For the past half century, there has been a large controversy within academic business ethics, in legal scholarship, and in the larger public about the role that corporations should have in addressing social injustices. Do corporations have a moral obligation to conduct business in a way that reduces poverty, racial inequality, other unjust economic and social inequalities, and unjust threats to the environment? Or should for-profit corporations focus on making money and leave solutions of these social problems to governments, nonprofit (...) organizations, and private individuals? -/- There are related but distinct controversies about corporations’ moral duties of transactional and relational justice. One important question is whether financial agreements or employment contracts can be wrongfully exploitative despite being fully consensual and beneficial to all parties. This question is distinct from the question whether corporations have a duty to promote distributive justice. Transactional unfairness is arguably possible in society with a just economic system, and fair transactions are presumably possible in a society with an unjust distribution. There are also important questions about the extent of firms’ moral obligation to avoid pollution, to refrain from discrimination, to treat employees fairly, and to respect the democratic process. These moral obligations may require more than obeying the relevant law. (shrink)

Jeffrey Barrett presents the most comprehensive study yet of a problem that has puzzled physicists and philosophers since the 1930s.

Many ethicists maintain that medical research on human subjects that presents no prospect of direct medical benefit must have a prospect of social benefit to be ethical. Payment is not the sort of benefit that justifies exposing subjects to risk. Alan Wertheimer has raised a serious challenge to this view, pointing out that in industry, social value is not considered necessary to make dangerous jobs ethical. This article argues that Wertheimer was correct to think that the ethics of hazard (...) pay should be the same in medical research and in business. Nevertheless, a qualified social benefit requirement should apply in both fields. For a study or a job with significant net physical risk to be ethical, it must have social value beyond the satisfaction of ordinary preferences, including the preference for money. The requirement derives from a non-absolutist version of the doctrine of double effect. If a risky study or a dangerous job has no distinctive social value, and hazard pay is subjects' or workers’ only reason to undergo risks, the very fact that they undergo risk is intended as a means to a financial end. Inviting people to enrol in such a study or to take such a job wrongfully treats people as mere means. By contrast, if a study or a job has social value, people can participate with a primary end other than money, even if they accept compensation. Researchers or employers do not intend but merely foresee risks to subjects or workers. (shrink)

The Greek text used was that of the English edition of Hugh G. Evelyn-White (HESIOD, 1914). The translations of the Theogony of Ana Lúcia Silveira Cerqueira and Maria Therezinha Áreas Lyra (HESÍODO, 1986) have been consulted for comparison, José Antonio Alves Torrano (HESÍODO, 1995), Hugh G. Evelyn-White (HESIOD, 1914) and José Marcos Mariani de Macedo (MACEDO, 2010). In addition, this translation was based on the translations of the Homeric Hymns, Edvanda Bonavina da Rosa et alia (2010), and Trajano Vieira’s Odyssey (...) (HOMERO, 2011). (shrink)

Although "the Socratic method" is commonly understood as a style of pedagogy involving cross-questioning between teacher and student, there has long been debate among scholars of ancient philosophy about how this method as attributed to Socrates should be defined or, indeed, whether Socrates can be said to have used any single, uniform method at all distinctive to his way of philosophizing. This volume brings together essays by classicists and philosophers examining this controversy anew. The point of departure for many of (...) those engaged in the debate has been the identification of Socratic method with "the elenchus" as a technique of logical argumentation aimed at refuting an interlocutor, which Gregory Vlastos highlighted in an influential article in 1983. The essays in this volume look again at many of the issues to which Vlastos drew attention but also seek to broaden the discussion well beyond the limits of his formulation. Some contributors question the suitability of the elenchus as a general description of how Socrates engages his interlocutors; others trace the historical origins of the kinds of argumentation Socrates employs; others explore methods in addition to the elenchus that Socrates uses; several propose new ways of thinking about Socratic practices. Eight essays focus on specific dialogues, each examining why Plato has Socrates use the particular methods he does in the context defined by the dialogue. Overall, representing a wide range of approaches in Platonic scholarship, the volume aims to enliven and reorient the debate over Socratic method so as to set a new agenda for future research. Contributors are Hayden W. Ausland, Hugh H. Benson, Thomas C. Brickhouse, Michelle Carpenter, John M. Carvalho, Lloyd P. Gerson, Francisco J. Gonzalez, James H. Lesher, Mark McPherran, Ronald M. Polansky, Gerald A. Press, François Renaud, and W. Thomas Schmid, Nicholas D. Smith, P. Christopher Smith, Harold Tarrant, Joanne B. Waugh, and Charles M. Young. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Callimachus in Context: From Plato to the Augustan Poets by Benjamin Acosta-Hughes, Susan A. StephensIvana PetrovicBenjamin Acosta-Hughes and Susan A. Stephens. Callimachus in Context: From Plato to the Augustan Poets. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012. xvi + 328 pp. 4 maps. Cloth, $99.Callimachus is a scholar’s poet, not just because his poetry is difficult and challenging, but also because we tend to see a reflection of (...) ourselves in him: self-assured to the point of arrogance, delighting in recondite words and fun facts, a target of unfair criticism from malevolent and envious colleagues. Callimachus was for decades perceived as antiquarian, bookish, a scholar whose poetry was divorced from the performative setting, not championing civic values, but rather l’art pour l’art avant la lettre. The main focus of scholarship used to be Callimachus’ relationship with the Greek poetic tradition, and virtuoso studies in intertextuality demonstrated just how rich and wide-ranging the tapestry of his allusions is, from poetry to technical writings in prose. However, in the last couple of decades, this image of Callimachus as the ivory-tower scholar-poet began to change. In his ground-breaking monograph Callimachus and His Critics (Princeton 1995), Alan Cameron argued that Callimachus was a prominent and active figure at the Alexandrian court, and far from an armchair intellectual.In recent years, numerous scholars have looked into the way Callimachus was indeed a child of his own time. Brill’s 2011 Companion to Callimachus (edited by the authors of the present book and Luigi Lehnus) is a good illustration of the current state of affairs in Callimachus scholarship: six out of twenty-seven papers discuss Callimachus’ relationship with the royal family and explore his status as a court-poet, his attitude to contemporary religion, and the geopoetics of his poetry and its political implications.This book is a successful union of the two aforementioned approaches to the poet. First, the authors set out to “contextualize Callimachus within his intellectual traditions and within his physical and social environments”; second, they pose five questions: “Why do there appear to be so many Platonic tangents in Callimachus? Why, in a poet considered the model of the ‘bookish’ author, are there so many indications of poetic performance? What is the rapport between the Ptolemies and their political interests and a remarkably diffuse body of work of one court poet? Why is Callimachus an ongoing feature of Roman poetic culture, and in such a particular way?” (viii). They provide an answer to each of these questions in separate chapters, carefully and meticulously negotiating between the study of intertexts and Callimachus’ social contexts.The introduction is fast-paced and fact-based. It provides an overview of Callimachus’ career and the political and cultural history of his native city, Cyrene, and his adopted home, Alexandria. It is the choice of facts and the sharp eye for detail that sets this section apart from a mere collection of data: by discussing the poetic production of the lesser-known Cyrenaean epic poet Eugamon, the authors provide “a glimpse into regional poetics and how it operated within the broader Panhellenic context” (6); careful reading of inscriptions and an assessment of the archaeological remains allows them to offer an interesting suggestion regarding [End Page 365] the dramatic performances of dithyrambic choruses in connection with the festival of the Carneia, which Callimachus memorably described in his Hymn to Apollo.A succinct discussion of Cyrenaean cults brings together results of decades of archaeological study and allows material culture to inform and enrich our view of Callimachus’ poetry: there was a bronze Delian palm in the Cyrenaean sanctuary of Leto (cf. H. Ap. 1–2); the local temple of Zeus Olympius had a cult statue that replicated Phidias’ (cf. Iambus 6); Thesmophoria were probably celebrated in the Cyrenaen sanctuary of Demeter and Kore (cf. H. Dem.); a number of local statue-groups and reliefs coincide with figures in Callimachus’ poetry. By juxtaposing the old and venerable city Cyrene with the newly founded cosmopolitan Alexandria in Egypt, the authors emphasize the cultural contrast between Callimachus’ native city and his chosen home. Since Callimachus was a poet active in a city... (shrink)

The question of when it is permissible to inflict risks on others without their consent is one that we all face in our everyday lives, but which is often brought to our attention in contexts of technological innovation and scientific uncertainty. Xenotransplantation, the transplantation of organs or tissues from animals to humans, has the potential to save or improve the lives of many patients but gives rise to the possibility of infectious agents being transferred from donor animals into the human (...) population. As well as being an important ethical issue in its own right it therefore provides a useful vehicle for exploring the more general question of how to balance the benefits of a practice against the risks to third parties. This paper focuses on the Rawlsian, justice-based analysis of the risks of xenotransplantation proposed by Robert Veatch. It argues that Veatch is right to take considerations of distributive justice into account, but that his particular approach is flawed. It is hoped that consideration of Veatch’s arguments, and of the underlying assumptions will suggest better ways of executing a justice-based approach. (shrink)

Le Culte des Idoles Translated by Ali Nematollahy.

Introduction: Natural necessity, being, and becoming -- Accentuate the negative -- Diffracting dialectic -- Opening totality -- Constellating ethics -- Metacritique I : philosophy's primordial failing -- Metacritique II : dialectic and difference -- Conclusion: Natural necessity and the grounds of justice : natural necessity as material meshwork.

Abstract:McMahan, Nussbaum, and Johannsen have recently suggested that humans should seek to eliminate predators from the wild or avoid reintroducing them if this can be done without great harm to an ecosystem. This is because predators cause a great deal of pain to those sentient animals which are their prey. This paper will first challenge the pragmatic aspects of such a position on the global level, arguing that it would be extremely difficult if not impossible to remove predators from the (...) environment without doing great ecological harm. Because removal of predators might be considered more feasible on the micro scale this paper will go on to challenge the axiological foundations of such a view. In particular defenders of the removal of predators from the environment tend to base their position on the preferencing of the disvalue of pain over the value of life. Yet if life itself has value it can be a good even with those beings that cause pain to others. Moreover, there is a value to diverse forms of life that must also be acknowledged. An ecosystem with diverse habits and life forms exercising different ways of being has great value even if again this comes at the cost of suffering and pain to some of the creatures in it. Once these things are understood it is clear that predators should not be eliminated from the wild and indeed should be reintroduced into ecosystems where they once flourished. (shrink)

The learning society has been advocated as an answer to current economic, political and social problems by a wide coalition of interests, including politicians, employers and educators. Here we critically analyse the concept as a myth; that is, as an idea which may or may not have validity, but which many people believe in. For the purpose of this analysis, the learning society is set alongside four other myths upon which it builds: those of productivity, change, lifelong education and the (...) learning organisation. It is argued that the United Kingdom cannot currently be considered to be a learning society, nor is it likely to become one in the foreseeable future. But the idea of the learning society retains an important role as a myth, in drawing together and channelling energies in directions sought by policy-makers. (shrink)

This study examined self-recognition processing in both the auditory and visual modalities by determining how comparable hearing a recording of one’s own voice was to seeing photograph of one’s own face. We also investigated whether the simultaneous presentation of auditory and visual self-stimuli would either facilitate or inhibit self-identification. Ninety-one participants completed reaction-time tasks of self-recognition when presented with their own faces, own voices, and combinations of the two. Reaction time and errors made when responding with both the right and (...) left hand were recorded to determine if there were lateralization effects on these tasks. Our findings showed that visual self-recognition for facial photographs appears to be superior to auditory self-recognition for voice recordings. Furthermore, a combined presentation of one’s own face and voice appeared to inhibit rather than facilitate self-recognition and there was a left-hand advantage for reaction time on the combined-presentation tasks. (shrink)

It is necessary that, if the world is divided into nations, conflicts should arise in which there is no strong argument against terrorism or repression. By a strong argument I mean one that would sway all minds not blindly partisan, without moral commitments that are unusual or outlandish in the modern world and with as much aversion to violence as most people have. So I do not here consider, because it is unusual, heroic and absolute pacifism, much as I respect (...) it; on the other hand I do mention Christian moral objections applying specially to terrorism because it seems somewhat outlandish even now to ignore the Christian element in our tradition. (shrink)

Hyman (1999, 2006) argues that knowledge is best conceived as a kind of ability: S knows that p iff S can φ for the reason that p. Hyman motivates this thesis by appealing to Gettier cases. I argue that it is counterexampled by a certain kind of Gettier case where the fact that p is a cause of the subject’s belief that p. One can φ for the reason that p even if one does not know that p. So knowledge (...) is not best conceived as an ability of this kind. (shrink)

This volume covers the major traditions of thought from Philo to Levinas and, since Jewish philosophy has occurred in broader environments, non-Jewish thinkers who have had an important influence on Jewish philosophy are also included.

Melancholia is an attunement of despair and despondency that can involve radical disruptions to temporal experience. In this article, I extrapolate from the existing analyses of melancholic time to examine some of the important existential implications of these temporal disruptions. In particular, I focus on the way in which the desynchronization of melancholic time can complicate the melancholic’s relation to death and, consequently, to the meaning and significance of their life. Drawing on Heidegger’s distinction between death and demise, I argue (...) that melancholic time leaves the melancholic in an impossible state of existing, where they are both unable to live and unable to die. Turning to the role of the physician, I consider the significant role that clinical interventions might have in resynchronizing the melancholic with time and examine these ideas further through a case study on physician-assisted suicide. In so doing, I demonstrate that the desynchronization of melancholic time should indeed be understood as a matter of life and death. (shrink)

Philosophers often claim that humility is a dependent virtue: a virtue that depends on another virtue for its value. I consider three views about this relation: Specific Dependence, Unspecific Dependence, and Fittingness. I argue that, since humility cannot uniquely depend on another virtue, and since this uniqueness is desirable, we should reject Specific and Unspecific Dependence. I defend a Fittingness view, according to which the humble person possesses some objectively good quality fitting for humility. I show beyond Slote’s original characterization (...) of the dependence relation that, even if humility’s value depends on having objectively good qualities, humility itself can be one such quality. So, humility can depend on itself. I call this view Bootstrapped Fittingness. (shrink)