"Corpus Anima" is a collection of previously published essays written for professional Jungian journals about the unity of psyche and soma, spirit and matter, body and soul. There are also two chapters of more personal reflections, previously unpublished, including a series of articles on the mid-Atlantic Azorean Archipelago. The essays on psyche and soma come from the direct experience of their unity. We live, life moves, at the confluence of these polarities of spirit and matter, body and soul, where through (...) the capacity to hold contradiction and paradox we can become whole. Included in this collection is a published essay (Routledge) on the Portuguese poet and writer, Fernando Pessoa (1888-1935). His particular paradoxical expression of the soul and its life in the world is radically inspiring. The lines below are written on his tomb in Lisbon, resting in the same national monument with Vasco de Gama (c. 1460s-1524), world oceanic explorer. Pessoa was an explorer of inner worlds. He is, posthumously, a national treasure. I am nothing. I shall always be nothing. I cannot want to be anything. But I have in me all the dreams of the world. Cedrus Monte, PhD, is a Jungian Analyst, graduate of the C.G. Jung Institute in Switzerland (1995) where she now resides. She is originally from Northern California. Her roots lie there, even her heart; but even deeper roots, soul roots, lie in the Azores and Madeira, both autonomous island regions of Portugal. An uprooted wanderer of many lands, she has grounded herself as much as possible in the one constant earth, the body. (shrink)

Monte Johnson examines one of the most controversial aspects of Aristiotle's natural philosophy: his teleology. Is teleology about causation or explanation? Does it exclude or obviate mechanism, determinism, or materialism? Is it focused on the good of individual organisms, or is god or man the ultimate end of all processes and entities? Is teleology restricted to living things, or does it apply to the cosmos as a whole? Does it identify objectively existent causes in the world, or is it (...) merely a heuristic for our understanding of other causal processes? Johnson argues that Aristotle's aporetic approach drives a middle course between these traditional oppositions, and avoids the dilemma, frequently urged against teleology, between backwards causation and anthropomorphism. Although these issues have been debated with extraordinary depth by Aristotle scholars, and touched upon by many in the wider philosophical and scientific community as well, there has been no comprehensive historical treatment of the issue. Aristotle is commonly considered the inventor of teleology, although the precise term originated in the eighteenth century. But if teleology means the use of ends and goals in natural science, then Aristotle was rather a critical innovator of teleological explanation. Teleological notions were widespread among his predecessors, but Aristotle rejected their conception of extrinsic causes such as mind or god as the primary causes for natural things. Aristotle's radical alternative was to assert nature itself as an internal principle of change and an end, and his teleological explanations focus on the intrinsic ends of natural substances - those ends that benefit the natural thing itself. Aristotle's use of ends was subsequently conflated with incompatible 'teleological' notions, including proofs for the existence of a providential or designer god, vitalism and animism, opposition to mechanism and non-teleological causation, and anthropocentrism. Johnson addresses these misconceptions through an elaboration of Aristotle's methodological statements, as well as an examination of the explanations actually offered in the scientific works. Reviewed in: Notre Dame Philosophical Review 2006.06.15; Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2006.08.37; Il-Sole – 24 Ore 6 Aug. 2006; Philosophy in Review 26 (2006): 360-2; Rhizai 3 (2006): 171-8; Journal of the History of Philosophy 45 (2007): 323-4; Ancient Philosophy 27 (2007): 191-200; Phronesis 52 (2007): 248-9; Isis 98 (2007): 375; Aestimatio 4 (2007) 146-152; The British Journal for the History of Science 41 (2008): 129-130. The European Legacy 14 (2009); La Cultura 47 (2009): 174-175; Sean M. Row, Teleology in Political Contexts: an assessment of Monte Ransome Johnson’s “Aristotle on Teleology”. (A thesis presented to the faculty of the college of arts and sciences of Ohio University, 2009.). (shrink)

Drawing on the natural-resource-based view, we propose that employee stakeholder integration is linked to environmental performance through firms’ proactive environmental strategies, and that this link is contingent on shared vision. We tested our model with a cross-country and multi-industry sample. In support of our theory, results revealed that firms’ proactive environmental strategies translated employee stakeholder integration into environmental performance. This relationship was pronounced for high levels of shared vision. Our findings demonstrate that shared vision represents a key condition for advancing (...) the corporate greening agenda through proactive environmental strategies. We discuss implications for the CSR and the environmental management literatures, with a particular focus on the NRBV and stakeholder integration debates. (shrink)

The key term of Aristotle’s teleology is “the cause for the sake of which”. Aristotle discusses in several key texts the fact that this has two different senses: aim and beneficiary. The aim of a knife is cutting, but the beneficiary is the person who does, or orders, the cutting. Aristotle uses this distinction to show how natural things have both aims and are beneficiaries of their functions. He also shows how non-natural things, such as god, can operate as causes (...) for the sake of which, but not as beneficiaries. Eternal things cannot be beneficiaries, because they cannot undergo change. Thus, the beneficiaries of Aristotle’s teleology are the elements, plants, and animals that can both undergo change and have functional aims. A survey of other terms of Aristotle’s teleology, such as “nature does nothing in vain”, the terms “complete” or “perfect”, as well as “end” and “entelechy” further show the specific orientation of Aristotle’s teleology, as do his use of axiological terms such as “better” and “fine”. (shrink)

Monte Cook - Robert Desgabets's Representation Principle - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:2 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.2 189-200 Robert Desgabets's Representation Principle Monte Cook THE CARTESIAN PHILOSOPHER ROBERT DESGABETS'S only philosophical publication is his Critique de la Critique de la Recherche de la vérité , in which he criticizes Simon Foucher's criticism of Malebranche's Search After Truth. This work has never been republished and is now available only in rare book collections. Desgabets also (...) wrote several unpublished works that were widely circulated during his lifetime and in which he developed a unique philosophical system of his own. Fortunately, these were published in 1983 as Robert Desgabets, Oeuvres philosophiques inédites. Drawing particularly on this volume and especially on the longest work in this volume, Supplément à la philosophie de Monsieur Descartes , I give a glimpse of Desgabets's system. I do so by discussing the surprising view of intentionality central to Desgabets's proof of the external world and to Desgabets's system in general. I note some interesting similarities and differences between Desgabets's position and the positions of Descartes and seventeenth-century Cartesians Malebranche and Arnauld. But mainly I clarify and give some needed structure to Desgabets's argument for his view of intentionality. This argument is interesting in itself as a sustained argument.. (shrink)

El presente trabajo tiene por propósito exponer —desde las consideraciones de Nancy y Kant—, el modo en que la libertad sólo puede ser pensada en su plena radicalidad, cuando es asumida desde una clave histórica. Aunque Nancy critique a Kant la identificación de Idea y Libertad, reconoce en el filósofo de Königsberg el haber visualizado un «más allá de la idea». El «más allá», de acuerdo a Nancy, es ubicado por Kant simplemente en la realidad objetiva de la idea de (...) libertad. A nuestro juicio, dicho «más allá de la idea» se incrusta y nutre de las reflexiones históricas y jurídicas kantianas. Este hecho, permite crear un terreno común para el diálogo entre la posición kantiana y la fenomenológica: libertad e historia constituyen una unidad indisoluble. (shrink)

The aim of this contribution is to provide a rather general answer to Hume’s problem. To this end, induction is treated within a straightforward formal paradigm, i.e., several connected levels of abstraction. Within this setting, many concrete models are discussed. On the one hand, models from mathematics, statistics and information science demonstrate how induction might succeed. On the other hand, standard examples from philosophy highlight fundamental difficulties. Thus it transpires that the difference between unbounded and bounded inductive steps is crucial: (...) while unbounded leaps of faith are never justified, there may well be reasonable bounded inductive steps. In this endeavour, the twin concepts of information and probability prove to be indispensable, pinning down the crucial arguments, and, at times, reducing them to calculations. Essentially, a precise study of boundedness settles Goodman’s challenge. Hume’s more profound claim of seemingly inevitable circularity is answered by obviously non-circular hierarchical structures. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 43.1 (2005) 21-36 [Access article in PDF] Desgabets on the Creation of Eternal Truths Monte Cook For many philosophers Robert Desgabets's1 doctrine of the creation of eternal truths will be of interest for the light it throws on Descartes's doctrine of the creation of eternal truths, a doctrine receiving considerable scrutiny the past several years.2 Desgabets was one of the few followers (...) of Descartes to defend this doctrine; and he not only defended it, he made it central to his philosophy.3 He spoke of the [End Page 21] doctrine as "being of the greatest importance and having great and incomparable consequences;" and he referred to it as being "so lofty, so fine, so saintly and so worthy of God" that Descartes ought never to have departed from it (RD 208, 209).4 But, Desgabets thinks, Descartes sometimes forgets his own doctrine and says things incompatible with it. More important, he thinks, Descartes fails to realize how important the doctrine is and fails to extend it to its full consequences. In Desgabets we get from a Cartesian and a near contemporary of Descartes: an interpretation of Descartes's doctrine of the creation of eternal truths, a criticism of Descartes's version of the doctrine purportedly based on Descartes's own principles, and the development of the supposedly correct version of the doctrine that Descartes would have advocated had he been truer to his own principles.5Recent discussions have brought to the fore several controversies about how to interpret Descartes's comments on the creation of the eternal truths. I piece together both where Desgabets's own doctrine stands on these controversies and how Desgabets interprets Descartes's position on them, and I note some consequences that Desgabets draws from the doctrine that are clearly opposed to Descartes's explicit views. 1. Desgabets's Interpretation of Descartes In Critique de la Critique, Desgabets first states Descartes's doctrine of the creation of eternal truths as follows: That the Whole is greater than its part, that the circle has its diameters equal, that man is a rational animal, that two & two are four, etc., are not such of themselves but... God has made & established them with a sovereign indifference being able not to establish them so that what is now true & necessary should not be so if he had not established it. (CdC 73) This states the core of Descartes's doctrine of the creation of eternal truths, and I doubt that anyone would deny that it is in Descartes.In the next paragraph, however, Desgabets both expands and limits the scope of what he takes to be Descartes's doctrine: Descartes claims that there is neither nature, nor essence, nor reality, nor conceivability, nor truth among created things that God has not made or established with a sovereign indifference, so that before we conceive that he has freely resolved to make & establish things & truths there is nothing conceivable except his unique Essence. And we must not listen to those who say that before his free decrees & before his [End Page 22] indifferent action he already necessarily saw natures & determined essences that had by themselves a real possibility that they did not owe to him & that distinguished them from chimeras & beings of reason. (CdC 74) Whether or not Descartes subscribes to the views expressed in this paragraph, they clearly go beyond the core doctrine of the creation of eternal truths expressed in the previous paragraph.First, Desgabets expands Descartes's doctrine to include opposition not just to the view that the eternal truths exist independently of God, but also to the view that God creates by giving actual existence to pre-existent essences that determine what is possible. Desgabets believes that for Descartes God does not create by contemplating pre-existent essences, to some of which he gives actual existence. Rather, God creates the essences themselves (cf. RD 32-33, 232). Moreover, Desgabets believes that for Descartes God gives existence not just to essences but also to possibilities. God does not confront... (shrink)

Leonidas Montes presents a new reading of Adam Smith's legacy. The classical influences, the meaning of some key concepts, and what other authors were saying at the time, are fundamental to understand what Smith really said. Starting with the famous Das Adam Smith Problem, Montes investigates the causes and the context of the Problem, and proposes the importance of the moral triad of the supposed impartial spectator, propriety and self-command for understanding Smith's broad concept of sympathy. Smith's virtues are fundamental (...) to his moral thought, and the nature of the meaning of self-command and propriety have important philosophical implications, reflecting the relevance of moral autonomy in Smith's thought. The concluding chapter gives an example of the mistake of simply looking at a problem through the eyes of today. It questions the popular version of Smith as a forerunner or founder of general economic equilibrium theory by investigating the real nature of Smith's Newtonianism. (shrink)

In "naming and necessity" saul kripke repeatedly uses modal arguments to show that proper names are not abbreviated or disguised descriptions. I defend these modal arguments against the frequent criticism that they rest on an ambiguous premise.

"Large-format photo study and narratives record journeys along the 100th Meridian from the Canadian to the Mexican borders. Explores life and communities along the vertical line that denotes the nation's geographic center and the shift in annual rainfallto less than twenty inches per year"--Provided by publisher.

Nowadays decision making is strongly supported by the high-confident point estimations produced by deep learning algorithms. In many activities, they are sufficient for the decision-making process. However, in some other cases, confidence intervals are required too for an appropriate decision-making process. In this work, a first attempt to generate point estimations with confidence intervals for the $^{222}$Rn radiation level time series at Canfranc Underground Laboratory is presented. To predict the low-radiation periods allows correctly scheduling the unshielded periods for maintenance operations (...) in the experiments hosted in this facility. This should minimize the deposition of radioactive dust on the exposed surfaces during these unshielded periods. An approach based on deep learning with stochastic regulation is evaluated in the forecasting of point estimations and confidence intervals of the $^{222}$Rn time series and compared with a second approach based on Gaussian processes. As a consequence of this work, an evaluation of the capacity of Gaussian process and deep learning with stochastic regularization for generating point estimations and their confidence intervals for this time series is stated. (shrink)

Faith-based organizations are a key player in major sectors of activity for maintaining the welfare state, including health, education, and social services. This paper uses a multivariate regression model in an attempt to identify the factors that affect the relationship between work engagement and flourishing. The paper also discusses the empirical research gap that has been identified in the literature about the moderated effect of human values on this relationship. This study is based on a sample of 142 nuns of (...) a congregation belonging to a religious organization with an international scope and a Catholic inspiration. The case of religious women who have chosen to live a life consistent with the charism of the congregation constitutes a paradigmatic and unique environment to investigate the potential alignment of personal values with professional activity. Two important conclusions are derived from this work. First, the more engaged nuns are in their work (social action to serve the poorest and most disadvantaged people), the more they flourish in their working environment and in their personal lives. Second, certain personal values reinforce the relationship between the professional role (work engagement) and the personal role (flourishing). (shrink)

This article examines how migration contributes to the plurality of masculinities among Guatemalan men, particularly among migrant men and their families. I argue that migration offers an opportunity to men, both migrant and nonmigrant, to reflect on their emotional relations with distinct family members, and show how, by engaging in this reflexivity, these men also have the opportunity to vent those emotions in a way that offsets some of the negative traits associated to a hegemonic masculinity, such as being unemotional, (...) nonnurturing, aggressive, and dispassionate. This study contributes to transnational migration studies in three ways: by examining the more personal and emotional side of transnational life, by examining ways in which men step away from culturally expected hegemonic masculine identity, and by providing an empirical study of subaltern masculinities, particularly among transnational immigrant men. Drawing on multi-sited, in-depth interviews conducted in Guatemala and California, my research contributes to our understanding of the emotional costs of transnational migration for migrants and their families, particularly for men, by examining the interplay among gender, family, and transnational migration. (shrink)

Aristotle normally begins a teleological explanation of a living thing with an identification of its goods. The existence of these goods implies certain requirements or “hypothetical necessity”. For example, if a fish is to survive and reproduce, it must be able to acquire food, which requires that it move, and so it must have fins, which in turn require tissues, and these must be composed of a certain combination of the elements. Some features of living things are not necessary for (...) its survival, but only as a concomitant to some other necessity, or because it is better for the creature that way. The case of animal behavior shows that Aristotle does not indulge in anthropomorphism: apparently purposeful behavior is not caused by deliberation. In fact, far from assimilating animal to human behavior, Aristotle goes the other direction and shows how many purposeful human activities happen without deliberation. (shrink)

Aristotle is commonly considered the inventor of teleology, although the exact term "teleology" originated in the eighteenth century. If teleology means the use of ends and goals in natural science, then Aristotle should be regarded rather as a critical innovator of teleological explanation. Teleological notions were widespread among his predecessors, but Aristotle rejected their conception of extrinsic causes like mind or god as the primary causes for natural things. Aristotle's radical alternative was to assert nature itself as an internal principle (...) of change and an end, and his teleological explanations focus on the intrinsic ends of natural substances---those ends that benefit the natural thing itself. To these he contrasted incidental ends of natural things, such as possible uses of the thing which do not serve its own functions and interests. ;Aristotle holds that natural science is knowledge that comes about through demonstration of the causes of natural kinds. Most important is "the cause for the sake of which"---the end. The identification of a natural end initiates the process of explanation and constitutes the basis for all objective knowledge about natural kinds---stars, elements, plants, and animals. The determination of the ends of natural kinds also indicates how other causal factors, such as matter and necessity, are to be integrated into an explanatory account of their parts and behavior. ;Aristotle's teleology was subsequently conflated with incompatible "teleological" notions, including proofs for the existence of a providential or designer god, vitalism and animism, opposition to mechanism and non-teleological causation, and anthropocentrism. I aim to correct these misrepresentations through an investigation of Aristotle's methodological statements, as well as the explanations actually offered in the scientific works. I argue that Aristotle's aporetic approach avoids the dilemma between backwards causation and anthropomorphism that is frequently leveled against teleology. ;Although Aristotle's philosophy sometimes suffers from failed extrapolation of teleological principles, still it succeeds in challenging the anthropocentric conception of nature, and rising above the banausic perspective which views all natural things as instruments for human ends, to a loftier viewpoint from which natures can be observed and appreciated as their own goods. (shrink)

Did Aristotle consider the properties of the elements to be teleologically explicable? According to some commentators, he did not, but considered these to operate according to material, moving, or mechanical causes. According to others, he did, and this is evidence of his commitment to an “overall” or “global” teleology. Both of the positions are wrong. Aristotle did consider each of the elements teleologically explicable, but he considered the beneficiaries of their properties and motions to be the elements themselves. This is (...) relatively clear in the case of ether, the element that composes the heavenly bodies: it has a simple motion in a circle, which is a manifestation of the intelligence of the extra-terrestrial bodies. But the other elements are included in a cycle of transmutation that guarantees their perpetual existence. This is a benefit to them according to the axiom: it is better to exist than not exist. Thus, rainfall is a necessary and cyclical process, but it is also somehow benefits the elements that are transformed in the process, for in so doing they complete cycles that resemble or imitate the eternal cycles of the heavenly bodies. (shrink)

I argue against Deborah Nails that Plato, like Aristotle, frequently used the term "ousia" to indicate what is ontologically fundamental, and that he did so throughout all periods of his writing.

A long tradition regards Robert Desgabets as a Cartesian empiricist. He says things that sound strikingly like Locke, and he argues against anti-empiricist reasoning in Descartes, Malebranche, and Arnauld. Moreover, throughout his writings he endorses the empiricist principle that nothing is in the intellect except what was previously in the senses. Since the Cartesians are generally supposed to be prototypical non -empiricists, Desgabets’s being a Cartesian empiricist would make him a particularly interesting specimen. In this paper, however, I challenge the (...) case for taking Desgabets to be an empiricist. (shrink)

Authenticates approximately 500 lines of Aristotle's lost work the Protrepticus (Exhortation to Philosophy) contained in the circa third century AD work by Iamblichus of Chalcis entitled Protrepticus epi philosophian. Includes a complete English translation of the authenticated material.

n recent years, there has been a resurgence of academic interest in Adam Smith. As a consequence, a large number of PhD dissertations on Smith have been written by international scholars - in different languages, and in many diverse disciplines, including economics, women’s studies, philosophy, science studies, political theory and english literature: diversity which has enriched the area of study. In response to this activity, and in order to making these contributions more easily accessible to other Smith scholars, Leonidas Montes (...) and Eric Schliesser have edited this important new book. Of interest to Smith scholars and those interested in the history of economic thought in general, the contributions to this book are self-consciously interdisciplinary and skilfully employ many different methodologies. (shrink)

Humans are capable of intentionally pursuing goals that they consciously set for themselves, and thus a different order of teleology applies to them, one which places them in the domain of ethics and politics. Every inquiry, art, and science has a goal, and they can broadly be classified into the productive-practical on the one hand, and the theoretical, on the other. Practical knowledge aims at practical goods by grasping causes for the sake of producing effects, while theoretical knowledge aims at (...) grasping causes for the sake of knowledge itself, an intrinsic good. The ultimate good for a human can be identified by a process of elimination: whatever is the highest good for another kind of organism cannot be the unique good for this kind of thing, and so the end of human life cannot be nutrition, reproduction, growth, perception or pleasure, for these are the proper goods of other kinds of organisms. This leaves knowledge, in particular theoretical knowledge. It is argued that Aristotelian teleology cannot be anthropocentric, or else it would be impossible to identify the unique human good by elimination, and the activity of the final good for humans would have no real object. (shrink)