Winner of the 2021 Toshihide Numata Book Award in Buddhism The assertion that there is nothing in the constitution of any person that deserves to be considered the self (ātman)—a permanent, unchanging kernel of personal identity in this life and those to come—has been a cornerstone of Buddhist teaching from its inception. Whereas other Indian religious systems celebrated the search for and potential discovery of one’s “true self,” Buddhism taught about the futility of searching for anything in our experience that (...) is not transient and ephemeral. But a small yet influential set of Mahāyāna Buddhist texts, composed in India in the early centuries CE, taught that all sentient beings possess at all times, and across their successive lives, the enduring and superlatively precious nature of a Buddha. This was taught with reference to the enigmatic expression tathāgatagarbha—the “womb” or “chamber” for a Buddha—which some texts refer to as a person’s true self. The Buddhist Self is a methodical examination of Indian teaching about the tathāgatagarbha (otherwise the presence of one’s “Buddha-nature”) and the extent to which different Buddhist texts and authors articulated this in terms of the self. C. V. Jones attends to each of the Indian Buddhist works responsible for explaining what is meant by the expression tathāgatagarbha, and how far this should be understood or promoted using the language of selfhood. With close attention to these sources, Jones argues that the trajectory of Buddha-nature thought in India is also the history and legacy of a Buddhist account of what deserves to be called the self: an innovative attempt to equip Mahāyāna Buddhism with an affirmative response to wider Indian interest in the discovery of something precious or even divine in one’s own constitution. This argument is supplemented by critical consideration of other themes that run through this distinctive body of Mahāyānist literature: the relationship between Buddhist and non-Buddhist teachings about the self, the overlap between the tathāgatagarbha and the nature of the mind, and the originally radical position that the only means of becoming liberated from rebirth is to achieve the same exalted status as the Buddha. (shrink)

Unlike many books of its kind, this collection of essays is more than a mere aggregate of papers loosely ordered around a set of common themes. In fact, for a work sensitive to the values inherent in the analytical tradition, it is surprisingly systematic, and strikes a happy balance between the products of the system-builders and the deliverances of those who are content to give us merely isolated insights. It embodies a sound knowledge of the history of philosophy, a sensitivity (...) to the contributions of the British philosophers since Bradley, and a desire to take science seriously without succumbing to the reductionism which so often characterized the contributions of the positivists. Throughout the papers the influence of Carnap, Kant and Wittgenstein is especially evident; and perhaps most characteristic are the repeated attempts to tread carefully, with their help, the sometimes narrow lines dividing realist and phenomenalist, realist and idealist, and realist and nominalist. Sellars is at pains to incorporate in his system the partial truths which always characterize conflicting philosophical alternatives. This book is well worth careful, critical study by philosophers of all persuasions.--C. V. (shrink)

A collection of six essays, including three previously unpublished papers entitled, "Methods of Philosophy," "The Nature of Value," and "The Metaphysical Concept of Space." The target in each case is the whole of technical philosophy; the thesis to be defended is the claim that its separate divisions represent no more than "linguistically contrived intellectual illusions." Along the way, it is argued that the traditional retreat from speculative metaphysics to philosophical analysis is to no avail, for it is claimed that since (...) all philosophy is of a piece, all its parts and methods stand or fall together. We are offered, therefore, the following dual thesis which is both surprising and unique: Philosophy is an ordered whole in structure and method, but the products of philosophical reflection embody nothing more than snares, delusions, and unproductive disputation.—C. V. (shrink)

A compact edition of Mr. Beck's excellent translation of the second Critique, slightly revised, together with a helpful short introduction and a bibliography.--V. C. C.

This textbook combines Father Klubertanz' Introduction to the Philosophy of Being and Father Holloway's Natural Theology in a new two-part abridgement, appropriate for single semester courses in general metaphysics and natural theology. The standpoint of both the authors is roughly that of existential Thomism, and the continuity between the work of each within the book is notable. The first part contains the revisions to be found in the second edition of Father Klubertanz' volume.—C. V.

Eight short papers, semi-popular in intent, surveying British philosophy from Bradley, through Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein, to the contemporary analysis of Ryle and Austin. Coverage is spotty, and some of the treatments are so brief and sketchy as to be of dubious value. Ryle's introduction, however, and concluding papers by Strawson and Warnock are both pleasant and instructive.--V. C. C.

A new edition of a famous classic, printed with elegance and taste. Mr. Shields' introduction succinctly reviews Mill's life and work, outlines the essay, and points up some of its problems.--V. C. C.

Hanson has set forth in a fascinating way the story of the discovery of the positron. He takes up in some detail the question concerning the symmetry of explaining and predicting, argues that certain features of microphysical theory cannot be accommodated to mechanical-type models, and defends his interpretation of the "Copenhagen" view of quantum theory. He shows how an adequate understanding of these matters makes possible a grasp of the significance of the concept of the positron, and in so doing, (...) illustrates the complex relationships in which physical theory stands to observation and experiment. Consequently, Hanson's book is another of the recent works in which an author refuses to construe the scientific enterprise as a sophisticated search for facts, where so-called theoretical entities serve as mere devices to make calculation easier. The book includes four appendices of a rather technical nature and 41 pages of notes on the text.--C. V. (shrink)

An attempt to present Kant's Critical Philosophy in a non-technical and up-to-date manner. The author is largely successful in translating complex doctrines into simple language and in relating Kant's thought to contemporary developments in philosophy, science, morals and theology. He stresses the continuity of Kant's thinking with our own, and expounds the Kantian position in the light of the criticisms which have been directed against it, in our and other times. Despite the simplicity of its language, however, the book is (...) not always as clear in meaning or content as one might wish, and some of the interpretations--as when, in Chapter 2, space and time are made out to be "particulars"--are decidedly strange.--V. C. C. (shrink)

Maritain's Walgreen Foundation Lectures on political philosophy, given in 1949, in a handsomely produced paperbound edition.--V. C. C.

An original and independent treatment of epistemology's central question--that concerning the relation between the mind and its objects. The author's answer is that of naive realism: the mind is a spectator of its objects, and the objects themselves are real and independent of it and its activity. The classical objections to such a view are examined forthrightly and yet with care; error, e.g., appears as a function of the unclarity with which some objects are apprehended rather than as evidence that (...) all objects are fictions. Professor Earle is quite willing to spell out the somewhat startling ontological consequences of his view; since whatever is an object of consciousness is real and independent, illusions differ from, say, material objects, not as non-being differs from being, but as one kind of being differs from another. The result is a contribution to metaphysics as well as to epistemology, and its conclusions in both areas are fresh and important. Part of Chapter I first appeared in this Review, VIII, 211-24.--V. C. C. (shrink)