In speaking of Demosthenes' conduct in the period between his return to Athens after the peace agreement with Macedon and Philip's death Aeschines refers to only one specific incident, the attempt by Demosthenes to have himself elected What this position was has never been satisfactorily explained.

The banker Pasion, father of the notorious fourth-century litigant and politician Apollodoros, some of whose speeches have survived under the name of Demosthenes, was originally a slave; freed by his owners, he made a substantial fortune from banking and subsequently received Athenian citizenship for his generous gifts to the city. At [Dem.] 59.2 we are given a paraphrase of the decree which enfranchised him: 'Aθηναον εναι Πασωνα κα κγνους τος κενου ‘[the Athenian people voted] that Pasion and his descendants should (...) be Athenian’. In common with inscriptions recording grants of citizenship, and unlike Roman military diplomata, the decree appears to have ignored Pasion's wife Archippe. The silence of the decrees of enfranchisement is echoed in the literary sources, with the result that we have no explicit testimony to the legal status of the wife of an alien who was granted Athenian citizenship. M. J. Osborne assumes that the status of the wife was in no way affected by the grant; she remained an alien. D. Whitehead has argued that in such cases the wife's status was indeterminate; in the event of the death of her first husband she might find herself married either to an Athenian citizen or to an alien, whereupon her status would be defined according to that of her husband. This article will argue that Archippe's status was unaffected by Pasion's receipt of citizenship, that is, that she remained a metic. I shall then proceed to consider the question of the implications of the difference in status of Pasion and Archippe subsequent to his enfranchisement for the legal basis of the relationship between them, and finally draw a tentative conclusion about the date of Pasion's receipt of citizenship. (shrink)

Phidias’ absence from the survey of sculptors in Cic. Brut. 70 is curious, explanation in terms of differing histories of sculpture only partly convincing. I suggest that Cicero has valid literary motives and is wittily undermining the Atticist position by adaptation of what was a rhetorical topos, the parallel development of Greek prose and sculpture from archaic spareness to classical expertise and dignity: see Dem. Eloc. 14, D. H. Isoc. 3, p.59 U-R; more elaborate but partly deriving from Cicero and (...) less homogeneous is Qu. 12.10.7–9. Cicero assumes the reader's knowledge of the commonplace, pointedly ignores the quality of grandeur and dignity, and develops a theory of technical progress on the basis of veritas and grace to attack the Atticists from their own preferences. The resulting model serves to demote Lysias, imitated by the Atticists but merely the counterpart of Calamis, strigosior like archaic sculptures and superseded by later progress. The analogy thus obliquely repeats the brief but charged parenthesis in 66 that Demosthenes superseded Lysias. (shrink)

That Hermias, the despot of Atarneus, was a barbarian as alleged by Theopompus, fr. 242, Oxf., Letter to Philip, in Didymus in Dem., col. 5, 24, has been denied by Jaeger, Aristoteles, p. 113 n., on the ground that in Aristotle's hymn and epigram he is put forward as a Hellene; cf. ibid., p. 119, on Callisthenes and Hermias. In confirmation may be added that, had he been a barbarian, he could hardly have induced the Eleans to declare the Olympic (...) truce to him as Theopompus says they did, Did. 5, 29. Demetrius the Magnesian, Diog. L. V. 3, said he was a Bithynian; and possibly Theopompus said the same in the defective passage in fr. 210, Did. 4, 69. He may have been in fact a Bithynian by place of birth, yet not by blood: at such Greeks the taunt ‘barbarian’ was readily cast; cf. Birds 1700 on Gorgias, and Aeschines on Demosthenes. But we may go much further in scepticism. (shrink)

The remarkable poem in which Aristotle addresses ‘Αρετά and honours the memory of his dead friend Hermias is fortunate in being well preserved. The complete text is given by Athenaeus XV 696a and by Diogenes Laertius V 27, and these authorities are now supplemented by the papyrus of Didymus’ Commentary on Demosthenes, which leaves few of the textual problems in need of a solution. But the poem still raises some questions. It is not clear what kind of poem it was; (...) its literary antecedents and affinities have not been fully studied; its contents still call for some remarks. In spite of Wilamowitz's brilliant treatment and Jaeger's acute comments it is puzzling enough to justify a few words of discussion. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 121.2 (2000) 320-324 [Access article in PDF] David M. Lewis. Selected Papers in Greek and Near Eastern History. Edited by P.J. Rhodes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. xii 1 418 pp. 4 pls. Cloth, $89.95. David Lewis's death in 1994 deprived the world of scholarship of one of the leading ancient historians of our time. His books include a revision of Pickard-Cambridge, The Dramatic Festivals (...) of Athens (with John Gould, 1968), A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C. (with Russell Meiggs, 1969; 2d ed. 1984), Sparta and Persia (1977), Inscriptiones Graecae I3 (editor-in-chief), fasc. 1 (1981), fasc. 2 (1993), and Cambridge Ancient [End Page 320] History, 2d ed. (co-editor), IV (1988), V (1992), VI (1994). Many of his most original ideas are to be found in his articles and reviews, however, and so the Cambridge University Press planned, before his death, a book of his short papers.The volume under review presents a total of thirty-eight papers, four previously unpublished, ranging from the 1950s to 1993. The general contents, notes, and final editing by P.J. Rhodes were discussed with Lewis; some of the notes simply give references, but there is representation of Lewis's words in the longer ones. His passion for precision, reconciling the testimony of inscriptions with the literary references, shows him to care, like Thucydides, for "exact knowledge."The four previously unpublished papers perhaps deserve summary. "On the Dating of Demosthenes' Speeches," read to the Oxford Philological Society in 1970, evaluates critically the testimony of Dionysius of Halicarnassus. The dates for Orations 22 (Against Androtion) and 24 (Against Timokrates) given in Ad Amm., relied upon by scholars for Demosthenes' career (e.g., Cawkwell, Sealey), are shown to be unlikely. The dates from Dionysius would be 355/4 for 22 and 353/2 for 24. More likely, however, are 358/7 or 357/6 for 22 and 354/3 for 24. Lewis patiently assesses the evidence of inscriptions for Androtion's career and for the documents cited in Oration 24, which he does not believe to be forgeries. He shows reasons for not putting confidence in the dates of Dionysius. Principally, this involves an analysis of Deinarchos, where his statements can be checked. Dionysius cannot be checked on his Demosthenes, but Lewis argues that his statements cannot be accepted outright. The analysis of Deinarchos is new, but part of Lewis's view there is anticipated in his "Notes on Attic Inscriptions," ABSA 49 (1954) 32, 39-49. Rhodes cites a text from the Agora excavations, soon to be published by John Camp and M.B. Richardson, which will support the date 354/3 for Oration 24.In "The Financial Offices of Eubulus and Lycurgus" (written ca. 1957) Lewis addresses two questions: "When did Eubulus hold the office of treasurer of the theoric fund (), and, with it, control of Athenian finances?" and "When was Lycurgus officially made controller of Athenian finances?" Generally held opinions would be in the 350s and 340s for Eubulus, with specific dates variously suggested, in relation to Demosthenes' speeches. For Lycurgus, either 342-330 or 338-326 is the tenure previously accepted. The decree honoring Lycurgus in [Plut.] Vit. X Or. has Lycurgus serve as treasurer of the public finance for three penteterids. Lewis argues that specific evidence is lacking for Eubulus, but that his moral authority in the reorganization of finances is likely in the 350s and 340s. He examines closely Aeschines 3.25 in assessing Eubulus' authority and argues that the office of controller of the public finance was created in 336, its term defined by the law of Hegemon: hence the period 336-324 should be understood for Lycurgus' tenure."Aristophanes and Politics" was delivered to the Oxford Branch of the [End Page 321] Classical Association in 1957 and had been given earlier in France. Lewis seeks a position that is not so minimalist as that of Gomme (in CR 1938), who had argued that Aristophanes is a dramatist, seeking... (shrink)

Phidias’ absence from the survey of sculptors in Cic. Brut. 70 is curious, explanation in terms of differing histories of sculpture only partly convincing. I suggest that Cicero has valid literary motives and is wittily undermining the Atticist position by adaptation of what was a rhetorical topos, the parallel development of Greek prose and sculpture from archaic spareness to classical expertise and dignity: see Dem. Eloc. 14, D. H. Isoc. 3, p.59 U-R; more elaborate but partly deriving from Cicero and (...) less homogeneous is Qu. 12.10.7–9. Cicero assumes the reader's knowledge of the commonplace, pointedly ignores the quality of grandeur and dignity, and develops a theory of technical progress on the basis of veritas and grace to attack the Atticists from their own preferences. The resulting model serves to demote Lysias, imitated by the Atticists but merely the counterpart of Calamis, strigosior like archaic sculptures and superseded by later progress. The analogy thus obliquely repeats the brief but charged parenthesis in 66 that Demosthenes superseded Lysias. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 35.1 (2002) 77-89 [Access article in PDF] Time and Judgment in Demosthenes' De Corona 1 - [PDF] Michael S. Kochin Hannah Arendt concludes the first volume of The Life of the Mind thus: If judgment is our faculty for dealing with the past, the historian is the inquiring man who by relating it sits in judgment over it. If that is so, we may reclaim our (...) human dignity, win it back, as it were, from that pseudo-divinity named History of the modern age, without denying history's importance but denying its right to being the ultimate judge. Old Cato... has left us a curious phrase which aptly sums up the political principle implied in the enterprise of reclamation. He said: "Victrix causa deis placit, sed victa Catoni" ("The victorious cause pleased the gods, but the defeated one pleases Cato"). (1978, 1: 216) 2This article is an exercise in reclamation of the kind that Hannah Arendt describes. I wish to reclaim the cause for which Demosthenes struggled, the cause of democratic freedom, from the judgment of history expressed in the defeat of Athens and her allies at the hands of Philip of Macedon. Though politics is attenuated in the contemporary world, we can understand the peculiar characteristics of political action by reconstructing in our imagination those moments in the past when political life was richest. Here I am going to take up an aspect of political action that is particularly well-illuminated in Demosthenes' speech On the Crown: the role of time in the judgment of political action. 3We can approach Demosthenes' political career for a variety of purposes: The easiest to understand, because it is in many ways the most superficial, is with the motives of the humanist. We study the political speeches of Demosthenes in order to be inspired to value political freedom [End Page 77] and to learn how it can be defended. The trouble with this view is that it assumes that the conditions for political action are present for us, as they were for Demosthenes in the Athens of his time, and that political action is itself something serious men (and now women) ought to undertake. That these two assumptions are edifying and patriotic does not make them true.We can also approach Demosthenes as an exercise in historical science (that is, historische Wissenschaft). The scientific historian wants to learn the facts about the rise of Philip's hegemony over Greece. The scientific historian therefore prefers objectivity to edification. As George Cawkwell, a leading participant in the Demosthenesstreit in the '60s and '70s, wrote, "Moral edification and history can be kept separate" (1969, 166).I find this the most difficult purpose to understand, because it is unclear how this scientific-historical perspective can be connected with the human-all-too-human perspectives of the participants. When, for example, Cawkwell writes of the age of Demosthenes that "The central fact of the age is military, not moral—viz. the huge preponderance in military potential of the Macedonian state over the power of any Greek state," he cites a fact whose truth he himself perceives in part from Philip's victory over the Thebans and Athenians at Chaeroneia in 338 B.C.E. and Alexander's campaign against Thebes in 335. 4 Cawkwell does not trouble himself to explain how Demosthenes or anybody else could possibly have learned the fact of Philip's greater military strength and resources prior to these events. Nor does Cawkwell refute the claim that given Philip's failures before Perinthos and Byzantium in 340, at the very time that Demosthenes led the Athenians to war it was reasonable to suppose Philip much weaker than he had seemed, or seems to us (Pickard-Cambridge 1979, 491). 5 He does not even show how Philip could have known his own capabilities prior to his success. It is thus unclear what use historical-scientific judgment could be, since it is not clear how to relate historical-scientific judgment to the judgment of participants in human affairs.I should stop here, not least because I... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Interpreting a Classic: Demosthenes and His Ancient CommentatorsK. KapparisCraig A. Gibson. Interpreting a Classic: Demosthenes and His Ancient Commentators. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002. xii + 261 pp. Cloth, $55.This book aims to provide a comprehensive account of the ancient scholarship on Demosthenes. Gibson points out that Demosthenes was widely read in later antiquity, and this created the need for linguistic and historical commentaries (...) on his speeches. Of these, some have partially survived on papyrus, while excerpts have also been preserved in later lexicographers and the Byzantine scholia found in the margins of Demosthenic manuscripts. The purpose of Gibson's study is to clarify some confusing and difficult issues related to the ancient scholarship on Demosthenes and to provide the text and commentary on the main sources. [End Page 481]Gibson's introduction includes an informative outline of key parameters in the debate, such as the accuracy of excerption from an ancient commentary, the significance of date and place, and the intended readership of these commentaries. The first chapter discusses the form and transmission of ancient commentaries, their relation with lexicographic works, and their impact on the Byzantine scholia. Gibson convincingly argues that the scholia do not reveal direct dependency upon the surviving ancient commentaries but were compiled from lexicographic works such as Harpocration or the Suda, and possibly other works lost for us. The second chapter deals with the sources, critical agenda, and readership of the ancient commentaries. Here, Gibson provides a clear account of the purposes and guiding principles behind the composition of these works. He concludes that ancient commentators were familiar with interpretative problems of the Demosthenic text and tried to explain allusions and references to specific events, people, and places and also provide semantic, etymological and textual explanations of difficult or unusual terms. In this and the third chapter, Gibson discusses in considerable detail the scholarship on Didymus. He rejects the view that Didymus was merely a filter for a "golden era" of Alexandrian scholarship and argues that his prominent position as a commentator is due to the vast quantity of his work and its impact on later scholars. In sum, the first part of the study offers an informative account of ancient Demosthenic scholarship written in a clear and accessible style.The second part of the book contains the texts of ancient commentators of Demosthenes, with English translations, and also linguistic and historical commentary. In the translation, Gibson chooses to leave out many lines from the papyrus texts where only single words or fragments of words are legible; he translates only the most extant sections of the text. This is a valid choice, but readers should be aware of the fact that many important details may be hiding in the leftovers and fragments that have been omitted. Gibson does not provide the readily available text of P.Berol.inv. 9780, the most extensive surviving work of Didymus, while he cites the rest of the texts from reliable modern editions. In the commentary there are interesting discussions on the Spartan mora, the building of the Parthenon, the Helliastic courts, and many other topics noted by the ancient commentators on Demosthenes. An appendix presents and discusses P.Lond.Lit. 179, a prologue and commentary on Dem. 21. The reader will probably find useful the indexes and rich bibliography provided in the last part of this study.Gibson's commentary is certainly thorough but contains a number of errors in detail, and important bibliography is missing on individual topics. For example:Page 113: Gibson adopts the text of Pearson-Stephens. The adjective is, or, as here (later Greek),. Therefore the text should be (see LSJ s.v.).Page 120: Gibson has missed several important contributions to the issue of the theoric fund in recent years (M. H. Hansen, GRBS 17 [1976] 235-46; E. M. [End Page 482] Harris in E. M. Harris and R. Wallace, eds., Transitions to Empire: Essays in Greco-Roman History 360-146 B.C., in Honor of E. Badian [Norman, Okla., 1996]; C. Carey, Apollodoros Against Neaira [Warminster, 1992] 152-57). As a result, his note on P.Berol. 9780, Col. 8.32-44 is... (shrink)

Despite the long controversy on the date and composition of the First Philippic, we are no nearer, it would seem, to a satisfactory solution. F. Focke, apparently following a suggestion in Gercke-Norden, developed what is perhaps the most reasonable presentation of the view that the speech was delivered in the spring of 350 B.C.; but what vitiates his argument in the long run is Focke's constant presumption that all the various datable references must belong to one and the same speech (...) or stratum of composition. For although the view of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, that the First Philippic really comprises two distinct speeches, has not in its extreme form won acceptance with modern scholars, other more moderate solutions are not impossible; and it would seem that Blass's revision theory suggests a more subtle way of handling the various inconsistencies between the first and the second parts of the speech. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Theopompos Not Theophrastos:Correcting an Attribution in Plutarch Demosthenes 14.4Brad L. CookModern reconstructions of Theopompos' presentation of Demosthenes are based on five passages, all of which are found in Plutarch's Demosthenes.1 Of these passages, two are favorable to the orator and two are starkly negative, with the fifth being neutral.2 In the negative passages Theopompos attacked the orator with such harshness, branding him unstable, unjust, and unworthy, that the two (...) favorable passages are often overshadowed in modern reconstructions of Theopompos' opinion of Demosthenes.3 Moreover, some scholars, both in the past and again recently, go one step further and argue that one of the favorable texts, Demosthenes 14.4 (F 327), should be attributed to Theophrastos. I argue that the attribution to Theophrastos in this passage is the mistake of a meddlesome scribe in one manuscript and that the reading "Theopompos" of most manuscripts should be accepted. This means that what little survives of Theopompos' opinion of the orator remains complex and not simply negative. The changes made to the other positive text, Demosthenes 18.2 (F 328), I hope to deal with on another occasion.In Demosthenes 14.4 (F 327), Demosthenes stands up to defy the cruel whim of the Athenian mob:[End Page 537]And, in addition,4 Theopompos recounts that when the Athenians were proposing him for a certain prosecution then, when he would not listen, made a commotion, he rose and said "As a counsellor, o men of Athens, even if you don't want to, you will use me; but as a false accuser, not even if you want to."The difficulty with this passage is that not all the manuscripts attribute the statement to Theopompos. The primary dissenting manuscript is Madrid 4685 (14th c.), previously known as Codex Matritensis 55 and commonly cited as N.5 Modern editions of Plutarch follow N and print "," whereas works on Theopompos follow the other manuscripts and print "." This disagreement has not received thorough examination in recent publications.6 A brief review of the arguments [End Page 538] for and against the reading of N, considering first the intrinsic character of the manuscript and then its standing in the manuscript tradition will indicate that we should reject the reading of N and keep the attribution to Theopompos.Every known manuscript and every printed text of Demosthenes 14.4 read "" until 1880. In that year Charles Graux published his examination of N and its reading in Demosthenes 14.4 of "."7 N consists of two parts. The first part contains Nikias–Crassus (the Nikias is from 24.2), Alcibiades–Coriolanus, Demosthenes–Cicero, and Agesilaos–Pompey.8 This first part of N has many readings that are distinct from the other manuscripts, and Graux argued that these readings are superior to those of the other manuscripts, especially in the Demosthenes–Cicero.9 Graux therefore not only accepted "." in Demosthenes 14.4 because of the readings in N but also supported "" by claiming that Theopompos was always hostile to Demosthenes and would never say anything favorable to him; thus Graux saw the reading "" in the other manuscripts as an error in transmission.10 [End Page 539]Response to the Madrid manuscript and Graux's high opinion of it was generally favorable.11 Several scholars, however, rejected Graux's unrestrained praise of N and argued that among the many improved readings there were interpolations.12 Gudeman complained that the scribe of N, a "semilearned librarius," was particularly intrusive with proper names and altered and interpolated the received text. Gudeman listed some of these intrusions in Demosthenes and Cicero; of note are Demosthenes 5.7, 10.3, and 23.6 as well as Cicero 36.7.13 In Demosthenes 5.7 Plutarch attributes a certain detail to Hermippos. N has a semieducated but incorrect gloss on Hermippos, calling him. But the Hermippos here is certainly Hermippos of Smyrna of the third century B.C., a writer of Lives, not the homonymous fifth–century poet.14 In [End Page 540] Demosthenes 10.2 Plutarch quotes Ariston of Chios who records an anecdote of Theophrastos about the orator. At Demosthenes 10.3 Plutarch continues, ""; N replaces with. But... (shrink)

The collection and disposal of rubbish and waste and the maintenance of a decent standard of hygiene was as much a problem for ancient city authorities as for modern town councils. The responsibility for the removal of waste would often be dependent upon the nature of the rubbish and the facilities which city authorities offered. Thus early in the fourth century B.C. the agoranomic law from Piraeus prohibited individuals from piling earth and other waste on the streets and compelled the (...) offender to remove it. The astynomic law from Pergamon, which probably dates originally to the Hellenistic period, similarly forbade the dumping or piling up of earth or the mixing of mortar on the streets of the city. As one of Demosthenes' speeches indicates, the effect of dumping rubbish indiscriminately was to raise the level of the road surface, which consequently restricted access and endangered adjacent property. Excavation of a triangular hieron to the south west of the agora at Athens further illustrates the results of dumping. Here it was found that, between the construction of the hieron in the late fifth century B.C. and the beginning of the fourth century B.C, the road surface on its northern side rose more than half a metre and covered the lower part of the wall of the hieron and its boundary marker. The accumulated fill included a deep layer of marble chips, which had been dumped in the area by marble workers. The laws from Piraeus and Pergamon were thus designed to keep streets passable, protect adjacent buildings, and safeguard pedestrians. (shrink)

In his speech against Meidias Demosthenes describes the arrogant and proud behaviour of his opponent in which Meidias persists in spite of the popular vote condemning him. Whenever there is voting, Demosthenes says, Meidias is put forward as a candidate; he is the proxenos of Plutarch, he knows everything, the city is too small for his aspirations. This illustration of the enormous popularity of an Athenian politician shows his predominant influence in the two spheres of domestic and foreign policy. The (...) main line of this foreign policy —the passage is obviously intended as an accusation—is expressed by the relationship of proxenia and xenia between Meidias and Plutarch, the leading politician of Eretria who, pro-Athenian at first, changed his attitude and almost brought disaster on the Athenian army intervening in Euboea. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Theopompus of Chios: History and Rhetoric in the Fourth Century B.C.John BucklerMichael A. Flower. Theopompus of Chios: History and Rhetoric in the Fourth Century B.C.Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. xii + 252 pp. Cloth, $49.95.Theopompos is a historian fully worthy of the attention of Michael A. Flower's new study of him. The results, unfortunately, are for the most part disappointing. F.'s most important contribution to an understanding of Theopompos' (...) method and goals is his incontrovertible conclusion that Isokrates' influence [End Page 495] on Theopompos is overrated and indeed misunderstood. F. successfully rejects the notion that Isokrates created a fourth–century genre of historical writing or that he produced from his school a cadre of historians. Despite the evidence of TT 2 and 5, the testimonia indicate only that Theopompos and Ephoros were students of Isokrates. Nothing in the evidence proves that Isokrates gave them any historical training. Isokrates was a rhetorician who educated others in oratory. He admits (Ant. 45–46; Panath. 1–2) that he himself had decided not to write history. His goal in life was to teach rhetoric that could be used for a variety of literary purposes. Although Isokrates obviously uses historical examples in his own writings, they make only a rhetorical effect. F. is surely right to say that Isokrates' influence on Theopompos was predominantly cosmetic—that he taught Theopompos the style but not the essence of his histories. The undue emphasis on Isokrates' influence on Theopompos obscures the historical genius of the latter.In chapter 4 F. examines the moral and political philosophy of Theopompos. He easily refutes (63ff.) the opinion of R. Lane Fox that Theopompos was merely a moralist without political experience and without practical criteria by which to assess people and politics. No one, however, can doubt that Theopompos was indeed a moralist. He criticizes the deleterious effects of luxury on various individuals and peoples, effects rendering them dissolute and lazy. He thinks instead that a well–ordered life of individuals and communities leads to security and prosperity. He is also a champion of ordinary and traditional religion. He is likewise opposed to democracy because he feels that it led to a dissolute life. Yet F. fails to explain the connection between personal virtue or vice and public affairs. So did Theopompos. Two examples will suffice. Although Theopompos considers Lysandros and Agesilaos good men and the Spartan constitution a good one for its moral and abstemious way of life, the efforts of both leaders led to defeat and disaster for Sparta. Conversely, Theopompos considers Philip II and the Macedonians decadent and debased because of their sexual and alcoholic excesses. Yet these degenerates won control of Greece. Without serious examination of this point, F. (117–18, 127) falls back upon Theopompos' explanation: if Philip was base, the Athenians were even more so. Perhaps Philip was just lucky, this founded in no small part upon the evidence of Demosthenes, who had himself fled from the battlefield of Chaironeia. F. never explains in historical terms why the Athenians were unable successfully to oppose Philip. In short, neither F. nor perhaps Theopompos succeed in demonstrating how good moral fibre ensures actual political success. When F. most effectively touches upon the point, he seems (114) to contradict his other conclusions.F. is surely right to endorse W. R. Connor's conclusion that Theopompos was no admirer of Philip. In chapter 5 F. examines Polybios' use of Theopompos, the latter's portrayal of Philip's private life, and the king's political and military abilities. The study of Polybios and Theopompos is needlessly speculative, and could have profited greatly by a careful reading of K. Meister, Historische Kritik [End Page 496] bei Polybios (1975), which is never cited. Theopompos and Demosthenes, neither a friend of Philip, describe Philip and his officers as hard drinkers and given to homosexual orgies. Again, no one can reasonably doubt that Philip and his Macedonians were guilty of both charges. But to repeat; neither moral defect impeded their political and military success, and in strictly historical terms the point is insignificant. The obvious truth is that Philip triumphed because he was a brilliant... (shrink)

The relatively plentiful sources for the year 346 pose several questions which have never been satisfactorily answered. Why did Philip insist on an alliance with Athens as a precondition of the peace? Did Demosthenes simply invent the promises of Philip which he claims Aeschines reported to the Athenian assembly in Skirophorion? Why were the Athenians frightened when Philip got control of Thermopylae? They had long expected him to settle the Sacred War, and such action surely required occupation of the pass. (...) The correct answer to these questions indicates that Philip had two alternative plans in 346. ‘Plan A’ was with the aid of the Athenians to turn on Thebes. By this move, he would reduce the power of the second greatest city in Greece and thus eliminate the possibility of a combination of Athens and Thebes, which might be sufficiently powerful to block his ambitions. (shrink)

‘The Greeks have two treaties with the King: the one which our city made, which all praise; and later the Lacedaemonians made the one which all condemn,’ says Demosthenes c. 350. Isocrates, however, did not always run with the pack, for a few years earlier he urged the Athenians to make peace on the basis of the treaty ‘with the King and the Lacedaemonians [which] commands the Greeks to be autonomous, the garrisons to depart from the cities of others, and (...) each people to have its own territory’. (shrink)

Les grandes interrogations sur la politique, la Cité, la République, se posent le plus souvent au cours de périodes où les réalités auxquelles ces notions sont communément référées sont en voie de délitement. Il en était ainsi dans l'Antiquité, comme en attestent, parmi d'autres, les préoccupations qui se font jour dans les écrits de Démosthène, Aristote, Cicéron. C'est aussi, en substance, ce qu'énonçait il y a plus de quinze siècles, Augustin, lorsque, dans une formule ramassée, se fondant sur la définition (...) cicéronienne de la respublica, il confrontait celle-ci à sa réalité : La république n'est plus puisqu'elle a cessé d'être la chose du peuple. Nous n'avons plus que le nom de république dont la réalité est dès longtemps perdue. Dans des circonstances où paraissent, une nouvelle fois, se défaire des institutions humainement construites, politique, république ou nation, il importe de savoir si l'usage de ces mots recouvre des réalités vivaces ou en voie de déconstitution. Il convient pour cela de "savoir à quoi on a affaire", de quels objets on parle, c'est là l'ambition de cet essai. Il ne s'agit pas pour autant de forger de toutes pièces des concepts inédits et vides, mais plutôt de travailler à penser la politique et ses lieux de réalisation, non en tant qu'idées, mais en tant que "choses", réalités concrètes, faisant retour aux réflexions de ceux qui se sont attachés à les concevoir dans leurs processus de constitution. (shrink)

Comparison of literary passages is a critical procedure much favoured by Gellius, and is the main theme in several chapters of his Noctes Atticae: ch. 2.23 is dedicated to a comparison of Menander's and Caecilius′ versions of the Plocium; 2.27 to a confrontation of passages from Demosthenes and Sallust; in 9.9 Vergilian verses are compared with their originals in Theocritus and Homer; parts of speeches by the elder Cato, C. Gracchus and Cicero are contrasted in 10.3; two of Vergil's verses (...) are again compared with their supposed models in ch. 11.4; a segment of Ennius′ Hecuba is contrasted with its Euripidean original in 13.27; Cato's and Musonius′ formulations of a similar sententia are confronted in 16.1; in 17.10 Vergil's description of Etna is compared to Pindar's; the value of Latin erotic poetry is weighed against the Greek in ch. 19.9, in which an Anacreontean poem and four Latin epigrams are cited; and finally in 19.11 a ‘Platonic' distich is set side by side with its Latin adaptation, composed by an anonymous friend of Gellius, though in this case no comparison of the poems is attempted. (shrink)

D'après les textes anciens, la région dite Cynosarges, sur le territoire du dème des Dioméia ou Diomeis de la tribu Aigèis (II), peut commencer au Sud du rempart d'époque classique et doit comprendre une partie de la chaîne de collines qui s'étend du Sud-Est au Sud/ Sud-Ouest de l'Olympiéion, sur la rive gauche de l'Ilissos; le gymnase de Cynosarges était proche du rempart. Les Dioméia jouxtent au Nord le dème urbain de Collytos auquel ils sont liés par le culte d'Héraclès, (...) au Nord-Est le lieu-dit Agra(i), au Sud le dème d'Alopékè. Sauf une scholie à Démosthène, Contre Timocratès 114, rien ne dit que le gymnase et l'Héracléion étaient voisins, voire imbriqués ; au contraire, l'éventualité de deux entités distinctes et distantes l'un de l'autre est soutenue par plusieurs textes. Elle conduit à une relecture critique des hypothèses, des fouilles et de leurs interprétations successives. Dès lors, il n'y a pas d'obstacle à ce que l'Héracléion se soit trouvé dans le secteur où D. M. Robinson a trouvé l'inscription IG II2 1665 sur l'installation de trépieds à Cynosarges et le relief votif à Héraclès, Mus. Ép. inv. 3942. Les vestiges archaïques et classiques découverts en 1895-1896 près de l'église Hag. Pantéléimôn ne présentent aucune garantie d'être ceux du gymnase de Cynosarges détruit par Philippe V en 200 av. J.-C, même s'il est vraisemblable que l'édifice impérial mis au jour un peu plus loin est le gymnase d'Hadrien. Il ne serait pas contraire aux textes de chercher celui de Cynosarges dans le secteur délimité par le rempart au Nord, la rive droite de l'Ilissos au Sud, la région du Pythion à l'Est et le Mur ou la route de Phalère à l'Ouest. Selon toute vraisemblance, les portes XI, XII et XIII étaient respectivement la Porte Diomèis, les Portes Itôniai et les Halade Pulai, et le sanctuaire d'Egée se trouvait sur le dème de Collytos, le plus important de la trittyie urbaine de la tribu Aigèis (II). Trouvés ensemble par Ch. Karouzos dans le quartier Dourgouti, les quatre documents relatifs aux affaires d'Alopékè et au culte d'Antiochos n'indiquent pas la proximité de l'Héracléion de Cynosarges, mais localisent, à l'endroit même où ils ont été trouvés, le sanctuaire héroïque et tribal de la tribu Antiochis (X), sur le territoire d'Alopékè, seul dème urbain de la tribu. L'affluent le plus méridional de l'Ilissos (maintenant la rue Frantzi) devait séparer les Dioméia d'Alopékè. Enfin, la loi sacrée IG I3 257 pourrait provenir non pas de l'Héracléion de Cynosarges, mais du sanctuaire d'Héraclès Panera tes. (shrink)

The Holocaust marks a decisive moment in modern suffering in which it becomes almost impossible to find meaning or redemption in the experience. In this study, C. Fred Alford offers a new and thoughtful examination of the experience of suffering. Moving from the Book of Job, an account of meaningful suffering in a God-drenched world, to the work of Primo Levi, who attempted to find meaning in the Holocaust through absolute clarity of insight, he concludes that neither strategy works well (...) in today's world. More effective are the day-to-day coping practices of some survivors. Drawing on testimonies of survivors from the Fortunoff Video Archives, Alford also applies the work of Julia Kristeva and the psychoanalyst Donald Winnicot to his examination of a topic that has been and continues to be central to human experience. (shrink)

Summary At the beginning of this century most scholars believed that the document inserted in Dem. 24.20–23 was authentic. It regulated the legislative procedure practiced by the Athenians in the fourth century B.C. which was introduced shortly after the restoration of the democracy in 404/403 B.C. But in his monograph “The Documents in the Attic Orators” (Oxford 2013), 80–102, Mirko Canevaro rejected the document at Dem. 24.20–23 as a late forgery. I responded with the article “The Authenticity of the Law (...) about nomothesia Inserted in Demosthenes Against Timokrates 20–23”, Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies 56 (2016), 438–476. In Klio 100 (1) (2018), “The Authenticity of the Document at Demosth. or. 24.20–3, the Procedures of nomothesia and the so-called ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων”, 70–124, Canevaro contested my arguments and restated his view that the document must be a late forgery. This article is my response to Canevaro’s article. (shrink)

The word τερθρεία, which L. and S.8 derived from τερατεία and translated ‘the use of claptraps’, is perhaps best known from its occurrence in Isocrates , but the new edition has spread the net more widely, citing Philo, Philodemus, Proclus, Galen, Dion. Hal., and giving its meaning as ‘the use of extreme subtlety, hair-splitting, formal pedantry’. This agrees better with the gloss / κενοσπονδία attributed to Orus of Miletus in Et. Mag. 753. 4. Aristotle, Demosthenes, and Plutarch each use τερθρεύομαι (...) once. In the Helen Isocrates, condemning the futile ingenuity of the Sophists in writing encomia on such unworthy objects as salt and humble-bees, holds that such tours de force are immoral, as tending to deceive, representing a literary form of the vice περιεργία. Τερθρεία, then, should take its place, as a recognized term for the idle over-elaboration of a banausic theme, in the vocabulary of Greek literary criticism. It does not, however, appear in Rhys Roberts's ‘Glossary of Greek Rhetoric’ appended to his edition of D.H.'s On Literary Composition. No doubt this is because τερθρεία does not occur in this or any other of D.H.'s Scripta Rhetorica. But D.H. himself uses the word in Antiq. Rom. . Similarly J. F. Lockwood does not discuss the term in his lists in C.Q. xxxi and xxxii, where he collects words which are used metaphorically by D.H. in literary criticism. The metaphor in τερθρεία is certainly not obvious; but the literary sense must have involved some transference of meaning, for it is not to be expected that the word τερθρεία sprang, in full panoply of critical significance, from the brain of the Muse of Rhetoric; and it is part of the purpose of this paper to point the way to an explanation, or at least to set forth some known facts about the word and its possible congeners. (shrink)

Cet article apporte, pour la première fois, des arguments confortant l'identification de l'emporion de Pistiros, attesté épigraphiquement dans la « Grande inscription » du village de Vetren, avec le site archéologique d'époque classique et hellénistique de la région d'Adžijska Vodenica, situé à 2 km de l'endroit où l'inscription a été trouvée. Les éléments en faveur de cette identification sont les suivants : 1) la relation entre l'emplacement de l'inscription — de l'autre côté de l'ancienne « Voie diagonale » reliant Byzance (...) à Serdica, près des ruines de la station romaine de Bona Mansio — et la vocation historique de Vemporion durant le règne de Philippe II de Macédoine ; 2) la tradition antique du nom de Pistiros jusqu'à son dernier avatar : Kapisturia ; 3) l'étymologie du nom Pistiros/Bistiros, toponyme que l'on trouve près d'une vaste étendue d'eau ; 4) l'interprétation de l'hapax epaulistes comme désignant un envoyé du roi thrace qui était obligé de passer la nuit avant le défilé de Succi (aujourd'hui Porte de Trajan) avant de poursuivre son chemin vers l'Ouest le lendemain ; 5) la localisation des Emporta Belana, d'après l'inscription, au pied du versant Sud du mont Orbélos (aujourd'hui Mt Belasitza). Historiquement Xemporion de Pistiros peut être identifié avec le chorion Masteira, mentionné par Démosthène. Des données sûres le concernant nous ont été transmises par l'historien Anaximène de Lampsaque. On tente aussi, pour la première fois, de localiser le chorion Drongilon, à partir de l'ancienne forteresse de Dingion dans la moyenne vallée de l'Hébros. L'article donne enfin une interprétation nouvelle du terme Thraces tetrachoritai, qui désignerait la zone d'occupation macédonienne à l'intérieur de la Thrace, où les quatre garnisons de Philippe II (Drongilon, Kabyle, Philippopolis et Masteira) furent en butte à la révolte. Du point de vue chronologique, cette zone fut établie au moins en deux étapes : en 352/1 et 342/1 av. J.-C. (shrink)

Анотація. У статті проводиться аналіз текстів донікейських Отців, які показують сприйняття ними водного хрещення. Зокрема, розглядаються праці чотирьох видатних богословів, що писали свої праці в III ст. – Орігена, Іполита Римського, Тертуліана і Кипріяна. На підставі їхніх текстів, що відбивають розуміння водного хрещення в різних регіонах Римської імперії, проводиться вивчення процесу формування дитячого хрещення, який активно проходив у цей період. Автор визначає фактори, що зробили значний вплив на заміну кредохрещення на педохрещення. Провідну роль в появі дитячого хрещення зіграли ситуації екстремального (...) хрещення, за умов якого суворі правила входження в громаду могли ігноруватися. Богословською підставою таких дій було уявлення про роль хрещення як очищення гріхів, яке поступово трансформувалося з прощення гріхів по вірі кандидата на хрещення на прощення гріхів ex opera operato. Так як в богослов’ї цієї епохи відсутнє поняття первородного гріха, то для пояснення хрещення невинних немовлят стало розвиватися орігенівське уявлення про так звану «пляму гріха». (shrink)

“Multiple modernities” is not a novel theme, as the editors and contributors amply concede in the volume. At its best, the conception is an invitation to ever more openness to the possibilities of...