts of Wittgenstein’s writings concerning representation and the mental. Its defining characteristic, and one of its main strengths, is an extensive use of material in the background of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and Investigations. Stern quotes from and discusses remarks from unpublished manuscripts, including the Big Typescript, little-studied published writings such as the Tractatus notebooks, “Some Remarks on Logical Form,” Philosophical Remarks, Philosophical Grammar, as well as lecture notes by Moore, King and Lee, and others. (...) How much of these writings the book reproduces is suggested by the fact that its appendix, giving the original German of the previously unpublished matter translated in the main text, is eleven small-print pages long; and there are far more quotations from the published part of the corpus. The result is a work in which, for a run of pages, the ratio of quoted material to comment can be as high as one to one ; and in which most pages contain a significant amount of indented quotation. The main justification offered for the wholesale inclusion of this material is that it provides a context that can help determine what problem Wittgenstein was addressing in a given passage from his two main works. Stern’s mastery of that material is impressive, as shown for example in his pellucid outline of Wittgenstein’s philosophical development after 1920. (shrink)

In the preface of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein says that his “most fruitful ideas” are due to the stimulus of Sraffa's criticism, but Sraffa is not mentioned anywhere else in the book. It remains a puzzle in the literature how and why Sraffa influenced Wittgenstein. This paper presents a solution to this puzzle. Sraffa's criticism led Wittgenstein away from the calculus conception of language of the Big Typescript (arguably, an adaptation of the calculus of the Tractatus), and towards the (...) “anthropological view,” which structures both the opening sections of the Philosophical Investigations and Wittgenstein's later philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

wo independent publishing projects have thoroughly changed the state of Wittgenstein scholarship in recent years. Michael Nedo's 'Wiener Ausgabe'1 offers a traditional critical edition of Wittgenstein's philosophical writings ranging from 1929 up to and including the 'Big Typescript' (1933). Considering the eclectic and - at times - arbitrary editorial policy underlying previous publications from the Nachlass2 Nedo's project offers unprecedented philosophical rigor as well as textual criticism in volumes designed for comfortable reading. A second, more ambitious, attempt at a (...) critical edition is the Bergen electronic edition.3 It is planned to include 4 CD-ROMs, covering the entire range of the philosopher's unpublished writing. Two disks are currently available, comprising all of Wittgenstein's manuscripts from 1929-1939, as well as type-scripts, beginning with 'Notes on Logic' (1913) and leading up to Typescript 226, composed in 1939. Wittgenstein's writings from the Thirties are, therefore, available in independent, reliable printed and electronic editions respectively. Readers can, for the first time, observe the philosopher at work, transferring paragraphs from pocket notebooks to handwritten 'volumes'; picking acceptable remarks to be included in type-scripts that are, at a later stage, cut up into slips of paper which are again annotated, rearranged and put together in further volumes and type-scripts. But this is only half the excitement. The 'Wiener Ausgabe' and the 'Bergen Edition' stake their success on different media, inevitably provoking a comparison between the well known features of printed scholarly editions and the not so familiar realm of digitized texts. (shrink)

Inhalt: A EINLEITUNG. 1. Das Sprachspielmodell. 2. Zur Entwicklung des Denkens von L. Wittgenstein. 3. Zusammenfassende Thesen. B ZUR GENESIS DES SPRACHSPIELMODELLS. 4. Die Umbruchsjahre 1928-1932. 5. Das Big Typescript. 6. Das Sprachspielmodell im BT. C ZUR GELTUNG DES SPRACHSPIELMODELLS. 7. Ein sekundärliterarischer Zugang. D Schlußbemerkung. E Abkürzungs- und Literaturverzeichnis.

Unlike his other major typescripts, the Big Typescript is divided into titled chapters, themselves divided into titled sections. But within a section we still get a collection of remarks typically without connecting tissue and lacking any transparently significant ordering or helpful signposting. So we still encounter the usual difficulties in trying to think our way through into what Wittgenstein might be wanting to say. Some enthusiasts like to try to persuade us that the aphoristic style is really of the (...) essence. But I’ve always wondered how true that is. So I here propose an experiment. Let’s take §108 of the ‘Big Typescript’ (the first of the sections in the part of the book titled ‘The Foundations of Mathematics’). There are four and a bit pages of remarks. I’m going to try to render them into rather more conventional prose. In the section that follows, then, I have embedded almost every sentence Wittgenstein wrote in his §108 – or rather, of course, I’ve embedded almost every sentence from the well-regarded translation. I have, however, often changed the order in which remarks appear, omitted some ‘and’s and ‘but’s and the like, changed some punctuation, demoted some passages to footnotes, but not – I hope – in any way that radically changes the significance of any remark, or distorts what is going on. And I’ve added a lot of signposting. I’ll comment, necessarily very briefly, on the results of the exercise starting in §3 below. So here we go . . (shrink)

It is sometimes argued that Wittgenstein's conception of grammar and the role he allocated to grammar (in his sense of the term) in philosophy changed between the Big Typescript and the Philosophical Investigations. It is also held that some of the grammatical propositions Wittgenstein asserted prior to his writing of the Philosophical Investigations are theses, doctrines, opinions or dogmatism, which he abandoned by 1936/37. The purpose of this paper is to show these claims to be misunderstandings and misinterpretations. On (...) all important matters, his conception of grammar and of grammatical investigations, of grammatical statements or propositions and of grammatical clarification did not change between the Big Typescript and the Investigations. Grammatical propositions (e.g. the meaning of a word is its use; a sample in an ostensive definition belongs to the means of representation; belief is not a mental state) are no more theses, doctrines or opinions than is “a bachelor is an unmarried man.” Nor are they in any way dogmatic. (shrink)

Nel febbraio 1912 Wittgenstein venne ammesso al Trinity College con Russell come supervisor, e iniziò a seguire le lezioni di Moore. E’ probabile che leggesse il libretto di Moore, Ethics, pubblicato al suo arrivo a Cambridge, o che ritrovasse nelle lezioni di Moore alcune delle suggestioni presenti nel libro. Ma dopo il Tractatus Wittgenstein dedicò poco spazio alle riflessioni sull’etica e quel poco in un periodo ristretto di tempo, agli inizi degli anni ‘30, dalla Conferenza sull’etica2 alle lezioni del ’32-33. (...) Alle lezioni del 32-33 assistettero sia Alice Ambrose che George E. Moore, che ci lascianpo diversi tipi di appunti:3 Ambrose riporta frasi di Wittgenstein, Moore presenta e rielabora le sue idee. Una lettura comparata di questi appunti dà un’idea abbastanza chiara di quanto Wittgenstein in quegli anni riuscisse a fondere le sue idee sui giudizi morali con le sue idee sulla grammatica filosofica che veniva elaborando nel Big Typescript. (shrink)

Unter den Typoskripten in Wittgensteins Nachlaß nimmt das Big Typescript von 1933 eine Sonderstellung ein. Denn kein anderes von Wittgenstein selbst zusammengestelltes Textkonvolut erweckt so sehr den Eindruck eines fertigen, 'konventionellen' Buches wie diese 768 Typoskriptseiten. Doch ist das Big Typescript tatsächlich so etwas wie ein fertiges Buch? Darf man es gar als dasjenige ansehen, an das Wittgenstein dachte, als er im Juni 1931 von 'seinem Buch' sprach? Hat man es hier vielleicht sogar mit einem eigenständigen Werk der (...) mittleren Periode seines Denkens zu tun? Und welchen systematischen Stellenwert haben die im Big Typescript niedergelegten Gedanken im Blick auf das Früh- und Spätwerk? Die Untersuchungen dieses Buches versuchen, solche Fragen einer Klärung näherzuführen. (shrink)

This book presents and discusses the varying and seminal role which colour plays in the development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Having once said that “Colours spur us to philosophize”, the theme of colour was one to which Wittgenstein returned constantly throughout his career. Ranging from his Notebooks, 1914-1916 and the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to the posthumously published Remarks on Colours and On Certainty, this book explores how both his view of philosophical problems generally and his view on colours specifically changed considerably over (...) time. Paying particular attention to his so-called intermediary period, it takes a case-based approach to the presentation of colour in texts from this period, from Some Remarks on Logical Form and Philosophical Remarks to his Big Typescript. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s use of the word ‘phenomenology’ to describe his own work in Philosophical Remarks and The Big Typescript has occasioned much puzzlement and confusion. This paper seeks to shed light on what Wittgenstein meant by the word through a close analysis of key passages in those two works. I argue against both the view of Nicholas Gier that Wittgenstein held ‘grammatical’ phenomenological remarks to be synthetic a priori and that expressed by Moritz Schlick that Wittgenstein held grammar to be (...) tautological. I also take issue with the claim by Merrill and Jaakko Hintikka that Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus ought to be regarded as a work of phenomenology. Wittgenstein’s adoption of a variant of Husserlian phenomenology, I argue, lasted no more than a few months, from February to October 1929, during which he conceived of phenomenology as something that sought to establish what one might call ‘analytic a posteriori’ truths through something like the Husserlian method of ‘bracketing’. By the end of 1929, I claim, he had abandoned that in favour of the view expressed in the slogan ‘phenomenology is grammar’, where ‘grammar’ is not confined to the tautological, but is rather intimately linked to Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘the understanding that consists in seeing connections’. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's attitude toward philosophy and philosophical problems is examined with the result that - in spite of his own strong criticism of his earlier work - the aim of philosophy remains the same throughout his life: clarity for its own sake. Wittgenstein's concept of philosophy is sketched as non-naturalistic and anti-systematic with the recommendation of being unbiased as the only remedy for falling again into the old traps. The criticism of the Russell-Frege view of existential quantification and generalization included in (...) the "Big Typescript" is outlined as well as the position toward verification Wittgenstein maintained in between his beginning to work in philosophy anew and his first attempt of systematizing the results in the "Big Typescript". (shrink)

This essay intends to identify intentionalism (infinity given by rules, not by extensions) and the idea of multiple complete mathematical systems (several “mathematics”) as the central characteristics of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics. We intend to roughly show how these ideas come up, interact to each other, how they develop and, in the end, how they are abandoned in the late period. According to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, infinities can only be given by rules and there is a single numerical system (the (...) number’s essence is the general idea of ordering). Intentionalism is up to at least 1933, but the idea of a single system is abandoned in 1929-30 (already in the Philosophische Bemerkungen). In its place one finds the idea of multiple, independent and complete numerical systems. This idea will engender some key moves in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of Mathematics. The notion of “seeing an aspect” from the Big Typescript, of instance, comes up so as to explain such systems. From 1934 onwards, Wittgenstein gradually abandons intentionalism and the idea of multiple, independent and complete systems. In his late philosophy, both ideas are used only as instruments to dissolve philosophical prose regarding mathematics. (shrink)

Why should the philosophical achievement of Ludwig Wittgenstein be taken seriously in the twenty-first century? This text answers this question by elaborating the distinctive therapeutic conception of philosophy defended in Wittgenstein's later work, typified by Philosophical Investigations. Here, Wittgenstein's highly contextual, problem-specific and person-specific conception of the philosophical project is clarified with reference to his own writings. In so doing, this text challenges contemporary failures to properly acknowledge all publications from those writings as posthumous, Nachlass (Legacy), or to treat judiciously (...) the material published from that Legacy. Explicitly following Gordon Baker's last essays (Wittgenstein's Method: Neglected Aspects, 2004), and drawing on biographical sources as well as scholarly ones, the text addresses Wittgenstein's published oeuvre. Importantly, this exposition gives weight to the Big Typescript (2005) and Voices of Wittgenstein (2003), as two "projected works" attempting to present Wittgenstein's philosophical agenda. Further, Wittgenstein's very last writings are argued here to constitute a single, broadly unified project, rebutting the suggestion of a 'third Wittgenstein'. Moreover, the book sketches philosophical discussions conducted in line with Wittgenstein's own conception of philosophy's project to continue chains of examples of the kind he used in exposition of it. (shrink)

Resumo: o propósito desse artigo é circunscrever e discutir a autocrítica, feita por Wittgenstein no período de 1933-39, a uma das teses mais fundamentais do Tractatus (TLP): ”Há uma e apenas uma análise completa da proposição” (3.25). Chamaremos esse procedimento peculiar de a “Grande análise”. Os argumentos de Wittgenstein contra a sustentabilidade da sua antiga tese podem ser encontrados em algumas passagens do livro Investigações Filosóficas (IF), bem como em passagens do Grande Datiloscrito (BT). Conforme será argumentado nesse artigo, essa (...) autocrítica é uma consequência direta da preocupação de Wittgenstein, no período intermediário, com duas importantes propostas feitas por Frege nos §§18-24 do Os Fundamentos da Aritmética (FA) em relação o seu entendimento da noção de “atribuição numérica”. Nosso objetivo principal será mostrar de que maneira o movimento de autocrítica feito por Wittgenstein em relação a sua antiga concepção de “Grande Análise” teria sido influenciado por suas preocupações, no período intermediário de sua obra, com essas duas propostas feita por Frege no FA a respeito da noção de “atribuição numérica”. A fim de completar tal tarefa, será apresentada inicialmente de modo breve uma versão de como seria a “Grande análise” no TLP. Em seguida, selecionaremos e discutiremos algumas passagens do IF nas quais Wittgenstein recusa a completude e unicidade envolvida em sua prévia concepção tratariana de “análise”. Procuraremos destacar com clareza uma noção que estaria envolvida de um modo essencial na autocrítica de Wittgenstein: a noção de “ver como/ver aspectos”. Como será argumentado, essa noção, assim como a autocrítica feita por Wittgenstein, foram ambas diretamente influenciadas pela noção fregiana de “atribuição numérica”. Para completar essa segunda tarefa, teremos de revisitar e discutir algumas noções pertencentes ao período inicial da filosofia de Wittgenstein -- como a de “propriedades internas e externas” e a distinção entre “dizer e mostrar” -- ambas noções discutidas no TLP. No decorrer de nossa discussão, apresentaremos uma crítica feita por Wittgenstein a Russell, mas também a Frege, sobre a concepção de generalidade, ou mais especificamente, sobre o uso do quantificador existencial, proposta por ambos. Abstract: The purpose of this article is to discuss Wittgenstein 1933-39 self-criticism of one of the most fundamental tractarian theses: There is one and only one complete analysis of the proposition (3.25). Wittgenstein's arguments against his previous thesis can be found in some passages of the Philosophical Investigation (PI) as well as in the Big Typescript (BT). As we shall argue, Wittgenstein's self-critique is directly related to two important ideas proposed by Frege in §§18-24 of The Foundations Arithmetic (FA) with respect to his construal of “number attributions”. Our main goal in this paper will therefore be to show how Wittgenstein's self-criticism of his old conception of the tractarian “analysis” would have been influenced by his concerns in the middle period of his work with these two proposals made by Frege in FA regarding the notion of “numerical attribution”. Our first task will then be to connect Wittgenstein's self-criticisms to his former conception of “analysis” in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP). To accomplish this first goal, we will have to briefly present a version of how such analysis would look like in TLP. Our next task will be to pinpoint some passages of the PI in which Wittgenstein rejects the completeness and uniqueness involved in his previous construal of the analytical process. We will try to circumscribe clearly a crucial notion involved in Wittgenstein's self-critique: the idea of “seeing as/seeing aspects”. Our claim is that this notion, as well as Wittgenstein's self-criticism, were both directly influenced by Frege's construal of the “number attribution” presented in FA. To accomplish this second task, we will have to revisit and discuss some further concepts from an early period of Wittgenstein's philosophy, like “internal and internal properties” and the “saying/showing distinction” in TLP. On our way towards accomplishing this goal, we will present a curious complaint by Wittgenstein regarding Russell's, as well as Frege's conception of generality, or more specifically, on the usage of the existential quantifier suggested by both these authors. (shrink)

The article describes the way Wittgenstein tried to collect „all his good remarks“ within one book. The first such attempt is the Tractatus, the second attempt - which Wittgenstein could not complete - are the Investigations.The ‚Big Typescript’, however,was intended only as an instrument towards this latter aim. This aspect of Wittgenstein’s way of doing philosophy remained stable and it can help to throw light on various exegetical questions.

In “Wittgenstein on Grammar, Theses and Dogmatism,” Peter Hacker addresses what he takes to be misconceptions of Wittgenstein's philosophy with respect to (1) the periodisation of his thought and to what should properly be counted as part of his work; (2) his conception of grammar since the Big Typescript (1929–33); and (3) his conception of philosophy as grammatical investigation. I argue that Hacker's restrictive conception of what ought to be considered part of Wittgenstein's philosophy and his conservative view of (...) Wittgensteinian grammar are unjustified and prevent him from appreciating the revolutionary importance of On Certainty for epistemology. Finally, while agreeing that Wittgenstein views philosophy as grammatical elucidation, I suggest some reasons for the resistance that this view has generated.In “Wittgenstein on Grammar, Theses and Dogmatism,” Peter Hacker deals with three of the “many misunderstandings, misrepresentations and misinterpretations of Wittgenstein's philosophy” (2012, 1); the first of which concerns “the periodisation of Wittgenstein's thought”; the second, the supposition that what Wittgenstein called “grammar” in PI differed fundamentally from, and was more limited than, his conception of it when he was writing the Big Typescript; and the third, the claim that what Wittgenstein took to be grammatical statements are, in fact, dogmatisms, theories or doctrines inconsistent with his meta‐philosophical remarks in PI. I address each of these concerns seriatim. (shrink)

In Chapter IV of his Schreiben und Denken , the Austrian linguist Hanspeter Ortner distinguishes and describes ten writing strategies (“Schreibstrategien”). One of them is “syncretistic writing”. 1 A simple application of Ortner’s defi nition and description of syncretistic writing to the genesis of the Philosophical Investigations (PI) makes clear that the PI can be said to be of syncretistic origin. 2 Wittgenstein’s writing of the PI 3 can be characterized by Ortner’s eight features of syncretistic: his writing (1) hops (...) all over the place (“Sprunghaftigkeit”); (2) combines disparate elements from his writings (“Verbindung von weit Auseinanderliegendem”); (3) is semantically open, under-determined and under-determining (“Unterdeterminiertheit und semantische Offenheit”); (4) postpones gestalt-formation/ elaboration (“Aufschub der Gestaltbildung”); (5) invites and offers many opportunities for creative ideas (“viele Chancen für und Einladungen an den kreativen Einfall”); (6) gives freedom to choose the points of departure and reference (“Freiheit bei der Wahl des/der Startpunktes/e und des/der Gesichtspunktes/e”); (7) is hierarchically under-determined (“hierarchische Unterbestimmtheit”); (8) works side-by-side with the already “fi nished” and the newly begun, which implies long text building processes and parallel operations (“lange ‘Bauzeit’ und Nebeneinander von Fertiggestelltem und Neubegonnenem”). 4 -/- In the following, I will try to show in more detail how the genesis of the PI is characterized by these eight features. First, the writings that constitute the PI’s genesis are characterized by a strong discrepancy between the sequence of remarks in their textual order and the sequence of remarks in their physical order. Texts are put together from chronologically and argumentatively dispersed units. One example is Wittgenstein’s rearrangement of remarks from an earlier dictation (TS 208) into a new text in 1930 (TS 209, published by Rush Rhees as Philosophical Remarks ). In this new text, he abandoned both the original argumentative order and the chronological order and did not necessarily obey the criteria of consistency and coherence, not even on linguistic levels such as demonstrative reference. The work that -/- emerges is seen by many as an unordered agglomerate of remarks, although I have argued that this view can be challenged. 5 The second example is the revision and rearrangement of the so-called Big Typescript (TS 213) in 1933-34, which is paradigmatic in its triple use of (1) the text in the typescript, (2) the handwritten revisions of it in the typescript, and (3) text in other manuscripts. In his edition of the Philosophical Grammar (1969), Rush Rhees has tried to take this complicated network of revisions into account and to follow it painstakingly and faithfully; by looking at the manuscript sources for this edition 6 one realizes how much “hopping all over the place” was going on in the originals. Thirdly, MS 142, the “Urfassung” of the PI, was produced in 1936-37 from remarks stemming from different places in manuscripts and typescripts and various loci of discourse. MS 157b, 13v, contains a list of references to pages in TS 213 from which parts of the text were to be taken to write the “philosophy chapter” of this fi rst PI version; other sources include MS 140 (last page), MS 152, MS 156a, MS 156b and MS 157a, all yielding materials, lists and drafts for the text of MS 142. The fi nal example is TS 228: in the later stages of the PI genesis, Wittgenstein selected about 400 remarks from this typescript to include in TS 227, the typescript used as the printer’s copy for the PI. (shrink)

Wittgenstein est mort en 1951 et on attend toujours une édition de ses œuvres complètes. Ce n'est qu'en 1994 que sont parus, accompagnés d'un volume d'introduction à l'ensemble du projet d'édition de la main du directeur de publication, Michael Nedo, les deux premiers d'une série de quinze volumes, les Wiener Ausgabe, qui reproduiront l'intégralité des écrits de Wittgenstein, de son retour à Cambridge en janvier 1929 à la première version du Big Typescript en 1933, avec index et concordances. D'après (...) le catalogue établi par Georg Henrik von Wright, il s'agit des articles suivants: MS 105 à 114 et 153 à 155, TS 208 à 218. Ces deux premiers volumes reproduisent les manuscrits écrits entre janvier ou février 1929 et l'été 1930, soit les MS 105, 106, 107 et 108. Ils constituent l'aboutissement d'une véritable saga entourant l'œuvre posthume de Wittgenstein, dont il vaut la peine de rapporter ici quelques-uns des faits marquants. (shrink)

Le but de cet article est d'examiner le rôle de l'analogie du calcul dans la philosophie du langage de Wittgenstein pendant les périodes intermédiaires et finales. Ce rôle a changé parce que Wittgenstein est passé d'une interprétation stricte à une interprétation large de cette analogie. L'analogie revêt un sens large dès lors que l'on admet que le langage peut être comparé à un calcul d'une multitude de manières et pour une multitude de raisons différentes. Le trait commun aux deux interprétations (...) consiste en leur ambition d'éradiquer un mentalisme conduisant à prendre la pensée et la compréhension pour des processus et des états se produisant dans l'esprit du locuteur, mais Wittgenstein a progressivement découvert qu'une lecture stricte de l'analogie induisait une représentation fausse du rôle des règles dans le langage. (shrink)

In a unique collection of essays and poems written in English, French, German and Russian (with a seasoning of Greek and Japanese), Constantine Shapiro explores fascinating universal questions and connections. Why, he asks, do so many people feel unhappy? Why do so many go to the doctor? Why is there so much criminality? Why is there international unrest? What is a healthy soul? In his investigation of these and other "Big Questions," the author examines such disparate areas as Japanese kanji (...) ideograms and personal character, spiritual ontology and science, Zeus and Christianity, objectivity and subjectivity in time and space, the nature of experience, and the flow of consciousness. The modern reader will find much to ponder in this second, expanded edition of Selected Writings. Also included are facsimiles of the typescript of Two Mathematical Problems and the Japanese translation of Transzendentale Musiklehre. (shrink)

Zentrale Denkfiguren der von Wolfgang Klafki begründeten kritisch-konstruktiven Erziehungswissenschaft werden in diesem Buch aufgegriffen und in ihrem Innovationswert für die wissenschaftliche Pädagogik reflektiert. Namhafte Autorinnen und Autoren unterschiedlicher Subdisziplinen und Generationen vertiefen Klafkis Ansatz theoretisch wie methodisch und öffnen Problemstellungen, die bisher nicht bearbeitet worden sind.

Amazon Book Review Series of “Better Economics for the Earth: A Lesson from Quantum and Information Theories”.

There are growing discontinuities between the research practices of data science and established tools of research ethics regulation. Some of the core commitments of existing research ethics regulations, such as the distinction between research and practice, cannot be cleanly exported from biomedical research to data science research. Such discontinuities have led some data science practitioners and researchers to move toward rejecting ethics regulations outright. These shifts occur at the same time as a proposal for major revisions to the Common Rule—the (...) primary regulation governing human-subjects research in the USA—is under consideration for the first time in decades. We contextualize these revisions in long-running complaints about regulation of social science research and argue data science should be understood as continuous with social sciences in this regard. The proposed regulations are more flexible and scalable to the methods of non-biomedical research, yet problematically largely exclude data science methods from human-subjects regulation, particularly uses of public datasets. The ethical frameworks for Big Data research are highly contested and in flux, and the potential harms of data science research are unpredictable. We examine several contentious cases of research harms in data science, including the 2014 Facebook emotional contagion study and the 2016 use of geographical data techniques to identify the pseudonymous artist Banksy. To address disputes about application of human-subjects research ethics in data science, critical data studies should offer a historically nuanced theory of “data subjectivity” responsive to the epistemic methods, harms and benefits of data science and commerce. (shrink)

Using Big Data to better understand urban questions is an exciting field with challenging methodological and theoretical problems. It is also, however, potentially troubling when Big Data is applied uncritically to urban governance via the ideas and practices of “smart cities”. This essay reviews both the historical depth of central ideas within smart city governance —particular the idea that enough data/information/knowledge can solve society problems—but also the ways that the most recent version differs. Namely, that the motivations and ideological underpinning (...) behind the goal of urban betterment is largely driven by technology advocates and neoliberalism rather than the strong social justice themes associated with earlier applications of data to cities. Geosocial media data and metrics derived from them can provide useful insight and policy direction. But one must be ever mindful that metrics don’t simply measure; in the process of deciding what is important and possible to measure, these data are simultaneously defining what cities are. (shrink)

The collection and dissemination of data on human and nonhuman organisms has become a central feature of 21st-century biology and has been endorsed by funding agencies in the United States and Europe as crucial to translating biological research into therapeutic and agricultural innovation. Large molecular data sets, often referred to as “big data,” are increasingly incorporated into digital databases, many of which are freely accessible online. These data have come to be seen as resources that play a key role in (...) mediating global market exchange, thus achieving a prominent social and economic status well beyond science itself. At the same time, calls to make all such data publicly and freely available have garnered strength and visibility, most prominently in the form of the Open Data movement. I discuss these developments by considering the conditions under which data journey across the communities and institutions implicated in globalized biology and biomedicine, and what this indicates about how Internet-based communication and the use of online databases affect scientific research and its role within contemporary society. (shrink)

Before the EU General Data Protection Regulation entered into force in May 2018, we witnessed an intense struggle of actors associated with data-dependent fields of science, in particular health-related academia and biobanks striving for legal derogations for data reuse in research. These actors engaged in a similar line of argument and formed issue alliances to pool their collective power. Using descriptive coding followed by an interpretive analysis, this article investigates the argumentative repertoire of these actors and embeds the analysis in (...) ethical debates on data sharing and biobank-related data governance. We observe efforts to perform a paradigmatic shift of the discourse around the General Data Protection Regulation-implementation away from ‘protecting data’ as key concern to ‘protecting health’ of individuals and societies at large. Instead of data protection, the key risks stressed by health researchers became potential obstacles to research. In line, exchange of information with data subjects is not a key concern in the arguments of biobank-related actors and it is assumed that patients want ‘their’ data to be used. We interpret these narratives as a ‘reaction’ to potential restrictions for data reuse and in line with a broader trend towards Big Data science, as the very idea of biobanking is conceptualized around long-term use of readily prepared data. We conclude that a sustainable implementation of biobanks needs not only to comply with the General Data Protection Regulation, but must proactively re-imagine its relation to citizens and data subjects in order to account for the various ways that science gets entangled with society. (shrink)

Although the terminology of Big Data has so far gained little traction in economics, the availability of unprecedentedly rich datasets and the need for new approaches – both epistemological and computational – to deal with them is an emerging issue for the discipline. Using interviews conducted with a cross-section of economists, this paper examines perspectives on Big Data across the discipline, the new types of data being used by researchers on economic issues, and the range of responses to this opportunity (...) amongst economists. First, we outline the areas in which it is being used, including the prediction and ‘nowcasting’ of economic trends; mapping and predicting influence in the context of marketing; and acting as a cheaper or more accurate substitute for existing types of data such as censuses or labour market data. We then analyse the broader current and potential contributions of Big Data to economics, such as the ways in which econometric methodology is being used to shed light on questions beyond economics, how Big Data is improving or changing economic models, and the kinds of collaborations arising around Big Data between economists and other disciplines. (shrink)

Theory in sociology is constructed as a canon, a very short list of social theorists who have been endowed with suprahistorical status. Drawing on the feminist analysis of gendered consciousness, the author argues that social theory is organized exactly as it should be if one were thinking like a White male capitalist. The perceptual frameworks it employs—a hierarchy of the social, logical dichotomies, decontextualized abstraction, an individualist approach—resonate well with descriptions of hegemonic masculine consciousness. As a result, social theory has (...) not just distorted social perception, it is becoming functionally irrelevant in contemporary social life. The author argues that reasonable understandings are more likely if we are developing via an epistemology of connection, moving from thinking of theory as a holy text to organizing theory to create bridges between diverse standpoints, across disciplinary boundaries, and between knowing and doing. (shrink)

In this paper we focus on how automated vehicles can reduce the number of deaths and injuries in accident situations in order to protect public health. This is actually a problem not only of public health and ethics, but also of big data—not only in terms of all the different data that could be used to inform such decisions, but also in the sense of deciding how wide the scope of data should be. We identify three key different types of (...) data, including basic data, advanced data and preference data, provide an ethical analysis of the use of these different types of data and of different ways of prioritizing between pedestrians and passengers, and propose four rules that can help set ethical priorities for ethical data use and decision making by automated vehicles. (shrink)