We formulate a unified display calculus proof theory for the four principal varieties of bunched logic by combining display calculi for their component logics. Our calculi satisfy cut-elimination, and are sound and complete with respect to their standard presentations. We show how to constrain applications of display-equivalence in our calculi in such a way that an exhaustive proof search need be only finitely branching, and establish a full deduction theorem for the bunched logics with classical additives, BBI (...) and CBI. We also show that the standard sequent calculus for BI can be seen as a reformulation of its display calculus, and argue that analogous sequent calculi for the other varieties of bunched logic are very unlikely to exist. (shrink)

Stimulating, thought-provoking analysis of a number of the most interesting intellectual inconsistencies in mathematics, physics and language. Delightful elucidations of methods for misunderstanding the real world of experiment (Aristotle’s Circle paradox), being led astray by algebra (De Morgan’s paradox) and other mind-benders. Some high school algebra and geometry is assumed; any other math needed is developed in text. Reprint of 1982 ed.

We introduce a logic BI in which a multiplicative (or linear) and an additive (or intuitionistic) implication live side-by-side. The propositional version of BI arises from an analysis of the proof-theoretic relationship between conjunction and implication; it can be viewed as a merging of intuitionistic logic and multiplicative intuitionistic linear logic. The naturality of BI can be seen categorically: models of propositional BI's proofs are given by bicartesian doubly closed categories, i.e., categories which freely combine the semantics (...) of propositional intuitionistic logic and propositional multiplicative intuitionistic linear logic. The predicate version of BI includes, in addition to standard additive quantifiers, multiplicative (or intensional) quantifiers ∀ new and ∃ new which arise from observing restrictions on structural rules on the level of terms as well as propositions. We discuss computational interpretations, based on sharing, at both the propositional and predicate levels. (shrink)

We give a novel approach to proving soundness and completeness for a logic (henceforth: the object-logic) that bypasses truth-in-a-model to work directly with validity. Instead of working with specific worlds in specific models, we reason with eigenworlds (i.e., generic representatives of worlds) in an arbitrary model. This reasoning is captured by a sequent calculus for a _meta_-logic (in this case, first-order classical logic) expressive enough to capture the semantics of the object-logic. Essentially, one has a (...) calculus of validity for the object-logic. The method proceeds through the perspective of reductive logic (as opposed to the more traditional paradigm of deductive logic), using the space of reductions as a medium for showing the behavioural equivalence of reduction in the sequent calculus for the object-logic and in the validity calculus. Rather than study the technique in general, we illustrate it for the logic of Bunched Implications (BI), thus IPL and MILL (without negation) are also treated. Intuitively, BI is the free combination of intuitionistic propositional logic and multiplicative intuitionistic linear logic, which renders its meta-theory is quite complex. The literature on BI contains many similar, but ultimately different, algebraic structures and satisfaction relations that either capture only fragments of the logic (albeit large ones) or have complex clauses for certain connectives (e.g., Beth’s clause for disjunction instead of Kripke’s). It is this complexity that motivates us to use BI as a case-study for this approach to semantics. (shrink)

This paper presents, assesses, and compares six diagrammatic methods for Categorical Syllogistic. Venn’s Method is widely used in logic textbooks; Carroll’s Method is a topologically indistinguishable version of Venn’s Method; and the four remaining methods are my own: the Dual of Carroll’s Method, Gardner’s Method, Gardner–Peirce’s Method, and Ladd’s Method. These methods are divided into two groups of three and the reasons for switching from a method to another within each group are discussed. Finally, a comparison between the Dual (...) of Carroll’s Method and Ladd’s Method supports the main result of the paper, which is an approximation of the two groups of methods. (shrink)

A logic family is a bunch of logics that belong together in some way. First-order logic is one of the examples. Logics organized into a structure occur in abstract model theory, institution theory and in algebraic logic. Logic families play a role in adopting methods for investigating sentential logics to first-order like logics. We thoroughly discuss the notion of logic families as defined in the recent Universal Algebraic Logic book.

In this paper, I will describe a technique for generating a novel kind of semantics for a logic, and explore some of its consequences. It would be natural to call the semantics produced by the technique in question ‘many-valued'; but that name is, of course, already taken. I call them, instead, ‘plurivalent'. In standard logical semantics, formulas take exactly one of a bunch of semantic values. I call such semantics ‘univalent'. In a plurivalent semantics, by contrast, formulas may take (...) one or more such values. The construction I shall describe can be applied to any univalent semantics to produce a corresponding plurivalent one. In the paper I will be concerned with the application of the technique to propositional many-valued logics. Sometimes going plurivalent does not change the consequence relation; sometimes it does. I investigate the possibilities in detail with respect to small family of many-valued logics. (shrink)

In this paper we present an extension of (bunched) separation logic, Boolean BI, with epistemic and dynamic epistemic modalities. This logic, called action model separation logic ($$\mathrm {AMSL}$$AMSL), can be seen as a generalization of public announcement separation logic in which we replace public announcements with action models. Then we not only model public information change (public announcements) but also non-public forms of information change, such as private announcements. In this context the semantics for the (...) connectives$$*$$∗and$$\mathrel {-*}$$-∗from separation logic are epistemic versions of their usual semantics. This is because formulas are interpreted in states, not in resources, and agents may be uncertain between different states representing the same resource. We present the logic$$\mathrm {AMSL}$$AMSLand its semantics, with a detailed case study that highlights its interest for modeling. We also prove the elimination of the dynamics modalities and discuss some alternative epistemic semantics for the separation connectives. (shrink)

The reductive, as opposed to deductive, view of logic is the form of logic that is, perhaps, most widely employed in practical reasoning. In particular, it is the basis of logic programming. Here, building on the idea of uniform proof in reductive logic, we give a treatment of logic programming for BI, the logic of bunched implications, giving both operational and denotational semantics, together with soundness and completeness theorems, all couched in terms of (...) the resource interpretation of BI’s semantics. We use this set-up as a basis for exploring how coalgebraic semantics can, in contrast to the basic denotational semantics, be used to describe the concrete operational choices that are an essential part of proof-search. The overall aim, toward which this paper can be seen as an initial step, is to develop a uniform, generic, mathematical framework for understanding the relationship between the deductive structure of logics and the control structures of the corresponding reductive paradigm. (shrink)

Finally, the first book started Peirceana. Peirceana is expected as a new series that provides access to both Peirce’s mostly unpublished late works and secondary papers, in which ideas of this American philosopher are developed. This edition is opened with three volumes on Peirce’s manuscripts on “Logic of the Future.” The thinker gave this definition to his theory of existential graphs, i.e., a diagrammatical logical project that includes three sections. The sections can roughly correspond to propositional logic, first-order (...) logic and modal logic. The theory of existential graphs is a particular conception. It predicts ideas of proof theory, mathematics of continuity, and cognitive sciences. Besides, it has an impressive philosophical foundation and perfectly emphasizes the importance of diagrammatic notations. Since many writings are published here for the first time, the edition per se is a significant event for the history of logic. However, Peirceana can do more than this. It urges to think of how the logic of 20‒21st centuries would have looked like if Peirce’s intentions were discovered earlier. At the same time, it clarifies the ground for contemporary investigations. Today we have a bunch of papers about various non-classical modifications, extensions, restrictions, and applications of the original theory. Peirceana is projected as the publication that can gather specialists (logicians, philosophers, as well as IT and cognitive science scholars) who are interested in the development of Peirce’s approach. It lets the readers reconsider our ordinary logical conceptions (e.g., reasoning, logical and language analysis, and others) as well as the conventional understanding of the evolution of modern logic. The current paper has two objectives: firstly, it estimates this diplomatic partly critical edition with its several thoroughly elaborated introductions, and secondly, it briefly introduces the existential graphs theory. A set of examples demonstrates the basic principles of this system. (shrink)

The investigations on higher-order type theories and on the related notion of parametric polymorphism constitute the technical counterpart of the old foundational problem of the circularity of second and higher-order logic. However, the epistemological significance of such investigations has not received much attention in the contemporary foundational debate.We discuss Girard’s normalization proof for second order type theory or System F and compare it with two faulty consistency arguments: the one given by Frege for the logical system of the Grundgesetze (...) and the one given by Martin-Löf for the intuitionistic type theory with a type of all types.The comparison suggests that the question of the circularity of second order logic cannot be reduced to Russell’s and Poincaré’s 1906 “vicious circle” diagnosis. Rather, it reveals a bunch of mathematical and logical ideas hidden behind the hazardous idea of impredicative quantification, constituting a vast domain for foundational research. (shrink)

René Girard’s anthropological theory is founded on the assumption that mimesis in primates may have been a threat to the emergence of new species, particularly for what humans would become. Mimesis necessarily led to rivalry around nonshareable objects, which may have led the members of the earliest anthropoid communities to autodestruction. As known to all who are familiar with the ideas of Girard, mankind has been selected by the repetition of a mechanism according to which a bunch of individuals killed (...) one member of their community. It is the hypothesis of the scapegoat victim that helps to explain the emergence of all cultural forms; in fact, it is the scapegoat victim that makes human thought possible... (shrink)

We take a fresh look at the logics of informational dependence and independence of Hintikka and Sandu and Väänänen, and their compositional semantics due to Hodges. We show how Hodges’ semantics can be seen as a special case of a general construction, which provides a context for a useful completeness theorem with respect to a wider class of models. We shed some new light on each aspect of the logic. We show that the natural propositional logic carried by (...) the semantics is the logic of Bunched Implications due to Pym and O’Hearn, which combines intuitionistic and multiplicative connectives. This introduces several new connectives not previously considered in logics of informational dependence, but which we show play a very natural rôle, most notably intuitionistic implication. As regards the quantifiers, we show that their interpretation in the Hodges semantics is forced, in that they are the image under the general construction of the usual Tarski semantics; this implies that they are adjoints to substitution, and hence uniquely determined. As for the dependence predicate, we show that this is definable from a simpler predicate, of constancy or dependence on nothing. This makes essential use of the intuitionistic implication. The Armstrong axioms for functional dependence are then recovered as a standard set of axioms for intuitionistic implication. We also prove a full abstraction result in the style of Hodges, in which the intuitionistic implication plays a very natural rôle. (shrink)

By now “continental” philosophy has long since ceased to be a geographical term; there are “continental” philosophers in the Midwestern United States. Likewise, “analytical” philosophy is now widely practiced in most areas where academic philosophy is practiced. Moreover, many of the old jabs at each side have lost much of their force. The idea of a pox on both their houses—that analytical philosophers are a bunch of small-minded logic choppers, and continental philosophers are a bunch of wooly minded gasbags—has (...) long since failed to carry the punch it once did. What I want to suggest here is that they are both the same type of philosophy in one crucial, determining aspect: That one of the key experiences of modern philosophy, maybe even the great motivating experience of modern philosophy, is that of a certain type of skepticism, the idea that “we” both collectively and individually are prone to fool ourselves, be misled by conclusions that are attractive but unsupportable, or be misled even by our own experience and ways of thought to come to conclusions that turn out later to be insupportable. Certainly something like this underwrites the motivational power in those parts of contemporary philosophy that can be called “analytic” or are at least inspired by the analytical philosophers of the first two thirds of the twentieth century. Why else the careful attention to argument, the constant recasting of theses so that their implications can be better viewed, the deep ethos of attacking papers given by colleagues with a barrage of counter-examples, and of subjecting our colleagues to ruthless, sometimes unforgiving examination? What often seems perhaps petty to those more irritated than enlightened by analytic philosophy—that it is only tedious logic-chopping or “academic in the worst sense” niggling—is inspired by a brooding sense of skepticism, a sense that without such very intensely rigorous policing of our arguments and our explications, we are simply too prone to slide off into assertions that feel good, that may even seem to some of us like really very deep matters, but which, alas, may on closer inspection or in the light of later hindsight just turn out to be dreadfully false. Better to jump on the arguments now than to be embarrassed by them later. (shrink)

Imagine a universe without human beings. Now imagine a universe devoid of any creatures like human beings, beings who could think about the universe and in so doing consider it as divided up into different kinds of things that could be objects of understanding. Now imagine – this is harder – your not being there, or anyone else, to imagine such a universe. Next think about setting about describing in physical laws such a universe in line with a completist physicalist (...) program: that all the facts about the world are physical facts. But where would one begin? Why would one begin? Remember there is no-one around to take more interest in any part of the universe than any other. This contrasts with what we do now. What we do now is take chunks of the universe – stars, planets, water, trees, air, particles – and demarcate the physical laws in such a way as to explain how these objects behave against a background of other objects and ultimately the universe as a whole. But what if we were not around? Why would we there be any reason to demarcate groups of physical laws in this or any other way? My suggestion is that there would be none. The grouping of the physical laws to form complex classes and layers of explanations is parasitic upon creatures having particular interests giving them a perspective upon the universe or world, which in turn derives from the kind of limited creatures they happen to be. But the perspective itself is not a physical fact about the universe. Rather it is a way of coming to form a system of facts about the universe. Further, not only might the perspective have been otherwise, there might be none at all. In which case the demarcation of physical laws, given meaning by their application to entities picked out as having a certain significance to us, would not get off the ground. At best there might be a random bunching of laws covering regions of the universe. But such random bunchings would have no meaning; they would be unintelligible; they wouldn't really be about anything. For laws to be about things you have to have limited creatures who differentiate between parts of the universe, and for whom different parts have a variable significance and value. Things stand out for them; they literally exist . Without such creatures, things we take for granted would, in the literal sense, not exist. It is the very limitedness of our perspective and capabilities, such that things are problems for us, and wherefore we literally or metaphorically bump into things, that brings objects into existence for us. Otherwise the universe would be utterly ‘flat’ and undifferentiated. A limitation of perspective is required for there to be objects of thought, and thus for thought itself. Thus, the intelligibility of the laws of physics is logically parasitic upon our having varying interests in different segments of the universe. (shrink)

Action theory may be regarded as a theoretical foundation of AI, because it provides in a logically coherent way the principles of performing actions by agents. But, more importantly, action theory offers a formal ontology mainly based on set-theoretic constructs. This ontology isolates various types of actions as structured entities: atomic, sequential, compound, ordered, situational actions etc., and it is a solid and non-removable foundation of any rational activity. The paper is mainly concerned with a bunch of issues centered around (...) the notion of performability of actions. It seems that the problem of performability of actions, though of basic importance for purely practical applications, has not been investigated in the literature in a systematic way thus far. This work, being a companion to the book as reported, elaborates the theory of performability of actions based on relational models and formal constructs borrowed from formal lingusistics. The discussion of performability of actions is encapsulated in the form of a strict logical system. This system is semantically defined in terms of its intended models in which the role of actions of various types is accentuated. Since due to the nature of compound actions the system is not finitary, other semantic variants of are defined. The focus in on the system of performability of finite compound actions. An adequate axiom system for is defined. The strong completeness theorem is the central result. The role of the canonical model in the proof of the completeness theorem is highlighted. The relationship between performability of actions and dynamic logic is also discussed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Form and Discontent*Rosmarie Waldrop (bio)1. Composition as ExplanationIn the beginning there is Gertrude Stein, who says in “Composition as Explanation”: “Everything is the same except composition and as the composition is different and always going to be different everything is not the same” [520].I could also say, in the beginning is Aristotle: “the fable is simply this, the combination of the incidents” [1460].2. A Look AroundThe forms that have (...) been striking me as “wild” have tended to be Steinian in this sense of stressing the horizontal, the axis of composition. I’m most struck by 3 tendencies: one is literally spatial composition, e.g. Susan Howe’s work; another, an emphasis on discontinuity, leaps on the level of syntax, of logic, of grammar. Breaks that do not immediately fold back into a smooth unity and may occur in mid-sentence:I was on my way from Carthage, it was night. It is not wax I am scorching was dead about her with knots.—Norma Cole, MarsI hide behind a category by misbehaving.—Carla Harryman, Under the BridgeLoop conceived in a line, the spine with its regions, reasons. On another, sweaters hang by the wrist to dry. The list is sweet. You lie. The eye is met by the season.—Ron Silliman, ParadiseYou took my temperature which I had meant to save for a more difficult day.—Rosmarie Waldrop, The Reproduction of ProfilesWent out so I’d take the car and a whole system of banking and money is based on a hierarchy.—Leslie Scalapino, Considering How Exaggerated the Music IsROAST POTATOESRoast Potatoes for.—Gertrude Stein, “Tender Buttons”Or, a subtler example, Mei-mei Berssenbrugge’s almost unnoticeable shifts from one grammatical structure into another: [End Page 54]Never mind if he calls, the places you get through inwardness take time, and to drift down to the shore of the island, you know by the sand moving, even the coarse sand here It’s hard to say if you can even stand up, there....[13]The third tendency is mathematical. There is a lot of counting. Not stresses, not even syllables—I’m not considering that most unimaginative bunch, the new formalists—but words per line, sentences per paragraph. You all know about Ron Silliman’s love for the Fibonacci number series, or Lyn Hejinian’s My Life, which began with 37 sections of 37 sentences each. When she published a second edition at age 45, she added 8 sentences to each section plus 8 new sections.Jacques Roubaud: “No ideas but in numbers” [291].Then, in a somewhat more remote way, a number of people use ideas of permutation. For example, Jackson Mac Low’s 4 Trains, of which I will quote the first two stanzas:Train rule atom intricate nitrogen. Rule unusual leotard entropy. Atom train ostrich might. Intricate nitrogen train rule intricate casual atom train entropy. Nitrogen intricate train rule ostrich genealogy entropy nitrogen.Rule unusual leotard entropy. Unusual nitrogen unusual social unusual atom leotard. Leotard entropy ostrich train atom rule dies. Entropy nitrogen train rule ostrich pope yearly.[7]As Zukofsky puts it: “[Thus] poetry may be defined as an order of words that as movement and tone (rhythm and pitch) approaches in varying degrees the wordless art of music as a kind of mathematical limit” [27].All these examples draw attention to arrangement, composition. They all listen to language. I once wrote:I don’t even have thoughts, I say, I have methods that make language think, take over and me by the hand. Into sense or offense, syntax stretched across rules, relations of force, fluid the dip of the plumb line, the pull of eyes.... No beginnings. All unrepentant middle.[A Form / of Taking / It All 74]And none of these forms are “organic form.” None relies primarily on metaphor, though from the Romantics on poetry has been more or less identified with it.3. Frameworka. HistoricalLet me step back for a moment to the beginnings of the concept of organic form, what it reacted against.When Goethe started to make a splash writing free verse, around 1770, the dominant aesthetic... (shrink)

This slim volume is another addition to the ever growing family of anthologies—in this case Oxford Readings in Philosophy—recognizable as such not only because of its eye-catching external appearance but also, and mainly, on account of its close similarity in technical features to the previously born siblings. The composite body of the various contributions bears the unmistakable mark of ‘analysis’ as an identifying label. This observation, needless to say, is not intended to be condemnatory—for there is a great deal to (...) be said in favour of dissecting propensities—it is merely an indication of what one should expect to find in this compilation. The nonet playing ‘Action’ consists of the following performers: J L Austin, A C Danto, H A Prichard, A I Melden, D Davidson, J Feinberg, P J Fitzgerald, G E M Anscombe, J O Urmson. As can be seen, the group represents a pretty homogeneous bunch—with the possible exception of the veteran ethical intuitionist Prichard, whose participation ceases to be a mystery only after Melden’s essay has been digested. I must confess that I find the arrangement of the articles rather puzzling. There seems to be no clear criterion involved. It cannot be in order of importance ; neither can it be taken to signify logical affinity ; it certainly is not chronological; and—in the presence of an eminent editor—one hesitates to see it as an ad hoc, haphazard motley. It might be maintained that A White’s excellent introduction—a rare combination of lucidity, economy and relevant information—with its appropriate headings throws some light on the collocation of players in the ensemble. If it was intended to do this then I fail to see the logic behind the plan. This, however, is a minor matter when compared with the meritorious execution of a difficult task which the introduction represents. It gives us a comprehensive bird’s-eye view of the territory disputed and pin-points neatly the various claimants to the, often more than obscure, land-titles. Considering the nature of the landscape and the diversity of figures swarming over and about it Professor White has done a splendid job and deserves unqualified praise. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:5. Grange plays the blame game on the free market system for example on pp. xviii, T^ 29, 67, 74, 85, 91, 94, 109, III; in connection with remarks on environmental mat- ~ ters it is a consistent subtext of his entire work. Two of his previous works are Nature: J^ An Environmental Cosmology, 1997, and The City: An Urban Cosmology, 1999 (both Albany: tfl SUNY Press). ^ 6. (...) The transliteration of ren as "authoritative person" is an egregious tour deforce, ^ leading to a somewhat inelegant result in English, as in the following examples: "Authoritative persons are content in being authoritative; wise persons flourish in it"; and "The Master said: "I have yet to meet people who are truly fond of authoritative conduct (ren)... And those who abhor behavior contrary to it, in becoming authoritative themselves, will not allow such conduct to attach itself to them" (cited from Grange, p. 29). Li (ritual propriety) is co-opted as a match for the Deweyan concept of experimental inquiry. Yi (sense of justice, outer righteousness, often combined with ren, which in combination constitute the two cardinal virtues of Confucian moral theory), and zhi (knowledge, wisdom) are similarly adopted to work in tandem with a model of an "aesthetic" populism. Grange renders yi as "what is fitting and appropriate," akin to "beauty," or "the fair and the fitting," that is, acting consistently in a manner of openness to what is happening that is "the very opposite of the narcissism that infects so much of Western culture" (p. 52)). 7. The demiurgic role of the "master" here reminds one of the fundamental rift between Whitehead and Dewey that is glossed over in this construction. Dewey, who remained committed to a naturalistic doctrine of emergent evolution, chided Whitehead for his doctrine of the ingression of eternal objects. In reply, Whitehead refused to change this key part of his cosmology. The doctrinal clash between the two thinkers appears to be reflected in the debate over the value of the Confucian concept of Heaven (tian), as indicated in note 4. Edited by Anne Waters American Indian Thought. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. 306 pages. $29.95 paper. This volume is a group of twenty-two essays about the various facets of Native American thought and philosophy. Eighteen Native American scholars of American Indian thought are the contributors. In many ways this volume is a first in that these Native peoples are trying to create an inteUectual space where ideas, philosophies, spiritualities and esthetics can be examined in a meaningful way. As a long time student of Native American political thought, I applaud this volume because it represents a departure from the attitudes that I encountered in the academy as a young Native American scholar a generation ago. I can remember as a young Associate Ptofessor being in the elevator of Bunche HaU at UCLA when a history colleague of mine turned to me and quizzed me about my interests in Native American history. When I stated that I was interested in Native American thought and particularly Native American political theory, the coUeague replied that they did not know that American Indians had any thoughts or inteUectual traditions. Needless to say, we have 863 ^ corne a long way since that conversation over twenty five years ago. I have ^ always taught undergraduate courses and graduate courses on the History of KH Native American Thought and I adopted this book for a graduate course of ^ mine when it first came out last year. I can say that it was well received by my ^ graduate students and it provided an excellent array of essays on the various areas of Native American philosophy. The work also demonstrates that Native American ideas can be examined within the context of the discipline of philosophy. This collection of essays by American Indian thinkers blends contemporary philosophies with traditional ideas and philosophical issues. Thus, philosophical questions relating to time, place, history, national communities, religion, law, science, the arts and ethics are all addressed. Moreover, the reader can compare Native American viewpoints on phenomenology, metaphysics, ethics, esthetics, epistemology, logic and science with the perspectives of Western philosophy on these topics. In a very real sense, this volume opens new ways... (shrink)

The year 2020 has yielded twin crises in the United States: a global pandemic and a public reckoning with racism brought about by a series of publicized instances of police violence toward Black men and women. Current data indicate that nationally, Black Americans are three times more likely than White Americans to contract Covid-19, a pattern that underscores the more general phenomenon of health disparity among Black and White Americans. Once exposed, Black Americans are twice as likely to die of (...) the virus. Unsurprisingly, Black Americans report higher levels of fear of Covid-19 than their White peers, but they also report higher levels of hesitancy toward a Covid-19 vaccine. This paper explores why this apparent discrepancy exists. It also provides practical recommendations for how government and public health leaders might address vaccine hesitancy in the context of the twin crises of 2020. (shrink)

High technology and nursing: ethical dilemmas nurses and physicians face on high‐technology units in Norway Results from two studies of ethical dilemmas nurses and doctors experience on two high‐technology units are compared and discussed. The qualitative comparative methodology of grounded theory was used to generate theoretical frameworks grounded in the empirical realities of the units. The ethical dilemmas they faced were related to: treating the one vs. the common good; end of life questions; and resource allocations with inadequate staffing. Similarities (...) were related to intensity and urgency of nursing care and patient treatment, clear nursing ideologies based on treating humans within a framework of hope, embracing technology and scarce resources. Differences between the two study units were patient diagnosis, hierarchical structure on one unit while one had a vertical structure and decision‐making processes, and finally how nursing knowledge and autonomy were used. The two studies demonstrated that clinical, ethical and administrative interactions and decisions are highly compounded, stressful and intertwined. (shrink)

This paper elaborates a theory of ‘unbecoming’ to explore how a queering of the subject might transform oppressive social conditions. In this analysis of the subject’s deconstructive relation to the law I take up the interpellation scenario forwarded by Louis Althusser and Judith Butler’s theory of performativity to argue that being ‘unbecoming’ potentially not only alters subjectivity, it also alters the very law that hails the subject into being. First, I deconstruct both subject and law in their relation to each (...) other as performatives, for it is at this threshold of undecidability that the possibilities for political transformation emerge. Second, I demonstrate the creative and transformative political force of queer performativity to show that our agency as political beings lies not merely in affirmative representations of identity. Political agency also emerges in the creative force of a becoming that is also an unbecoming, where in and through our abjection from the social order we critique and transform it. (shrink)

This article proposes the concept of blind visuality as a response to the injunction to look differently at both visual images, and vision itself, posed by Bruce Horak’s exhibition Through a Tired Eye. The brightly colored impressionistic paintings suggest an artist who revels in the domain of the visual, yet he describes his practice as a representation of blindness. This accessible exposition of blind visuality speaks to the broad question of what critical disability arts contribute to discourses about vision, visuality (...) and spectatorship in the arts. I analyze Horak’s paintings as examples of blind epistemology and haptic visuality, showing that this work evokes a way of seeing that blurs the boundaries between vision and embodied feeling. I argue that by expanding understandings of vision and multi-sensory knowledge, deconstructing the separation between vision and haptic perception, and challenging western ocularcentricism, blind visuality poses an alternative economy of looking that reflects disability aesthetics, shifts from individualism to relationality, and challenges understandings of perception/knowledge as a form of mastery. (shrink)

Autism spectrum disorder affects an estimated 1 in 54 children aged 8 years in the United States. For many of these children, there are concomitant eating and/or behavioral challenges that can make managing their nutritional health challenging. This commentary responds to a particularly challenging case in which a pediatric patient with ASD presented to the local hospital’s emergency department with severe weight loss and malnutrition.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Good Work: Christian Ethics in the Workplace by Esther D. ReedWilton BunchGood Work: Christian Ethics in the Workplace Esther D. Reed Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2010. 132pp. $18.96Work has become a political football. There are laws defining who can work and who cannot. And there are laws that stipulate who can receive and who is eliminated from what were formerly standard benefits. There are even laws, as (...) in the state of Alabama, that define what work ministers can do for the poor, the needy, and those who are ill. Given the many issues affecting what occurs in workplaces—where most working people spend most of their time—there is a need for an integrated perspective on work. Esther Reed’s Good Work provides just that: a broader context for understanding the significance of our work.Many people understand “work” to be the energy they expend in order to receive something they can then spend. Such an understanding of work, Reed observes, reflects the assumptions of a capitalist society in which people are valued in terms of what they do and how much money they make. From this standpoint, cardiac surgeons are valued much more highly than garbage collectors, even though societies could not function without garbage removal but did, in fact, survive for centuries before cardiac surgeons. In a similar vein, in the supposedly egalitarian halls of academe, the grossly underpaid adjunct professor is dismissed and discounted even though she spends much more time with students than does her tenured counterpart. [End Page 196]Yet there are other ways of defining work. Reed reminds us that the same Hebrew word translated as “hard work” (‘abad) can also mean priestly service in the Tabernacle (12). The work (or liturgy) of tabernacle worship was understood to be service to God. Likewise, Jesus described his ministry as work and even spoke of the Father as still working: “My Father is still working, and I also am working (Greek ergazetai/ergazomai; John 5:17)” (13). The work of Jesus and his Father had to do with salvation and blessing for human beings. From this standpoint, work clearly has a spiritual dimension.The framework Reed develops for establishing a Christian ethic of work is rooted in the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead. What we say about work, she contends, will depend on what we say about the resurrection. Indeed, she argues, reflection on the resurrection can orient (or reorient) the working lives of Christian in important ways (2). An understanding of work rooted in the resurrection, Reed argues, is cultivated by participating in the liturgy of a worshipping community. Many Christian liturgies begin with praise to God for the salvation that comes through Jesus Christ. By beginning worship in this way, the community is able to concentrate on a kind of work that enables them to go beyond their individual lives and become part of something larger—a community in praise of God. In turn, the bread and wine that is blessed during the Eucharistic celebration contains not only the fruits of creation but also the fruits of human labor. As the Spirit of God infuses the bread and wine with the presence of Jesus Christ, crucified and raised from the dead, it also sanctifies our labor. And as we receive the bread and wine, and as we meditate on Christ’s passion and resurrection, we become hungry for enacting justice and mercy in all realms of our lives—including the realm of work. Indeed, through this encounter with the Triune God and with one another in worship, we gain a renewed appreciation of who we are as human beings. More profoundly, we become those who can, in fact, not only work and love but also—through the Spirit’s power—renew everything we do and encounter, including the curse of work.Central to Reed’s argument is the claim that work entails a dimension of justice. Persons have rights to work and to rest because they are created in the image of God, which means they have intrinsic worth. Such rights, she argues, must be closely linked with liberties that are understood not merely negatively... (shrink)

The study presented in this article is based on field observations over one year on a critical care unit in Norway. Data were analysed according to Glaser’s grounded theory and generated a theory of hidden and emerging drama in the context of ambiguity while the nurses routinized the handling of complex technology. To the untrained eye the unit presented a picture of calm competence, while under the surface one finds hidden drama full of difficult interacting clinical and ethical problems. The (...) nurses identified six ethical dilemmas: (1) end of life issues; (2) whether there should be an age limit for coronary surgery; (3) distributing limited resources; (4) resource allocation in terms of better staffing; (5) situations in which is it more harmful than beneficial to continue treatment; and (6) transferring patients to other facilities. The six problems overlap and have clinical as well as ethical components, but it was the ethical dimensions that the nurses identified and discussed. The significance for nursing is the importance of well-educated and well-qualified nurses and how they find viable solutions to complex ethical and clinical problems. (shrink)

Surprisingly often Kant asserts that it is possible to behave in such a degrading way that one ‘throws oneself away’ and turns oneself ‘into a thing’, as a result of which others may treat one ‘as they please’. Rather than dismiss these claims out of hand, I argue that they force us to reconsider what is meant and required by ‘respect for humanity’. I argue that to ‘throw away’ humanity is not to lose or extinguish it, but rather to refuse (...) or otherwise fail to claim the respect that it authorizes one to claim. If I refuse or fail to make this claim, there is a sense in which I become a thing, and I leave others no choice but to treat me as such. This is compatible with their respect for humanity in my person. (shrink)

In the original publication, the sentence “Most notable and famous are the Tuskegee syphilis experiments that occurred from 1932–1972, in which Black men in Macon County, AL were infected with syphilis under the guise of free health care.” under the section “Drivers of Mistrust of Motives” was published incorrectly. The correct one is “Most notable and famous are the Tuskegee syphilis experiments that occurred from 1932–1972, in which Black men in Macon County, AL many of whom had latent syphilis, were (...) misled into believing that they would receive free health care in exchange for their participation. (shrink)

Gains in moral judgement, as measured by the Defining Issues Test (DIT), correlate strongly with advancing education. Curricula that are strongly biblically based may not promote, and students with a strong fundamentalist orientation may not demonstrate, such moral growth. Students at an interdenominational, but very conservative seminary, completed the DIT before and after ethics courses conducted in three different formats. Those students who spent 30 hours in small‐group discussions of ethical dilemmas improved their moral reasoning scores, while those who had (...) fewer hours of discussion or lectures did not. It would appear that small group discussions, shown to improve moral reasoning scores in other educational settings, are also successful in a strongly biblical environment. (shrink)

We prove that Wilkie's identity holds in those natural HSI-algebras where each element has finite decomposition into components.Further, we construct a bunch of HSI-algebras that satisfy all the identities of the set of positive integers ℕ. Then, based on the constructed algebras, we prove that the identities of ℕ hold in the HSI-algebra of finite posets when the value of each variable is a poset having an isolated point.

Ms. Johnson’s case highlights a number of the ethical challenges that can arise when treating anorexia nervosa, including uncertainty about a patient’s decisional capacity, the limitations of treat...

Like Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, we now have both an A- and a substantially revised B-edition of Henry Allison's commentary to and defence of that work: Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense . Unlike Kant's Critique, however, Allison's first edition is unlikely to persist as an occasional rival to the second, since reviewers rightly consider the second to have superseded the landmark scholarship of the first. Nevertheless, before Allison's first edition is entirely supplanted, I would like to save (...) a neglected insight from its treatment of the B-deduction that is not retained in the second edition. (shrink)

I argue that Kant’s own views—his commitment to happiness as part of a transcendent highest good, his view of the afterlife as a place of moral striving, and his conception of the “absolute unity” of rational and animal natures in a human person—commit him to belief in an embodied afterlife. This belief is just as necessary for conceiving the possibility of the highest good as the beliefs in personal immortality, freedom, and God’s existence, and thus it too is a “practical (...) postulate” in Kant’s sense. (shrink)

Objective—To identify and describe the current state of clinical ethics support services in the UK.Design—A series of questionnaire surveys of key individuals in National Health Service (NHS) trusts, health authorities, health boards, local research ethics committees and health professional organisations. Interviews with chairmen/women of clinical ethics committees identified in the surveys.Setting—The UK National Health Service.Results—Responses to the questionnaires were received from all but one NHS trust and all but one health authority/board. A variety of models of clinical ethics support were (...) identified including twenty formal clinical ethics committees (CECs). A further twenty NHS trusts expressed an intention to establish a CEC within the next twelve months. Most CECs in the UK have been in existence less than five years and are still defining their role. The chairmen identified education of committee members and contact with other ethics committees as important requirements for committee development. Problems were identified around lack of support for the committee and with raising the profile of the committee within the institution. There has been little evaluation of clinical ethics support services either in the UK or in other countries with longer established services. What evaluation has occurred has focused on process rather than outcome measures.Conclusions—Clinical ethics support services are developing in the UK. A number of issues have been identified that need to be addressed if such support services are to develop effectively. (shrink)

Having a decreased sense of security leads to unnecessary suffering and distress for patients. Establishing trust is critical for nurses to promote a patient's sense of security, consistent with trauma‐informed care. Research regarding nursing action, trust, and sense of security is wide‐ranging but fragmented. We used theory synthesis to organize the disparate existing knowledge into a testable middle‐range theory encompassing these concepts in hospitals. The resulting model illustrates how individuals are admitted to the hospital with some predisposition to trust or (...) mistrust the healthcare system and/or personnel. Patients encounter circumstances increasing their emotional and/or physical vulnerability to harm, leading to experiences of fear and anxiety. Without intervention, fear and anxiety lead to a decreased sense of security, increased distress, and suffering. Nurse action can ameliorate these effects by increasing a hospitalized person's sense of security or by promoting the development of interpersonal trust, also leading to an increased sense of security. Increased sense of security results in diminished anxiety and fear, and increased hopefulness, confidence, calm, sense of value, and sense of control. The consequences of a decreased sense of security are harmful to patients and nurses should know that they can intervene in ways that both increase interpersonal trust and sense of security. (shrink)

Patients in nursing homes sometimes give accounts of episodes in which they feel their autonomy and/or self-respect are violated as a result of the care they receive from nursing staff. In these ethically difficult care situations nurses use strategies such as negotiation, explanation and, in some cases, restraint. This study investigates how nurses apply these strategies to resolve ethical dilemmas in such a way that patients experience respect rather than violation. Critical issues that will be discussed include the definition of (...) ethically difficult care situations in nursing homes and the identification of strategies for resolving such situations. Examples of the use of three strategies are presented. The use of negotiation, restraint and explanation are discussed in order to ensure respect for patients’ autonomy and thus to optimize health care outcomes. (shrink)