By making Korea a central part of comparative history of East Asian religion and society, this book traces the evolution of Korean religion from the oldest representation to that of the current day by utilizing wide-ranging interdisciplinary and comparative resources. This book presents a holistic view of the enduring religious tradition of Korea and its cultural and social significance within the wider horizons of modern and globalizing changes. Reflecting nearly five decades of the author s work on the subject, it (...) presents an understanding of the main current in Korean religion and social thought throughout history. It then goes on to examine discourses on values and morality involving the relationship between religion and society, in particular the human meaning of economy and society, which is one of the most central and practical problems in the contemporary world with global relevance beyond Korea and Asia. Addressing the overview of the Korean religious tradition in the context of its impact on the making of modern society and economy, this book will appeal to students and scholars of Religious Studies, Korean Studies and Asian Studies. ". (shrink)

1. An Tŏng-mun ŭi hangmun chŏngsin kwa ch'ŏse pangsik -- 2. An Tŏng-mun ŭi Samsan Sŏwŏn wisang chŏngnip kwa kŭ ŭimi -- 3. Ha Ik-pŏm ŭi sam kwa munhak -- 4. Pak Ch'i-bok ŭi Nammyŏnghak kyesŭng yangsang -- 5. Kang Pyŏng-ju ŭi hangmun kwa munhak -- 6. Chŏng Chae-gyu ŭi hangmun chŏngsin kwa 'Taehak' haesŏk -- 7. Kim Chin-ho ŭi haksŏl e taehayŏ -- 8. Kwak Chong-sŏk ŭi Myŏngdŏksŏl nonjaeng -- 9. Kim Hwang ŭi Kyŏnghak Sipto e taehayŏ.

Trusting relationships are both valuable and risky. Where the risks are high and the fears of betrayal are also high, it might seem rational to try to mitigate the risks, while still enjoying the benefits of the trusting relationship, by forming a contingency plan. A contingency plan—in the sense I am interested in—involves contingent punishments for defection, which are primarily meant to encourage the trusted partner to act trustworthily. I argue, however, that such contingency plans suffer from an internal tension (...) wherein the contingency planner both seeks and undermines a particular level (or kind) of trust. There are two problems in particular, either of which is sufficient to undermine trusting relationships: one, the planner fails to see the trusted partner as sincerely engaged in the trusting relationship, and two, the planner separates herself out from the trusting relationship by seeing her flourishing as separate from her partner’s (or, even worse, as dependent on her partner’s harm). Continency plans, then, are not just about the future; they cast a moral shadow on what we are doing now. (shrink)

本书是一本关于陈冲体验人生感悟人生的书法集子。内容包括:悟道篇;明理篇;做人篇;处世篇等。.

When the odds of achieving world peace seem so long, do hopes for peace amount to anything more than wishful thinking? In this paper, I introduce the idea of meaningful hope, which can help us to u...

In a society marked by liberal gun ownership laws, and an increasingly militarized police force, how should we think about cases where a homeowner shoots a person who has mistakenly knocked on the wrong door, or where a police officer shoots someone who is unarmed? The general tendency – by shooters, courts, and many observers – is to use the framework of self-defense. However, as I will argue, relying on the framework of self-defense is inappropriate in these cases, because theories (...) of self-defensive killing are built up around a very specific type of case, namely, a random, sudden, one-off encounter between roughly equally matched strangers. When a person who acts in self-defense has undertaken certain preparations to kill in self-defense – such as buying a gun, or undergoing certain kinds of training – they transform what would have been defensive violence into offensive violence. But because the self-defense framework distinguishes only between defensive and aggressive violence, it cannot easily register the unique moral features of offensive violence. Relying on the self-defense framework, then, produces judgments that are overly permissive of killings by gun owners and police, masking them as self-defensive when in fact they are much more morally fraught. (shrink)

It is widely believed that some wars are just, and that the paradigm case of a just war is a defensive war. A familiar strategy used to justify defensive war is to infer its permissibility from the case of self-defensive killing. I show, however, that the permission to defend oneself does not justify killing, but instead calls for nonviolent resistance. I conclude that on the account of self-defense I develop, the appropriate way to respond to a war of aggression is (...) not by prosecuting a defensive war, but by engaging in a form of nonviolence I call pacific resistance. (shrink)

Just war theory has long held that the aim of a just war is peace, and not victory. Peace, however, does not feature in either of the two traditional pillars of just war theory: jus ad bellum (which governs the conditions under which we may go to war) and jus in bello (which governs the scope and manner of killing in war). This paper examines the question, which has so far been ignored in the literature, of how exactly just war (...) theory orients a war towards peace. Establishing this foundational claim, which I will refer to as the Peace Claim, is crucial in order for just war theory to hold the middle ground between its two main rivals, realism (which holds that we must pragmatically pursue victory) and pacifism (which holds that we must nonviolently pursue peace). (shrink)

How should we talk to children about war? The basic story we tell them is that the world is split into good guys and bad guys, and that sometimes we have to kill the bad guys for the sake of justice. These stories of heroic killing teach children to train their attention on violence, and to interpret that violence as just or good. I show how this basic story – which also motivates much of our philosophical thinking about the morality (...) of war and killing, mostly notably just war theory – makes it difficult for us to consider and evaluate pacific alternatives. If we are to give children the space to develop their imagination, so that they can more genuinely engage with the possibilities of nonviolence and peace, then we must learn to tell a different story. (shrink)

: We may better understand the development of the Neo-Confucian religiousethical tradition in East Asia if we can discern the different ways that the scholars of Japan and Korea reacted to and adjusted the discourse of the tradition. Focusing on the optimistic concept of human nature and an ethic of situation developed by the Kogakuha scholars in Japan, we will contrast them with the more rigoristic philosophy of kyŏng (reverential seriousness) and an ethic of principle emphasized by the Korean Neo-Confucian (...) thinkers Yi T'oegye and Yi Yulgok. By doing so, we attempt to delineate the salient characteristics of the Japanese and Korean traditions of moral culture. (shrink)

At first, the disciplined, proper, and moralistic Confucian might seem a far cry from the free, independent, and spontaneous individual of liberalism. However, Confucian self-discipline and ritual propriety are quite suitable for a democratic society. Liberal political theories privilege individual freedom, but there is little in them that deals with concrete ways in which this freedom can be exercised. Confucian theories of self-discipline and ritual propriety can fill this gap in liberal theory. Michel Foucault's investigations of Ancient Greek and Roman (...) technologies of the self show that self-cultivation, self-discipline, and ritual conduct are indispensable for the proper practice of freedom. Thus, Foucault provides us with a new perspective from which to investigate and affirm the democratic potential of Confucianism. (shrink)

교사와 장학관을 역임한 저자가 들려주는 전통도덕의 원리와 실천서. 유가의 사상, 유가의 생활, 제도와 예법, 유가 전적의 이해 등을 설명했다. 전통적 생활방 식과 가치를 이해하고 실천하는데 도움이 되도록 엮었다.