This is Appendix B to the note, Deconstructing the Physical World (DPW). This appendix extends DPW to provide a set of new conceptual tools able inter alia to deliver a systematic, well-structured and highly novel set of insights into: core aspects of how language learning and use might work; what precisely is going on in inverted qualia thought experiments and in relation to the knowledge argument; and how incorporating differentiated forms of qualia into some fundamental ideas about language learning and (...) use can help more clearly define what we mean when we refer to such things as ‘concepts’ and ‘imagination’. (shrink)

This is an End Note to 'Deconstructing the Physical World: The Substructure of Language' (DPWSL) that validates key concepts introduced in DPWSL by demostrating how they can be used to build a model able to describe, explain and predict the Stroop effect, the reverse Stroop effect and other Stroop-related effects, which are an array of empirically reproducible effects widely studied in cognitive psychology.

Ronald Sandler's ‘Climate change and ecosystem management’ provides a fine summary of reasons to modify our approach to ecosystem management given ‘rapid and uncertain ecological change’. We...

Some metaphysics are provided showing that what is commonly called ‘the physical world’ can be deconstructed into three ‘levels’: a single, unified ‘noumenal world’ on which everything supervenes; a ‘phenomenal world’ that we each privately experience through direct perception of phenomena; and a ‘collective world’ that people in any given ‘language using group’ experience through learning, using and adapting that group’s language. This deconstruction is shown to enable a clear account of qualia and of how people can hold some things (...) to be physically real even when it is clear no one can ever directly experience those things as phenomena. It is further shown to enable a single, internally consistent, largely empirically supported conceptual framework – a ‘metacosmology’ – able to encompass not only the physical world as people conceive of it for everyday purposes, and as scientists conceive of it for scientific purposes, but also people’s first person phenomenal experience of a physical world and, prospectively, the mechanisms by which such first person, conscious experiences can be generated. (shrink)

This is Appendix A to the note: Deconstructing the Physical World (DPW). It shows how the conceptual framework developed in DPW relates to Russellian Monism (RM) and that it can accrue RM’s benefits while defeating the combination problem that challenges many RMs.

This article investigates the interplay of agriculture and writing in the elder Cato's aristocratic self-fashioning . I argue that the De Agricultura represents Cato and his contemporaries as individual, small-plot farmers by making explicit the agricultural inflection of a more general masterly extensibility, i.e., that slaves were prosthetic tools with which owners accomplished various tasks, a move that in turn reveals the ubiquitous, assiduous “labor” of the individual owner. The preface's valorization of small-plot farmers, past and present, contextualizes the owner's (...) “labor” both culturally and historically , and thereby seeks to bridge the agricultural and temporal divide that separates Cato and his contemporaries from their esteemed predecessors. (shrink)

Three distinct explanatory models are described which underpin the relationship between the cultural authority of science and public trust. This essay describes how current discourses framed around how the enterprise of science is undertaken; damage these models, diminishing knowledge–attitudes, alienating the public while reducing the cultural meaning of science.

In States of Knowledge, Sheila Jasanoff argues that we gain explanatory power by thinking of natural and social orders as being produced together, but she and her volume contributors do not yet offer a theory of the coproduction of scientific knowledge and social order. This article uses Mary Douglas’s cultural theory to identify four recurring states of knowledge and to specify political–cultural conditions for the coproduction of scientific knowledge, social order, and scientific, cultural, and policy change. The plausibility of this (...) theory is illustrated by using it to explain the coproduction and transformation of forest and wildlife science and management in the Pacific Northwest. (shrink)

José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955) was a Spanish philosopher and essayist best known outside his home country for The Revolt of the Masses, first translated into English in 1932. In this book, Ortega critiques a populist deformation of democracy by the rise of a "mass mentality" characterized by selfishness, a lack of curiosity, and a general indifference to the opinions and attitudes of others. However, as Brendon Westler makes clear, we need to look beyond Ortega's arguments about populism and (...) democracy in his most famous work to recover the philosopher's expansive political outlook and to identify his valuable contributions to the history and advancement of liberalism. Westler's book reconstructs Ortega's political theory, underscoring its distinctive historical origins as well as the ways in which it might be instructive to us today. Through an exploration of works less familiar to an English-speaking audience, such as Concord and Liberty, "Vieja y nueva poli̹tica," "De Europa meditatio Quaedam," and "Democracia morbosa," combined with a sensitivity to larger social and political ideas circulating within Spain, The Revolting Masses traces the contours of Ortega's approach to politics. Westler argues that reading texts written over the course of the philosopher's entire career, in combination with The Revolt of the Masses, offers a more complete picture of Ortega's political thought-one that advocates for a liberal ethos as an answer to populism and promotes both individual freedom and the preservation of community bonds. As The Revolting Masses shows, Ortega was, above all, a philosopher who reflected on what it would take for people of differing beliefs to live together. His unique conception of liberalism, grounded in the Spanish tradition, not only emphasizes pluralism and diversity of thought and institutions but also serves as a potential antidote to the populism of our present moment. (shrink)

Utilitarianism tells us that actions are morally right and good if and to the extent that they add to human happiness or diminish human unhappiness. And—or, perhaps, therefore—it also tells us that the best action a person can perform is that which of all the possible actions open to him is the one which makes the greatest positive difference to human happiness. Moreover, as everyone will also remember, utilitarianism further tries to tell us, perhaps intending it as a corollary of (...) that first, main claim, that the motive for an action has nothing to do with its moral rightness or goodness. But even if, as utilitarians, we accepted the dubious corollary, it would not follow, as many have thought, that utilitarians have no moral interest in motives. For unless, absurdly, a utilitarian believed either that there was never more than a fortuitous connection between on the one hand what we intended to do and on the other what we did and the consequences of what we did, or that, if there were such connections, we could not know of them, he must believe, as a moralist, that the best motive a person can have for performing an action is likely to be the desire to produce the happiest result. Indeed, utilitarians ought to be morally committed, it would seem, to trying to find out as much as they can about the consequences of our actions, e.g. what connections exist, if any, between how we raise children and what sort of adults they grow up to be. (shrink)

The origin of this paper is a problem: I had long been struck by the fact that if my glance happened to fall on a newspaper, a message on a note pad, printing on a label, etc., I would begin to read what was there written or printed—if I could see it and it was in English. If I can see it, and it is in English, I cannot but read what my glance falls on, even if I wish not (...) to do so. So my reading—at least on these occasions and of this brief sort—seemed to be involuntary. The illiterate person, of course, cannot read and, in that way, is not free to read. The person learning to read does not read freely. But the ‘free’ reader is not free not- to read that on which his glance falls. (shrink)

According to Wittgenstein's mature philosophy, no 'language game' or 'form of life' is inherently philosophically problematic. However real, practical moral problems undermine the objectivity of morality, which as moral beings we cannot abandon. This problem is both philosophical and 'real'. Morality therefore undermines the later Wittgenstein's whole account of philosophy, i.e. its nature, how such problems are resolved, and its relation with the rest of our lives. Perhaps that is why he virtually never mentions Ethics in his writings after 1932-3.

This article traces the development of the idea of God from the ancient Near East thought into Patristic Christianity with its fusion with Greek philosophy. The article details five patterns that shape the way in which God language in Christianity influences social and political systems: androcentrism or male domination over women; anthropocentrism or human domination over nature; ethnocentrism or the domination of a `chosen' people over other people; militarism, and asceticism or the dualism and hierarchy of mind over body. It (...) also suggests how these patterns of domination can be dismantled and more mutual relations between God, humans and nature developed. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that the apparent historical inaccuracies contained within Lewis Nordan’s Wolf Whistle represent a systematic repeal of the controversial history surrounding the murder of Emmett Till in 1955. Nordan reconstitutes the principle characters to function as iconoclasms of the historical record. As iconoclasms, these representations undermine our culture’s accepted model of history, what Hayden White terms the “historical account”.

In Nature Ethics: An Ecofeminist Perspective, Marti Kheel explores the underlying worldview of "nature ethics," offering an alternative ecofeminist approach. Seeking to heal the divisions between the seemingly disparate movements and philosophies of feminism, animal advocacy, environmental ethics, and holistic health, Kheel proposes an ecofeminist philosophy that underscores the importance of empathy and care for individual beings as well as larger wholes.

Having distinguished essentially fictional characters from inessentially fictional ones and having identified Anna Karenina as an inessentially fictional character, Barrie Paskins solves the problem I posed in ‘How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?’ thus: ‘our pity towards the inessentially fictional is, or can without forcing be construed as, pity for those people if any who are in the same bind as the character in the fiction’. Making a similar point in a footnote, ‘our emotions towards (...) fictional characters are directed towards those real people, if any, who are in essentially the same situation’, he continues in the text, ‘This possibility is neglected by Radford and Weston.’. (shrink)

In challenging the implications of my putative counter‐example to Wittgenstein's claim that “It's on the tip of my tongue” (TT) is not the expression of an experience (cf. Philosophical Investigations, p.219)1, Professor Slater writes2 … the obvious way in which to meet the threat to the adequacy of (b1) [which is that the speaker should believe that he may be able to produce the missing word (fairly soon)] is to claim that the utterer of “It's on the tip of my (...) tongue” must not merely believe that he may recall the word fairly soon, he must also believe, i.e., not rule out the possibility that, he may do so without any treatment, i.e., without being prompted by an external source such as cues, pills, or shock, (p.51). (shrink)

What is the connection between pain and pain behaviour? Is it logically necessary, or is it contingent? Or is it too complex to be classified in terms of this Humean dichotomy? Surely it is too complex, for if we say the relationship is a necessary one, we should, apparently, have to deny that there could be pain without pain behaviour, or pain behaviour without pain; yet stoicism and shamming pain occur. If we say that the relationship is not necessary and (...) so contingent, we should have to say that the natural correlate or expression of pain might have been languor or jolly laughter, and, conversely, that wincing, grimacing, writhing, groaning, etc., might have been the natural correlate or expression of sensations quite different from pains. To avoid the first difficulty it could be said that necessary connections need not be invariant. To avoid the second, it might be pointed out that some contingent connections are less contingent than others, and that, in particular, causal relationships need not always be of the external, Humean kind. But even if these observations are correct they are difficult precisely because they attempt to soften and blur a distinction whose hardness and exhaustiveness is constitutive of its clarity and strength. If we modify Hume's law we may do so only after a careful examination of a case which forces us to do so. (shrink)

In the Lectures on Religious Belief Wittgenstein is reported as saying that the non-believer cannot contradict the believer. This claim may seem both to run against our experience, particularly if we are apostates, and to offer a protection to the believer from the most direct criticism. Such claims, and others which are less clear but just as surprising, combine to suggest that much of what Wittgenstein has to say about religion and religious belief is obscurantist, and he acknowledges that some (...) say this of him. (shrink)

This article traces opposition to women's contraceptive rights moving from the role of St Augustine and Thomas Aquinas to the modern day role of the Vatican. Traditional views of women and sexuality have been challenged by modern feminism but Catholicism is still pursuing a global crusade against abortion, birth control, and redefinitions of the family that might include homosexual couples. This means opposing sex education curricula and opposition to state funding for family planning assistance. But the Catholic crusades against women's (...) reproductive rights have generated rebellion among some Catholics worldwide. This is led by Catholics for a Free Choice and the SeeChange campaign. (shrink)

If I am looking at myself in a mirror I am directly facing, do I see myself looking at myself? If so, do I also see myself looking at myself looking at myself – and so on?

Our language and metaphors about environmental issues reflect and affect how we perceive and manage them. Discourse on invasive species is dominated by aggressive language of aliens and invasion, which contributes to the use of war-like metaphors to promote combative control. This language has been criticised for undermining scientific objectivity, misleading discourse, and restricting how invasive species are perceived and managed. Calls have been made for alternative metaphors that open up new management possibilities and reconnect with a deeper conservation ethic. (...) Here, we turn to Indigenous perspectives because they are increasingly recognised as offering important and novel voices in invasive species discourse. We examine how Australian Aboriginal elders and land managers (rangers) speak about ‘environmental weeds’ (the term used to describe invasive plants in Australia) and weed management. Based on qualitative research with five Aboriginal groups in the Kimberley region of Western Australia, our findings indicate that Aboriginal elders speak about weeds through passive, neutral language and prefer metaphors for weed management that focus on health, care and creation. We outline the influence that this language has for how rangers practice weed work and discuss its implications for the mainstream paradigm. (shrink)

This book presents Cicero's natural law theory, including valuable definitions of the state, the ideal state, the ideal ruler, and the laws for the ideal state. Explanations are offered of the Greek sources of Cicero's republican philosophy, his influence on the Principate of Augustus, and his role in the development of modern political philosophy. As all the ages of the world have not produced a greater statesman and philosopher united than Cicero, his authority should have great weight (John Adams, 1787).